ANALYSIS – The Elliott School of International Affairs
The 2019 Novel Coronavirus, or COVID-19, is a new respiratory virus first identified in December 2019. Elliott School experts weigh in on how regions around the world are reacting to the pandemic.
Experts: Kimberly Morgan, Susan Aaronson, Marlene Laruelle, Madeline McCann, and Ivan Oelrich - March 23, 2020
Kimberly Morgan. Director, European and Eurasian Studies program, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs.
Europe has been especially affected by the novel coronavirus. European economies are deeply integrated in the global economy, with growth powered by international trade, finance, and tourism. Although we do not yet know exactly how the novel coronavirus arrived and why it quickly spread in some parts of Europe, global travel and commerce were surely at the root of it. Yet because of the virus’s capacity for efficient and silent spread, it took weeks for governments to recognize the danger. Italy was hit hard, early on, perhaps because of the prevalence of multi-generational households and contacts in Italian society. Some speculate that the young helped spread the virus to the old and that Italy’s aging society is especially vulnerable to the disease.
Once the scale of the threat became apparent, the Italian government’s responses were swift and dramatic. The government shut down economic and social life, initially in the North where the virus was most widespread, and then across the entire country. Faced with rising numbers of infections, governments in other European countries have been adopting a similar tool kit: closures of schools, child care centers, and other public facilities; lockdowns of entire cities, regions or countries, once the limits of encouraging voluntary social distancing became apparent; mobilization of health care infrastructures, which includes prioritizing care for the seriously ill; and the expansion of economic supports for individuals and businesses. Public and private research centers also have ramped up testing capacities, working to manufacture supplies, expand test availability (e.g. drive-through centers), and speed up delivery of results. In Italy, over 130,000 people have been tested so far (compared to only 25,000 in the U.S.), while in Germany, some credit early initiatives at widespread testing with having kept down the infection and death rate, compared to its neighbors.
In one of French President Emmanuel Macron’s speeches to the nation about the pandemic, he stated that because the virus has no nationality and knows no borders, Europe should confront it as Europeans, not as individual nations jealous of their own interests. Some EU institutions have taken coordinated action, including a recent effort by the European Central Bank to purchase hundreds of billions of dollars of public and private assets across the Eurozone. The aim is not only to try to prop up sagging markets, but also to prevent the health crisis from turning into a financial crisis, with Italy once again at the epicenter as investors grow restive about the country’s large public debt.
Yet, the response to the virus has so far revealed the limits of pan-European solidarity. Many countries have reintroduced border controls that had been eliminated under the Schengen Agreement, and did so unilaterally. An Italian government request to trigger an EU mechanism that should deliver supplies to countries overwhelmed by a national disaster was met with a deafening silence by other EU states; instead, countries imposed limits on the export of crucial medical supplies. China has stepped into (and taken advantage of) this leadership void, sending shipments of ventilators and other supplies. European integration, in its current form, may prove to be one of the many casualties of the pandemic.
Susan Aaronson. Director of the Digital Trade and Data Governance Hub, Research Professor of International Affairs, GW Cross-Disciplinary Fellow and Senior Fellow at CIGI
Since its first days in office, the Trump Administration has adopted economic nationalist policies in the belief that such policies would return jobs and investment to the US. Specifically, they have used tariffs, export restrictions, supply chain regulations, and disincentives to foreign investment. Meanwhile, the US has adopted restrictions on the export of needed medical supplies, which has led other governments to adopt similar restrictions on masks, drugs, etc.… However, export bans send inaccurate signals to market actors and force other countries to carry adjustment costs. Such export controls have historically led to retaliation, a loss of trade and trust, and to outcomes where everyone is worse off. Governments should collaborate and share resources, as ironically China is now doing. Finally, the Trump Administration imposed specific tariffs on Chinese medical products that appear to have contributed to shortages and higher costs of vital equipment at a time of nationwide health crisis. As a result, according to economist Chad Bown, “The US medical establishment faces looming trouble importing these necessities from other countries, which may be hoarding them to meet their own health crises.”
What would a better response look like?
Marlene Laruelle. Director, Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies; Director, Central Asia Program; Co-Director, PONARS-Eurasia; Research Professor of International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs
Madeline McCann. Program Coordinator, PONARS-Eurasia
Despite shared borders with China and Iran, high levels of internal population mobility, and frequent interactions with Europe, many of the states of Eurasia currently show some of the lowest coronavirus case rates across the continent. This suggests a serious underreporting of cases, consistent with decades-long traditions of concealment and secrecy.
In a new PONARS Eurasia Policy memo, Marlene Laruelle and Madeline McCann analyze post-Soviet states’ political—and ideological—responses to the coronavirus outbreak (accurate as of at least March 20). They categorize Armenia and Georgia as early responders; Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Ukraine as later responders; Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan as laggards, and Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Belarus as deniers, with leadership that denies the importance of the crisis and its potentially devastating impact on public health. Russia belongs to the first two categories of early and late responders. It was quick to close borders with China, introduce quarantines for newcomers, and place Moscow under special safety measures, but has only recently addressed the issue in a more political way at the higher level, by Vladimir Putin himself.
The COVID-19 pandemic will generate a whole wave of new research on how societies will transform in the wake of the trauma and how states will adapt to prepare for future public health crises. For the Eurasia region, previous literature has shown how much post-communist regimes’ legitimacy relies on the ability to manage natural or industrial disasters. It thus remains to be seen if a health disaster may challenge, reinforce, or weaken popular support for the authorities. Literature on crisis management and communication has explored how authoritarian states manage partial accountability and how citizens may organize their own responses in the face of a lack of state efficiency. Here too, the current crisis will offer a unique opportunity to study in real time how biopolitics evolves.
Depending on the level of the crisis—which has yet to peak at the time of this writing—the Russian state’s ability to present itself as having effectively managed the crisis could have deep political impacts. Faced with a growing urban activism by an active segment of the population, and a population already on edge as a result of recent welfare state and pension reforms, the authorities’ policies will be closely scrutinized. They could either increase support for the strong state as the provider of security—based on the examples that Asian countries have faced the COVID-19 crisis with more success than Europe—or, on the contrary, accelerate the delegitimization of the regime.
Ivan Oelrich. Non-resident scholar of the Elliott School of International Affairs and non-Resident Fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks
The number of those stricken by the Corona virus continues to grow. In the coming weeks, perhaps days, the nation will need more ventilators for the seriously ill than it has at hand. The government has taken measures to rapidly expand manufacture of new ventilators. President Trump has pushed the car companies into the role. But there is no reason to think that they are best suited to the job. It is important to make this decision right the first time because time is short. There are several criteria to meet. Flexibility and creativity, at least as close attention to parts suppliers as to assembly, and an appropriate manufacturing culture will all be needed.
Read Ivan Oelrich's full article for Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
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