Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries

Providing for Peacekeeping No. 1

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Cover Photo: Nigerian soldiers serving with the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) during an inspection visit by General Martin Luther Agwai to El Daean Team Group Site in South Darfur, March 10, 2008. ALBANY ASSOCIATES/STUART PRICE.

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Providing for Peacekeeping is an independent research project established to broaden the understanding of the factors and motivations that encourage or discourage states from contributing to UN peacekeeping operations. Its aim is to generate and disseminate current information and analysis to support efforts to “broaden the base” of troop- and police-contributing countries, improve the quality of troop and police contributions, and fill key capability gaps. The project is done in partnership with Griffith University and the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its partners and to its generous donors whose contributions make projects like this possible.
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Executive Summary

Today, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping stands at another crossroads. With consistently high demands for peacekeepers and an expanding range of mandated tasks, the UN faces the challenge of finding more, and better, peacekeepers. This comes at a time when financial austerity measures are being imposed across much of the world and in a political context where the UN must compete with other international organizations to recruit peacekeepers from what is a relatively limited global pool of relevant capabilities. To meet the challenge, the UN’s New Horizon initiative and the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) have called for an “expanding of the pool of available capabilities.” The Providing for Peacekeeping Project was established by the International Peace Institute to inform and assist this endeavor.

This, the project’s first thematic report, reflects on what broadening the base of UN troop- and police-contributing countries will entail in practice, and it provides a framework for thinking about why UN member states do, or do not, provide peacekeepers to UN-led missions. The report identifies recent trends in troop contributions to UN and non-UN missions, summarizes states’ rationales for providing peacekeepers to UN operations, examines the factors that inhibit such contributions, identifies potential major contributors of uniformed personnel for the future, and notes some of the most significant challenges facing the UN. These challenges include the global financial crisis, political controversy over the future direction and nature of peacekeeping mandates, issues of discipline and ill health, and the unique problems associated with finding police personnel for UN missions.

The paper concludes by suggesting ways in which the UN might begin to improve its ability to expand the pool of peacekeeping capabilities. It recommends providing incentives to encourage larger and better contributions of uniformed personnel, enhancing public diplomacy related to peacekeeping, improving the way in which the UN Secretariat makes its requests to member states for peacekeepers and relevant specialist capabilities, and strengthening analysis of contributing countries as a precursor to developing a strategic plan on force generation.

Introduction

Once again, United Nations peacekeeping stands at a political crossroads. Recent years have been characterized as a period of “strategic uncertainty” but also one in which UN peacekeeping has entered a phase of consolidation after the surge it experienced during the mid-2000s. The rising demand for peacekeepers during the twenty-first century saw the UN operate at a historically unprecedented tempo, with increases in the number and size of missions as well as the scope and complexity of their mandates. The need to deploy and sustain some 120,000 UN peacekeepers and the complex demands placed upon them in the field are outstripping the willingness and to some extent the capacity of the UN’s member states to provide them. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged in February 2011, “Securing the required resources and troops [for UN peacekeeping] has consumed much of my energy. I have been begging leaders to make resources available to us.”

Today, the task of providing peacekeepers continues to be met in a highly unequal manner with well over two-thirds of all UN uniformed personnel coming from just twenty or so countries. The contemporary division of labor with regard to UN peacekeeping prompted the Secretary-General to warn that while “those who mandate [UN] missions, those who contribute uniformed personnel and those who are major funders are separate groups...tensions and divisions are inevitable, with potentially negative impacts on our operations.” Guatemala’s UN representative described the situation in less diplomatic terms as “an accident waiting to happen.”

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It was in this context that the UN’s 2009 New Horizon initiative called for “an expanded base of troop- and police-contributing countries...to enhance collective burden-sharing and to meet future requirements.” The following year, the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) also emphasized the need to “expand the available pool of capabilities” for peacekeeping. To do so, the C-34 called upon the Secretariat to analyze “the willingness and readiness” of troop- and police-contributing countries (TCC/PCCs) and “to develop outreach strategies” in order to strengthen contacts and longer-term relationships with current or potential TCC/PCCs, encourage further contributions from existing TCC/PCCs, and provide support to emerging contributors.

In practice, “expanding the pool of available capabilities” means doing four main things:

1. Persuading more countries to move beyond “tokenism” (i.e., providing fewer than forty people to a mission who do not form a specialized team or unit) and to become major contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations (i.e., able to provide sustained contributions of more than 2,000 troops or police).

2. Persuading members of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) and countries with rapidly developing relevant capabilities to fulfill specialist peacekeeping functions.

3. Persuading current major contributors to sustain or expand their contributions while also improving the performance and capabilities of deployed forces.

4. Persuading select TCC/PCCs to purchase or develop relevant specialist capacities that they either do not currently have or do not have a surplus of, and to contribute these capacities to UN peacekeeping.

This study examines some of the issues associated with expanding the pool of capabilities for UN peacekeeping in light of the initial phase of the IPI Providing for Peacekeeping Project. First, it reviews the relevant twenty-first century trends. Second, it summarizes the principal reasons why UN member states do or do not contribute uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. Third, it briefly reviews some of the similarities and differences between national decision-making structures with regard to peacekeeping. Fourth, it discusses token and specialized contributions. Fifth, it reflects on potential and emerging TCC/PCCs. Sixth, it reviews some of the key ongoing challenges related to force generation. Finally, it offers some recommendations focused on disseminating a positive image of UN peacekeeping, strengthening ties between the Secretariat and certain TCC/PCCs, and building relevant capabilities.

Current Context and Trends

The available pool of UN peacekeepers is heavily influenced by two factors. First, there is a relatively fixed stock of global military resources suitable for UN peacekeeping. Moreover, this stock is significantly smaller than often surmised with one estimate suggesting that the ceiling might be around 210,000 troops. Key limiting factors include the presence of large numbers of conscripts in many armies, rotation demands, training and expertise requirements, and the suitability of forces for peacekeeping.

Second, states have choices about where to send their troops. They can choose to send personnel to:

- UN-led missions—authorized by the UN and under UN command and control;
- UN-authorized missions—authorized by the UN but conducted by other actors; or

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7 As of June 30, 2012, fourteen countries contribute more than 2,000 uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. Twenty-seven states provide more than 1,000.
8 The first phase of this project resulted in a forthcoming edited volume, which includes case study chapters on the following UN member states: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Bangladesh, Brazil, Ghana, India, Japan, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, and Uruguay. It will be published as Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, eds., Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Details of the subsequent phase of the project can be found at http://www.ipinst.org/peace-operations/providing-for-peacekeeping/programslist.html.
• non-UN missions—neither authorized nor conducted by the UN.

The first decade of the twenty-first century saw a significant increase in the number of peackeepers deployed by coalitions of states but also by various international organizations, including the UN, NATO, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and other regional arrangements. The range of alternative institutional vehicles for conducting peackeeping operations means the UN has to compete for personnel with other organizations. Its principal competitors are NATO, the EU, Western-led coalitions of the willing, and, to a lesser extent, the AU.

In a chapter commissioned for the forthcoming Providing Peacekeepers volume, Donald Daniel used an extensive database of troop contributions to identify six trends in the provision of troop contingents to UN peackeeping during the twenty-first century.\(^\text{10}\) First, there has been unprecedented growth in the number of troops contributed to (UN, UN-authorized, and non-UN) peackeeping operations. Second there has also been unprecedented growth in the number of TCC/PCCs but most of them made only token contributions: one third of UN TCC/PCCs contributed 84 percent of the troops and only 20 percent are persistent major contributors. Third, once states contributed troops to the UN, most (82–87 percent of TCC/PCCs) were prepared to stay the course, maintaining their presence for the duration of the mission. Fourth, this means that compared to other institutional vehicles for deploying peackeepers, the UN has a good recruitm ent record: while troops committed to several non-UN operations declined in the second half of the 2000s, the UN enjoyed a steady increase. However, fifth, the UN is more heavily reliant on TCC/PCCs with relatively limited military capacities than non-UN operations.\(^\text{11}\) As a result, sixth, the UN has proved less able than non-UN operations to secure key specialized capabilities needed for multidimensional and robust operations.

Why States Contribute United Nations Peacekeepers

The existing literature on why states contribute to UN peackeeping operations has generated a variety of generalized explanations.\(^\text{12}\) These can be divided into five clusters of rationales related to political, economic, security, institutional, and normative concerns. When thinking about why states contribute, it is also useful to distinguish between the general predispositions of states toward the UN and peackeeping and the specific decisions taken by their governments with respect to particular missions. Many factors influence how far individual states are positively or negatively predisposed to provide peackeepers for UN operations, but a positive disposition toward the UN or peackeeping in general does not determine individual decisions about contributing to particular missions. These decisions depend on specific state policies and commitments relevant to the case at hand. While this means troops or police are not automatically forthcoming from states that are positively predisposed to UN peackeeping, it also means that even states that have a negative predisposition to UN peackeeping might contribute occasionally if the right circumstances present themselves.

**POLITICAL RATIONALES**

Political rationales for contributing to UN peackeeping take many forms, including the following:

• Peacekeeping contributions may be perceived as a means of enhancing the country’s “national prestige.” However, this might be pursued by contributing to certain easier, “safer” UN missions, some of which have bucked the trend and been oversubscribed (e.g., UNAVEM II in Angola and UNMIH in Haiti). As a result, established and rising powers may see UN peackeeping as a useful foreign policy tool,
especially when it helps support regional order or prestigious diplomatic and peacemaking activities.

- Contributing troops or police may be a rational response to political pressure or persuasion from allies, great powers, or the UN Secretary-General or Secretariat.
- Participation in a peacekeeping mission permits a TCC/PCC to influence decisions about the operation through the acquisition of key posts within the mission headquarters.
- Participation provides access to privileged information about a particular mission.
- A perception that peacekeeping contributions can strengthen a country’s bid for an elected seat on the UN Security Council could drive contributions. For some states, this may apply to their bid for a permanent seat on a potentially reformed Security Council.
- For countries that have benefitted from hosting peacekeeping operations, providing peacekeepers might represent a way of repaying international society for those earlier efforts.13

In sum, a variety of states find in UN peacekeeping missions, “a niche that brings them greater respect and authority in international institutions, especially the UN, allowing them more voice in international security issues than they otherwise would [have].”14

One strand of this literature argues that democratic states are particularly likely to think that participation in UN peacekeeping offers such political benefits. Consequently, some analysts have suggested that “a country’s level of democracy accounts for why and how much countries contributed” to peace operations.15 We think there are important reasons to question this assumption; not least because only eleven of the UN’s top twenty TCC/PCCs were classified as democracies according to Polity IV Project data from 2011.16 The preoccupation with regime type has also been challenged by a recent study of UN and non-UN peacekeeping contributions by forty-seven sub-Saharan African states, which argued that regime type was only one factor among several. It concluded that “states that are poorer, with lower state legitimacy and lower political repression, participate more often in regional peacekeeping.” Specifically, the profile of an African state most likely to contribute to peacekeeping was said to be “a poor, less repressive, former British colony with low state legitimacy and a large military.”17

ECONOMIC RATIONALES

The central argument here is that contributing to peacekeeping stems from a desire to benefit or even profit financially from the activity.18 One variant has suggested that since most peacekeepers came from developing (aid-receiving) states, contributions to UN missions could be explained by an “aid imperative,” wherein the TCC/PCCs were “increasingly driven by financial and development motives.”19

When discussing economic rationales for providing peacekeepers it is important to distinguish among the different potential beneficiaries:

- National governments, particularly those in developing states with small economies, might use UN compensation payments to support national budgets.
- Security sectors might utilize UN compensation payments to augment their budgets.
- Individuals can benefit economically from UN peacekeeping deployments in two main ways: (1) through mission subsistence allowances and (2) if the portion of the UN’s compensation payment of $1,028 per soldier per month they receive from their government considerably increases their domestic salary.
- Firms and national corporations can also profit

13 Trevor Findlay, introduction to Findlay, Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, pp. 7–9.
19 James H. Lebovic, “Passing the Burden: Contributions to UN Peace Operations in the Post-Cold War Era,” unpublished paper dated July 2010, on file with the authors.
from UN procurement contracts for goods as diverse as beef, bottled water, and air transportation that are used in peacekeeping operations.

With increasing expectations placed on UN peacekeepers, and static compensation rates and allowances in the face of inflation in some parts of the world, the financial margins are becoming tighter for some TCC/PCCs. As a result, individuals might continue to benefit, but the net financial gains for states and security sectors are declining.

SECURITY RATIONALES

One robust finding in the literature is that states are more likely to participate in peacekeeping operations when they believe it is “decidedly in their national security interests.” Thus, the level of perceived threat posed by a particular conflict is assumed to be a major driver of decisions to provide peacekeepers. Such threat mitigation can assume several forms, including insuring against a bad outcome in a particular armed conflict or helping to contain it (geographically or in terms of casualty levels). In this approach, geographical proximity is usually assumed to play a prominent role, with peace operations being more likely to receive contributions from states in the immediate neighborhood or region than those further afield.

INSTITUTIONAL RATIONALES

Participation in UN peacekeeping can also stem from motives related to the country’s armed forces, security sector, and bureaucratic dynamics. One recent argument based on evidence from Latin American states locates the decision to engage in UN operations within civil-military relations, specifically viewing it as the result of doctrinal policies and bureaucratic infighting. There is also an argument that the size, quality, and posture of a state’s armed forces are related to its contribution to UN peace operations, although clearly this is just one factor among several. An alternative institutionally-focused explanation suggests that contributing to peacekeeping operations is attractive because it provides “invaluable overseas experience” for the personnel concerned.

Another variant of institutionalism, usually applied to states emerging from a period of authoritarianism or praetorianism, suggests that participation in peacekeeping offers a way of keeping the armed forces “occupied outside of the country rather than meddling in domestic affairs” and perhaps rehabilitating them after a period of authoritarianism. Alternatively, peacekeeping participation has been explained by suggesting that such activities provided the armed forces in a variety of states (including Argentina and Uruguay) with an acceptable, even prestigious, role after the Cold War. This helped insulate them from full exposure to what might have been a more significant series of cuts brought on by a post–Cold War peace dividend. While some military institutions might embrace peacekeeping for self-interested reasons, others might do so because they see their role and identity as being fundamentally tied to peacekeeping.

NORMATIVE RATIONALES

Countries might contribute to UN peacekeeping operations for normative reasons. Countries might be disposed to provide peacekeepers because it fuels their self-image as “global good Samaritans,” “good international citizens,” or as part of a “non-aligned” group of states that supports the UN as an alternative to great power hegemony. Good Samaritans identify with the suffering of others and contribute to collective peacekeeping efforts because it promotes the greater good. Examples include Canada (periodically), Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Alternatively,
some states identify themselves as being normatively committed to the UN’s system of conflict management because, like Ghana, they see it as the most legitimate framework and wish to be “good international citizens,” or, like India, they see it as a fairer and more preferable alternative to great power hegemony and provide peacekeepers to support that system. Other states have expressed this sentiment, including Brazil and China. Rwanda stands out as a country that has seen peacekeeping partly through the lens of preventing mass atrocities—it has deployed almost all its UN peacekeepers to Sudan in large part because of the mass atrocities there.

**PEACEKEEPING HABITS: A NOTE ON PATH DEPENDENCY**

Whichever rationale or combination of rationales leads a country to provide peacekeepers, once it contributes above a certain level, path dependency can play an important role in sustaining that state’s commitment as a TCC/PCC. Once states commit to UN peacekeeping, it is more likely that their security forces will internalize the peacekeeping role and develop institutionalized processes and habits that support an ongoing commitment across multiple missions. This is particularly evident in South Asia but is also a factor in Ghana and Uruguay, which have developed the “habit” of contributing peacekeepers and have maintained a reasonably consistent level of support over a number of years. The tendency toward path dependency has been facilitated by the increasing number of peacekeeping training centers established around the world since the mid-1990s. These help foster peacekeeping habits and give states a pool of trained peacekeepers that they then need to employ.

**Why States Don’t Contribute United Nations Peacekeepers**

The combination of predispositions and specific policy decisions can also help explain why states choose not to provide UN peacekeepers or make only token contributions to missions. Although all particular policies are context specific, several inhibiting factors are evident across multiple cases.

**ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL OR STRATEGIC PRIORITIES**

States might decide other foreign or security policy concerns are more pressing than UN peacekeeping. This usually includes national security concerns that place demands on relevant resources (e.g., fear of a direct security threat, regional insecurity, internal instability or secessionism, etc.). Some states focus their activities on certain parts of the world and may contribute to peacekeeping missions but only in particular regions. Finally, it is worth noting that many TCC/PCCs that develop formal decision-making processes or “white papers” adopt national interest-driven criteria that usually involve assessing the degree of risk associated with the particular mission.

**ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCES FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

States have choices about which institutions they will utilize to address particular problems. Some might prefer to work through alternative international organizations, alliances, or ad hoc coalitions. In rare cases, states may choose to operate unilaterally. As a result of high profile failures in the 1990s, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, several members of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) remain skeptical about the UN’s command and control mechanisms and have decided that only in exceptional circumstances would they place anything other than token contributions under the UN chain of command. WEOG members will usually only contribute significant military forces when they can exercise direct operational control, whether through unilateral action, ad hoc coalitions, or alliances such as NATO, or when special arrangements are established (e.g., the Strategic Military Cell in UNIFIL post-2006). As a result, the UN is often the institutional choice of last resort. As former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy put it: “It is probably inevitable that the UN will be the organization of last resort, when others either cannot gain the

necessary consensus, or maintain the staying power over the long term, or indeed where no one major actor has enough abiding interest but the world must nevertheless act.\textsuperscript{31}

**FINANCIAL COSTS**

Financial arrangements are an additional disincentive for many WEOG states because the UN’s compensation payments do not fully reimburse the costs of deploying their military. (Indeed, the past decade has seen the gap increase between the UN’s rates of compensation and actual deployment costs.) In an era of increasing financial austerity, these governments will be under pressure to reduce their defense expenditure. This has already resulted in defense budget cuts and hence a reduction in deployable capacity, and it may make some governments less willing to accept the financial burdens associated with UN deployments.

At the same time, however, the UN, unlike most other international organizations, does provide some level of reimbursement for peacekeeping contributions that might attract some cash-strapped governments. Moreover, some participants in the current Afghanistan operations may place an increased emphasis on peacekeeping to justify defense budgets once the Afghan operations wind down. The UN’s move toward enforcing minimum standards of training, capability, and equipment is also increasing the costs associated with peacekeeping for some developing countries, as the UN’s call for more capabilities generates greater procurement costs for the country concerned. Several contributors also complain that delays in reimbursement force them to assume financial risk, which is becoming more difficult given increasing costs and decreasing margins.

**DISCOMFORT WITH THE EXPANDING UN PEACEKEEPING AGENDA**

States are more likely to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations if they support the political values these missions promote. If consensus over these values breaks down, states that feel marginalized are less likely to make major contributions. Although arguments that a fundamental clash between Western and “rising” powers are overblown, there are clearly elements of the contemporary peacekeeping agenda that are controversial.\textsuperscript{32} For example, some TCC/PCCs remain opposed to the concept of “robust peacekeeping” and prefer to maintain a traditional approach, which places them somewhat at odds with current thinking and practice on matters such as the protection of civilians, use of force, human rights, and the acquisition and management of consent. Similarly, the Russian deputy ambassador to the UN has argued that some UN peacekeeping operations recently broke a cardinal rule of peacekeeping by “render[ing] tacit support to one of the parties to a conflict” and thus calling “into question the reputation of the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{33}

**EXCEPTIONALISM**

In some states, an influential strand of exceptionalist thinking promotes a national self-image that can inhibit contributions to peacekeeping. When domestic elites believe their country possesses unique interests, responsibilities, capabilities, or perspectives, they tend to see UN peacekeeping in instrumental terms as a foreign policy tool, a vehicle for advancing regional or global interests, or for supporting diplomatic or peacemaking activities. Exceptionalism reinforces a government’s tendency to see the UN as only one of several potential mechanisms to work with, to be highly selective about the missions it participates in, to expect senior positions in missions and influence over mission design, and to expect an influential role in shaping peacekeeping doctrine and guidelines. When these expectations are confronted with the reality of official UN policies or objections by other member states, lingering disillusionment or frustration can result.

**ABSENCE OF PRESSURE TO CONTRIBUTE**

States that are not among the UN’s largest TCC/PCCs rarely feel under significant pressure to contribute more. Some officials report that their governments are not seriously asked to contribute more, making it easy for them to maintain only


\textsuperscript{33} Mr. Nikita Zhukov cited in UN Doc. S/PV.6789, June 20, 2012, pp. 15–16.
token contributions and avoid national debates about playing a larger role. Additionally, outside of South Asia, where there is a degree of informal peer pressure, many states feel limited or no serious pressure from their peers to contribute more peacekeepers.

**DIFFICULT DOMESTIC POLITICS**

While the prestige associated with UN peacekeeping is a significant motivating factor in some countries, in others, especially some WEOG members, strengthening contributions to UN peacekeeping is not actively promoted by publics and parliaments. Indeed, in some countries, important domestic political elites will often disparage the UN. Aversion to potential casualties in UN peacekeeping is also widespread, as these are not typically operations associated with national defense or core security interests where casualties may be tolerated. In theory, this makes it politically risky for leaders to contribute more to UN peacekeeping. In practice, it more often means that the question of contributing more is not seriously raised and debated.

**RISKS FOR NATIONAL REPUTATION**

The UN’s move toward a zero tolerance stance on discipline issues and the greater attention paid to crimes and abuses committed by peacekeepers has exposed poor discipline and standards among some TCC/PCCs. In some cases, ill discipline has been a source of national embarrassment that might inhibit peacekeeping contributions in the future. In addition, long-standing concerns about HIV/AIDS infection rates in the armed forces of some TCC/PCCs weakens suitability for peacekeeping duties. Finally, other health-related problems—such as the role of Nepalese peacekeepers in introducing cholera to Haiti—can cause embarrassment and potentially inhibit contributions from TCC/PCCs.

**MILITARY RESISTANCE**

Some military establishments are resistant to taking on UN peacekeeping duties. Sometimes this stems from past negative experiences or skepticism about UN command and control mechanisms and force structures. Sometimes it stems from a concern that training soldiers to be peacekeepers detracts from their war-fighting capabilities. In other cases, such as Turkey, the military might not be encumbered with negative views but simply has not factored UN peacekeeping into its internal rewards system, with the result that troops and units have few rewards for participating in UN service.

**WEAKNESSES IN THE UN FORCE-GENERATION “SYSTEM”**

Although they have not specifically addressed this question, the sixteen country case studies discussed in the *Providing Peacekeepers* book suggest that the UN’s force-generation “system,” as it currently stands, is of secondary importance to domestic political considerations and plays little role in shaping national decisions to contribute peacekeepers or not. In part, this is because the UN’s force-generation mechanisms do not always engage in effective outreach to member states—i.e., outreach that is strategic, coordinated, well-informed, and forward looking. Some case studies found that officials in relevant departments in national capitals were simply unaware of initiatives such as the UN’s “gap lists” or even the very existence of gaps within peacekeeping missions.

**The Decision-Making Process**

There is significant variation in the way that TCC/PCCs make decisions about whether and how to contribute to UN peacekeeping. From the case studies presented in the *Providing Peacekeepers* volume, it seems that only a minority of TCC/PCCs have formal procedures for handling these decisions, and in several cases where formal procedures exist, they are seldom actually used. Key points of similarity and difference include the following:

**POLITICAL LEADERSHIP**

In almost every case, decisions to contribute are taken by the head of government or president. Sometimes, this decision is made on the basis of advice after the request has been considered by relevant government departments. In other cases, though, the head of government or president indicates from the outset whether a request should be taken seriously. Domestic political considerations are therefore always a factor in decision making, as are considerations about other demands placed on the armed forces or police, political attitudes toward the UN and assessment of its peacekeeping record, the feasibility of the proposed
mission, and the politics associated with the mission.

ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS
Parliaments often have the formal right to oversee decisions about peacekeeping deployments and the appropriation of resources to that end. However, in all but a small number of the sixteen cases examined in *Providing Peacekeepers*, parliaments proved not to be central to decision making about individual requests. Of these cases, only in Japan did a parliament prove to be a significant independent actor in the decision-making process, though parliamentary considerations impacted upon governmental decision making in other countries. Other than Japan, none of the case studies identified instances where a parliament blocked a government from committing personnel to UN peacekeeping operations or where an executive was compelled to contribute by a parliament. The apparent compliance of parliaments can be partly explained by the fact that in most parliamentary democracies, the governing party or coalition commands a majority in parliament and partly by the fact that UN peacekeeping is a low priority issue in most countries, meaning that governments will not bring forward potential deployments to UN operations that are likely to prove contentious. The apparent compliance of parliaments might help by streamlining the political process but the absence of parliamentary engagement might also weaken domestic support for contributions. It seems clear, however, that further systematic research is needed to understand and explain the role played by parliaments in decision making about UN peacekeeping.

LEAD DEPARTMENTS
Different countries give the leading role on peacekeeping requests to different departments or ministries. This affects the priority given to different issues. In some TCC/PCCs, a presidential-style system dictates that the head of government or president takes an early decision and the rest of government then has to implement that decision. In most countries though, a request is handled either by the foreign affairs ministry or by the defense ministry, and discussion is then based on the initial assessment by that ministry. Anecdotally, it seems that when it comes to declining requests for UN peacekeepers, the initial assessment is also often the final assessment. In many cases, requests are not seriously considered in national capitals or are handled by the country’s permanent mission to the UN. Permanent missions themselves play a greater or lesser role in different countries, but as a general rule they tend to be much more engaged with these issues than national capitals. However, engagement is not the same as authority. Except in those countries that have established strong “path dependency” (see above), permanent missions rarely appear to play a decisive role in decision making.

Token Contributions
When asked to contribute to a UN peacekeeping operation, potential troop- or police-contributing countries have at least four options: (1) contribute forces as requested; (2) make a specialized contribution; (3) make a token contribution; or (4) decline the request.

*Token contributions* can be defined as contributions of fewer than forty uniformed personnel to a mission, where these personnel do not make up a specialized unit. Such personnel are normally deployed as specialized units but when they are, these contributions are not best described as “token” because they add significant value to a mission’s capabilities. *Specialized contributions*, on the other hand, might also be small in size (though not necessarily, some may be quite large) but relate to the contribution of specific capabilities, usually in one of the following areas: communication, engineering, information gathering and analysis, logistics, mobility (aerial or surface), medical, mine clearance, or units capable of high-intensity operations.

Token contributions are remarkably common in UN peacekeeping. In August 2011, Katharina Coleman observed that states made 322 contributions to UN missions: 220 (or 68 percent) of which were “token,” as they comprised fewer than forty troops. Indeed, 179 contributions (or 55 percent) comprised fewer than ten troops. Of ninety-seven TCC/PCCs, ninety made at least one token contri-

bution and eighty made at least one contribution of fewer than ten troops. Token contributions often represent a deliberately chosen and distinctive mode of participation in UN peacekeeping. They are not simply products of resource constraints in the contributing country. Very few TCC/PCCs (8 percent) contribute to only one mission at a time. The rest contribute to multiple missions, most often with a series of token contributions.35

However, token contributions are obviously inefficient from a military perspective. As UNIFIL’s force commander recently noted, “Based on experience gained on the ground, I can say that the ideal solution would be to have homogenous battalions.” While he acknowledged that different national sub-units at the company level of around 150 troops “would also be manageable,” national troop contributions “below that level is recommended only for specific tasks.”36

There are several reasons why states make token contributions, many of which stem from an incentive structure that encourages such contributions. Put simply, token contributions

- expand the options available to states—states can make extremely low-cost and low-risk contributions to collective endeavors;
- may provide TCC/PCCs with a way to familiarize themselves with the relevant UN procedures and mechanisms and hence act as a stepping stone to more significant contributions in the future;
- establish a country as a TCC/PCC to a mission, giving it access to privileged information about the mission, membership on the C-34, and the right to attend meetings on the mission;
- generate prestige both domestically and within the UN;
- allow individuals to be placed in key positions of influence or rewarded with staff officer or military expert or observer postings that have much higher allowances than regular peacekeepers; and
- allow developed states to contribute to missions without taking on the financial burden of supporting deployments of fully formed troop contingents.

**Specialized Contributions and WEOG States**

We noted earlier that the UN has been less successful than some other organizations in securing specialized contributions from its members. This is partly because the states belonging to the Western European and Others Group hold the preponderance of specialized capabilities and prefer to operate outside UN command and control.

Some WEOG countries view their militaries in rather exceptionalist terms as too highly trained and equipped to be used as rank-and-file peacekeepers in UN missions. In combination with the inhibiting factors outlined above, it seems unlikely that WEOG states will contribute large numbers of infantry to UN peacekeeping. (Although the new generic guidelines for infantry battalions finalized by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in June 2012 might raise UN standards sufficiently to allay the concerns of some WEOG states about operating within UN force structures.) It is possible, though, that they would consider contributing specialized capabilities relating to heavy lifting, engineering, mobility, intelligence, medevac and hospital provision, and rapid reaction or high-intensity capabilities. In the medium term, mission specialization and the use of partnership arrangements might forge a practical division of labor that can achieve the mandates of UN’s peacekeeping operations.

Operationally, a distinction should be made between “tightly coupled” and “loosely coupled” partnerships. In “tightly coupled” missions, such as KFOR and UNMIK in Kosovo, the UN and non-UN components are jointly mandated and share some common command or political decision-making structure. “Loosely coupled” partnerships, in contrast, are ad hoc, and the different components do not share formal institutional structures, though the UN and non-UN elements may cooperate very closely.37 Partnerships can also be distinguished on the basis of timing: some arrangements are sequenced such that non-UN operations precede or follow a UN mission, while

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35 This paragraph is based on Coleman, “Token Contributions.”
others are conducted parallel to UN peacekeeping. Four specific types of partnerships between the WEOG states and UN missions can be identified.

- **Spearhead or vanguard operations**: the WEOG force deploys first and prepares the security environment for a follow-on UN peacekeeping mission (e.g., the International Force for East Timor or the Multinational Force in Haiti).
- **Stabilization operations**: the WEOG force works alongside UN and/or other international peace operations to provide military security (e.g., Opération Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire and Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone). This includes operations where a UN observer mission or political office operates alongside a WEOG military operation (e.g., UNOMIG in Georgia and UNAMA in Afghanistan).
- **Fire-fighting operations**: the WEOG troops provide in-theater military support to a UN mission, particularly providing enforcement capabilities (e.g., the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO’s Kosovo Force, and Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
- **Over-the-horizon operations**: the WEOG forces are dispatched close to the theater in question to perform a deterrent role and provide enforcement capability if required (e.g., US Joint Task Force in Liberia and EU Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

This is not an exhaustive list of possible partnerships, but such partnerships can provide a vehicle for harnessing relatively large-scale, specialized contributions from TCC/PCCs that might be reluctant to place troop contingents under UN command and control.38

### Emerging Contributors

In addition to thinking creatively about the acquisition and management of specialized contributions, “expanding the pool” also means increasing the number of countries prepared to join the group of major TCC/PCCs and the number of small contributors prepared to contribute hundreds rather than dozens of peacekeepers, ideally in fully formed battalions or police units.

There are multiple possible strategies for identifying prospective TCC/PCCs to fill such roles. One is to identify states that are already “committed contributors” to UN peacekeeping but that could contribute more. Donald Daniel has identified a list of thirty-seven states that were “committed contributors” to UN peacekeeping between 2000 and 2010: Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chile, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Zambia.39 Of this list, nine TCC/PCCs stand out as having significantly more military capacity that could be contributed to UN peacekeeping (see Table 1).

#### Table 1: Committed UN TCC/PCCs with large (active) military capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Defense Budget (US$ bn)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>38,500</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>69,480</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>255,000</td>
<td>330,000 (+100,000 Strategic Missile Forces)</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>310,000</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>30,000 (+80,000 Air Defense Command)</td>
<td>4.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>233,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>3.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 AMISOM is a particularly complex case in this context, where a mission launched and run under the African Union banner, and subsequently endorsed by the UN Security Council, was initially equipped and funded almost entirely by Western states and was later provided with a major support package by the UN.


A second method used by Donald Daniel is to identify states that have been “committed contributors” to Western-led, non-UN operations but that have not contributed significantly to UN peacekeeping in the same period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assuming that the US and most European states will continue to prefer to deploy their troops with NATO, EU, or other WEOG-led missions, and if one considers only those other countries that have demonstrated a particular interest in UN peacekeeping, the contributors in this list with the greatest untapped potential for UN peacekeeping are Australia, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Honduras, Japan, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.\(^{41}\)

A third approach is to assume that rising powers such as China, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, and possibly South Africa are potential sources of future major contributions. As rising powers, such states are keen to acquire international recognition of their status and particularly sensitive to prestige and image issues that might be advanced through UN peacekeeping. The potential downside, though, is that as the influence of these rising states increases, there is a risk that they will adopt worldviews similar to established powers and use UN peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool to be embraced only selectively.

A fourth approach is to consider a country’s military capacity to contribute more, its geography, and its predisposition to peacekeeping. Daniel’s modeling along these lines has generated two relevant lists of UN member states. First, a list of nine low-level or token contributors that have the potential to become better established contributors: Bahrain, Botswana, Croatia, Cyprus, Kuwait, Macedonia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela.\(^{42}\) Of these, Botswana, Croatia, Macedonia, Mexico, and Paraguay are perhaps the most likely sources of additional troops. The second lists ten moderate contributors that could become major contributors: Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, El Salvador, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Togo. Of these, Chile was assessed as the best prospect because of its capacity, normative “fit,” and geography, followed by Brazil, Bulgaria, El Salvador, and Namibia. It should be stressed that because of the small size of their armed forces, Namibia, Niger, and Togo in particular would need to embrace peacekeeping to a similar extent as top contributors like Ghana or Uruguay in order to become major contributors (i.e., sustaining a deployment of around 2,000 peacekeepers).

These different methods yield a combined list of seventy-eight TCC/PCCs that could theoretically expand their current contributions to UN peacekeeping. A better understanding of the relevant factors in the decision-making processes of each of these seventy-eight countries would help to identify potential new sources of troops and equipment. Stronger ties between them and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) might help to facilitate additional contributions. Of this pool of seventy-eight TCC/PCCs, we have identified thirty-three that seem to perform well across multiple measures and are hence worthy of particular attention. Based on a combination of their performance across these different measures and our judgment of their suitability and interest, these might be clustered into three groups reflecting the strength of their potential:

**Group 1** Argentina, Brazil, China, Malaysia, Nigeria.

**Group 2** Bulgaria, Chile, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Poland, Turkey.

**Group 3** Australia, Botswana, Colombia, Germany, Honduras, Japan, Mexico,

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Mongolia, Namibia, Niger, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Vietnam.

Challenges to Broadening the Base

Expanding the pool of capabilities for peacekeeping will require overcoming significant challenges beyond identifying states that might make enhanced contributions. The following are some of the key contemporary challenges.

THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

Although uneven in its effects, the global financial crisis has increased the likelihood that many TCC/PCCs outside of Asia will reduce their defense budgets and cut personnel numbers. While this may bring other benefits, it reduces the pool of available resources for UN peacekeeping and increases the potential for competition between organizations for deployable capabilities. Alternatively, as noted earlier, defense establishments might champion UN peacekeeping as a means of giving the armed forces a prestigious role and protecting their budgets, especially after the end of NATO operations in Afghanistan.

THE POLITICS OF CONTEMPORARY PEACEKEEPING

Many TCC/PCCs are highly sensitive to the nature of peacekeeping operations, and this plays a significant part in national decision making. No TCC/PCCs, even committed contributors such as Ghana, want to suffer casualties. Consequently, they will be more reluctant to contribute troops to missions that are thought to be overly dangerous. Many national publics are also intolerant of casualties sustained in peacekeeping operations. This poses a major challenge to the concept of “robust peacekeeping.” Potential TCC/PCCs might also be deterred by controversies associated with individual missions, be they political controversies (e.g., UNOCI) or those associated with indiscipline (e.g., MONUC/MONUSCO). Another major deterrent is the absence of genuine host-government consent for UN peacekeepers in some missions (e.g., UNAMID, UNMIS, MINURCAT, UNMISS).

TCC/PCCs are also sensitive to the credibility of exit strategies and political progress. States are more comfortable contributing to missions that have clear goals tied to feasible political progress and a viable exit strategy than to missions that lack these basic prerequisites. Finally, TCC/PCCs will tend to be more skeptical about contributing to missions that are perceived to be either treading water or lacking the conditions for success. It is widely understood that participation in a failed mission damages national standing and often entails political costs. One lesson that was probably drawn by the Belgian and Dutch governments from their experiences in Rwanda and Srebrenica respectively was that “it is better not to deploy at all than to deploy and fail.”

DISCIPLINE AND ILL HEALTH

Poor discipline and ill health among peacekeepers undermines mission performance, erodes legitimacy in the eyes of local actors, and has the potential to cause national embarrassment, thereby further inhibiting contributions from the TCC/PCCs in question. There have been several acute examples of this, such as President Kabila’s threat to force the withdrawal of Indian peacekeepers from MONUC after allegations of corruption surfaced. Embarrassment cannot be managed through secrecy, much less impunity, so attention needs to be paid to the prevention of disciplinary and health problems. Preventing disciplinary problems requires improved training, methods for checking whether appropriate norms have been internalized, and better risk assessment and management practices. Ultimately, ending impunity requires holding TCC/PCCs accountable for their disciplinary problems. This, in turn, will require more transparent information about allegations of misconduct and perhaps some form of penalty in terms of UN compensation and/or selection for future missions. In relation to health problems, better screening of potential peacekeepers might be necessary, especially for communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and cholera, as might better monitoring of peacekeepers once deployed. This would place additional burdens on TCC/PCCs, creating its own disincentives, which would need countering with new incentives.
POLICE PERSONNEL
Demand for police personnel has also increased significantly in the past decade, but relatively few UN member states are well prepared to fill this gap. Although the challenges of providing "police-keepers" are far too numerous and complex to cover here, it is worth briefly noting that current and potential PCCs face different challenges in relation to the provision of quality police personnel. For example, the deployment of personnel overseas directly reduces domestic capacity, not all police forces provide their personnel with weapons training, and police officers are often employed by subnational entities, which places considerable bureaucratic obstacles in the way of international deployment. As well as the UN’s own attempts to build a standing police capacity, a small number of PCCs have begun to develop deployable police capacities which may prove to be useful ways of bridging these gaps. However, the provision of these capacities remains largely ad hoc, which will need to be addressed if demand continues to grow.

Recommendations
While it should be understood that the national considerations identified earlier are paramount in shaping government decision making about whether and what to contribute to UN peacekeeping, and acknowledged that the UN's direct influence over these debates is limited, there are ways in which the UN can help to expand the base of contributing countries.

Over the long term, the key goals should be to build positive images of UN peacekeeping among member states; identify and support influential national champions for UN peacekeeping; forge stronger working relations with national capitals; and identify, augment, and assist in building the capabilities required for UN peacekeepers to successfully complete their mandates. Achieving these goals would help strengthen the will and capacity to contribute. The following recommendations suggest some ways in which these goals might be achieved.

1. Provide incentives to encourage more than tokenism.

There are only limited incentives for a TCC/PCC to go from being a token to a substantial contributor. This raises two questions.

A. How can the UN create incentives for states to move beyond tokenism, toward larger and more capable contributions?

The relative balance of costs and benefits at the UN encourages states to make multiple token contributions, with most TCC/PCCs making nothing but token contributions. It will be politically difficult to persuade states to alter these arrangements, and it will be awkward to navigate the process of trying to do so while maintaining positive relationships with the TCC/PCCs concerned. For many developing states, financial incentives might be the best way of encouraging movement beyond tokenism. It was notable, for example, that The Economist recently concluded that UN peacekeepers in Africa were doing a useful job and this was “worth a few more dollars a day.” But budgetary cutbacks in light of the global financial crisis are likely to hamper any such initiatives. Measures that attach greater prestige to larger but also better contributions should also be considered, especially in light of ongoing work on operational readiness and performance evaluations. But clearly, this is politically difficult for DPKO. Past proposals that election to the Security Council and other honors be dependent on a country's contributions to peacekeeping have not flourished. In addition, there is a limit to the extent that prestige can be conferred by the UN itself and a danger that the conferral of prestige on some TCC/PCCs but not others could become a point of political contention.

Even so, there are some modest steps that might be taken. The Security Council might be encouraged to make greater use of presidential statements to commend major TCC/PCCs and highlight the good work done by UN peacekeeping. The council might also be encouraged to conduct more site visits to operational theaters in order to draw attention to the work of the missions and convey the council's gratitude to the TCC/PCCs. Civil society initiatives to track and assess peacekeeping contributions based on both quantitative and qualitative factors might help generate publicity and prestige for effective contributions.

B. How can the UN enable potential and emerging TCC/PCCs to develop relevant capabilities for UN peacekeeping and then ensure those capabilities are deployed when the UN needs them?

Of central importance here are measures aimed at lowering the entry costs to UN peacekeeping and building relevant national capacity. One study proposed that new or emerging TCC/PCCs might voluntarily partner with a leading TCC/PCC for guidance on deployment and training routines. In practice, joint deployments—when two or more countries join up to contribute a formed unit—have become an emerging trend in UN peacekeeping operations. This is one way in which new or smaller TCC/PCCs can make a contribution, train with an experienced partner, and learn about UN peacekeeping by doing. In terms of assistance for capacity building, there may be a need to enhance and target existing bi- or multilateral “train-and-equip” programs such as the United States’ Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), France’s Reinforcement of African Peace-Keeping Capacities (RECAMP), the EU Stability Fund, the UK’s Peace Support Teams, Norway’s Training for Peace program, and Canada’s Global Peace Operations Program.

The question of ensuring that the relevant capabilities are deployed when the UN needs them is more difficult. Politically, it is probably best to separate capacity building from direct encouragement to contribute to UN peacekeeping, but it would make sense for external programs to pay particular attention to those countries that have demonstrated a commitment to contributing.

2. Improve public diplomacy for UN peacekeeping.

The UN needs to tell the public better stories about UN peacekeeping and establish relations with TCC/PCCs that are distinct from specific force-generation discussions for particular missions. This kind of public diplomacy should aim to

- increase awareness among governments (executives and parliaments) and citizens of the positive contribution that peacekeeping makes to international peace and security;
- increase the prestige associated with making large and high-quality contributions to peacekeeping operations; and
- assist and provide informational and political resources to national “champions” of UN peacekeeping in their debates with national skeptics.

These activities should be done separately from discussions about specific force-generation requests in order to build positive attitudes about UN peacekeeping.

Potential initiatives might include appointing an “ambassador for peacekeeping” and developing a “friends of UN peacekeeping” mechanism. Such initiatives could be accompanied by the public release of more information about who contributes what—including trend analyses over time—and by non-UN efforts to publicize and rank contributors and publicly recognize the best TCC/PCCs.

Public diplomacy could also be used to send generic messages about enabling pathways for countries that are potential TCC/PCCs. Important messages to new or small TCC/PCCs include: (1) start off modestly by providing a few military observers and/or individual police officers and build toward meeting the UN’s requirements for a generic infantry battalion; and (2) the UN needs equipment, enabling assets, and niche capabilities as well as troops and police. In addition, civil society could be harnessed to promote positive messages. The Washington DC–based Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping (PEP) provides one model for how this might be done. Other countries could be encouraged to establish PEPs, and an international network of PEPs could be created to strengthen this work. It is worth stressing here that very few TCC/PCCs have active civil society or academic networks in the field of peacekeeping. More work is therefore needed to build the civil society support structure for peacekeeping among many TCC/PCCs.

45 Another useful initiative to consider would be the IPI–Pearson Centre “Being a Peacekeeper Series,” an initiative aimed at de-mystifying the process of contributing to UN peacekeeping for aspiring TCC/PCCs.
46 George Clooney fulfills some of the more public aspects of this role in his capacity as UN “Messenger for Peace,” but this could be augmented with more focused bilateral discussion with TCC/PCCs.
47 See the website of the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping at www.effectivepeacekeeping.org.
3. **Improve the way that requests are made.**
Decisions about contributing troops and police tend to be made in national capitals, not in permanent missions in New York. DPKO must therefore do more to reach out directly to the key decision makers and lead departments or ministries in national capitals. Faxing requests or sending only *notes verbales* for troops, police, or assets makes it too easy for potential TCC/PCCs to decline or avoid serious consideration of requests and reinforces the tendency for DPKO to only talk seriously about contributions with a relatively small pool of existing committed contributors. There is no substitute for building bilateral ties with TCC/PCCs that are not related to specific requests and then actually visiting potential TCC/PCCs to request peacekeepers.

4. **Strengthen strategic analysis of TCC/PCCs and develop long-term force-generation strategies.**
Public diplomacy and the strengthening of ties with TCC/PCCs are important precursors to requesting personnel and equipment for a specific mission. However, these should be guided by analysis of the key, emerging, and potential TCC/PCCs. This could take the form of regularly updated “contributor profiles,” which includes information on the TCC/PCCs past history with peacekeeping, its UN and non-UN commitments, how it makes decisions about peacekeeping, key motivating factors, and other relevant issues. In light of the financial constraints and the potential for a post-Afghanistan window of opportunity noted above, such analysis will also require an understanding of the evolving operational capacities of potential TCC/PCCs with regard to their deployable structures, concepts, and approaches.
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