Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament

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GWU
Start and End of Nuclear Weapons Activity and NPT Ratification

- Autocracy (-10 – 0)
- Semi-Democracy (1 – 6)
- Democracy (7 – 10)
- Transition Period
- Ratified NPT
- Ratified NPT as ROC
- Ratified NPT, Withdrew in 2003

Countries:
- Switzerland
- Brazil
- Yugoslavia (1) + (2)
- Sweden
- Australia (1) + (2)
- Italy
- (West) Germany
- South Korea
- Egypt
- North Korea
- Taiwan (1) + (2)
- South Africa
- Libya
- Iraq
- Algeria
- Iran (1) + (2)
- Romania
- Syria

Start and End of Nuclear Weapons Activity and NPT Ratification
Shared Responsibility for Disarmament: Renewing the NPT Bargains

• “Non-nuclear Weapons States were enjoined from acquiring nuclear weapons and Nuclear Weapons States were forbidden to transfer nuclear weapons and the wherewithal to make them to an NNWS. To compensate for this obvious discriminatory division of the world's nations, NNWS were assured that they had an "inalienable right" to the peaceful application of nuclear energy, and the NWS obligated themselves in Article VI of the treaty to work in good faith toward nuclear disarmament.”
  - Wolfgang Panofsky, 2007

• “The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy.”
  - President Barack Obama, 2009
Shared Responsibility: Articles IV & VI

- Articles IV and VI are linked, and both should apply to NWS and NNWS
- Article IV: “Inalienable right” to nuclear energy is conditional on Articles I and II compliance
- NWS should offer voluntary safeguards on more facilities

Qom Nuclear Facility, Iran
Shared Responsibility: Articles IV & VI

Article VI: Pursue disarmament “in good faith”

- All parties must pursue negotiations for disarmament.
- NWS will not make deep reductions if national uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing programs proliferate.
- NNWS should “pursue negotiations in good faith” on international control of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities as part of their Article VI Commitment.

Barack Obama in Prague, 2009
Shared Responsibility: Articles VI & X

- Article VI & Article X
  - Difficult for NWS to disarm without more confidence that NNWS will not withdraw

- Potential Reforms
  - “Return to sender” clauses
  - IAEA INFCIRC/“66-type” safeguards
  - “Lengthening the fuse” from 90 to 365 days
  - Automatic UNSC referral after non-compliance
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

- Guidelines on Transfer of ENR Technology

Old NSG Policy

“Suppliers should exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and material usable for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices” and facilities should not be designed to enrich uranium beyond 20 percent.
New NSG Guidelines (June 2011)

• Any nation wishing to receive ENR technology must meet all of the following criteria:
  1. Member of the NPT
  2. Not under review by the IAEA
  3. Implementing Security Council Resolution 1540
  4. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and an Additional Protocol (or regional accounting and control for nuclear materials)
  5. Intergovernmental agreement with the supplier including assurances regarding non-explosive use, effective safeguards in perpetuity, and retransfer
  6. Committed to international standards of physical protection and to IAEA safety standards and international safety conventions
Today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

“To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.”
“By demonstrating that we take seriously our NPT obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament, we strengthen our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.”

“The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”
The 2010 NPT Review Conference

• NPR and other Obama initiatives created incentives and space for compromises

• Indonesia announces intention to ratify the CTBT initiative, directly linking this to Obama’s initiatives.

• Egypt: “virtuous double game” as leader of NAM and NAC

• Brazil: Push for nuclear disarmament, concedes on non-binding language on the AP

• Iran Sidelined
### The 2010 NPT Review Conference

Elements of the Obama administration’s nuclear policy initiatives mentioned in statements during the May 2010 NPT Review Conference general debate.

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<th>Prague Speech</th>
<th>World without Nuclear Weapons</th>
<th>UN Summit</th>
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Source: Harald Mueller, “A Nuclear Nonproliferation Test” 2011
The NPT Review Conference

Elements of the Obama administration’s nuclear policy initiatives mentioned in statements during the May 2010 NPT Review Conference general debate.

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Russian Cooperation

New START:
• 1550 Deployed Warheads
• 700 Deployed Launchers
• Verification

Draft Russian Nuclear Doctrine (2009):
• NW could be used for “a preventive nuclear strike on the aggressor” or “to repel an aggression with the use of conventional weapons not only in a large-scale but also in a regional and even a local war.”

Final Russian Nuclear Doctrine (2010):
• NW would be used in response to conventional aggression only in attacks that were “imperiling the very existence of the state”
UK Nuclear Doctrine

UK Strategic Security and Defence Review (2010):
• “The UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT. In giving this assurance, we emphasize the need for universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and note that this assurance would not apply to any state in material breach of those nonproliferation obligations.”

Mirroring of U.S. NPR (2010):
• “The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”
In Lieu of Conclusions