2016

The Elliott School
Undergraduate Scholars

JOURNAL
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The Elliott School
Undergraduate Scholars

JOURNAL

Issue VII

Editors

Ethan Nava
Gerard Gayou
Anabelle Suitor

Elliott School of International Affairs | Washington, DC
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Resolving today’s global challenges demands the dedication of a new generation of leaders: leaders with knowledge, leaders with skills, leaders with character. At GW’s Elliott School for International Affairs, our mission is simple – to build leaders for the world. Academic preparation is a critical element of this process. The collection of articles contained in this edition of The Elliott School Undergraduate Scholars Journal display the intellectual talent of our students as they prepare to take on the world’s toughest challenges.

It is no small undertaking to contribute to a scholarly journal. Dedication, foresight, patience and a commitment to scholarly research are vital foundations. It takes a distinct individual to excel and follow through. The best of the best. The Elliott School’s Undergraduate Scholars Program provides some of our best students with a platform for major research projects that expand their expertise on issues they care about. It strengthens their research, analytic, and communication abilities.

The Elliott School Undergraduate Scholars Program supports independent research by providing undergraduates with a research stipend, a faculty advisor, a graduate student mentor, and a series of meetings focused on advanced research skills and effective writing. These efforts conclude in a Spring Conference, where the Scholars present their research findings. The Program and the Conference reinforce our academic community by bringing together undergraduate students, graduate students, faculty, and staff in highly interactive, instructive projects and presentations.

Fourteen Elliott School undergraduates participated in the Undergraduate Scholars Program in 2015-16. Their research and writing covered a wide range of international affairs topics including sustainable development, democratization, migration, identity, decolonization and economic engagement. These research projects span the globe – from Africa, Europe, the Americas, and Asia to the Middle East – while also crossing disciplinary boundaries – anthropology, geography, history, politics, and global health.
On behalf of the Elliott School and our students, I would like to thank the faculty advisors who shared their exceptional expertise with our undergraduate scholars: Nemata Blyden, Elizabeth Chacko, Robert Churchill, Christina Fink, Henry Hertzfeld, Steven Livingston, Stephen Lubkemann, Robert Maguire, Melani McAllister, David Rain, David Shambaugh, Robert Shepherd, Robert Sutter and Sharon Wolchik. Your guidance and expertise are not only important for professional development but for the personal relationships being created.

I would also like to recognize the vital contributions of the Elliott School graduate students, who served as mentors to our undergraduate scholars: Andrew Arvesth, Luke Farrell, Brittany Goetsch, Adrianna Hardaway, Hyea Yoon Jung, Michelle Kerr, Ekaterina Khvostova, Roderick Lee, Liliana Martinez, Nicholas Moy, Zakia Nouri, Cory Smith and Hannah Waller. Mentoring is very important to the development of our scholars and the creation of collaborative work.

It is my privilege to extend a final congratulation to the 2015-2016 Undergraduate Scholars. You should be proud to have completed such a rigorous program and produced research projects that are engaging, intelligent and tackle very relevant and timely questions. Bravo!

You are entering the world of International Affairs well equipped and well prepared. Most importantly you are entering with a deep curiosity, fearless inquiry and future full of possibilities.

My very best to all of you.

Reuben E. Brigety II
Dean
Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University
About the Elliott School
Undergraduate Scholars Program

The 2015-2016 Elliott School Undergraduate Scholars cohort was an impressive group. Their contributions to scholarship and intellectual inquiry were evident by their presentations at the Research Symposium in the spring and the compilation of this journal. Those of us who had the privilege of leading the 2015-2016 class through the ups and downs of this rigorous research program witnessed these accomplishments, along with their weekly interactions with one another as they peer reviewed one another’s work. Though less “public,” these classroom encounters were no less significant and in many cases, more character-shaping. The Scholars were relentless in their pursuit of understanding complex issues in order to contribute to the greater good. They were tireless in providing feedback while maintaining the utmost respect for one another. They were always quick to exhibit good humor in the face of obstacles and encouraged one another to press on when the path ahead seemed daunting. We are very proud of this class and expect that they will only continue to make the world around them a better place.

The Elliott School Undergraduate Scholars program, launched in 2009, has matured from a one-semester program into a robust year-long independent research experience for Elliott School juniors and seniors chosen through a selective application process. Through this program, participants have the opportunity to delve into a complex international affairs issue of their choosing. During the fall semester, they refine their research design and gain skills from some of the best faculty the Elliott School has to offer. This year scholars presented their findings in the halls of GW at the university sponsored Research Days, while others traveled to present findings at conferences in San Francisco and South Africa. Through the spring semester, they drafted their papers and offered feedback through peer review sessions. The program culminates in the spring Research Symposium where they present their findings before faculty, staff, family
members, and peers. Throughout the year, faculty advisors and graduate student mentors provide invaluable support and guidance.

We want to thank the 2015-2016 Elliott School Undergraduate Scholars for their hard work, commitment to thoughtful inquiry, and collaborative spirit. We consider it a privilege to have provided guidance for them along the way and are confident they will continue their contributions to scholarship for years to come.

We would also like to thank Dean Reuben E. Brigety for his enthusiastic support of this program in his first year at the helm of the Elliott School. His embrace of the program from day one of his tenure has ensured crucial support so it may continue to grow and thrive. We look forward to future innovations as he leads the Elliott School into the future. We also add our voice to his gratitude for the faculty advisors and graduate student mentors who are crucial assets to this program. Finally, we are grateful for the hard work of the lead editor, Ethan Nava, and co-editors of this publication, Anabelle Suitor and Gerard Gayou.

We wish the 2015-2016 Elliott School Undergraduate Scholars great success in the years to come!

Courtney Heath  
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Nicholas Moy

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Roderick Lee

Ekaterina Khvostova
THE RESEARCH PAPERS
Theme 1:

Religion, State and Migration: Global Forces in Development
ISLAMIC ENVIRONMENTALISM IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
Case Studies in Indonesia and Senegal

Caroline Anapol

The field of international development confronts grave challenges as it balances economic development and environmental sustainability in the face of the myriad of environmental crises occurring today. In the last several decades, a body of theory of Islamic environmentalism has emerged from Islamic scholars across the world. Religious leaders have increasingly begun to preach about living in harmony with the natural ecosystems of the earth in light of the modern world’s environmental crises. The Muslim world has seen varying degrees of active change in response to this growing movement. This paper analyzes the state of Islamic environmentalist movements and the ways in which they influence sustainable development practices, focusing on Indonesia and Senegal as case studies. Examining non-governmental organizations, religious organizations, religious education, and global engagement in each of the respective countries, the paper analyzes the different ways in which Islamic environmentalism has been integrated into Indonesia and Senegal. Through qualitative research on primary and secondary sources, this study connects Islamic theory to realities on the ground.

Introduction

The modern field of international development is relatively new; it dates back to the end of World War II by most definitions. Sustainable development, which takes the environment into account even if at the expense of economic development, is an even newer concept. Sustainability has slowly moved into the global consciousness as a significant component of development. The growing awareness and understanding of a series of dangerous environmental issues necessitated this shift. Climate change, overconsumption of resources, degradation of the earth, and other major environmental problems have collectively created a serious environmental crisis.

Sustainable development is popularly defined as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”1 More specifically, it aims to reduce harmful effects of human and economic development on the environment. Sustainable development and environmental movements have grown in prominence across the developing world, manifesting differently depending on several factors in different countries, including religion.

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Caroline Anapol majored in International Affairs with concentrations in International Development and Conflict Resolution. She developed an interest in this topic after studying abroad in Dakar, Senegal. She is currently living in Mohammedia, Morocco, where she works as an ESL teacher at an American language school.

In the past few decades, many notable Islamic scholars have written on the subject, the premise growing in popularity among the scholarly class. This shift, in turn, has led to real-world implications around the globe. Islamic environmentalist theory has begun to be interpreted into Islamic environmentalist movements within both government and civil society. Islamic countries write environmental policy based on Islam, while secular countries produce results too through civil society organizations and academia. As most majority-Muslim countries are in the Global South, the effects of these movements can be seen influencing understandings of sustainable development.

Two relevant cases of Islamic environmentalist theory moving into civil society can be seen in Indonesia and Senegal, two secular countries in which Islam plays a major role in society. Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, is one of the global leaders of Islamic environmentalism. Senegal has a vibrant civil society and a religious population, but has not combined the two on the same scale as Indonesia.

This study examines the differences and similarities between understandings of Islamic environmentalism in Senegal and Indonesia, and the impact of these different understandings on sustainable development. First, it examines scholarly works on Islamic environmentalism to establish the theoretical basis for the field. It then delves into the countries of Indonesia and Senegal, discussing the different ways in which Islamic environmentalism manifests itself in sustainable development. This paper considers the ways in which non-governmental organizations, religious organizations, religious education, and global engagement influence the integration of Islamic environmentalism into the respective countries. Finally, it concludes by investigating the factors that contributed to these different manifestations and broadens to a discussion of Islamic environmentalism’s prospects for the sustainable development movement worldwide.

**Methodology**

This study focuses on Islamic theory on environmentalism and the ways in which it has appeared in Muslim societies. However, ‘Muslim societies’ differ drastically across the globe. Islam is incorporated differently into each community. The study uses Indonesia and Senegal as examples because the religious structures look similar, at least on the surface, in the two countries. Both are majority Muslim, making Islam the lingua franca of religious discussion. Both are secular rather than Islamic, making for a different relationship between religion and the state. The incorporation of Islamic environmentalism in Islamic countries, while relevant, is not the focus of this study. Further studies are needed to examine factors within Islamic countries.

The study uses qualitative research in order to look at the state of religious-based sustainable development in the two countries. A review of primary and secondary sources allows the researcher to gain an understanding of the topic. This study was limited by time and financial resources, which prevented travel to the respective countries. Further work is needed to solidify and expand upon the arguments presented here.
Islamic Environmentalist Theory

Islamic Frameworks

Combine the concepts of tawhid, khilafah, amana, halal, and haram with words of justice (adl) and moderation, temperance, balance, equilibrium, harmony and the concept and ihtihsan (preference for the better) and istislah (public welfare), and one has the most sophisticated framework for an environmental ethic that one can possibly desire. – Scholar and activist Ziauddin Sardar²

Before delving into the Islamic justification for environmentalism, it is necessary to define Islamic environmentalism and distinguish it from Muslim environmentalism. Though the line can blur between the two, Islamic environmentalism includes suras from the Qur’an, Hadith, and other widely accepted sources of Islamic philosophy. Suras are verses from the Qur’an, words that Muslims believe were transmitted from God to the Prophet Mohammed to be written down. Hadiths are records of Mohammed’s words and behavior. Although Muslims do not worship Mohammed, they look to him as an example of how a Muslim should lead a good life.

Muslim environmentalism, on the other hand, can refer to any environmental movements taken up by Muslim people. The Muslim world is vast and diverse, with widely varying interpretations of the religion and different ecological issues. Interpretations of Islamic environmentalism differ, but the sources that the scholars work from are the same: suras and hadiths. Islamic environmentalist scholars refer to certain principles found within Islam and interpret them as prescriptions on how humans should interact with the environment. The following terms give a brief summary of the key concepts of Islamic environmentalism, but scholars can cite many more.

Fitra – An often-cited term in Islamic environmental scholarship is the Qur’anic concept of fitra, meaning ‘instinct’ or ‘that which is natural or original.’ The Qur’an calls Islam din al-fitra, meaning “the religion of the primordial nature.”³ In other words, the prescriptions of Islam fit perfectly into the natural world; a follower of Islam is acting upon instincts that are already natural to him or her. Through suras and hadiths, Islam shows the fitra of humans to be an instinct that is altruistic, thoughtful, and conservationist.⁴ Rather than the concept of original sin as seen in Christianity, Islam presents humans in their “natural” state as being ultimately good in character.⁵ Naturally, humans are inclined towards behavior that is more harmonious with the natural world, and the modern

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world’s environmental crises stem from a breakdown or a repression of those instincts.

**Tawhid** – The word *tawhid*, meaning ‘oneness’ or ‘unity’ is central to Islam. In simplistic terms, it refers to the oneness of God and the monotheistic nature of Islam. It served to differentiate the Muslim God from the pagan gods that most other Arabs worshipped at the time when Mohammed had his revelation. However, it has evolved to have a much more profound meaning and has been taken up by Islamic environmentalist scholars. *Tawhid* speaks to the unity between God, humankind, and all of his creation. It evokes the idea that all life, including humankind, is fundamentally linked. Humans, just as the rest of nature, live in submission to God. When humans harm the natural world, they are also harming God and themselves because of this unity.

**Khalifa** – A key concept in the Islamic environmentalist movement is *khalifa*, meaning ‘stewardship’ or ‘vicegerency.’ According to the Qur’an, humans are God’s servants and his stewards on earth. He made the earth for humans, in that they may benefit from its resources. However, humans may only dominate the earth in a way that is in accordance with God’s will and laws. Humans do not own the earth, but are rather stewards of it; they should look after it with respect to all of its creatures. They cannot take away or destroy the rights of the rest of creation for their own profit. Their right to this earth only exists in conjunction with their responsibility to it.

**Wastefulness** – Through a hadith, Muslims can see that Mohammed was a conservationist who abhorred wastefulness. He forbids his followers from using too much water, even if they were using it to perform ablutions (the ritualistic washing that Muslims carry out before prayer). He told one disciple that he should not waste water during ablutions even if he was washing himself on the bank of a rushing river. The disciple was using a free and abundant resource, causing no harm to any living being while doing so, and carrying out God’s order to wash before praying. If Mohammed detested waste even in a case such as this one, Islamic environmentalists argue that his proscription would be even stronger in the case of something that polluted nature, harmed a living being, or had no use but a frivolous one. As is often the case in religious texts, this parable speaks not just to the conservation of water, but can also be applied to other environmental resources.

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10 Ibid., 15.
Overarching Themes

Certain threads appear over and over throughout Islamic environmentalist literature. First of all, almost all scholars agree that modern ecological crises are occurring because humans have lost their way with God and with nature. What was once a harmonious relationship between God, nature, and humankind has devolved into an exploitative and destructive pattern in which humans put themselves ahead at the expense of the rest of creation. The natural order of the world has fallen by the wayside as humans over-consume, drive species into extinction, pollute, and more.

Scholars also by and large agree that this disconnect comes from the Western tradition. They argue that modern civilization has lost its divine connection with the earth in the pursuit of wealth. In the era of globalization, of course, this tradition has infiltrated nearly every culture and community. The scholars do not argue that other regions of the world are faultless. Scholars do not claim that Muslim countries are immune from this trend; rather, they see the influence of Western society within Muslim countries as the driver of behavior that negatively impacts the environment. They find that the values central to the Western worldview and lifestyle are drivers of environmental destruction. Capitalism and unrestricted economic growth, by their very nature, require the consumption of more, more, and still more resources. The environmental problems that are seen today cannot and will not end without a widespread rejection of some of the fundamental values in Western culture.

The concept of international development, as it is understood today, is similarly flawed. Today’s development movement seeks to promote economic growth of countries in the Global South until they can reach the development level of the Global North. This unlimited growth, without a significant scaling-back of consumption in the Global North, is not feasible with the amount of resources that exist on this planet. If everyone consumed at the rate of the United States, for example, several more earths would be needed to support that lifestyle. The Islamic environmental doctrine argues that a different development path is necessary.

The keys to that development path, according to scholars of Islamic environmentalism, lie in Islam and in a reclaiming of the natural order of things. The Islamic way of life, as set out in the Qur’an and in hadiths, is opposite to the modern Western-influenced way of life. Through his interpretation of the Qur’an and his behavior (recorded in the hadiths), Mohammed encouraged his followers to treat the natural world with respect and reverence. He promoted the planting of trees. He forbade the needless destruction of vegetation. He displayed kindness and justice to animals. He established and protected early nature reserves. He emphasized cleanliness and rejected wastefulness and pollution.11 If Muslims around the world reject modern Western values and instead reclaim the wisdom that their religion offers them, environmental crises will be alleviated and more sustainable development can occur.

Scholars do acknowledge, however, some obstacles to the widespread implementation of environmentalism through an Islamic lens. First of all, overcon-
sumption and the pursuit of endlessly newer technology is a problem all over the world. However, the bulk of new technology today comes out of the West. Thus, Muslims must engage with the West in order to gain that technology, and lose the opportunity to apply Muslim principles to consumption by doing so. A second major problem with implementing these principles is that urbanization has become widespread all over the world. These migrants are cut off from their traditions and environment, and have less attachment to the new environments that they move to. Urbanization has exacerbated the dissociation of humans from the natural world.

A final problem lies in governance in Muslim countries. Many Muslim countries are, unfortunately, led by autocratic and dictatorial regimes. In such regimes, there is little space for environmental movements to gain prominence if they openly disagree with government policy. This is a significant obstacle to the growth of this movement; unless these governments enact environmental policies (which they are, in some cases), there is little hope for widespread change.

From Theory to Practice

Challenges notwithstanding, Islamic environmentalism has moved from an esoteric scholarly pursuit to a series of movements around the world. Starting in the 1980s, Saudi Arabia began to define Islamic principles of environmentalism and create an Islamic ministry to deal with them. In 1984, they laid out these Islamic principles (most of which are outlined above) in the first official statement of its kind. This statement prompted other Islamic countries to begin developing their own Islamic environmentalist policies. At the same time, major international institutions such as the World Wildlife Fund and the World Conservation Union were beginning to engage faith communities around the world in environmental protection and conservation. An international coalition of Islamic environmentalists had begun, including governments, international institutions, academics, and non-governmental organizations.

Over the next few decades, a robust international discourse developed on the topic of eco-theology. A series of conferences occurred around the world to wrestle with environmental crises and sustainable development through the lens of Islam. This large-scale discourse is likely to continue as a major part of the international cooperation on climate change and conservation. However, this paper will zero in on the movements in two countries: Indonesia and Senegal. International discourse on any issue does not necessarily translate to on-the-ground change, and Islamic environmentalism is no different.

13 Ibid., 91.
15 Ibid.
Indonesia Case Study

Background

Indonesia is an excellent candidate for this discussion for a variety of factors. First of all, Indonesia ranks 110 out of 188 countries for human development indicators. As it develops, it struggles with sustainability and a host of environmental issues including deforestation, air and water pollution, and overfishing. Furthermore, Indonesia is the most populous Muslim country in the world, with nearly ninety percent of its citizens identifying as Muslim. A cursory look into the field of Islamic environmentalism will reveal that Indonesia has led the Muslim world at both developing theory and implementing it in practice.

Indonesia’s natural beauty and biodiversity is challenged by a host of environmental issues exacerbated by industrialization. For example, many of the naturally forested islands have lost huge percentages of their tree coverage to make space for human habitation in urban areas, agriculture, and the palm oil industry.

The last decade has seen an increasing trend of ‘green-ness,’ or environmental consciousness in Indonesia. Supermarkets promote semi-biodegradable plastic shopping bags. Advertisements for sustainable residential communities appear on billboards. Prominent government officials sponsor initiatives such as a ‘bike to work’ campaign. Environmentalism is on the up-and-up in Indonesia. The Indonesian government has also taken strides to address environmental problems like climate change in their country. At the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Indonesia committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by twenty-six percent by 2020. The Indonesian government has also worked to enact environmental legislation and programming on the domestic level as well.

Indonesia ranks as one of the countries in the world whose civil society, academia, and even government are most active in Islamic environmentalism. The religious hierarchy in Indonesia is actively involved in promoting environmentalism and sustainable development. Islamic environmentalist law has begun development. Political movements that engage Islam and environmentalism in the same spaces have come to the forefront. And finally, the Islamic boarding schools known as pesantren have become extremely absorbed in Islamic understandings of environmentalism, passing the message on to the next generation. Thus, a religious conceptualization of environmentalism is part of the national conversation and has real impacts on the environmental movement and sustainable development.

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19 Schwencke, Globalized Eco-Islam, 26.
Religious Organizations: Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah

Indonesia is home to the world’s two largest Muslim welfare organizations, called Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. They provide social services across Indonesia, filling in gaps that the government does not fill. The two organizations not only have tens of millions of members, but they have considerable social influence.\(^{20}\) They both have a political wing, but are primarily religious and social organizations.

Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah have both established departments to address climate change. They work closely with the government and the Ministry of Environment. Muhammadiyah founded the Institute for the Study and Empowerment of the Environment, the Environmental Institute, and the Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center.\(^{21}\) Despite these accolades, Nahdlatul Ulama still has had more involvement with environmental advocacy thus far. They also have customs and traditions that make them well-suited to environmental advocacy. For example, Nahdlatul Ulama-affiliated families traditionally plant a coconut tree to mark the birth of a child. This serves as a symbol of the child’s spiritual tie to the environment.\(^{22}\) The religious preaching of these organizations, and the cultures of the communities where they exist, all show strong ties to the environment.

Nahdlatul Ulama also helps the government to form awareness-raising programs about environmental problems.\(^{23}\) Branches of Nahdlatul Ulama engage their community in regions across Indonesia in order to teach them environmental skills. In one region, Nahdlatul Ulama implemented a program to teach the community about waste management and composting.\(^{23}\) Perhaps most significantly, however, are the eco-boarding schools affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama, known as pesantren. Nahdlatul Ulama religious leaders administer schools at which they promote environmentalism.

These two organizations benefit from a strong and positive relationship with the government, both in general and in terms of environmental messaging. The government uses civil society organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama in particular, to disperse their message at the grassroots level. In turn, Nahdlatul Ulama pushes the government to advance the moral causes of environmentalism and sustainability.\(^{25}\) It is for these reasons that Nahdlatul Ulama is respected by the Indonesian government as a full partner in promoting environmentalism and sustainable development.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., 97.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., 95.
\(^{23}\) Ibid., 97.
\(^{24}\) Ibid., 96.
\(^{25}\) Ibid., 100.
Religious Education: Pesantren

Since Indonesia’s independence in 1945, the state has taken control of both public schools and Muslim schools (madrasas), which combine religious education with non-religious subjects. However, a third type of education exists: pesantren, or private Islamic boarding schools. While little information about pesantren exist, a scholar notes that they have existed for over two centuries and are modeled after colleges at the Al Azhar University in Cairo. The number of pesantren has steadily increased since their inception, numbering around 10,000 across Indonesia today. Although pesantren are traditionally affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah-affiliated schools are also working to create environmental education programs.

Pesantren are traditionally found in rural communities and are well-regarded in Indonesia. They have remained privately run by religious leaders known as kiai. This autonomy allows kiai to retain control over their educational goals and curricula. Their educational goals focus on giving children an Islamic education and instilling Islamic values into them, but they are typically open to creative pedagogies. Their pedagogy tends to have strong Sufi influences, emphasizing introspection and internal spirituality. In that way, kiai seek to communicate with students’ hearts rather than their heads.

Progressive pesantren have increasingly started to deal with environmentalism, human rights, and other forms of social justice. Eco-pesantren have emerged through a combined effort by Nahdlatul Ulama and the Ministry of the Environment. Although eco-pesantren continue to preach more traditional Islamic teachings, they now incorporate practical knowledge about recycling, composting, planting trees, and more – all through the lens of Islam. Kiai understand these skills as part of students’ social responsibility as Muslims and as global citizens.

These programs not only help the students to learn how to interact more positively with their environment, but they also help the pesantren itself to become more efficient and environmentally-friendly almost immediately. Many of the eco-pesantren’s teachings revolve around two themes: trees and water. First of all, teachings on these resources are very explicit in hadiths. Kiai can cite specific instructions from the Prophet Mohammed to explain the importance of conserving water and planting trees. Furthermore, deforestation and water pollution are two of Indonesia’s most significant environmental problems. Thus, teachings on those two issues are among the most relevant messages that kiai could convey at eco-pesantren.

One kiai from an eco-pesantren, Kiai Heri, explained how he teaches his students practical environmental information through the lens of Islam. For exam-

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31 Ibid., 92.
ple, he shows his students how to collect water from ablution and reuse it for fishponds. As he does so, he cites the hadith in which Mohammed instructed his followers never to waste water (described above).[^33] Another pesantren had each student plant a tree within the grounds a few years before graduation. The student then had to care for the tree throughout his or her time at the pesantren. The student would receive a grade based on how well the tree had grown.[^34]

**Global Engagement**

Indonesia is a leader in the global Islamic environmentalism movement; it is world-renowned for its effective Islamic outreach (known as dakwah). Recently, religious leaders across the country have begun to implement ‘eco-dakwah’ – outreach with environmental messages.[^35] This outreach has resulted in more attention and funding for the cause. In 2002, religious leaders and activists from across Indonesia came together in the city of Bogor to discuss Islamic environmentalism at a program called *Faith and Environment*.[^36] The conference included discussions on specific Islamic law on the environment, called *fiqh al-bi'ah* in Arabic.

In 2010, Indonesia hosted another conference in Bogor, this time for the international community. The International Muslim Conference on Climate Change marked the first time that global leaders assembled in Indonesia to discuss Islamic Environmentalism. The Indonesian government alongside Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah supported the conference.[^37] Representatives of fourteen Muslim countries attended, including scientists, religious leaders, and environmental activists. The countries joined together in the *Bogor Declaration*, vowing to work in their respective countries to protect the environment and educate their peoples about the environment. The conference advocated for the development of pesantren-esque schools in other countries to pass on the messages of Islamic environmentalism.

**Further Analysis**

Islamic environmentalism has taken off so significantly in Indonesia thanks to the strong relationships that exist between the state, civil society (including and especially religious organizations), and religious education. Although the government is secular and largely guarantees religious freedom, they recognize six official religions including Islam. Most Islamic environmentalist progress in Indonesia has been state-sponsored or state-supported. The religious organizations that administer these projects embrace the state support and work in conjunction with them.

Islamic environmentalist scholars frequently cite religious education as one of the most effective ways to promote the field. The eco-pesantren has been lauded

[^34]: Gade, "Tradition and Sentiment in Indonesian Environmental Islam,” 267.
[^35]: Ibid., 264.
[^37]: Ibid., 43.
by the international Islamic environmentalist community as being an effective tool to disseminate Islamic environmentalism at a grassroots level. At international conferences, they have discussed ways to promote similar initiatives in other countries. It is largely the *pesantren* that cause Indonesia to be listed as one of the world’s leaders in Islamic environmentalism. Rather than disassociating from this education system, the government has embraced and promoted it, working to establish more eco-*pesantren*.

Major environmental issues in Indonesia remain unaddressed by Islamic environmentalism. The bulk of religious teachings happening in Indonesia right now have more to do with individual practices, rather than large-scale environmental destruction. One group of students’ recycling habits is a drop in the ocean when compared to the palm oil industry that has perpetuated widespread and extremely destructive deforestation across the country. Because destructive practices are so closely related to industrialization, economic development, and profitable industries, it is difficult to garner impetus to restrict them. Thus, despite the social and ideological progress that Islamic environmentalism has had in Indonesia, the country has yet to experience large-scale change because of it. With such influence in the government, however, religious organizations have sway to continue advocating for both legal and social change.

**Senegal Case Study**

**Background**

A discussion of Senegal’s potential for Islamic environmentalism to influence sustainable development processes is extremely relevant. Today, Senegal ranks among the most underdeveloped countries in the world. UNDP, the UN Development Program, ranks Senegal at 170 out of 188 countries for human development indicators. As Senegal struggles to develop in the modern world, it has faced a host of environmental crises including deforestation, soil degradation, overgrazing, and overfishing.

These problems arise from a pattern of unsustainable development in order to meet the demands of the global market. However, unsustainable development practices are already damaging Senegal’s ability to succeed economically. Deforestation and desertification threaten the long-term sustainability of the farming industry – a dangerous circumstance in a country where nearly seventy percent of the population makes their living with jobs in or related to agriculture. As lands across the Sahel (in central Senegal) dried up and turned to desert, farming communities lost both productive fields in the present but also the knowledge of sustainable environmental practices.

Senegal is also relevant to this discussion because of its religious nature. About ninety-five percent of the population is Muslim, and religion has a strong presence in Senegalese culture. Islam in Senegal is organized almost entirely into

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40 Ibid., 112.
Sufi brotherhoods. Senegal also has a large and active civil society. Development-related NGOs are extremely active across sectors and regions in Senegal, though they are concentrated in the capital city of Dakar.

While the crops grown traditionally in Senegal were staples such as millet or sorghum, the French imposed a cash crop system of rice and groundnut farming. Though Senegal has few natural resources, its peanuts are of significant export value. In fact, peanuts are one of the major industries in Senegal despite the fact that they are not native to the land and even degrade it. Peanut farming became the domain of religious leaders across Senegal during French colonial rule. Many religious leaders grew in power under French rule through their success in the peanut production.\(^{41}\)

Islam’s strength in Senegal perhaps deepened under the yoke of French colonialism. Senegalese people turned to their religious leaders as a form of protest against colonial rule. In that way, religious leaders maintained political and social power even during the age of colonialism. When the French left, a secular government took control of the territory and has had successful democratic transitions since then. These religious leaders are still relevant today, both socially and politically.

Religions Organizations: Sufi Brotherhoods

Islam in Senegal is dominated by hierarchical Sufi brotherhoods. Most Senegalese people belong to one of these brotherhoods, where they receive religious and cultural guidance from the leaders, called marabouts or cheikhs. These marabouts are believed to be endowed with spiritual powers that allow them to make charms, practice traditional medicine, and send powerful prayers to the heavens. The three major brotherhoods in Senegal are the Qadiriyyah (the oldest), the Tijaniyyah (the largest), and the Muridiyya or Mourides (the most powerful). This analysis will focus on the Muridiyya as it is the most powerful brotherhood, specifically looking at the agriculture sector.

Followers of these brotherhoods, known as talibés (meaning students), are connected to the brotherhoods and their marabouts religiously, socially, politically, and economically. Talibés work on the land of their marabouts and give a certain percentage of their yield to their marabouts. The brotherhoods exert political, economic, and social power across the country. The Mourides in particular have a history of being extremely powerful. A major part of the Mouride philosophy instructs talibés that the most sincere way to God comes through hard work. Rather than follow the normal requirements of Islam, Mouride disciples dedicate their time to working in the fields. They believe that this is the true path to God.\(^{42}\)

This mindset can still be seen today among the Mourides. The Mourides are more than a religious organization; they make up a coalition of peanut farmers dedicated to working hard. They firmly emphasize economic development at all costs. If pushing the land to produce a higher peanut yield creates more

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\(^{42}\) Ibid., 114.
wealth and more short-term development, they encourage their talibés to pursue it.

Politically, Mourides play a central role in the Senegalese political system. Since they command so much of Senegal’s population, politicians often appeal to their Mourides for their endorsement. A popular trope in Senegal claims that the way to the Presidential Palace is through Touba (the city of the Mourides). This political bargaining power gives the Mourides considerable sway. Mouride leaders are known to have received special consideration in government policy. For example, when one marabout protested against peanut tariffs that were limiting his revenue and that of his talibés, the government made an exception on the tariff.\(^\text{13}\)

The political power, when combined with the religious nature of the brotherhood, poses an interesting paradox in terms of environmental outlook. The Mourides, as a Sufi-influenced brotherhood, should be expected to feel strong ties to the environment. Furthermore, they should be expected to use their political and social sway to push the rest of Senegalese society towards more sustainable development. But on the contrary, Mouride farming practices are infamous in academic circles for contributing to environmental issues like soil degradation. Their peanut farming helps to advance development in the short-term, but cannot last because of the environmental toll that it takes. While they do encourage development, it comes at the expense of sustainability.

The centralized religious establishment may not be promoting Islamic environmentalism, but the ideals are catching on at the grassroots level in some communities. One Mouride village, Ndem, started an NGO to promote sustainable development. They work to improve education about and accessibility to sustainable agriculture technology, including drip irrigation and organic gardening techniques.\(^\text{44}\) They try to develop economically as a form of spirituality. But they also incorporate principles of their religion that emphasize environmentalism, understanding themselves and their religion as inseparable from the natural world around them.

**Religious Education: Talibés**

Socially, the Mourides power comes from their talibés, students of marabouts starting from childhood. Many families send their children, particularly boys, to schools called daraas. Daraas are run by marabouts and focus on religious education. Traditionally, the child talibés also work on the farmlands of their marabouts. From a very young age, agriculture and hard work is integrated into the religious structure.

In the traditional daraa system, marabouts accept children into their schools at no cost. In exchange, the boys work the marabout’s farmland to support him and themselves. They also go around the community to beg for food and even monetary support. The value of this practice is twofold. First of all, the resources earned from begging serve to support the boys and the marabout. In addition, the practice is intended to teach the boys the value of humility.\(^\text{13}\)


Unfortunately, the traditional system has been perverted. Today, the streets of Dakar and other major cities are lined with young boys begging throughout all hours of the day. Families from rural communities send their sons into cities to study under a marabout. Many marabouts have become corrupt and profit from the blind trust of the families so far away. They force the boys to beg for almost the entire day, dedicating only a few hours to religious education, if at all. Some marabouts become abusive if the boys do not earn enough from begging.45

Unlike Indonesia’s pesantren, there is little government support for or supervision over the religious education system. This makes the government unable to transmit environmental messages through religious education. Religious education has enormous potential to convey messages of environmentalism and sustainable development to communities. Unfortunately, the religious education system in Senegal has shown few signs of organization or embracing Islamic environmentalist principles. As Senegal continues to develop, there is enormous potential in such widespread Islamic education.

Global Engagement

Senegal has been involved to some degree in the international Islamic environmentalism movement. The country sent representatives to Istanbul in 2009 to support the Muslim Seven Year Action Plan on Climate Change, one of the founding documents of the global movement.46 However, Senegal sent no representatives to the next conference in Bogor in 2010. They have shown tentative support for the movement, but have not made any strides to become a leader in the movement. The reasons for this lack of participation are unclear, but may come from reluctance on the part of a firmly secular government to engage with development from a religious perspective.

Further Analysis

Sustainable development as understood through the lens of Islam has not made significant strides as a movement in Senegal. Although the decades-old development movement is beginning to address environmentalism and sustainability more and more, it has not been connected to Islam in the mainstream. The major reason for this lies in the lack of social encouragement by the powerful religious hierarchies in the country. As environmental issues worsen, the necessity for sustainable development will move (and already has started to move) from the abstract to very real consequences for Senegalese farmers. At this point, it is reasonable to imagine that Islamic environmentalism might gain more traction among the Senegalese religious elite.

Although Islamic environmentalism has not yet caught on in the mainstream, some individual religious leaders do emphasize it to their congregations. One Imam in Dakar, Youssoupha Sarr, preaches ‘green jihad’ to his congregation. Imam Sarr began his activism in response to pollution and litter overwhelming his community. To him, the question of environmentalism is a moral one; it is the moral responsibility of Muslims to look after their environment. If this message carries over to the development movement, it could have implications for a more religiously focused and widespread understanding of sustainable development.

There is space in Senegal for the religious organizations, namely the brotherhoods, to pressure the government into enacting more legislation or initiating programs for sustainable development. Currently, politicians do come to the brotherhoods to appeal for support during their campaigns. The brotherhoods have such large memberships that politicians may have a difficult time being successful in their campaigns if they do not. If the brotherhoods did begin to advocate for environmental policies in the name of Islam, they have this political avenue to do so. This type of bargaining will likely increase as Islamic environmentalism continues to grow traction around the world and in Senegal.

Conclusion

Islamic environmentalism has taken off in the last few decades, moving from an academic field that individual scholars wrote about to a global movement with real-world effects. Qur’anic teachings on environmentalism are expansive. The concepts of *ta'wīd*, *fitra*, *khalīfa*, and the others mentioned previously only scratch the surface. However, the fact that theory has been developed means nothing without engagement in the real world. An international movement has steadily emerged, spanning the Muslim world from Turkey to Southeast Asia (not to mention smaller movements beginning in Western countries that are not majority Muslim, like the US and the UK).

Indonesia and Senegal serve as case studies to show what factors make Islamic environmentalism manifest itself more or less strongly in a particular country. Indonesia is at the forefront of Islamic environmentalism. The country is active in all global discussions on the subject and is often cited as a potential model for other countries. The reasons for which Indonesia has implemented Islamic environmentalism to such a degree have to do with the ways in which religion relates to the state and other entities.

The central Muslim organizations in Indonesia, *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*, have memberships that rank in the tens of millions. Their influence is both wide and deep. Besides having a large membership, they also exert influence in the government, particularly when it comes to environmentalism. *Nahdlatul* partners with the government to put on conferences, push for legislative change, promote the Ministry of Environment, and even administer *pesantren*. Though *pesantren* are wholly independent and have little obligation to

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the state, the government supports them and helps to found more eco-
pesantren. It is this partnership that has allowed Nahdlatul Ulama’s message of Islamic envi-
ronmentalism to grow so strong in Indonesia.

In Senegal, on the other hand, the religious hierarchy remains much more
separate from the state and other entities in the country. While politicians do
appeal to influential members of the brotherhoods for political support, religious
leaders have not yet exploited that to promote moral messages like Islamic envi-
ronmentalism. In fact, there has not yet been widespread promotion of Islamic
environmentalism among the Sufi brotherhoods of Senegal. The political power
dynamic in Senegal means that there is immense potential if the brotherhoods
were to take up the cause of Islamic environmentalism. The religious education
system in Senegal has also not been taken advantage of as a method to dissemi-
nate the messages of Islamic environmentalism. Unfortunately, widespread cor-
rup|tion and lack of oversight prevents Senegalese daraas from implementing
large-scale programs like eco-pesantren.

The religious systems and manifestations of Islamic environmentalism in
the two countries differ in many ways, but the need in both is great. Both coun-
tries’ development processes are being hampered by destructive and unsustain-
able practices, from the peanut farming industry in Senegal to the palm oil indus-
try in Indonesia. As global awareness for climate change and other environme-
tal issues continues to grow in the near future, sustainable development pro-
grams will no longer be optional. Each country in the throes of development
must come to its own understanding of sustainable development and environ-
mentalism, working on it through the lens of its own culture or religion. The sto-
ry of Islamic environmentalism is only just beginning. It will undoubtedly be a
force to be reckoned with for the years to come.

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owe this to you.
Filipino Labor Emigration and Remittances: An Analysis of the Development Impact of Migrant Flows from 1970 to Present

Hannah Hassani

In this paper, I assess the impact of international Filipino migrant flows on the domestic economy from 1970 to today. I first explore the theoretical underpinnings for the cause of this migration and how this migration impacts the welfare of the citizens, primarily from an economic standpoint. I pair explanatory migration theories with welfare theories to understand the interplay between migration and remittance-independent development. I then introduce the case of the Philippines and the country’s particular economic and political conditions that led to the creation of a state-powered migratory apparatus. In the final section, I present my original data analysis on migrant and remittance trends through gender and occupational composition, and a case study of remittances from two key receiving countries: historically, the United States and contemporarily, Saudi Arabia. I conclude that because the goal is to develop the economic situation and welfare of the Filipino people, there is mixed evidence to suggest that a policy of labor export actually realizes this objective.

Introduction

In many ways, the trajectory of the Philippines’ economic and labor force has been emblematic of that of other developing countries: emergence from a colonial stronghold post World War II; wage stagnation and domestic oversupply of labor; overbearing authoritarian and oligarchic interests; labor exodus to developed and other developing countries; and economic growth challenges and dependency on advanced economies. However, what sets the archipelago apart from other developing countries is the magnitude of these factors. The Philippines was a Spanish colony for over 400 years and then immediately fell under the purview of the United States for another fifty. Despite efforts to liberalize, the economy did not improve as predicted, and even today the country faces major economic challenges, as well as employing its burgeoning labor force. A country of 100 million people, there are over 10 million Filipino nationals currently working abroad in over 190 countries. What are the implications of such a large migrant labor force, and how has this trend impacted development?

Hannah Hassani is currently a senior pursuing a BA in International Affairs with a concentration in International Economics, and a BS in Economics. Her current research focuses on domestic job opportunities and wage determination in the Filipino labor market. Post graduation she plans to pursue her PhD in Labor Economics.

In this paper, I address the impact of Filipino migration and remittances on the development of the Filipino economy. The first section analyzes economic and migration theories to assess how international migration should impact the welfare of citizens, primarily from an economic standpoint. I then introduce the case of the Philippines by briefly explaining why the Philippines’ economic and political conditions led to the creation of a state-powered migratory apparatus. In the policy analysis section, I define the exact role of this state agency, the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) by looking at the historical executive orders that established it and compare the Philippines’ policy as a sending country to the demands of the receiving countries. Finally, I present my original data analysis on gender and occupational composition of migration and remittances. I contrast migrant and remittance figures from the United States and Saudi Arabia to demonstrate the significance of permanent migrants on the volume of remittances. I conclude that there is mixed evidence to suggest that labor export policies promote migration- and remittance-independent development.

Methodology

I derive my results from aggregate data from the International Organization for Migration (2013), the Central Bank of the Philippines (2014) and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (2016). I obtain original results from the Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF) from the years 1993 to 2002. This dataset, produced by the Philippine Statistics Authority, provides details on 29 different attributes for samples of 2,500 to 3,500 individual migrants covering demographic factors such as age, education, and gender, along with migration information such as number of months abroad, occupation, and remittances. One particular extract is a comparison of occupations in the Philippines and those abroad.

As this paper explicitly and implicitly indicates, statistics regarding migration and remittance flows are inherently imperfect. Legal flows of people are difficult enough to measure, and illegal modes of migration compound the issue even further. In addition, remittance figures are all estimates, as cash transfers through banks are merely one method of sending money to relatives and friends. As such it is more advantageous to regard these migrant and remittance figures as indicative of larger trends then as an exact set of data. Furthermore, the main point of analysis for this study is wages. Though wages are a key component of welfare, one cannot use them to explain the entire reasoning behind an individual’s motivation to migrate, nor can one conclude that a high enough wage will satiate the needs of migrants and the people they leave behind. There are immense cultural factors supporting and social costs to migration that this paper only assesses briefly. Despite the predominant focus on wage, however, the original findings of this study can still be used to uncover various certainties in the migration-remittance-development nexus.

Selected Theoretical Views on Migration and Welfare

Labor migration theories such as the neoclassical model and new economics of labor migration seek to explain why and how an individual decides to and
ends up outside of his or her country of origin. On the other hand, welfare models that pertain to migration, such as Hanson’s (2010) skilled emigration model and Carling’s (2007) remittance discussion, attempt to assess how certain types of labor migration impact domestic economies and therefore, the citizens living in them.

Although migration theorists have moved beyond analyzing migrant flows solely on neoclassical and wage differentiation theory, in the case of the Philippines, a significant amount of out-migration can be explained by stagnant wages in the domestic labor market. One particular offshoot of the neoclassical model that fits the trajectory of the Philippines’ case is George Borjas’ self-selection model. The model is first based on the Roy model (1951), which theorizes that workers can only use one occupational skill at a time, even though they have skills in each occupation. Consequently, Borjas indicates through the equation

\[
\ln W_k = \mu_k + \delta_k z
\]

that \(W_k\), an individual’s wage in the economy, is determined by the base wage, \(\mu_k\) (the wage of a worker with zero skills) and the skill premium, \(\delta_k\) multiplied by the individual’s skill level, \(z\). This wage, \(W_k\), is unique to a particular national economy, and an individual makes his or her decision to migrate based on a comparison of the two wages:

\[
\ln W_k - \ln W_s > \pi.
\]

Essentially, the Borjas model states that as long as an individual’s increase in wage (defined here as the expected wage in the destination country, \(W_s\), less the expected wage in the sending country, \(W_s\)) is greater than the cost of migrating, \(\pi\), then migrants will self-select into labor migration.

In the case of the Philippines, there has been a simultaneous increase in wages abroad and decrease in costs of migration due to decades of involvement by the POEA, as will be discussed in the policy section below. Thus, because Filipinos primarily emigrate as labor, the neoclassical wage model actually provides a useful starting point for an analysis of the migrant flows.

To supplement the understanding of the Filipino labor flow, I now turn to a brief discussion of the new economics of labor migration. Stark and Bloom expand the unit of analysis from the individual in the neoclassical model to the family, and emphasize the intersection of the labor market and household needs. They also contend that social considerations play a large role in that relative social disparities influence migration. This pertains directly to the Philippines, as there has been much scholarship on parental migration, particularly that the departures of female head of households and the effect on Filipino socie-

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In addition to the importance of family as a meaningful unit of analysis in the Filipino case, there are both rural-urban and rich-poor divides. Furthermore, the Philippines’ national identity is incredibly strong given that there are over 7000 islands in the archipelago. Lastly, as I discuss later in this section, there is a class of landed oligarchs that have been in power since before the Spanish colonial era and control much of the land, wealth, and political power in the country. Due to these disparities, it is likely that a family may want to improve their social standing and invest in a family member abroad.

While neoclassical theory and new economics of migration explain the rationale behind why migrants decide to migrate or how exactly they arrive at such reasoning, there is an entirely separate question of how migrant streams impact development. In order to assess the motivations and outcomes of migration in a manner that is appropriate to the case of the Philippines, I pair migration theory with a discussion of two economic variables’ effect on the domestic economy: wage and remittances. According to Hanson’s model of skilled emigration,

$$Y_i = W_i(1 - t_i) + G_i,$$

an individual’s disposable income, $Y_i$, depends on his or her wage, $W_i$, minus the proportion of his or her wage paid in taxes, $t_i$, plus government transfers, $G_i$.

Given that skilled workers are complementary to unskilled workers and substitutive to other skilled workers, the departure of skilled workers, regardless of the work they engage in abroad, results in contrasting changes to different types of workers’ welfare. If there is an unskilled worker whose boss emigrates, for example, then her productivity, and thus her wage, $W_i$, could decrease since her ability to perform a given task was dependent on a complementary input: her manager. Coupled with the assumption that skilled workers contribute positively to social welfare programs, the double loss of productivity and social benefits, $G_i$, unambiguously reduces an unskilled non-emigrant’s welfare, $Y_i$. However, if there are two, say, engineers and one departs for abroad, because the two were competing for jobs against one another, the emigration of the skilled engineer increases the employment opportunity and thus, productivity and wage of the non-emigrant engineer. However, there is still a decrease in social benefits due to the departure of the skilled worker, and therefore, there is an ambiguous change in welfare for the non-emigrant skilled worker. In both cases, skilled emigration is not necessarily a net positive for the sending country. This process has been referred to in the literature as ‘brain drain.’ A major shortfall in this theory, though, is that wages in the official labor market are only one component of a family’s income, especially in the developing world. Regardless, wages are an integral component of an individual or family’s welfare and thus, though an analysis of welfare based on wages is not complete, it is a reasonable starting point.

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In addition to wages earned domestically, another source of income for many families in the Philippines and the developing world at large is remittances. In the most basic sense, remittances are “funds transferred by migrants abroad to their families at home.” But how exactly do remittances impact the lives of non-migrants and the economy as a whole? In recent decades migrant remittances and the discourse surrounding them have increased tremendously. The early 1990s, in particular, cast remittances in a more optimistic light than in the past, as remittance spending on health and education in the receiving countries came to be seen as investment in human capital. Governments of countries with high remittance inflows must decide how to promote beneficial uses. According to David Ellerman, the aim of remittance-dependent communities would be to build local enterprises that would not live off remittances directly or indirectly (via the multiplier) so that local jobs could be sustained without continuing migration and remittances.

Table 1: Immediate and Secondary Benefits of Remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure type</th>
<th>Immediate benefits to the recipients</th>
<th>Future benefits to the recipients</th>
<th>Benefits to secondary beneficiaries</th>
<th>Remittance-independent development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buying imported goods</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buying local goods/services</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on education</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving in the bank</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building a house</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting up a business</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Carling, 2007

It is often difficult to quantify the benefit of a remittance. In Table 1, migration and remittance scholar Jørgen Carling clearly separates the short and long-term benefits of remittances, and whether or not the expenditure type promotes remittance-independent development. Though there is no one definitive way to spend remittances, if the eventual goal is to develop living standards, spending on education and setting up a business have both future benefits to the recipients and induce remittance-independent development. However, a family that is struggling to subsist will clearly need to focus first on buying goods and services and will likely choose an imported good over a local one if it is cheaper and vice versa. Therefore, remittances vary not only in volume, but also in the

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6 Hanson, “International Migration and the Developing World,” 47.
9 Carling, “Interrogating Remittances,” 49.
characteristics of the receivers. Naturally, it is difficult to incorporate every socio-economic stratum into a policy that addresses remittances.

Governments can selectively enact policies to address specific objectives. In general, a government can incentivize its citizens to channel remittance money directly or indirectly into development purposes, investment, consumption, or saving. Each of these tools can refocus the money into debatably more productive means that will in turn sustain themselves over time. However, two issues arise. First, unless a state decides to tax remittances, all of the money belongs to the migrants and the families, who will know what they need more so than any third party, governmental or otherwise. Secondly, in programs such as the tres por uno initiative in Mexico where the government matches funds sent to hometowns rather than individuals, there remains the question of whether or not scarce public funds should be used in areas that already benefit from remittance inflows.

Another tricky issue that crops up is the relationship between remittance senders and receivers. All sorts of tensions can arise from asymmetric information. The sender may not feel like he or she has control over how the relatives spend the money and that they do so carelessly or without regard to the efforts undertaken. Indeed, even in cases where remittances are able to bring people out of poverty, they may simultaneously reinforce a community atmosphere of “apathy and waiting” that dominates micro-level functioning of society.

To conclude, the term remittance is complex and amorphous. One cannot assess the ‘net benefit’ of remittances (or migration more generally) on development because the effects that are felt in different spheres and time frames cannot meaningfully be added together. In other words, any single remittance exchange can have any number of ramifications, short term and long term, for the senders, receivers, communities and society at large. Each individual perceives the exchange in a way relative to his or her environment. Thus, to net out these benefits would be meaningless. However, one of the major premises of setting up the expansive labor export system in the Philippines was the hope that migrants would remit money back into the domestic economy. In the next section, I explore the historical explanations for why this policy came to fruition.

**Right People, Right Time: Contextualizing the Exponential Increase in Filipino Migrants**

The Philippine islands lie at the eastern most edge of Southeast Asia and were once considered part of East Asia. In the late 1950s, the Philippines was the

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10 Taxing usually does not work for the obvious reason that migrants will choose to circumvent official cash transfers and opt into other methods instead.


second-most industrialized country in Asia after Japan. However, the landowning political elites pressured the government to remove import and currency controls and as a result the industrial base never developed as it could have. The origins of this omnipotent landed oligarchy lie in the decision of 16th-century Spanish colonists to empower native leaders through land grants, which severely contrasted the indigenous view of land as a communal resource. When the Americans assumed control after the Spanish-American war in 1898, they chose not to reform the system because doing so would have interrupted the flow of cheap natural resources to the United States. Consequently, today 5.5% of families own 44% of arable land and a mere 100 families hold all elected positions at the national level.

Despite independence in 1946 and market liberalization post World War II, the entrenched power of the landed oligarchy has prohibited the capacity of the Philippines to grow economically and equitably like its East Asian neighbors. By the 1970s, this economic stagnation manifested itself in two interconnected issues: (1) a surplus of domestic labor and (2) unfeasibly low wages. The Philippines sought a temporary solution for resulting internal economic problems: exporting labor. During the period of martial law under Marcos (1972-81), in the face of land ownership restrictions due to vestiges of Spanish colonialism and American occupation, citizens sought to engage in waged labor. However, the majority of the population lived at a subsistence level, leaving few opportunities for domestic employment for skilled and unskilled workers alike. Jobs that did exist yielded unfeasibly low wages. Former Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos and subsequent administrations actively supported the export policy as a solution to a labor surplus at home. The goal was for migrants to go abroad to earn high wages, remit money back to offset the balance of payments deficit, and then return home after their contractual work had finished with new skills to employ in the home market. The way in which the Philippines institutionalized labor export is discussed next.

Supply and Demand: Policy Actions in the Migrant Marketplace

In this section, I analyze the two components of migrant employment abroad: (1) the supply in the sending country and (2) demand in receiving countries by examining the specifics of the creation of the POEA and various labor demands from 1970 onward.

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15 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
Sending Country

There were three government agencies connected to the administration of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs): the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB), the National Seamen Board (NSB), and the Bureau of Employment Services (BES) housed in the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). In 1982, President Ferdinand Marcos consolidated these three departments into one comprehensive agency, the Philippines Overseas Employment Agency. The official mandate of the agency is as follows:20

“[POEA] shall formulate and undertake a systematic program of promoting and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino workers, taking into consideration domestic manpower requirements, and to protect their rights to fair and equitable employment practices.”21

Marcos was ousted a mere four years later during the People’s Power Revolution of 1986. His successor, Corazon “Cory” Aquino later revised POEA’s organization through another executive order in 1987. Although part of her election campaign promised not to substantially increase the number of overseas workers due to growing concerns that OFWs bore an unfair burden of the National Development Plan by being separated from their families, the mandate essentially did the opposite. In addition to changes to the agency’s structure, Aquino expanded POEA’s role by mandating that the agency

(1) Regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and overseas placement of workers by setting up a licensing and registration system;
(2) Protect the rights of Filipino workers for overseas employment to fair and equitable recruitment and employment practices and ensure their welfare;
(3) Develop and implement programs for the effective monitoring of returning contract workers, promoting their re-training and re-employment or their smooth re-integration into the mainstream of national economy in coordination with other government agencies as well as other legal provisions to monitor and protect Filipino workers.22

At its core, this mandate set up the preconditions for more involvement and intervention into migrant recruitment and protection on the part of the government.

Destination Countries

While the Philippines has actively pursued this labor export policy since 1972, the composition of the migrant flow in terms of gender and occupation abroad is also largely shaped by the policies and needs of receiving countries. The bulk of migrants engage in contract work in the Middle East and East Asia.

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20 I have excluded the specific points of the mandate that discuss the internal structure of the organization, as they are not particular to this organization.
21 Ferdinand Marcos, Executive Order No. 797 (Manila, Philippines, 1982).
22 Corazon Aquino, Executive Order No. 247 (Manila, Philippines, 1987).
The Arabian Gulf countries undertook major development projects after the significant increases in oil prices in the 1970s, which necessitated additional labor. This flow to the Middle East was overwhelmingly male, as many of the jobs involved traditionally masculine construction work. By the 1980s, however, most of the projects had been more or less completed, diminishing the need for male migrant workers. At this point there was a shift in the gender composition of Asian migration from male to female. The gendered demand of migrant workers switched to female workers who could perform reproductive roles and would service the infrastructure.

Many of the female migrant workers in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are domestic workers. However, by the late 1990s there was yet another shift in these migratory flows. The success of the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea) led to rising numbers of dual-income families and a push for higher rates of female labor-force participation in these countries. This, in turn, generated a need for domestic workers to take care of the house, and one answer was to find and employ cheap female migrant workers. The emergence of the ‘global care chain’ has been a huge source of demand for Filipina and other Southeast Asian domestic workers, typically women. Today, the flow is approximately equal in terms of gender, as many Gulf countries have again begun major construction projects and East Asian economies still need domestic help. In the next section, I quantify these migrant flows and relate them to remittance trends.

**Migrant and Remittance Flows and Current Stock**

The number of migrants – and their prized remittances – has continued to increase steadily and significantly over time. What was thought to be a temporary panacea to a nation’s economic woes has instead resulted in a state-led migratory apparatus with thousands of Filipino laborers leaving every day. In 2013 alone, 1.8 million migrant workers were deployed, 464,888 of which were new hires. On a regional scale, over half of the top ten sending regions within the Philippines for new hires come from Metro Manila, the capital city, and surrounding areas, Cavite and Batangas.

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27 Philippines Overseas Employment Administration.
Concurrent with the expansion of the state migratory apparatus in the early 1970s and into the 1980s, official cash remittances have soared from about $10 million in 1970 to over $25 billion in 2014. Despite ever-increasing numbers of Filipinos working abroad and remitting money, however, the economy continues to fumble its way forward. Though the country’s GDP growth rate is high by the standards of advanced economies (7.1%, 6.8%, and 5.8% in 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively), the fluctuation of the figure suggests the instability of the economy at a macroeconomic scale. In addition, the effects of growth have not been felt equitably, as the landowning class continues to wield disproportionate wealth and power.

To recall the original thought process of the Marcos mandate in 1982, the main benefit of labor migration was to be remittances, with the added benefit of new skills gained while employed abroad. By 1987 however, the Aquino administration emphasized the need to reintegrate the workers into the economy, which suggested a relative increase in the importance of the skills earned abroad. This could be a plausible benefit, except for the fact that many workers are underemployed for their skill level. For example, nearly one third of all new hires in 2013 were domestic workers. Since women make up about half of the workers deployed, this indicates that many Filipino women, skilled and educated women, engage in domestic labor abroad. While there are certainly experiences to be gained while abroad, domestic work does not allow women to flourish in the Fil-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metro Manila</td>
<td>67,196</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>33,406</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>33,790</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavite</td>
<td>19,419</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>11,262</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>8,157</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batangas</td>
<td>19,059</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>13,727</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5,332</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangasinan</td>
<td>17,825</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7,467</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>10,358</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cebu</td>
<td>15,756</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>10,213</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5,543</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maguindanao</td>
<td>15,265</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>14,139</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laguna</td>
<td>15,199</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>8,230</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6,869</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulacan Province</td>
<td>14,695</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7,981</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6,714</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rizal</td>
<td>13,150</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7,534</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5,616</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pampanga</td>
<td>13,029</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8,448</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4,581</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (Top 10)</td>
<td>210,513</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>109,394</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>101,119</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>200,296</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>70,240</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>130,056</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>410,809</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>179,634</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>231,175</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IOM, 2013

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41 Philippines Overseas Employment Administration.
Filipino national wage economy in the Philippines since they are not cultivating professional or other skills.

With regard to the gender composition based on destination country, it is clear from Figure 1 that the most highly feminized destinations are those in East Asia, while the United States is about gender equal, and Saudi Arabia is the least feminized. The Asian Tigers are typically in between 70% and 80% female, reflecting the consistent demand on the part of East Asian countries for Filipina migrants, particularly domestic workers. Perhaps the most common occupation is domestic work, but female migrants are also employed as nurses, entertainers, and so on. The percentage of female migrants to Saudi Arabia, a big destination for Asian migrant workers in general, increased from just over 20% in 1993 to just under 30% in 2002. This can be attributed to the need for domestic workers in the Middle East, especially as construction projects waned and help was needed to maintain the infrastructure.

32 This ambiguous term can refer to performing artists, but is generally a euphemism for bar girls and sex workers. In the recent years the demand for entertainers in Japan, the major destination country, has decreased by 95% due to embarrassment on the part of the Japanese for being placed on a U.S. State Department list of countries lax toward human trafficking.

Survey on Overseas Filipinos (SOF) Analysis

The Survey on Overseas Filipinos, or SOF, is a government-conducted survey of roughly 3,000 workers employed overseas. While nationally aggregated data are available through the POEA, the SOF questionnaire includes data on gender composition of migrants, their region of origin, reasons for migrating, and occupations at home (if any) and abroad. The crucial outcome of analyzing the SOF data comes from a comparison of migrants’ occupations in the Philippines versus the kind of work they are employed in abroad. Table 4 lists the occupational groups of migrants before they left for the most recent year (2002). These totals are for those who cited contract work as their reason for leaving, as opposed to tourism, study, etc.

First, the obvious conclusion is that migrant workers come from all sorts of professional and non-professional backgrounds, and range from farmers to technicians to health professionals. However, at a more nuanced level, the top occupational categories (say, with 100 or more individuals) are individuals who are professional or semi-professional. This suggests that it is not the poorest of the poor who migrate, but instead those families or individuals with enough resources to afford the cost of migrating. As Jason DeParle said in his 2007 New York Times cover page article on Filipino migrant workers, “Only the privileged among the poor could leave.” There is therefore more to the story than just wages abroad. Additionally, to recall Hanson’s conclusion of the varying effects on welfare based on skilled emigration, there will be reductions in welfare for unskilled workers in the domestic economy and ambiguous effects for skilled workers domestically. Yet, the situation is complicated further by the fact that unskilled workers are also emigrating. Hanson’s model does not encompass unskilled emigration due to the fact that if we assume that unskilled migrants make negative contributions to social welfare programs, then the effect of unskilled emigration is ambiguous for both skilled and unskilled workers. Additionally, at 29% of total migrants, homemakers and students comprise a significant plurality of overseas contract workers, which is fascinating because this implies that working abroad is not just a shift in occupation, but also a shift from non-employment to employment.
### Table 3 Occupation of Filipino Migrants Prior to Migration, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation at Home of those who cite contract work as primary reason for leaving, 2002</th>
<th>Number of Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special (and Nonwage) Occupations, Includes:</td>
<td>1133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeper/Homemaker</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student/Dependent</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal, Machinery and Related Trades Workers</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers and Mobile-Plant Operators</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Occupations (Value &lt; 25)</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Models, Salesperson and Demonstrator</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales and Services Elementary Occupations (Includes professional domestic workers)</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Science and Health Professionals</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and Protective Service Clerks</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Clerks</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Forestry, Fishery and Related Laborer</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Craft and Related Trades Workers</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, Construction and Related Trades Workers</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Construction Laborers</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Managers or Managing Proprietor</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical, Mathematical and Engineering Science Professionals</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEM Technicians and Professionals*</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and Other Plant Growers</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Operators and Assemblers</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Associate Professionals</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Services Clerks</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Professionals</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision, Handicraft, Printing and Related Trades Workers</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2824</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SOF 2002

The pattern of skilled versus unskilled employment mirrors that of the domestic ranking when looking at the occupations of the same pool of migrants abroad as seen in Table 3. However, the overwhelming plurality of workers (28%) is employed in the category of Sales and Services Elementary Occupations, most of whom are domestic household workers.
Table 4 Occupation of Filipino Migrants in Host Country, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations Abroad, 2002</th>
<th>Number of Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sales and Services Elementary Occupations (Includes professional domestic workers)</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and Protective Service Clerks</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers and Mobile-Plant Operators</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal, Machinery and Related Trades Workers</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Science and Health Professionals</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEM Technicians and Professionals*</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Associate Professionals</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, Construction and Related Trades Workers</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Occupations (Value &lt; 20)</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical, Mathematical and Engineering Science Professionals</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Construction Laborers</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Operators and Assemblers</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Craft and Related Trades Workers</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Clerks</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Services Clerks</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Models, Salesperson and Demonstrator</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professionals (Includes homemakers and students)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Professionals</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SOF, 2002

One can extrapolate two points from this comparison. First, because women comprise the majority of homemakers and the majority of waged domestic workers abroad, as evidenced by the POEA statistics in the previous section, the shift from the Philippines to work abroad is not just a geographic shift, but also one of non-employment to employment, particularly for women. It is not clear whether or not this is the first time these migrants have worked professionally, either abroad or in the Philippines, as the data merely states their occupation prior to leaving. Second, the Filipino government should prioritize the quality of occupations abroad rather than the quantity of recruitments and departures. Indeed, the fate of each individual migrant should be seen as the primary concern, since each migrant’s acquisition of money and skills abroad is the key benefit to the Filipino economy. To take this further, the return of migrants is also relevant to the sending economy, as their retention rate and contributions to the national economy also determine their migration story.
Filipino-US, -Saudi Case Study

Deployment of Landbased New Hires to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, 1993-2010

To look at a more concrete example, take the case of Filipino emigration to the United States and Saudi Arabia. The data points in Figure 2 reflect the number of land-based (as opposed to seafaring) new hires actually deployed. From Figure 2 it is clear that since 2006, over 300,000 contract workers leave the Philippines every year to engage in temporary contract work either for the first time working abroad or for the first time with a new company. Despite a few minor fluctuations, the general trend is upward, with an average increase of 779.3 workers per year according to a simple linear regression. Of the workers deployed, laborers to Saudi Arabia constitute the largest proportion, with about 34.9% of the total in 2010. Though not the lowest percentage, the United States barely musters 0.3% of the total workers in the same year. And although the population of Filipinos migrating to the United States was relatively larger in the early 1990s, about 1.3% in 1993, the average percentage was 0.69% throughout the period, and therefore much less significant than migratory flows to Saudi Arabia.

Having seen these numbers, one would hypothesize that remittances flows would roughly correlate with the migratory flows. In other words, given the ever increasing numbers of migrants in Saudi Arabia compared to those migrating to the United States, it seems likely that remittance patterns from Saudi Arabia would increase and those from the United States would stay about the same. However, a lengthy historical relationship suggests otherwise. As a former American colony (1898-1946), Filipinos have long been travelling to the United States for work, leisure, and permanent residence. Most notably, their status as American citizens excluded them from the notorious Asian Exclusion Act of 1924 and allowed them special access to the United States. Many Filipinos settled in Ha-
Filipino Labor Emigration and Remittances

According to Table 5 below, as late as 2013, the total stock of permanent migrants in the United States was 3,135,293. This number translates to 64.4% of the total permanent Filipino migrants globally and easily the largest. The permanent Filipino migrants in Saudi Arabia are a mere 264 individuals, though the country contains nearly one million temporary workers. In somewhat of a role reversal, the United States contains by far the largest Filipino permanent migrants, while Saudi Arabia receives by far the most migrants annually. Together, the United States and Saudi Arabia hosted 45% of all overseas Filipinos in 2013. Thus, it would stand to reason that these two countries would constitute a large percentage of remittance inflows into the Philippines, the nuances of which will be explored in the next section.

Table 5 Filipino Migrant Stock

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>Temporary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>World</td>
<td>4,869,766</td>
<td>4,207,018</td>
<td>10,238,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3,135,293</td>
<td>129,383</td>
<td>3,535,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>948,038</td>
<td>1,028,802</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: POEA, 2016

Figure 3 Remittances to Philippines from U.S. and Saudi Arabia, 1989-2014

Figure 3 breaks down the remittances from the United States and Saudi Arabia for a slightly shorter time period – the years 1989 to 2014. During this time frame, it is clear from the graph that while both remittance inflows have been increasing, the rate of increase from the United States is greater than that of Saudi Arabia. In 2014, remittances from the United States amounted to $10.374 billion (42.6% of total remittances in that year), while those from Saudi
Arabia were only $2.526 billion (10.4%). What is most striking is that these percentages mirror the total stocks of migrants much more closely than the number of migrants being employed in that year. In the case of the United States, this suggests that despite the permanent residency status of the Filipinos, individual Filipinos still remit money back home. What is unclear from this data is how much each individual remits and what other factors are at play. Namely, is it merely the fact that for similar work, an individual’s real wage in US dollars is relatively larger than a worker’s wage in the Saudi Riyal? Additionally, due to the longstanding history of the Filipino community in the United States, it is possible that Filipinos residing in the United States are more likely to engage in higher skilled, and thus higher paying work, or they remit money in more visible ways, for example through bank wires as opposed to cash.

To return to the idea of remittance-induced development and the welfare of non-emigrants, the only group of people who definitively gains from remittances is the immediate recipients of the money. At the same time, the data reveal that official remittances from the United States are much greater than those from Saudi Arabia. Therefore, only families of American immigrants or migrants would benefit directly from those remittances. We could conclude, then, that investment in obtaining skilled job opportunities abroad could help the welfare of more citizens. However, the POEA does not encourage skilled emigration of the Filipino workforce, as seen by the large numbers of domestic and construction workers in places such as Saudi Arabia and East Asia. Thus, the key finding of this paper is that neither emigration of skilled labor nor reintegration of any labor has been properly addressed by the government, which is to the detriment of the national economy and the migrants alike.

**Conclusion**

Despite the strategy of the Marcos and Aquino administrations in the 1980s, POEA has promoted the increase of migrants and remittances but has yet to fulfill a key mandate: reintegration of Filipinos back into the domestic economy. This last point is a difficult task since the process of labor export has become so streamlined and the higher wages elsewhere continue to be of great appeal and necessity. Theoretically, by the Borjas model, the increase in migrants makes sense in the wake of decreased migration costs and increased wages abroad even with a dip in skill level of the profession. Thus, POEA has allowed for the efficient flow of Filipino migrants abroad. However, the government could do more to capitalize on migrants, as the migrants are not easily integrated back into the domestic economy upon their return. Two changes could be effective. First, the government could vitalize (and create), where necessary, post-departure orientations (in contrast with pre-departure orientations, which have increased in size and detail). In these orientations migrant workers could be given resources to save or invest money earned abroad. In fact, because it is the ‘privileged among the poor’ who migrate, not all the resources earned necessarily go to subsistence, especially any extra money physically brought back with the return migrant during holidays. If there was some sort of incentive to match these funds, it might promote sustainable uses of remittances. This brings us to the next point, which is that if return migrants collectively feel that opportunities are growing in their home country, then they are more inclined to have a reason to
stay. While there is the status symbol of being a migrant or the family member of a migrant, some family members long to witness important events such as childhood milestones, graduations, and weddings. This social cost of migrating is completely disregarded in a strictly wage-focused analysis. If the wages were comparable in the domestic economy, more migrants might be inclined to stay.

These results and policy suggestions emphasize the nuanced complexities and gaps between the intentions of the executive branch, those of the POEA, and those of migrants trying to make a better life for themselves. For now, the number of migrants and remittances continue to skyrocket, while the economy grows marginally. It seems that the establishment of POEA has achieved the first two-thirds of its mandate, but faltered on the third component. It is the ordinary people of the Philippines who must endure the ramifications of this policy.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to everyone who made this project possible. First and foremost I would like to thank my Faculty Advisor, Dean Elizabeth Chacko for walking me through every step of the research and writing process, and lending me her precious time and insights. Thank you to my Graduate Student Mentor, Sherry Jung, and my peers in the scholars program for providing feedback on my drafts. Lastly, I would like to thank Dr. Neil Ruiz of The George Washington University Law School for loaning the dataset with which I conducted my research.
SANITATION SYSTEMS IN THE TIME OF CHOLERA:
The Barriers to Developing a Full Sanitation Chain in Haiti

Kelsey Hatchitt

This research examines the present development of sanitation systems in Haiti in an effort to identify the different barriers to establishing a full sanitation chain across the country. To do so, this research turns to the five steps in a standard sanitation chain, looking separately at containment, collection, transportation, treatment, and reuse. The research will also focus on the coordination between the government and NGOs that provide sanitation access and infrastructure to the Haitian population to assess the efficiency of their relationship. The final aim of this research is to offer a guide to both government and nonprofit workers in Haiti to enhance policies and infrastructure, and overcome the barriers identified. In doing so, the sanitation system would improve in its capacity to separate the Haitian population from waste and associated diseases, providing the country with a better chance of eliminating cholera. Ultimately, the research found that the relationship between the Haitian government and the NGOs is the most inhibiting factor to developing a sanitation system.

Introduction

On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti killing between 200,000 and 316,000 people. The damage from the earthquake was extensive, exacerbating the precarious configuration of Haitian society as thousands of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) flooded the country. Months later, on October 12, the first case of what later became the largest cholera outbreak in the Western Hemisphere was reported in the Artibonite Valley in central Haiti. This second disaster further fractured the country, threatening the health of the population. These two disasters have come to define Haiti in the 21st century, but prior to these events, the country suffered from a crippled economy and failed infrastructure projects, including a nonexistent sanitation system. Cholera spread rapidly throughout the country as a result of Haiti’s fragile sanitation system, illuminating the dire conditions of sanitation in the country that have existed for decades, infiltrating each of Haiti’s departments. Despite the money pledged by the international community, these efforts have largely failed to improve the sanitation system. This research examines the present development of sanitation systems in Haiti, in an effort to identify the different barriers to establishing a full sanitation chain across the country. The research will also focus on the coordination between the government and NGOs that provide sanitation access and infrastructure to the Haitian population to assess the effi-

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ciency of their relationship. Ultimately, the research found that this relationship is the most inhibiting factor to developing a sanitation system.

**Background**

Throughout Haiti’s history, both domestic and foreign actors have made multiple attempts to improve the country’s sanitation. Although these attempts largely failed, it is imperative to identify them and review the role they played in Haiti’s development to understand the sanitation situation.

Since independence in 1804, Haiti’s government has been overwhelmingly dysfunctional and corrupt. Over the past two centuries, civil wars, coups, and foreign occupations limited the creation of an effective and democratic government that would provide adequate services and infrastructure to the population. Almost immediately after independence, Haiti broke out into a civil war, prompted by the assassination of President Jean-Jacques Dessalines. The country was divided between the Northern Kingdom of Haiti and the Republic of Haiti until 1843 when Jean-Pierre Boyer united the two nations. During Boyer’s presidency, France recognized Haiti as a state, conditional on payment to their government to compensate for the economic loss of the colony of Haiti. The Haitian government continued to repay this debt to France well into the 20th century. During these years, resources that would have been used to develop state institutions and national infrastructure were sent to France by the government to pay, in effect, for its independence. This debt had significant repercussions on Haiti’s political system, which can still be seen today.

A disorderly first century propelled Haiti into the 20th century without a stable government, paving the way for the US Marines’ invasion in 1915. The first plans to develop sanitation infrastructure were created by the Marines during their occupation from 1915 to 1934.\(^1\) Despite the length of the occupation and the resources invested, the efforts largely failed because of distrust towards the troops and mismanagement of the resources.

Beginning in 1957, when Francois Duvalier (Papa Doc) came into power as ‘President for Life,’ government money was funneled out of the country and put into private banks for the Duvalier family. In 1964, despite suspension of international funding during Duvalier’s dictatorship, the Centrale Autonome Métropolitaine d’Eau Potable (CAMEP) was established by a grant from the World Bank.\(^2\) CAMEP was meant to provide water services and create “a plan to improve sanitary conditions in Port au Prince.” However, without a government to develop the capacity, CAMEP remained little more than a vapid symbol of progress.

In 1977, 13 years after the creation of CAMEP, another public entity called the Service National de l’Eau Potable (SNEP) was established to manage water supplies outside of metropolitan Port au Prince. Rather than focus broadly

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on rural areas, however, SNEP directed its efforts towards secondary cities, including Cap Haitien and Jacmel, largely neglecting the rural population, which consisted of approximately four million individuals or 80% of the population.3

Political instability continued to afflict Haiti well into the latter decades of the 20th century. A variety of military interventions and coup d’états, most notably the overthrow of President Aristide in 1991, only reinforced the notion of a country demoralized by conflict. Once again, outside intervention determined the fate of the Haitian government. The political instability between 1995 and the early 2000s significantly impacted sanitation projects and the allocation of humanitarian aid. As governments rose and fell during this period, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program, alongside other aid organizations, periodically decreased their funding to Haiti because of a “constitutional vacuum” within the country.4 Aid increased after the military regime was ousted and Aristide’s government was restored, only to decline again in the years following the end of his presidency in 1996. Eventually, aid began to increase once again when the UN Stability Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) arrived in 2004 following another ousting of Aristide.

After the collapse of the USAID project in the 1980s, the next attempt to improve sanitation systems was not made until 2009 with the creation of the National Directorate for Potable Water and Sanitation (DINEPA), the regulatory body for water and sanitation in the government.5 The Haitian Parliament established DINEPA under a law that sought to reform the Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH) sector using public institutions. DINEPA absorbed CAMEP and SNEP, creating a consolidated sanitation institution to comprehensively address the sanitation issues across the country. At the time that DINEPA was formed, only 17% of the population had access to improved sanitation facilities and 10% of the rural population reported having access to a basic toilet or pit latrine.

Nine months after the creation of DINEPA, the January 2010 earthquake struck, crippling the country, vastly shifting the development goals of the government and NGOs active in the country, and posing enormous challenges to the nascent state water and sanitation entity. Originally created to provide long-term services, DINEPA was forced to focus on emergency response projects, like providing temporary sanitation access to individuals in tent camps. The earthquake claimed the lives of between 200,000 and 316,000 individuals and displaced more than 1.5 million, many of whom were concentrated in tent camps, which sprung after the earthquake. The international community responded to the humanitarian crisis in scores, bringing with them medical aid, emergency shelter, recovery teams, and basic provisions, such as clean water and food. This


descent of NGOs onto Haiti after 2010 is perhaps the longest lasting impact of the earthquake. These international organizations continue to work in Haiti, funding development projects through smaller organizations, whilst avoiding the government’s attempts at regulation, thereby decreasing the sovereignty of the Haitian state.

In October of 2010, another disaster arrived in Haiti when multiple cases of diarrhea and vomiting were reported in a small village in the central part of the country. Days later the Ministere de la Santé Publique et de la Population (MSPP) formally announced the outbreak of *V. cholerae* serogroup O1, biotype Ogawa in the Artibonite and Plateau Centrale Departments.6 Scientific research found this specific strain of cholera identical to a Nepalese strain, leading scientists to conclude that the disease was introduced to Haiti by a battalion of United Nations soldiers from Nepal.7

Cholera, an acute diarrheal disease, causes severe dehydration and, if not treated quickly, death. The disease has spread across Haiti in the six years following the first case in central Haiti. Although it has remained concentrated in three departments, Centre, Artibonite, and Ouest, cholera cases have been found in each department as well as in the Dominican Republic and Mexico. As of August 2015, cholera has killed nearly 9,000 people with over 740,000 reported cases of the disease.8 However, these numbers are considered understated due to low levels of reporting at the beginning of the outbreak, with experts estimating record rates of the disease.9

**Aim of Research**

The aim of this research is twofold: (1) to identify how the sanitation system in Haiti currently operates and (2) to identify the barriers to developing a nationwide sanitation system. The sanitation system in Haiti not only consists, as seen above, of a variety of actors, but also takes on a very informal structure at each step of the sanitation chain. This paper then identifies the barriers that prevent the system from effectively functioning in a way that separates humans from their own waste. This separation is key because it is the only way cholera can be eliminated from the country. Broadly speaking, the primary goal of this study is to identify these barriers and to provide policy changes needed to restructure the Haitian sanitation system and in doing so, eliminate cholera. To do so, this research turns to the five steps in a standard sanitation chain to identify barriers within each step, looking separately at containment, collection, transportation,

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9. Ibid.
treatment, and reuse. This isolation offers a better understanding of how the system in Haiti functions and what prevents the system from operating properly. The final aim of this research is to offer a guide to both government and non-profit workers in Haiti to enhance policies and infrastructure, and overcome the barriers identified. In doing so, the sanitation system will improve in its capacity to separate the Haitian population from waste and associated diseases, providing the country will have a better chance of eliminating cholera.

A Review of the Literature
Sanitation Systems

A sanitation system consists of five main steps, which, as created, should be followed in a linear manner demonstrated by the figure below.¹⁰

![Figure 1 Components of a Sanitation System](image)

Containment is the most common way to think of sanitation infrastructure, consisting of a toilet, latrine, or pit to contain the waste directly after excrement. To properly isolate waste after defecation, infrastructure is required to separate the waste from human settlements. Collection is the often-unseen infrastructure of sewage systems, which involves septic tanks or piping that collects the waste from the containment site for later treatment. In certain countries, waste collection also involves manual labor, which requires humans to physically collect the waste from the site of containment. Transportation refers to the movement of waste from the site of containment to the site of treatment. A variety of options exist to transport waste, including sewage pipes, trucks, or traditional methods, like buckets. The goal of transportation is to bring the waste to a site where it can be treated for pathogens and diseases. Treatment is the removal of contaminants through physical, chemical, and biological processes to prepare the waste to be reused or properly disposed of. Disposal or reuse is the final step of the sanitation chain. The goal of disposal is to reintroduce the treated waste into the environment, preferably in a way that benefits an ecosystem. The cycle eliminates any potential for the waste to contaminate other resources, like bodies of water or agricultural products.

Although vital to the system, the last four steps are often neglected in favor of containment, which simply involves pit latrines or toilets leading nowhere. The majority of NGOs that work in developing countries use the sanitation ladder, Lao standards, when designing projects to improve sanitation. The sanitation ladder depicts a hierarchy of sanitation infrastructure, which shows the improvements in infrastructure on a vertical plane.

This preference for the first step, based purely on containment, has proven to be highly ineffective and deadly when attempting to solve the sanitation crisis. By focusing on latrines and the containment of excreta and waste as opposed to the actual function of a sanitation system, the entire sanitation process from excrement to disposal is neglected.

**Impact of No Sanitation Systems**

Until the development of sewage systems, poor sanitary conditions and waterborne illnesses have afflicted nearly every population since the creation of human settlements. Inadequate sanitation systems continue to impact underdeveloped countries, which lack the infrastructure to transport and treat waste. Inadequate water and sanitation services are responsible for a large number of preventable diseases including cholera, parasitical diseases, trachoma, and helminthes, which all have a tremendous burden on Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), or the measure of disease burden on a human life. In Haiti, one of the most common diseases resulting from low access to sanitation services and clean water is cholera, a diarrheal disease that occurs after fecal contamination of food or water.

Diseases like cholera are endemic in countries with little or no access to sanitation or water services because no buffer zone exists to prevent waste and pathogens from contaminating ground water or food products. Without this buffer zone, human waste and the pathogens it contains can easily spread to water sources, like wells and rivers, and further contaminate agricultural products if used in agriculture. Infrastructure and sanitation chains are both needed to prevent contamination and fecal-oral contact, but efforts typically fall short of the requirements necessary for improving sanitation systems.

**A Republic of NGOs: Problems or Prospects?**

Over the past decade, Haiti has become notorious for the number of nonprofits and non-governmental organizations that are present in the country today, so much so, that it has become known as the ‘Republic of NGOs.’ In 2008, it was estimated that 10,000 nonprofits were present in Haiti, a number that increased exponentially after the earthquake and cholera outbreak in 2010. As a result, services more commonly provided by governments are, in Haiti, now largely provided by nonprofits. While this aid assists the Haitian people in the short term, it also severely limits the capacity of the government and its potential to develop Haiti, creating a vicious cycle of dependence.

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Carol Adelman writes of this cycle in her analysis of the aid situation in Haiti today.\textsuperscript{12} Citing a National Adaption Programme of Action (NAPA) study that declared funneling money through NGOs has created a weak government in Haiti, she argues that few improvements can be accomplished until Haiti has a stable government.\textsuperscript{13} In a study she cited, researchers found that the brain drain, or the emigration of educated individuals to more developed countries, is a direct result of the NGOs eroding the legitimacy of the government. With few employment opportunities in government institutions or local civil society organizations, educated individuals leave Haiti to pursue a more prosperous life elsewhere.

Mark Schuller discusses the various components of an NGO that ultimately makes it impossible to succeed in the way it believes it can.\textsuperscript{14} Within this globalizing world, larger development agencies have begun to directly bypass a state’s government institutions, opting to allocate funding to smaller NGOs. But it is increasingly difficult for these organizations to provide a service, as it should exist – sustainable and enduring – regardless of its nature. Schuller offers a variety of points to support this argument. The first, and perhaps the most common, is donor fatigue. NGOs, including smaller charity organizations and larger multinational organizations, rely on altruism from individuals to contribute funding for their various projects across the world, including Haiti.\textsuperscript{15} Although these altruistic tendencies increase in the aftermath of a disaster, like the 2010 earthquake, there is also a tendency for fatigue to set in or for another disaster to distract donors. This unreliable structure makes it difficult for NGOs to survive, and at the very least, for specific projects to be completed.

Instead of acknowledging these setbacks and barriers to success, NGOs continue to push forward, providing an array of services to the Haitian people, which discredits the authority of Haiti’s government and dismisses the sovereignty and rights of the Haitian people. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the government to provide services, like sanitation services. But the culture of nonprofits in Haiti is one of superiority, dismissing the ‘corrupt and ineffective’ Haitian government in favor of the ‘compassionate and experienced’ foreign organizations. This limits the government’s ability to provide goods and services to its people and rejects the right of Haiti to exist as its own sovereign country.

**Methodology**

The primary method of data collection for this research was semi-structured interviews conducted over a period of three months with a variety of workers in the nonprofit and government sector. A total of 10 interviews were conducted during this period in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and Washington DC. Of these interviews, six were conducted in person and four were conducted via Skype.


\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
or email. Eight interviews were conducted with workers in the nonprofit sector and two were conducted with government employees from both Haiti and the US. All interviews were conducted in either English or French and were translated by the researcher into English if conducted in French. Nonprofit workers were selected from both larger and smaller organizations, with projects focusing on water and sanitation in Haiti since the 2010 earthquake. Finally, it is important to reiterate that these interviews were limited to experts in the field. They have a vastly different experience than those actually participating in the system. Further research should be conducted to identify the barriers perceived by the average Haitian person.

Findings & Discussion

The findings of this research will be presented following the steps of the sanitation value chain, not in order of importance or significance of research. As outlined above, the sanitation value chain identifies the five steps of a safe sanitation system, from the moment of discharge to the point of safe disposal or reuse. It is important to take note that the impacts of the barriers identified are not isolated to one part of chain. But for the sake of clarity, barriers will be identified based on the specific part of the sanitation chain in which they predominantly affect.

Step I: Containment

People are waiting for the NGOs to come.16

Containment of waste is the first step in the sanitation chain and should occur directly after excretion. The purpose of containment is to consolidate the waste to prevent contact with humans. Often this means digging pits in the ground or using of traditional porcelain toilets. It is the first step in the chain. Because it is the most tangible, its importance is often emphasized over other steps.

One of the most common themes in each interview on the barriers to containment was the cost of infrastructure that contains waste, like traditional porcelain toilets and pit latrines. The founder of an NGO active in rural Haiti noted that the supply chain of toilets in Haiti is not in the least related to the demand chain. There is a clear deficiency in the goods offered on the market and those demanded by the population of Haiti. Haitians need low cost but effective latrines, but instead they are offered porcelain latrines costing upwards of 1,000 dollars or simple, often discarded Styrofoam take-out boxes, which individuals use to defecate in and toss away. The costly nature of effective sanitation infrastructure has created this market failure in Haiti. Without the ability to properly allocate goods to consumers, the efficiency of the market declines and ultimately fails to serve its purpose.

Another barrier to containing waste is a policy created by DINEPA that forbids organizations from subsidizing toilets. This means that any toilet, whether-

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16 In-person interview, November 2015.
er offered for free or at a reduced price, cannot be given to individuals. Although contentious, the rational of the government is that giving away toilets creates a society of dependence and limits the sustainability of the project. However, individuals refuse to purchase toilets because they know if they wait long enough, nonprofits will bring them toilets for free. And they do. Over the years, and especially since the cholera outbreak, a number of organizations have brought latrines and portable toilets to Haiti. Although education is sometimes part of a project, oftentimes organizations simply donate toilets to communities or households with the expectation that they will be used. In reality, however, the toilets are sometimes used for anything but defecation. In some households, toilets are present simply as a status symbol, while in others they are used more practically as storage units for rice and grains.

As with all goods and services, sanitation exist within a market, where the supplier allocates goods and services to the market that consumers pay for. In developed countries, it is often not thought of in this way but individuals purchase toilets for their home, pay for collection services via their water bill, and contribute to the maintenance of the sewage system through taxes. What is needed for this market to succeed is proper finances, but in Haiti, without a strong government to collect taxes, financing this system on its own is impossible. Meanwhile, the affordability of toilets limits the ability of the consumer to purchase one, which has created the market failure mentioned previously. The policy, the inability of the government to enforce it, and the disregard that many organizations show for the policy is representative of a larger problem in Haiti: a lack of respect from NGOs and aid organizations for the Haitian government’s authority.

Since the creation of the Haitian state, foreign governments and larger multinational organizations have continued to undermine the government of Haiti, refusing to recognize its authority under the pretext that it is corrupt, naive, and incapable of functioning. Using this justification, these organizations and foreign governments enter Haiti with complete disregard for the laws of the state, the demands of the population, and the policies of the government. They enter with the notion that they know best what Haitians need and that with the right amount of funding and goodwill, the problems will be solved. Within the context of sanitation, this culture of paternalism has far reaching effects, particularly when it comes to the manifestation of DINEPA’s no-subsidization policy. Whether or not this policy is the correct route to improve sanitation is not as important as the division it has created between nonprofits and the government and their partners.

A final limitation to containing waste was identified by an employee of a large institution funded by the US government. According to the man, containing waste is less a matter of infrastructure or system than an issue of education and awareness:

Culture affects education, especially within the rural population. People defecate en plein air (outside) because there are no policies. Even with the policies, they would. People do what they can to survive. The country needs to do more work to educate people on how to use toilets. Before 2000, there was a
certain structure, but then sanitation programs disappeared from schools and open defecation increased.

This interview offered two important insights to the study, one less obvious than the other. Although education policy certainly presents an issue in Haiti, the tone of the interview and the bias of the man’s ideas represent a much larger issue that persists in Haiti, especially within the sanitation sector. Haiti is deeply divided based on class (wealthy or poor), language (French or Kreyol) and skin color (mulatto or black). The man, a Haitian working within a US government agency, provided an explicit example of this class divide during this discussion. The perception that educated, French-speaking Haitians have towards darker skinned, Kreyol-speaking Haitians can be defined as elitist and discriminatory. Although united under one Haitian nationality, there is a definite perception that the peasants of Haiti are uncivilized and their mannerisms, whether that be open defecation or rural farming practices, are stagnant and cannot change. When it comes to sanitation, this culture of internal discrimination has a number of impacts. It creates a culture of paternalism within the country, separating individuals based on an elitist system that excludes the majority of the population. Within the sanitation system, it manifests in the supply of toilets. The wealthier people have toilets while the poor are forced to defecate in the open or in Styrofoam take out containers. The poor are forced to adapt to their economic circumstances, while the wealthy deride these adaptations as uncivil, as a result of choice rather than a result of circumstances. Much like the divide over DINEPA’s policy, the division between classes has made it difficult to formulate education programs that are effective but also altered to the specific culture of the country.

This challenge accompanies the second piece of insight derived from the interview that education is necessary. Without education on hygiene and sanitation practices or leadership from government ministries to educate the population, little can be done to solve the problem of open defecation. What is important is that education policies are addressed in a way that is particular to culture, while maintaining the efficacy of the lesson. Even more important, is that these policies exist in Haiti. In 1990, MSPP expanded the allocation of sanitation infrastructure to include modern toilets in its reservoir of public or private sanitation solutions. Along with this expansion, education about modern sanitation infrastructure, including benefits and simple tips for use, was included in the programming. But in 1995, during yet another political crisis, policies and education about sanitation and hygiene practices in schools virtually disappeared. The lack of education policies coupled with a general lack of sanitation infrastructure contributes to the continuing problem of open defecation. A more nuanced look at the identified barrier presents an example of the complexity of Haitian society and the consequences this has on sanitation. Haiti is a deeply unequal society, which, when coupled with access to toilets, only further perpetuates the challenge of containing waste.
Step II: Collection

When you try to solve one thing, you hit a wall.17

One of the more prevalent misconceptions held by aid workers about sanitation is that providing a toilet will solve the problem by giving the individual sustainable sanitation for life. But toilets require services, whether that is maintenance, consistent emptying, or a point of exit where the waste can flow either through pipes to a treatment center or to a septic tank where it should be stored until it is emptied and transported. Most toilets and latrines in Haiti are connected to buckets or septic tanks, where waste is stored to be collected later. The collection of waste is a fundamental step in the sanitation chain, officially separating humans from their waste and ensuring continuous use of toilets.

One of the factors inhibiting the collection of waste is the geographic distribution of the population. Haiti’s population of over 10 million people is sporadically dispersed throughout the country’s rural and urban areas, like Port au Prince, Cap Haitien, and Jacmel are densely populated, with homes sometimes stacked on top of each other. Port au Prince, in the southern region of the country is the largest and most densely populated city in Haiti, with a population of over 3 million in the metropolitan region. Cap Haitien in the north and Jacmel in the southeast are also densely populated, with populations around 250,000 and 150,000 respectively. The remaining populations live in smaller secondary cities such as Gonaives, in periurban areas outside of the secondary cities, or in small villages or isolated farms scattered throughout the countryside.

This diverse demography makes it challenging for trucks or individuals to collect waste in both urban and rural areas. Within urban communities, roads are narrow, unpaved, prone to flooding, and filled with stalls and vendors. In rural communities, similar problems present themselves, although streets are less narrow and communities are significantly farther apart. One organization that concentrates on improving sanitation in urban areas identified the disproportionate concentration of the population in crowded urban settlements as one of its most pressing challenges. Customers pay for a collection service where trucks travel to each individual’s home to collect the waste. But the dense population forces workers to go from home to home by foot to collect the waste because the streets are too narrow for the trucks to travel down. Although the system functions, the organization has faced the challenge of diminishing efficiency as it expands its capacity.

This lack of infrastructure reflects a much larger issue: the government’s lack of investment in public infrastructure and services. Across the globe, in both developed and developing countries, underground pipes are used to collect waste, either directly from toilets or from the underground septic tanks. Haiti, like many other developing countries, however, never had the chance to develop this infrastructure because of its tumultuous history and ineffective governments. This lack of sewage channels and extreme population distribution in Haiti has forced the country to develop alternative solutions to collecting waste, which would otherwise be achieved with underground piping.

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17 In-person interview, November 2015.
The traditional method of collecting waste using the *bayakou* was developed to fill the void of collection services. *Bayakou*, traditional waste collectors in Haiti who manually empty septic tanks unseen in the dead of the night, are in essence the country’s sanitation infrastructure. Exclusively male, they work in teams of three. There is a middleman, who arranges the job between the client and the *bayakou*, and collects the payment to keep the worker shrouded in anonymity and protect the illusion that the client is not dealing with waste. Another individual enters the septic tank to gather the waste, more often than not intoxicated to better handle the overwhelming smell of excreta. He uses lavender scented bleach to soften the feces, making it easier to move the waste from tank to bucket. Using buckets, he passes the excreta up to the workers above ground who empty them into storage containers. These containers are then transferred using a wheelbarrow to various waste sites across the city or, if dawn is breaking, can be left in a ravine for collection the next night.

Despite the incredible importance of the *bayakou* in Haiti’s sanitation system, these individuals are often stigmatized for the work they perform. This stigmatization compels the *bayakou* to work at night, therefore unseen by their fellow countrymen, and forces them to work in exceptionally dangerous conditions that increase their risk of disease and death. Human waste and municipal waste are not always separated in Haiti, which means at times the *bayakou* may immerse themselves in pits of waste containing broken glass and other hazards, increasing their exposure to infection. The stigma against the *bayakou* has also been the cause of violent crimes towards these silent waste collectors, including murder and stoning.

In addition to the stigma the *bayakou* face, there are few regulations that exist to ensure their safety or enforce safe working conditions. DINEPA has recognized ‘manual desludging,’ the procedure used by the *bayakou*, as a legitimate process, but has not yet created a formal document to legalize the workforce. The regulations that do exist were created by DINEPA but cannot be enforced because of the limited workforce within the sanitation department.

This lack of institutional regulation challenges the wellbeing of a silent workforce that households and organizations alike depend upon. These individuals have become increasingly more important, especially for the public health of the Haitian population as they face the worst cholera epidemic in the western hemisphere. The international community does not recognize the *bayakou* as a part of the official sanitation workforce. This lack of recognition from major donors and development organizations leads to a lack of support, limiting the capacity of the workforce to be legitimized despite the efforts of DINEPA. Despite this negligence from the external community and even from internal actors, the *bayakou* will continue to play a vital role in the momentum of the sanitation cycle as long as Haiti lacks proper sanitation infrastructure.
Step III: Transportation

Companies are there, but the government doesn’t know how to regulate them.\textsuperscript{18}

Among key informants, two identified the importance of utilizing water as a component of sanitation infrastructure. For the most part, sanitation systems are water based, which means they rely on water to push the waste from point A, a toilet, to point B, a treatment site. But in Haiti, where potable water is already scarce, the ability to capture water and manipulate it for human benefit is vastly limited. Throughout the world, dams are a critical component of the infrastructure needed to facilitate waste transportation. In the US alone, there are over 8,100 dams and in the Dominican Republic, Haiti’s neighbor, there are nearly 20. In Haiti, however, there is just one dam, located in the central plateau near the Dominican Republic border. The Peligre Dam is Haiti’s only large-scale infrastructure project that manipulates water for human use. Without captured water to push the waste, underground piping will not work, limiting the transportation options in present day Haiti. This lack of hydraulic infrastructure ultimately comes back to the limited capacity of the Haitian government over the past few centuries.

Similar to the lack of functional roads and sewage systems, without the institutional capacity, infrastructure to collect, treat, and store water could not develop to a functioning capacity. Now, in the present state, Haiti’s government is even less likely to provide this infrastructure given the limited state funding and perpetually turbulent political nature of the state. This necessitates alternative solutions similar to the ones in collection: the so-called informal workforce of the bayakou and the official private sector cluster.

However, an individual who works for an international organization closely aligned with DINEPA identified a lack of coordination and respect between the private and public sector. Within Haiti, the toilets and latrines are connected to septic tanks, which need to be emptied on a regular basis depending on the size of the tank. Private companies, like Jedco, empty the septic tanks not emptied by the bayakou. Although the government is rarely involved in the actual transportation of waste, DINEPA has a number of policies to regulate locations of disposal. A disposal fee for each truck that enters the facility is also charged on site. According to one participant, these regulations present a conflict to private sector interests:

The private sector presents a significant barrier with transportation. DINEPA will say ‘You cannot dump anywhere, you can only dump where we tell you and you must pay.’ But the private sector won’t pay the fee or they dump illegally in areas not permitted by the government. They fight rather than find a common solution... There are companies to transport the waste, but the government has figured out how to regulate them.

\textsuperscript{18} In-person interview, November 2015.
This excerpt provides another example of challenges to DINEPA's authority. In addition to conflict between the NGOs and the government, there is a struggle between the public and private sector institutions in Haiti. Private sector companies neglect these regulations for a variety of reasons, the most obvious being the cost. Instead of paying a fee, they dump the waste elsewhere, in rivers, runoff drainage canals, and open fields where it goes untreated and in some situations, percolates down to aquifers, polluting local water sources and further increasing the prevalence of cholera.

This brings to light the disjointed connections between each step in the sanitation chain. The errors of previous steps carry repercussions throughout the entire process. Without proper transportation of waste from the point of collection, it cannot be brought to a treatment site, and without treatment, the waste is instead disposed of in a diseased state.

Step IV: Treatment

C'est ferme… C'est trop loin (It's closed… It's too long).

The process of treating waste and wastewater is complex and capital intensive. Waste treatment necessitates a large facility and extensive equipment to process and treat waste. In addition to the facilities required, different chemicals and technology, like UV Radiation, are required to remove microbes and bacteria. Unfortunately for Haiti, the technology needed to treat waste in the way that is done in Western countries is not present, nor are there adequate sites for dumping and treating waste.

During a conversation with a smaller NGO, the lack of municipal regulation and management was identified as a major barrier to treating waste. According to the participant, the central dump of Port au Prince has fallen into disarray over the past few months, predominantly because of mismanagement within the compound and the collapse of external forces. During the political crisis that has overwhelmed Haiti over the last six months, local and municipal governments have struggled to remain orderly and operational. The Port au Prince dump is under the authority of the Service Métropolitain de Collecte des Résidus Solides (SMCRS), a municipal institution within Port au Prince’s local government. The turmoil from the election crisis manifested behind the walls of the dump, as institutional order crumbled. Rather than disposing of waste, fires are set to burn the waste and piles of trash and solid waste litter the compound because the intake of waste is greater than what the compound can manage. The lack of management from higher up in the institution further hinders the effectiveness of the dump, while interrupting the missions of other organizations.

Another issue for increasing treatment of waste in Haiti is the position of this step in the entire process and the requirements needed for the system to function. Treatment is a continuous process, most organizations however, do not think in terms of the longevity of the projects.

One explanation for this was offered by an individual with nearly a decade of experience working in Haiti: the issue of cost. According to him, “no one who

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19 In-person interview, November 2015.
has the money is willing to pay for it,” leaving the untreated waste strewn about the city. Investing in waste treatment technology is a costly endeavor, which despite its necessity, is neglected for less time consuming and costly projects. According to another individual, the structure and bureaucracy decreases the chances of longer-term projects because NGOs work in terms of funding cycles, and projects must be completed in a certain time period to obtain funding for the next cycle.

There is definitely a lack of coordination and different incentives that exist between parties. The average project length of these organizations is 5 years so the funders and the administration expect results in five years. But the project may take longer than 5 years, especially when discussing behavior changes because that is a generational change... But NGOs are really stressed to show results because of their shorter cycle.20

Donors hesitate to jump into projects that last longer than five years, opting instead for low cost toilets or projects related to cholera treatment and prevention. They choose these surface level solutions over time intensive projects that encourage behavioral change or larger infrastructure projects like treatment plants. But treatment centers necessitate a process, from building the actual structure to maintaining the infrastructure. The longer commitment and process-based project dissuades NGOs, who prefer results based projects to investing in practical sanitation structures.

In reality though, it is only these large infrastructure projects that can eliminate the presence of cholera and other waterborne diseases in the country. This structure discourages long-term projects required to improve sanitation and eliminate cholera, while making it nearly impossible to retain funding to complete a longer project. Without the guarantee of long-term funding and investment for waste treatment facilities, it will be impossible to develop functioning treatment systems in Haiti.

Step V: Disposal/Reuse

Infrastructure and services are inseparable...Toilets depend on services.21

The disposal of human waste is the final step in the sanitation service chain. In an effective sanitation system, waste is treated and then disposed of into the environment, often as fertilizer for agriculture fields or in sewage lagoons. It is this stage that determines whether an endemic disease outbreak like cholera will occur. Regardless of the system, waste always reaches the disposal stage. An individual can defecate in plastic bag, toss it into a river, effectively disposing of

20 In-person interview, November 2015.
21 In-person interview, November 2015.
the waste. What qualifies waste disposal as safe is the location of disposal and the state of the waste upon disposal.

In Haiti, safe disposal of waste is rare for a variety of reasons, most often because of preceding flaws in the chain. Without effective methods to treat waste, it can never be disposed of safely. Without regulatory policies for the bayakou, the waste they collect is disposed of in haphazard places across the cities. Without the ability to regulate the actions of the private sector, they follow a pattern similar to that of the bayakou, dumping waste where it is most convenient. Without concentrated funding for sanitation, major construction projects to effectively treat waste are impossible to build.

The final barrier to the safe disposal of waste in Haiti is one that permeates each step of the chain, preventing the overarching goal of a sanitation system. This barrier, subtly identified by each participant in the study, is the capacity that DINEPA has in terms of regulating sanitation.

The government needs to be involved in sanitation. People think of the government of Haiti as impossible and focus on the private sector development instead. But NGOs aren't sustainable, financially or environmentally. The government and public sector need an expansion of their capacity in order for sanitation to work.22

This explicit statement came in response to an inquiry on how sanitation can be improved in Haiti. In order for waste to be disposed of safely, whether that be in a sewage lagoon or in the form of compost, each step of the sanitation chain needs to be effective. More importantly, cohesion is needed between these steps, effortlessly linking each step to the other and ensuring that no waste is lost along the way. But without proper regulation and allocation of resources from one overhead organization, the chain becomes disjointed and ineffective.

Another concern regarding DINEPA’s mandate is the institutional black hole of funding that is characteristic of economic operations, particularly in the development field in Haiti.

Everyone wants to do something but no one has the resources. Waste management is an institutional problem... They need to get behind the government in terms of dialogue and funding.23

The lack of funding for DINEPA severely limits the ability of the organization to expand their workforce, create and regulate policies, begin and complete WASH projects, and maintain sanitation infrastructure. Instead of giving funding to this government organization, donor states and smaller nonprofits opt to act alone or hire international contractors to utilize the funding. While this is common in Haiti, “the Nation of NGOs,” it is not sustainable or effective, par-

22 In person interview, November, 2015.
23 In-person interview, November, 2015.
particularly when thinking in terms of an entire sanitation chain. NGOs operate within an aid cycle, often completing projects every five years. It is unlikely that an entire sanitation system can be built within that time frame. The only institution that can operate in a country long enough to construct, develop, and maintain a sanitation system is the government. Without the larger capacity of DINEPA, the impossible challenge of safely disposing of waste will persist in Haiti.

Discussion

Everything is lacking in Haiti because of a lack of resources.24

A participant shared these words during one of the final interviews for this research. Although it is valuable insight for understanding the problems in Haiti, these words offer a surface level explanation of the real issues that plague the country. The problem is not a lack of resources, rather an unequal distribution of these resources. Funding for development projects exists in Haiti in great quantity, but it is distributed sporadically around the country to different organizations attempting to solve similar problems. These organizations seek to allocate goods and services to the Haitian people much like the government does in other countries. Projects to build wells, construct cholera treatment centers, install community block toilets, or fund pit latrines make up the bulk of development projects in the sanitation field. Although altruistic in principal, in practice these projects have proven to be ineffective and unsustainable. This is because the nature of sanitation and the structure of NGOs make it fundamentally impossible for these organizations to provide sanitation services to the people of Haiti.

A number of steps must be taken in order to improve the sanitation system in Haiti, eliminate the cholera epidemic, and ultimately improve the population’s quality of life. Broadly speaking, the first step to expanding the capacity of DINEPA is to expand the coordination between NGOs and the Haitian government by creating a relationship of trust and equality, rather than suspicion and disrespect. Given the current political state of Haiti today, it is not realistic to ascertain that DINEPA can expand its workforce and scope independent of other institutions. To establish this relationship though, the thousands of NGOs operating in Haiti and international governments must first recognize the sovereignty of the Haitian state. Disregarding official state policy, introducing development projects without the consent of the government, and meddling in national elections do nothing but erode the potential of Haiti to succeed as an independent country. Instead of listening to a minority of Haitian elites, foreign governments and NGOs must be accountable to the Haitian population, listening to their demands and acknowledging their manifestations as more than chaos on the streets. A shift in how the international community interacts with the Haitian government is vital to creating a stable government and ensuring institutions, like DINEPA, can expand their scope and perform the responsibilities they have been tasked with.

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24 In-person interview, November 2015.
This is not to say that NGOs should be eliminated entirely from Haiti. When applied in a conscientious framework, the work of NGOs has the potential to be very helpful in developing a country and improving the livelihoods of the population. In conjunction with a general shift in the culture of NGOs in Haiti, the format of development projects must also shift before a sustainable sanitation system can operate. Currently, NGOs fund small sanitation projects, which although beneficial in the short run, do little to ensure that Haitians will have access to sanitation services in the years to come. Shifting away from these short-term, aid oriented projects to government sponsored projects will have immeasurable effects on the development of a sanitation system.

DINEPA, located in Port au Prince, is highly centralized much like other Haitian government institutions. For sanitation, a field that requires an extensive workforce and facilities across the country, this greatly limits the chances of Haiti ever bringing sanitation services to the entirety of its people. The premise of a partnership between DINEPA and NGOs should be to expand DINEPA’s presence across Haiti, developing institutional capacities for DINEPA to work at a department level, a city level, and centralized locations between smaller villages. In order for these human and capital resources to succeed though, they must be allocated through the hands of a permanent institution. In Haiti, DINEPA is this institution and rather than avoid the government because of corrupt tendencies, NGOs must strive to improve the institution, which the well-being of the country depends upon.

A critical advantage of combining the resources of NGOs and DINEPA is the number of local sanitation experts that can replace the foreign individuals who primarily work within sanitation today. With additional monetary resources, DINEPA will have the ability to recruit and train a sanitation workforce across the country; each office designed for the particular population demographics of the region. With the help of NGOs, these trained officials can integrate technical sanitation practices into their local governing system and civil society. In doing so, Haiti will have a network of sanitation officials with the scope to address problems across the country, rather than in large urban areas.

An expansion in DINEPA’s workforce would have immeasurable impacts on the state of sanitation in Haiti. Increasing the number of experts in DINEPA will, first and foremost, make the organization self-sufficient in terms of human capital. With the promise of a skilled and experienced workforce, DINEPA can expand its policies, increasing the detail of each regulation and the number of policies to cover the range of sanitation issues in Haiti. In addition to increasing the scope of policy, having a larger workforce ensures that the policies will be regulated and enforced. The enforcement of policies will fundamentally change the Haitian sanitation system, allowing it to expand in its own right as a system designed for the traditions and culture of the country. This is particularly important when it comes to the bayakou and their status in the sanitation sector. Operating in the informal manner in which they currently do is unsustainable, dangerous, and largely ineffective. Only when they become recognized as a necessary component and official sector within the system can their mechanisms of waste collection and disposal be enforced. Funding from NGOs to DINEPA will also provide better equipment and safer working conditions for the bayakou, improving the chance of waste safely making its way from the site of collection to a safe treatment site. An expansion of DINEPA’s funding will also increase the
chances of building and maintaining a number of waste treatment centers outside of urban areas and within centralized locations in each department.

Long-term investment into DINEPA will expedite improvements in sanitation much more than will the current initiatives of NGOs. Rather than helping Haiti, these small-scale projects or short-term donation-based projects do little for the individuals they claim to be helping. Instead, they increase dependency, as communities wait for the unwavering group of individuals to conduct research and surveys, construct toilets, and leave boxes of oral rehydration salts to cure the cholera cases. International aid has largely failed Haiti under the terms and conditions it has set, and it is now time for these NGOs and foreign governments to operate according to the conditions set by the Haitian people.

Conclusion

This research sought to identify the barriers to developing a nationwide sanitation system in Haiti, using the experience of experts in the field as the primary source of data. Each participant identified a variety of barriers, but with each interview, a pattern began to develop, eventually attributing each issue back to one cause: the minimal capacity of DINEPA. Without a strong government institution that has the power to change and regulate water and sanitation services, little progress can be made to improve the system. Policies mandating education on sanitation come from DINEPA, as do policies legitimizing the bayakou, the backbone of Haiti’s sanitation system. Enforcement mechanisms that regulate private sector sanitation companies and the practice of open defecation are at the core of DINEPA’s mission. But without the capacity to expand the workforce, to enforce policies or strengthen the policies to change the system, DINEPA will have little impact on eliminating the barriers to sanitation. To change this capacity, a systemic shift is needed in Haiti. It is not enough to simply move from providing toilets to pipelines, or oral rehydration salts to treatment centers. The international community needs to recognize the Haitian government for the independent and sovereign entity that it is and work to expand its influence rather than suppress it under the notion of goodwill. Sanitation needs a strong and stable government to thrive, and until Haiti’s government institutions expand their scope, the sanitation system will continue to falter.
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Does Religion Matter?
Cambodians’ Perceptions of Buddhist and Christian Development Initiatives

Ethan Nava

Cambodia’s religious landscape has become more diverse in the last century with the influx of religions like Christianity and its various denominations, which manifests strongly in the country’s development landscape. This research paper hopes to understand the social implications of religiously motivated aid in the country by exploring how Cambodians perceive Buddhist and Christian organizations and what factors influence these perceptions. The data collection process included 46 semi-structured interviews conducted with locals and NGO workers of Buddhist, Christian and non-religious organizations in two provinces in Northwest Cambodia. Additional data was also collected through consultations with several academics that have experience working in Cambodia. Most Cambodians interviewed in the study showed equal, if not greater willingness and trust in religious organizations as compared to secular ones, even if the organization was of a different faith. The fluidity of religion in the Cambodian context has allowed for Cambodian participants to reconcile differences between different religious philosophies and to benefit from the multitude of aid provided by various faith-inspired organizations (FIOs). While the religion of an organization or individual did not determine whom Cambodians chose to receive help from, it did affect the comfort level of FIOs’ beneficiaries and how beneficiaries chose to identify themselves. The interviews also revealed the importance of the individual’s experience in shaping perceptions of religious organizations and the existence of an open and tolerant religious environment in Cambodia. Cambodians also tended to compare Buddhist FIOs with their Christian counterparts and expected Buddhist FIOs to adopt more proactive approaches to development. The paper closes out with a discussion of some of the merits that can arise from interfaith collaborations amidst Cambodia’s increasingly diverse development landscape.

Introduction

Since the days of the Angkorian ‘God-Kings’ who derived their legitimacy by associating themselves with the Gods, Cambodian history has shown the unrivaled influence that religion has on society.1 During the Angkor period, religion heavily influenced the development of the country as seen by the numerous religious structures that were erected. Even in the years of the Khmer Rouge when religion was purged, religious organizations continued to play an important role in supporting refugee communities that fled across and to borders of Cambodia. In recent years, religious institutions have made a remarkable resur-

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1 Justin Corfield, The History of Cambodia (California: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2009), 8.
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Today, the religious landscape of Cambodia has become more pluralized with the influx of many Christian organizations. The influence of religious institutions in Cambodia has also been reinvigorated through the many faith inspired organizations (FIOs) that provide much needed welfare services to the populace.

With the increasing multitude of Christian organizations providing development services to a predominantly Buddhist populace, one cannot help but wonder what kind of dynamic it creates within society. Thus, my research question sought to understand what factors influence Cambodians’ perceptions of Buddhist and Christian development initiatives.

To answer this question, I conducted 46 semi-structured interviews with individuals in two provinces in Northwest Cambodia as well as with NGO workers and experts who have had experience in Cambodia, to map how individuals perceive the development work of both Christian and Buddhist organizations. In analyzing the interviews, the perspectives of individuals and NGO workers are compared and contrasted to attain an understanding of faith-inspired development in Cambodia. By analyzing the factors that influence people’s views of Buddhist and Christian organizations, Cambodian FIOs will be better equipped to design development programs that engender trust and cooperation with their beneficiaries, which will be essential to the success of any development program.

Faith-Inspired Organizations (FIOs) and Development

Faith-inspired organizations (FIOs) can be considered some of the earliest development organizations in history. While they traditionally focused on the spiritual wellbeing of the individual, FIOs also supported the physical welfare of their communities, which was essential for the growth and development of their religion. In this study, I take a holistic view towards development that includes any program that addresses the well being of an individual or community, be it physical, mental, economic, or social. I will use the term ‘faith-inspired organizations’ (FIOs) to refer to any organization engaging in development work whose chief motivation is its faith or religion. Following the example of Dr. Katherine Marshall, I chose to use the term FIOs rather than faith-based organizations to encompass a broader range of organizations that avoids the assumption that all such organizations have an affiliation with a formal religious body. This definition includes small missionary groups that run just one or two projects as well as large international organizations implementing a multitude of development initiatives, and can range from having a strong proselytizing focus to one where faith is only manifested in the values of the organization. I also chose to consider FIOs as a subset of NGOs, putting them into the same category as their secular counterparts. In doing so, I hope to illuminate the merits and failings of religious organizations or FIOs as members of the NGO community.

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Background Information

Before diving into an analysis of the views captured in my study, it is important to understand both the historical and political-economic context in which FIOs function in Cambodia. In this section, I will first cover Cambodia's development landscape, to understand the role and impact of FIOs in Cambodia. Then, I will explain the character of both Christianity and Buddhism in the country and how it links to the forms and approaches of their respective FIOs.

Cambodia’s Development Landscape

Cambodia has made tremendous economic progress over the years following the calamitous civil war and Khmer Rouge period in the 1970s, but the wealth gained has often been disproportionately distributed to the political elites within society. With close to 80 percent of the population still living in rural areas, most growth is concentrated within the cities of Phnom Penh and Siem Reap. The vast majority of Cambodians continue to live without access to clean water or electricity and insufficient land to adequately feed their families. Many Cambodians have had to sell their land to pay for medical bills, one of the highest out-of-pocket fees in the region. Thus, despite the country’s average growth rate of 8 percent from 2001 to 2010, its per capita income and education levels have remained lower than most of its neighboring countries.

The Royal Government of Cambodia’s (RGC) relative tolerance for the freedom of association has led to the proliferation of a vibrant civil society and NGO community. More than 2600 NGOs, the majority of whom are local, are responsible for filling the service gaps left behind by the inefficient government. In 2010 alone, NGOs provided more than US$127 million and managed another US$93 million from development partners, resulting in over 20% of total Official Development Aid (ODA) in Cambodia for that year. In 2012, an NGO survey found that NGO projects benefited over one million Cambodians across 24 cities and provinces, and include projects ranging from education to community development to democracy and governance. These numbers highlight the important role that NGOs, and more specifically FIOs, play in Cambodian society.

In 1993, Article 43 of the newly drafted constitution reinstated Theravada Buddhism as the state religion after its removal by the Khmer Rouge almost two

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9 Ibid., 1446.
Cambodian Buddhism

Cambodian Buddhism has undergone many transformations over the span of its history and these developments have shaped how it manifests in practice and thought. Today, most Buddhists in Cambodia follow the Theravada traditions, but there are two distinct schools of thought present within this type of Buddhism: Mahanikay and Thommayut.

The Mahanikay school of thought originates from the much older Cambodian Buddhist traditions and thus, has a much wider influence within the sangha. 97 percent of all Theravada Buddhists are Mahanikay. The Mahanikay sect can be further split into two major movements: the boran and the modernist movement. The dislocation of communities and rejection of religion that took place during the civil war and Khmer Rouge era of the 1970s led many of the younger generations to lose touch with the more traditional boran practices, such as the neak tā (tutelary spirits), that were tied to specific locations. Furthermore, many of the monks during the Khmer Rouge era were killed or fled Cambodia, leaving behind very few senior monks with experience and knowledge of the doctrine in the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge. The karmic focus and democratic influence of the modernist approach also explains their more developmental or socially engaged slant, often termed socially engaged Buddhism. It is usually the modernists that are more predisposed to running FIOs or getting involved in the work of other NGOs.

The Thommayut School, on the other hand, is often seen as the antithesis of the Mahanikay School, having strong urban elements and an association with the monarchy. They tend to be less predisposed to the developmental approaches

decades prior. Part of Article 43 also respected people’s freedom to believe in any religion. Today, roughly 95 percent of the population in Cambodia remains Buddhist, with a significant minority of Muslims (about three percent) and a smaller number of Christians. The strongly religious populace and the state’s tolerance of other religions partly explain why many Cambodian NGOs are religiously affiliated. These FIOs are free to carry out religious activities as long as they are registered with the Ministry of Cult and Religion (MoCR) and refrain from interfering with the state.

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12 Harris, *Cambodian Buddhism*, 205.
taken by the Mahanikayas due to their strict adherence to the precepts of world renunciation.\textsuperscript{17}

Today, Cambodian Buddhism is very decentralized. The monks at each pagoda shape the character and role of the pagoda and are responsible for securing funds for their own programs.\textsuperscript{18} Most pagodas have historically functioned as community centers providing education and basic healthcare (often in the form of traditional healers) as well as caring for disabled, widows and orphans in their respective communities, be it rural or urban.\textsuperscript{19} In my own travels, I have witnessed and heard numerous stories of poor families who send their children to receive education in pagodas, as it is a free alternative to the formal education system. During my time in Cambodia, it was particularly difficult to find Buddhist FIOs that functioned as formal NGOs providing development programs to a community; many still portrayed themselves as religious organizations helping the poor. Nonetheless, the two Buddhist FIOs that I did encounter had a wide array of programs from healthcare to water and sanitation and even scholarship programs. However, these organizations were located within an urban city center, which adds limitations to their outreach. Thus, pagodas will continue to play an important role in locally based organic community development within rural areas.

Cambodian Christianity

Christianity in Cambodia consists of many denominations ranging from Catholicism to the various Protestant churches. Western missionaries first brought Christianity to Cambodia during the 17th century.\textsuperscript{20} Records suggest that the missionary work often included education and healthcare and thus, was both development-related and evangelical.\textsuperscript{21} Like their Buddhist counterparts, Christian leaders were also purged during the Khmer Rouge period. In 1973, there were fourteen Protestant ministers in Cambodia. This number was reduced to three by the end of the Khmer Rouge period.\textsuperscript{22} During the Khmer Rouge period, many encountered Christianity in refugee camps at the Thai-Cambodian border, resulting in a sizeable number of Cambodian converts. The fact that genocidal and life-harming rhetoric could be born within a Buddhist society led many to question the validity of Buddhism as a life philosophy and thus led to widespread disillusionment with their own religion.\textsuperscript{23} Many faith-based organizations like the Mennonite Central Committee, Church World Services, and American Friends Service Committee entered Cambodia along with the numerous refugees returning to Cambodia, thus creating a fertile breeding ground for Christianity to flourish.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[18] Ibid., 68.
\item[19] Ibid.
\item[20] Phan, \textit{Christianities in Asia}, 130.
\item[22] Phan, \textit{Christianities in Asia}, 130.
\item[24] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
Despite the heavy inclination towards Buddhism, Cambodia’s faith-inspired development landscape has a strong Christian presence, with some fields like human trafficking and maternal health being completely dominated by Christian organizations.25 The only other NGOs involved in such fields are the secular organizations found in all aspects of development work. The extent of Christian involvement in Cambodia’s development landscape can be observed from the presence of several large FIO alliances around particular development issues such as the anti-human trafficking coalition, *Chab Dai*, and maternal health coalition, *MEDiCAM*, which boast 80 and 16 Christian organizations respectively.26

During my time in Cambodia, I came across numerous churches that provided education and nutrition programs to the children who attended them, thus revealing a similar trend to the Buddhist pagodas. However, unlike their Buddhist counterparts, Christian organizations were more diverse in their manifestations, which is evident amongst the Christian organizations I interviewed. Some organizations like World Vision, Hagar International and Caritas were international NGOs with a long history and mandate in the country; others like Changing and Hoping for Lives (CHL) were small NGO startups set up by ambitious and generous locals seeking to emulate the western NGO model; whereas other organizations such as the Catholic Church of Siem Reap use more traditional religious structures like the church as a base for their development operations. NGOs and Christianity, as Western imports, have a long history of interacting, informing, developing, and engaging each other in Cambodia, which explains the diversity of development models in the Christian development landscape.

In comparison, Buddhism’s Asian roots lack a comparable NGO model and still rely heavily on their religious structures (i.e. pagodas) as the base for delivering their development programs. The few monks and staff at Buddhist organizations whom I interviewed are the few exceptions that do adopt the Western NGO model in the delivery of their development programs. Thus, the development approaches of both Buddhist and Christian organizations are deeply rooted in their histories and these will in turn shape the interactions and subsequent perceptions that Cambodians have of Buddhist and Christian FIOs.

**Methodology**

Most of the data I collected for this study was attained through semi-structured interviews conducted in either English or Khmer. I conducted interviews with individuals in two provinces in Cambodia, Siem Reap and Banteay Meanchey, as well as with NGOs workers and academics familiar with religiously affiliated development work and Cambodian culture. The interviews covered topics ranging from the degree of interest in different kinds of NGOs to what attracted individuals to particular organizations to how they compared religious and non-religious aid. I approached NGOs and academics through connections that I had amassed through previous trips to Cambodia and through snowball recommendations, whereas Cambodian villagers were approached at random.

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26 Ibid., 33.
through house-to-house visits. A total of thirty-two interviews were conducted with Cambodian villagers. Each province had sixteen interviews consisting of seven men and nine women. In terms of religious affiliation, the sample size included twenty-five Buddhists and seven Christians. Muslims were not interviewed as they were not the focus of the study and only resided in the urban centers of select districts, which I did not visit. Twelve NGO workers who were based in Siem Reap Province or who had operations in the region were also interviewed along with several academics. Of the twelve NGO staff, two came from secular NGOs, three from Buddhist NGOs and seven from Christian NGOs. Of the NGOs I interviewed, most adopted a holistic approach to development, covering areas from healthcare to education to community development. Due to the shortage of time, I did not manage to interview the beneficiaries of all the NGOs interviewed in this study.

In laying out the perceptions of participants in this study, I will first examine Cambodians’ perceptions to give an idea how they perceive development work of FIOs. When exploring the perception of individuals, a thematic exploration will be used to examine urban and rural settings, religious orientation and experience. After which, I will cross reference these perceptions with NGO workers’ perspectives to highlight some of the important roles that FIOs play and how these roles can be tweaked to be more responsive to the perceptions of their beneficiaries.

Perceptions of FIOs

Urban VS Rural: Differences in Education and Livelihood

One of the most important factors to consider when examining Cambodian society is the urban-rural divide. In Cambodia, majority of the country is still rural and agrarian, with only two major cities, Siem Reap and Phnom Penh, in the entire country. Thus, the inclusion of participants who lived in Siem Reap Province was intended to represent the urban populace in Cambodian society, whereas those in the neighboring province of Banteay Meanchey represent the rural inhabitants in Cambodia. The urban and rural experience differs, namely in terms of the educational and financial opportunities, exposure, services, and law enforcement to name a few. These differences shape how culture in an urban environment differs from the culture in a rural environment. This will become apparent when we examine some of the responses towards religious organizations.

One of the responses that clearly demonstrates the urban-rural divide would be the preference that individuals had for a religious as opposed to non-religious or secular organization. In the case of the rural participants, ten out of sixteen had an inclination towards religious organizations whereas only six out of sixteen of the urban participants expressed a similar inclination. Not a single rural respondent preferred a secular organization to a religious one. Instead, those who were not inclined to religious organizations were open to all organizations equally. The opposite was true in an urban context where six out of the remaining ten respondents chose a secular organization, leaving a minority who had no preference. Most respondents in the rural context chose FIOs out of a sense of familiarity with religious organizations or because of a lack of familiarity with
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non-religious organizations for which they claim to have never come across, or both. This lack of exposure amongst rural respondents is one major difference that separates the urban from the rural.

The greater agglomeration of NGOs found in urban areas influences the likelihood of individuals being exposed to both secular and religious NGOs in an urban context. Unlike religious organizations who often have connections with local religious chapters in remote areas, secular organizations are often confined to traditional modes of outreach that start from the cities where there is the necessary infrastructure. In the areas where I conducted my fieldwork, it was extremely rare to find a secular NGO working in more rural parts of the country. Thus, unlike their rural counterparts, urban respondents I interviewed were more likely to have been exposed to a secular organization, which would shape their perceptions of such organizations.

An alternative explanation for this trend is that secular organizations are often confused for Buddhist organizations, especially in communities that have less exposure to secular NGOs and thus less ability to discern the difference. This is complemented by the fact that a number of secular organizations in Cambodia, including the two interviewed in the sample, do include a religious aspect to their work such as by using monks as an intermediary. Considering that majority of Cambodians are Buddhist, the likelihood of a local NGO worker being Buddhist is also quite high and thus, it is possible to affiliate the NGO worker’s religion with that of the organization. Either way, having been less exposed to secular NGOs, rural inhabitants would naturally be less open to such organizations that are foreign to them.

Another key factor that contributes to this urban-rural difference is the perception of choice, which is intimately tied to the finances of a household. Upon further analysis of the rural inhabitants who were open to all organizations and chose not to have a preference, it became clear to me that rather than being motivated by liberal ideas, they are more often motivated by need. While their responses to other questions indicate a clear preference for religious organizations, their circumstances precede their comfort levels. Thus, they chose to receive help from any organization. When given choices, these same respondents often refused to make them and gave very general open statements like “as long as they help.” When questioned about preferences between Buddhist and Christian organizations, a similar response to the ones they gave for religious and non-religious organizations was given. While affluence is a possible factor affecting the degree of agency an individual has in making decisions, it may or may not fall along rural-urban divide. We cannot assume that all urban inhabitants are rich or all rural inhabitants are poor as some Cambodians travel back and forth between these spaces and may be more affluent despite living in a rural setting or vice versa. Thus, while this trend happened to fall along urban-rural lines, it can only be concluded that desperation of their circumstances may drive them to omit preference or choice, which is seen as a luxury they cannot afford.

While it is not possible to determine which factors are most important in shaping the Cambodians’ experience from this study, it does draw attention to the fact that there will be some differences in urban and rural respondents’ perceptions of FIOs. These differences should be considered in the planning of development programs. The implications of reduced agency in more rural, poorer households can be that individuals may accept whatever development program
is thrust upon them by the FIO without fully believing it. They may accept the program not because it specifically tackles the problems of the community, but rather simply because it is given. In this way, FIOs may find it difficult to receive feedback and input from individuals in rural households who may feel they have no agency.

Religion and Experience:

The religion of an individual is intimately tied to his or her experience. It is neither inherent nor static. A person’s belief system is subject to change based on the experiences of an individual. He or she constantly interacts with new information through the lens of his or her belief system, which in turn informs or challenges the belief system. When the belief system fails to meet expected realities experienced by the individual, attempts are made to update one’s understanding of the belief system to match such realities or to reinterpret the reality altogether so as to retain one’s belief system. Thus, it is impossible to examine the religion of the individual in isolation from his or her experiences. Only when considered together can we see why an individual holds certain beliefs or perceptions about development programs run by Buddhist and Christian organizations.

Christians and Buddhist-Christians: Negotiating Aid and Conversion

Amongst the seven Christians I interviewed, most preferred receiving help from Christian NGOs and were very adamant about not getting help from Buddhist ones. However, the reason they chose not to receive help from Buddhist organizations is not because of the religion itself, but rather because of the lack of a positive experience with such organizations. With the exception of two individuals who were raised as Christians, most other Christians interviewed were converts who had chosen to convert either because they were receiving help from a Christian organization or because they had been disillusioned with the Buddhist faith, and usually it was a combination of the two. That being said, not all of the Christians I interviewed were explicit about this and some said they liked the philosophy of Christianity. However, it does not change the fact that in all the individuals’ stories, they only converted after they were helped, which came in various forms including monetary and food assistance, house and toilet construction/repair, education, and scholarships. Thus, their preference for Christian over Buddhist organizations cannot be separated from their experience with Christian organizations.

They told me to go to some of the events and ceremonies. They helped me a lot so I believed. I can get money and food from the church. – Villager Hem Teth

Because they helped me a lot. I think it [The Catholic Church] is good so I converted…Yes, the morals are good. Everything is good. – Villager Ho Hearp
When I interviewed these individuals, many felt that conversion was the natural response to take after receiving help. They felt obliged to convert. Yet, individuals were quick to point out the agency they exercised in making that choice. And against the backdrop of other Buddhists who were receiving help from the church but not converting, it does show a degree of agency in the decision. So why did they choose to convert while other Buddhists did not? Perhaps some of them did take interest in the philosophy of the religion. The fact that many interviewees held the view of all religions being ‘good’ and guiding people to lead good moral lives made it easier to convert, as it draws attention to the similarities of the religions. However, that alone would not be enough to cause one to forsake tradition and ancestral belief, which are highly regarded in Cambodian society.

By explaining the context behind this phenomenon, I hope to shed light on the combination of structural factors that create an environment for conversion. The first structural factor to consider is the disruption of Buddhist tradition due to the conflict years in Cambodia, which meant that people were often less tied to their tradition, especially the younger generation. The constant relocation of people and eradication of religious influence starting in the 1970s made it difficult to maintain their traditional neak tā traditions or visits to the pagodas, and thus many of the younger generation were not imprinted with strong Buddhist beliefs in their formative years. Secondly, the absence of some sort of method to adequately repay the church for the support they received left them with few other options for repayment aside from conversion. Amongst the Buddhist interviewees receiving support from the church, most mentioned that they were able to repay the church through ‘involvement.’ Some reported that they helped out the church with cooking chores, the running of big celebrations, or by helping to repair houses as part of the Church’s programs. Many villagers described this relationship with the Church as an established norm, whereby the more involved you are with the Church, the more benefits you can receive. Thus, it is logical for those who need more benefits to be more involved by converting to Christianity, as simple chores would only constitute a limited involvement with the Church.

Thirdly, the absence of more conservative elders or the presence of more Christian converts within the community would make the conversion less stigmatizing and thus easier to handle. In one particular interview, female villager Tut expressed her concern with villagers badmouthing her for receiving help from the Church.

If I believe in Christianity, people around me would think that I am not good; they would say, ‘we all believe in Buddhism, why do you believe in Christianity?’ So we would not feel so close to each other...from personal experience, people directed it [insults] at me, so I am uncomfortable. – Villager Tut

Although this was not a common occurrence amongst my interviewees, it does suggest that there is some inertia to converting that arises from being stigmatized within the community. Thus, to assume that a villager converts just because he or she receives aid would be ignorant of the structural factors in which this phenomenon occurs. I contend that it is a choice that is made based on a
confluence of different structural factors experienced by the individual. The individual may then decide based on the level of aid they wish to get from the Church, whether conversion is necessary or even desirable.

Perhaps the best example of the fluid nature of religion and the negotiation process that is constantly taking place within an individual’s belief system is the phenomenon that will henceforth be referred to in this study as ‘Buddhist-Christians.’ Buddhist-Christians are individuals who are not Christians in the true sense of the belief, which requires an acknowledgment that Jesus is the one true god. They are not prepared to give up their Buddhist past and still participate in some of the ceremonies and traditions of their old religion. They can identify as either Christian or Buddhist, but their involvement in both religions suggests that they cannot be considered as purely a Buddhist or Christian. This phenomenon parallels the way in which Cambodian Buddhism incorporated bơran traditions. The bơran traditions in Buddhism are an example of the openness with which Cambodians interpret religion as evidenced by the animist or Brahmanic influences that manifest themselves within Buddhism, at the expense of strictly following the Tripitika.27 Thus, in the same way, Buddhist-Christians are another evolution in the transformation of Cambodian Buddhism where one practices both Buddhist and Christian beliefs simultaneously and selectively. They are the ideal proof that agency exists within the decision to convert. This can also explain the more liberal approach taken by the younger generation towards Buddhism, and the increasing frequency of converts to other religions like Christianity. These younger Cambodians seek future-oriented, pragmatic ideologies that can fill the void left by the lack of traditions.28

Villager Hem Teth is the ideal example of such an individual, as he has not renounced the traditions and practices of his ancestors, still is still involved with the Buddhist traditions, but also identifies as a Christian.

I can’t choose which one. I cannot only believe in Christianity and not believe in Buddhism, because Buddhism is the religion of the old generations. In my family, there are two religions, some are Buddhists and some are Christians. It is difficult to choose one. – Villager Hem Teth

Villager Sar Rear is another example. Despite identifying as a Buddhist, she is quite involved with the Catholic Church and takes part in their ritual blessings such as pouring water over her head. She has registered with the Catholic Church but still asserts her identity as a Buddhist. In doing so, she is able to justify receiving education and food support from the church over the past seven years. How long an individual remains a Buddhist-Christian can vary greatly. For some such as Hem Teth, it may be a permanent compromise, but for others it may be a temporary status based on circumstances such as in the case of Sar Rear who would gladly pick a Buddhist NGO over a Christian one if one ever offered her help; chances are she would stop being involved with the church if

Does Religion Matter?

such a situation occurs. While only a few Buddhist-Christians were identified in the sample size, it is likely this phenomenon could be more widespread. Some Buddhist-Christians may deliberately conceal their simultaneous involvement to protect their reputation as Buddhists and avoid gossip.

The presence of Buddhist-Christians within a community is significant in showing how villagers navigate between their own belief systems and the belief systems of the FIO. Many villagers acknowledge that they are poor and thus are very open to receiving help from religious organizations of different faiths or non-religious ones as well. Yet, many are also unwilling to completely forsake their traditions in order to achieve that support. While many religious organizations profess their magnanimity in not expecting to convert their beneficiaries, they often fail to consider the possibility that social norms may be unintentionally created through interactions that arise from the programs they implement. These social norms may influence their beneficiaries and in some cases, beneficiaries may feel compelled to make decisions to convert. In the case of Taom village, where rural respondents came from, the Catholic Church’s programs propagated a social norm that implied a greater level of support from the Church requires a greater level of involvement with the Church. This social norm may have ultimately led some to convert or become Buddhist-Christians.

The Buddhist Experience: Experiences Define Preference

Since Buddhists make up the majority of the population in Cambodia, it is their individual experiences rather than the philosophical beliefs that explain the different views they have of FIOs. Most poor Buddhists will not be selective of which religious organization to receive help from. However, it may affect their comfort level when interacting with the organization. Out of the 25 Buddhists I interviewed, 13 of them or slightly over half of them said they would prefer a Buddhist organization over a Christian organization if given a choice due to their affiliation to that religion. Some stressed the importance of the ancestral beliefs while others just said it was more comfortable for them.

Out of the remainder, two thirds of the Buddhists (eight people) tended to be more open, saying they would interact with any religious organization, either Buddhist or Christian. This had to do with the fact that many of them had a positive view of religious organizations seeing all religions as trying to help people to lead good lives. This view can be partially attributed to the fact that many of these Buddhists have had positive experiences with Christian organizations and are more comfortable with the religion. That being said, not all Buddhists who had a positive experience with the church remained neutral. Some of the Buddhists who had positive experiences with the church still preferred a Buddhist organization if given a choice, showing the entrenched nature of people’s beliefs or comfort levels with organizations of their own religion. Another reason for people’s openness to other religions is the lack of options available to them, which may drive a person to accept help from any organization out of need as mentioned above.

While individual experiences with FIOs are essential, it is also important to consider that one’s interactions with an NGO can be perceived in different ways and thus, can help entrench a certain way of thinking or expel it altogether. For example, just because a villager received benefits and support from a Christian
organization, does not mean that they would automatically have a positive perception of Christian organizations. I found that most Buddhists who had a more negative view of Christian organizations were those who tended to compare what they got with what other people were receiving and thus were disgruntled with the fact that they were not being helped equally. Interestingly, the rural-urban difference surfaced here whereby only urban respondents who had negative perceptions of Christianity chose to receive help from secular organizations. This goes back to the lack of exposure to non-religious organizations in rural areas, which may have influenced rural respondents not to select a secular organization over a religious one.

Take for example, villager Yit Ken, who was bedridden and isolated in his house for the past 20 years. He clearly showed a preference for Buddhist organizations and had a more negative view of the Church, but when it came to answering what type of organization he would receive help from, he still took a more open stance of wanting help from any organization that offered it. This case is illustrative of the fact that the experiences of the individual, namely their poor circumstances, may still trump religious preferences and perceptions. However, it is important to remember that preconceived perceptions or expectations can also affect how experience with an FIO is interpreted.

Another example of how perceptions shape the experience and subsequent perceptions of individuals is the negative perspective that some Buddhist interviewees had towards their own religion. This had to do with the lack of material support from Buddhist organizations. I found this sentiment amongst both Buddhists and Christian converts. Many of these individuals expressed that they had never received support from a Buddhist organization, only Christian ones, which led some Buddhists to prefer Christian organizations over Buddhist ones. These individuals were often disgruntled with the fact that their donations to the Buddhist pagodas were not being reciprocated with appropriate material support. Furthermore, I found that these individuals were fully aware of the larger theological reasons associated with Buddhism’s focus on world renunciation, but still chose to blame Buddhist organizations for not caring for their own people.

I have never gotten help from Buddhist monks. When the Buddhist temple needs help, they get money from the village but they don’t help [the village]. Instead, the people in the village around here help the Buddhist temple…I would choose the Christian organization. – Villager Chun Chan

To understand this, we must look back to the fundamental worldview of each religion. Christianity adopts a linear worldview in which believers who follow practices diligently go to heaven after death. However, Buddhism is based on a cyclical worldview where believers are reincarnated constantly until they attain enlightenment to escape the cycle. The differing worldviews inform the practices of the religion. Thus, for Buddhism the goodwill accumulated in this life is rewarded in the next, whereas Christians tend to give and receive in this life since it is the only life to do so before Judgment Day. Disgruntled Buddhists are aware of this difference in philosophy, and out of practicality they choose to seek help from the Christian organization. Some Buddhists may convert to Christianity, as they are attracted to the Christian focus on needs in this life ra-
ther than the Buddhist concern with earning merits for the next. Ironically, their focus on material gains is counterproductive to their religious philosophy, which espouses the renunciation of the material; this creates more favorable circumstances for conversion as well.

For example, Buddhist [monks] would take from me and the people around here, but they don’t help today as is needed by the people. They announce that you will have a good return in your next life, not this life. So that convinced me to stay Christian because they preach that they only help the people in life, not the dead people. – Villager Vong Ko Win

In general, the more positive the experience, the more likely a villager will be favorable towards that type of organization. Take for example, Villager Kim Ty who has received help from both Christian and Buddhist organizations in the past. Because of her more positive experience with a Buddhist NGO, which she is currently enrolled in vocational training classes with, she would select a Buddhist FIO over a Christian one. However, because of existing Buddhist beliefs and traditions, Buddhists were not as willing to choose Christian FIOs over Buddhist ones and just opted to receive help from any organization. This suggests that the traditions and beliefs still hold some sway in influencing people’s preferences and comfort levels with other religions. Alternatively, it could also reflect the pressure of social norms that may stigmatize those who choose an alternative religion over those of their ancestors as with the case of villager Tut.

Thus, there are certain expectations that develop between villagers and religious organizations of the same affiliation as them. The absence of support from the organization causes individuals to become more disgruntled with their own religion as their focus has shifted to more material needs first before spiritual ones as seen above. As people become exposed to the proactive approaches of Christian and secular organizations, Buddhist organizations are expected to measure up. The failure to do so could result in a reduction in the size of their congregation or at the very least, the commitment of their followers.

**NGO Perceptions:**

Having discussed some of the most important factors that influence people’s perceptions of FIOs and NGOs, I intend to compare these findings with what I found from NGOs that I interviewed, in hopes of drawing out the implications these perceptions have on the work of FIOs and NGOs.

**Connecting Through Faith**

Most NGO staff I interviewed were quick to acknowledge the importance of religion in development work. They saw religion as an important tool for connecting and engaging with communities. Even the non-religious organizations I came across included monks in their programs as a way of solidifying their relationship with the community. For example, Build Your Future Today Center (BFT) uses Buddhist monks as peace and morality educators because of the respect monks garner from their beneficiaries, making beneficiaries more likely to
follow their teachings. BFT reportedly also used Christian nuns and Hindu priests in the past when reaching out to communities with those respective religious affiliations. World Vision also echoed a similar approach of collaborating with religious leaders or personnel of different faiths in order to connect with communities of different religious orientations.

Faith itself can make a difference in the work that we do. For instance, if you do some research on the role of faith in trauma or overcoming trauma after disasters, you’ll find most recover faster if they have some kind of faith…I think that we also see that faith leaders have an influence on a community so working with faith leaders can help us to reach into the community.

– Faith & Development Director Ajit, World Vision Asia Pacific Office

While all NGO workers acknowledged the power of religion, not all approached it from the more secular view of inter-faith collaborations. Some religious organizations interviewed had little interaction and collaboration with other religious organizations. Many would cite their participation at inter-faith conferences as an example of inter-faith collaborations, but were unable to cite any occurrences within communities. While some international Christian organizations like Caritas and World Vision followed the practice of inter-faith collaboration, other more local organizations like churches and Christian schools were less collaborative. This may be due to the diversity in the organizational structure of FIOs found in Cambodia. While some international FIOs may see themselves as NGOs incorporating religion in development, other more localized organizations like churches or pagodas may see themselves as religious institutions incorporating development into their religious work. Thus, rather than being adverse to collaboration, religious and lay staff at churches, pagodas and other local religious organizations may simply not see the need to collaborate with other faiths since their priority is still to promote their own faith.

That being said, in a country where the majority of the population is Buddhist, should non-Buddhist organizations engage in such inter-faith collaborations as a way to build rapport with a community? While there are definite benefits to being able to do so, as has been exemplified through international NGOs like World Vision, such interventions appear more idealistic rather than necessary. The ability of Cambodians to navigate different religious structures and their hunger for knowledge would imply that they are more than capable of handling the interactions with non-Buddhist institutions. I would go further to suggest that rather than being necessary for Christian organizations, inter-faith collaborations are potentially more important for Buddhist organizations. With the negative perceptions that some participants have towards Buddhist organizations, inter-faith collaborations provide opportunities for Buddhist leaders to represent their faith in the development landscape and to propagate a more positive impression of their religion’s commitment to the welfare of its people. Working with Christian organizations who are more proactive in their outreach can help Buddhist organizations overcome the barriers associated with a lack of resources, while simultaneously promoting religious and social harmony at large.
Moral Guidance in Development

Most FIO staff also cited moral and spiritual guidance as a positive contribution of religion since all religions have a moral code embedded in their religious philosophies. NGO staff interviewed lauded praises for using their religious philosophy as a medium to educate people to be 'good' people. A staff of World Vision even suggested that some secular organizations are missing certain social and emotional elements of development because they do not incorporate religion. He argued that a purely economic focus to development would be unable to enhance the wellbeing of the individual as a whole. That being said, some non-religious organizations interviewed seem to respect this view and focused not just on economic development, but also on the social cohesion and community development of communities they supported. However, unlike their religious counterparts, they argued that religion was a contributing factor to the development process but not the most important one. Instead, non-religious organizations emphasized the importance of education and engaging stakeholders within the community, which included religious leaders.

I believe that community development is not all about religion. It’s all about understanding the issue, investigating, researching and then conducting community consultation to engage them in the process from start to end. For me, if I were to work in Muslim or Christian country, that is still something we need to strive for – engaging the stakeholders. We can engage priests or people in looking at the issues happening in their communities. – Secular NGO worker Sonny

A number of the study participants also echoed the importance of religion as a moral authority that guides them, and tended to prefer receiving help from FIOs who incorporated their religious values in their development work. This desire for spiritual and moral guidance can be traced back to the weakening of Buddhist traditions that came in the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge period. People came to question the philosophy of Buddhism and how the Khmer Rouge was able to proliferate within the virtuous Cambodian society. Disillusionment with this ideology and the fear of going down the wrong path may be what drives some Cambodians to search for that guidance in the philosophy and messages of FIOs. Thus, programs with an emphasis on peace education or moral education may help to meet this demand for spiritual and moral guidance. BFT is one such organization that has recognized this need and has used religious leaders in its peace education program to promote such values. They serve as an example for FIOs and NGOs to emulate.

Redistribution of Wealth

Religious institutions often act as a conduit for dispersing money to remote areas. However, different religions adopt different approaches to fundraising,
which has implications on their development work as well. The Catholic Church, for example, receives money from their international headquarters, which is then dispersed to local churches in smaller sums to carry out development work. However, this appeared to be a function exclusive to Christian organizations. Based on the NGOs interviewed, most Buddhist organizations found it difficult to raise funds, and those that were successful often reached out to international donors. The irony is that many of the international donors for Buddhist organizations that I came across were Christians. Perhaps because of the more decentralized structure of financing amongst Buddhist pagodas, it is harder for Buddhist FIOs to locate additional sources of funding since they are in competition with each other for limited local resources. That being said, some of the members of secular NGOs, whom I interviewed, discussed how Cambodians in communities they support use the traditional Buddhist style of fundraising for pagoda construction to help raise money for other development work in their community. For example, the Health Equity Fund program, pioneered by a French NGO Enfants & Développement, reimburses people for user-fees paid at health centers using the Buddhist model of fundraising, which has proven to be sustainable as well. This creates an interesting dynamic where Buddhist organizations are adept at redistributing wealth within a community, whereas Christian organizations are adept at redistributing wealth between communities. However, the absence of international donors made it difficult for any Buddhist FIO to sustain itself. This could also contribute to why there tend to be much fewer formal Buddhist FIOs than Christian ones present in Cambodia.

The absence of more sustainable international fundraising mechanisms for Buddhist organizations I came across explains one of the key barriers to development for Buddhist organizations: lack of finances. Without the necessary injection of capital from international communities, it is hard to sustain projects on local financing structures alone. As more people expect Buddhist organizations to adopt more proactive approaches to development, Buddhist organizations will have to find new innovative ways to fundraise and meet the needs of their communities. In my opinion, there is room for collaboration for these two different fundraising strategies to support community development. While external fundraising can help to provide capital to jumpstart development projects, internal fundraising through Buddhist structures can help to make these projects sustainable and community-driven. In this sense, Christian and Buddhist organizations have something to learn from each other and would benefit from engaging in inter-faith collaborations.

Conclusion

This study has provided a glimpse into the lives of people in northwest Cambodia and how they negotiate between different forms of development, both religious and non-religious. I found that experience with FIOs is the most influential factor in shaping the perceptions that Cambodians had of FIOs. The reli-

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region of the organization is only important insofar as it shapes the experience that an individual has with an FIO.

Absence does not imply neutrality in the eyes of Cambodians interviewed. The lack of exposure to secular organizations has meant that people in rural areas may not have a clear conception of what a secular organization is. More importantly, the absence of Buddhist development organizations has rendered an almost negative perception of Buddhism. These perceptions are bolstered by comparisons with Christian organizations that have made Cambodian Buddhists set higher expectations for organizations of their own faith. The failure of Cambodian Buddhism to adopt a more proactive development approach that can compare to Christian organizations has caused them to lose face in the eyes of some Cambodians. This implies that Buddhist organizations may need to re-think how they design their development programs, which have traditionally been centered in pagodas. One suggestion could be to engage in interfaith collaborations with secular and Christian organizations by sending monks to volunteer in the programs of those organizations so as to reinvigorate the community’s trust in the state religion.

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Theme 2:

Democratic Transitions and Peacebuilding
UNDERSTANDING NONVIOLENCE:
Lessons from Otpor! and the Arab Spring in Egypt

Michelle Avrutin

Nonviolence has long been used as a tool in bringing about political change. Nonviolent action experienced success in cases such as Gandhi’s Salt March and the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Given the current limitations of second track diplomacy it becomes increasingly important to develop successful nonviolent tactics that will not only empower a population, but also bring about positive political change. Gene Sharp, a well-known nonviolent theorist, began the process of creating certain tactics to ensure successful nonviolent change. However, despite all of his findings it is necessary to define success of nonviolent action, determine the criteria that ensure nonviolent success, and discuss relevant cases. Authors such as Chenoweth provide the empirical data to support the success of nonviolence, while individuals such as Popovic provide the life experiences and practical knowledge regarding protests. In order to better understand nonviolence and address the topics previously listed, I interviewed individuals that have contributed significantly to the field. I also acquired information from the grassroots and spoke with activists and protesters about their experiences. Following these interviews, I applied both the theoretical and practical knowledge to an analysis of the case studies of the Serbian Revolution in 2000 and the Arab Spring in Egypt. Through these interviews and research, I developed the criteria that ensured the success of nonviolence and contributed to the ongoing discussion of the effectiveness of nonviolent tactics. Once these criteria have been fully developed, activists can use these criteria to determine if nonviolent action is the appropriate method to enact political change.

Introduction

Violence – A word that affects millions of people all over the world. We live in a society surrounded by violence in TV shows, violence on the streets and violence in conflict abroad. Thus, it comes as no surprise that for a long time this word has dominated our discussions of achieving peace. During the past 3,400 years, humans have only been at peace for about 268 or eight percent of these years. At least 108 million people have been killed in wars in the 20th century alone. This emphasis on using violence to prevent violence has permeated foreign and domestic policy all over the world. Nations spend only about $1 on conflict prevention for every $1,885 they spend on military budgets; while vio-

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2 Ibid.
vence continues to kill more than 1.6 million people a year. This constant trend of violence is not sustainable and many individuals and NGOs have begun conducting research to find a solution. As this research emerges and foreign policy begins to shift to track II diplomacy, it is becoming abundantly clear that there are viable alternatives to violence, namely, strategic nonviolent action.

Emerging now as a critical concept, strategic nonviolent action has the potential to be at the forefront of theoretical analysis and political change. Strategic nonviolent action can be defined as a term covering dozens of specific types of protests, noncooperation and intervention. Within nonviolent action, activists respond to conflict without using violence. Nonviolent action has been used all over the world since 1980 in countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Slovenia, Madagascar, Mali, Bolivia, and The Philippines, among others.

In my paper, I will analyze strategic nonviolent action and use previous research to argue that strategic nonviolent action is more effective than violence in bringing about political change. To do this, I will analyze the cases of the Arab Spring in Egypt and the Otpor! movement in Serbia as well as research to devise a set of criteria that can be applied predictively to forecast instances in which strategic nonviolent action is likely to be successful in bringing about nonviolent political change. The paper will begin with a review of current nonviolent literature and a discussion of methodology, followed by a discussion of case studies and a concluding argument.

Methodology

The research for this paper is divided into two major categories: academic sources (primary and secondary sources) and interviews. Sources include well-known experts in the field of nonviolence and include Stephan, Chenoweth, and Sharp. The second set of sources include personal interviews from a small sample of experts concerning their opinions regarding their views on criteria for success, their evaluations of Chenoweth and Stephan’s conclusions, their views regarding successful nonviolent tactics, and what they deemed to be successful or not successful in both case studies. There were three limitations encountered in the research process. First, there was no substantive literature analyzing the case studies of the Arab Spring in Egypt and the Otpor! movement in Serbia concurrently. Second, it was difficult to get a larger sample of experts to commit to an interview within the allotted time for this project. Third, due to the time constraints on this project, I was unable to analyze all relevant case studies in order to develop more detailed and more comprehensive criteria.

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4 An unofficial form of diplomacy that occurs at the grassroots level between organizations such as NGOs.
Defining Violence and Nonviolence

There are several different definitions for the concept of violence and nonviolence, and thus, it is important to achieve a greater understanding as to how these concepts will be interpreted in this paper. Michael Allen Fox presents a strong definition of violence. He argues that violence is “force, coercion, or psychological manipulation of any kind, used in a harmful or destructive way against some being that has an interest in not being harmed or destroyed; or that is used reflexively by one who has abandoned interest; or that is used against an object or entity some being has an interest in not seeing harmed or destroyed.” Fox’s definition is quite broad which has made it a bit controversial. However, there are numerous forms of violence that would not otherwise be able to be addressed with a simple definition. For the purpose of this paper, I will be adopting Fox’s definition of violence. The broad nature of his definition lends strength to the argument that nonviolence is more effective in bringing about political change than violence. As such, if nonviolence is effective against Fox’s broad definition of violence then it follows that it will be effective in most cases.

Practicing nonviolence can be seen as unlearning aggressive, competitive, and other types of sacrificing behavior. Nonviolence is a relatively new concept and the term was officially developed in 1923. Fox’s writings prove themselves to be instrumental in providing a more concrete and focused definition of nonviolence. Fox points out that the negation of violence does not fully encompass everything that nonviolence is and what it stands for. He further states that harm avoidance is at the center of nonviolent thinking. This idea of ‘do no harm’ is one of the most basic moral precepts. A narrower view of nonviolence would focus on things such as not fighting, obeying the rules, remaining open minded, and not bearing malice among others. Additionally, when studying nonviolence one must be careful not to equate the concept with pacifism. For the purpose of this paper, I will be adopting Fox’s definition of nonviolence. His narrow definition of nonviolence both captures the essence of what common acceptance of nonviolence is and provides the strongest contract to the previously accepted definition of violence.

Why Nonviolence?

It is important to consider a couple of reasons as to why nonviolence may be the optimal choice. Some of the most basic benefits of nonviolence include the lower rate of casualties and the ability for broad participation.

An alternative to nonviolence that has been used in the past such as in the case of Egypt is the use of a military coup. A military coup d’état can sometimes appear as one the easiest and fastest ways to remove a ruler from power. However, this method has a lot of unintended consequences. For example, it may effectively remove the ruler from power, but it does not plan what group will take the ruler’s place following the coup. This ultimately leads to a misdistribution of

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8 Ibid., 152-154.
power between the population and the elite, and consequently replaces the previous ruler with a very similar or even worse regime.\textsuperscript{9} Others have proposed various alternatives to nonviolent action including engaging in negotiations. Negotiations can be an extremely useful tool in resolving specific types of conflicts where \textit{fundamental issues} are not at stake. \textit{Fundamental issues} are those that affect the issue of human freedom, contain religious principles, or the future development of society.\textsuperscript{10}

Nonviolence is also extremely important to the concept of political jiu-jitsu. This concept rests on the fact that the nonviolence used by the population will cause dissention in the regime’s ranks. It has been shown that a regime’s use of brutality against nonviolent activists has forced many in the ranks to rethink their positions in the conflict and begin supporting the resistance.\textsuperscript{11}

Nonviolence is also superior to violence in other ways as well. For example, the negative impacts of violence linger and affect both the victims and the perpetrators negatively in the long-term. In the broader sense, it can also be argued that violence begets more violence.\textsuperscript{12} Nonviolence also has a lot of benefits for individuals and society compared to its violent counterpart and outside of its strategic gains. Nonviolence can be personally healing and remedial, and it can build up communities and instill trust amongst members of society.\textsuperscript{13}

Understanding its Success

In order to understand the role of nonviolence within successful nonviolent movements, it is helpful to both understand and define success. For the purpose of this paper, success is a sustained change in government in a pro-democracy direction. While according to Stephan and Chenoweth’s research, a campaign can be considered a success if it meets two conditions:

1. The full achievement of its stated goals within a year of the peak of activities.
2. A discernable effect on the outcome, such that the outcome was a direct result of the campaign’s activities.\textsuperscript{14}

A campaign can be defined as a series of observable, continual tactics that are in pursuit of a political objective. There are also certain situations under which nonviolent campaigns can succeed according to their research. They argue that nonviolent campaigns can succeed with mass mobilization and disruptive activities that raise the cost of the status quo and divide the opponent from its most crucial pillars of support, with the aid of foreign sponsorship as well as

\textsuperscript{9} Fox, \textit{Understanding Peace}, 8.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 15-17 and 46-47.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 49.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 151.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 155-156.
shifting in regime loyalty (see figure 1).\textsuperscript{15} Other conditions that may be worth considering include the region of the world in which the campaign is occurring and the timing of the campaign. One may argue that campaigns may be more successful in places like Europe, the former Soviet Union and America because they are places that are more open to protest and democracy. Others may also argue that time period has a significant effect on the success of nonviolent movements. However, according to the evidence, timing and geographic location do not have a significant effect on the success of the movements. As evidenced by figure 1 from Stephan and Chenoweth’s study, nonviolent resistance has had more success in every region of the world when compared to violence. There is also very little support for the expectation that nonviolent campaigns would be more likely to succeed at different times in history.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Figure 1 Rates of Campaign Success by Region}


Others may argue that groups do not engage in nonviolence in certain areas due to the likelihood of success. According to the theorists, there are three groups of major opponents to a nonviolent resistance movement: authoritarian opponents, powerful opponents, and repressive opponents. The vast majority of nonviolent movements have actually been found in countries with authoritarian regimes where even peaceful opposition against the government can have fatal consequences. The authoritarian regimes are thought to be less constrained by domestic electoral incentives, as well as external factors such as human rights or domestic institutional barriers. Even when Stephan and Chenoweth controlled for regime type, nonviolent resistance remained significant in improving the

\textsuperscript{15} Chenoweth and Stephan, \textit{Why Civil Resistance Works}, 12.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 70-72.
odds of success. Therefore, whether the opponent is democratic or not democratic seems to matter little in regards to the success of nonviolent campaigns.\textsuperscript{17}

The second type of opponent is the powerful opponent. Due to such power, it would seem that the nonviolent movements would focus on developing in the weaker states. However, the studies find that the power of the state in question does not actually determine whether a campaign that emerges is violent or nonviolent in nature. It has been found that nonviolent campaigns can emerge in some of the most objectively powerful states, as evidenced by figure 2.

\textbf{Figure 2} Percentages of Campaigns by Location’s Relative Power

The figure clearly depicts that nonviolent campaigns are actually more likely to arise in stronger states in general, as well as more frequently than violent campaigns. It almost seems counterintuitive considering the fact that more powerful states generally have more access to resources that are more likely to defeat such campaigns. Regardless, it is evident that the power of a state in general does not determine whether a campaign that arises is violent or nonviolent in nature.\textsuperscript{18}

The third type of opponent is a repressive opponent. One might think that a nonviolent movement would not survive in a regime where the opponent is repressive. However, many scholars have found that crackdowns by the regime actually lead to increases in mobilization. The argument is that internal and external costs may be higher to repress a nonviolent uprising than a violent one.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, an opponent’s violence is more likely to backfire and create higher external and internal costs when responding to a violent campaign than a nonviolent campaign. Along with higher costs to the opposing party, nonviolence is also more effective. According to the data, nonviolent campaigns are over 12 percent more likely to succeed than violent campaigns.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Chenoweth and Stephan, \textit{Why Civil Resistance Works}, 67.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 68.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
In addition to the effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns, it has been proven that violent resistance campaigns actually have a negative effect on success in general. Violence causes significant backfiring, which creates higher internal and external costs to the regime. Additionally, it has been statistically proven that violent resistance campaigns generally have a negative effect on the chance of success. Thus, it is clear that nonviolent campaigns are effective, ensure long-term success, and encourage the possibility of post-conflict democracy.

Why these two case studies?

Given the time restraints placed on this project, I have only been able to fully analyze the Otpor! movement in Serbia and the Arab Spring in Egypt. There are several reasons that justify the selection of these two case studies in pursuance of the study of the effectiveness of nonviolence. Both the Arab Spring in Egypt and the Otpor! movement in Serbia were influenced by Popovic. The tactics in Serbia were later applied within the Arab Spring movement in Egypt. Additionally, the case studies are in two completely different parts of the world. This allows a full analysis of the effectiveness of nonviolence and the development of criteria regardless of location. Additionally, the application of the tactics in Arab Spring about ten years later allowed for the possibility of the development of the use of social and digital media, which gives us insight into new successful tactics for future movements.

Otpor! Movement in Serbia

Background

Serbia is a country that is situated in former Yugoslavia with increasing tensions with its neighbors, as well as a long history of communist rule. It entered a dark period of economic and social problems following the death of its ruler, Tito. Given these issues, it was evident that Yugoslavia was unable to remain a unified country. The Otpor! movement began following the election of Slobodan Milosevic. Under his rule, average income in Serbia fell from $800 per month to $50 per month in order to keep the masses weak and prevent them from rebelling. Milosevic impoverished Serbia and its people, as well as contributed to an economic crisis and hyper-inflation. For example, in January 1994 a kilogram of potatoes that used to cost 4,000 dinars now cost 9,000,000,000,000,000 dinars. The actions during his presidency were so bad that he was put on trial at The Hague shortly after the country deposed him and was charged with 66 crimes against humanity.

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21 Ibid., 68 and 88.
22 Bringing Down a Dictator, directed by Steve York (2001, USA: A Force More Powerful Films, 2001), DVD.
The Movement

The first movements began in 1996 and 1997 and later developed into the successful larger movement from 1998 – 2000 with nearly 70,000 supporters.²⁵ Otpor! employed nonviolent strategic action successfully through various tactics inspired by theorists and developed by Popovic.²⁶ The movement began with a brand and a message. One of the first items to consider is the appeal of the message to the masses in order to encourage mass mobilization. As Popovic argues in his book, it is not enough to simply have your friends and family come to support the cause. In cases of democratic transition by nonviolent means, it is necessary to have a broad base of support that is willing to support the cause until the end. The movement successfully achieved this broad base of support, which is ultimately what encouraged the entire country to participate in the rebellion against Milosevic.²⁷ In addition to a broad base of support, the movement also did not have a specific leader in charge from the beginning. This was beneficial because it motivated groups of individuals to take charge all over the country and ultimately encourage the success of the movement.²⁸ Furthermore, the movement was also successful because it was adept at keeping its momentum. The leaders used various tactics such as discussing the issues online and hosting rock concerts to keep people both interested and motivated so that the goal could be achieved. They also ensured that the momentum would last by electing one of their own to Prime Minister.²⁹

The movement also had a clear and simple message. The message that proved to be the most effective was Gotoj je, which means ‘he is done.’³⁰ The movement also had a very clear symbol, a black fist that was inspired by the symbol of social change used by those fighting against the Nazis in World War II. The symbol was simple and easy to recreate in demonstrations all over the country, which increased its effectiveness. Popovic argued that if the movement did not have symbols then it was unlikely that they could have gotten such wide support outside of their friends and families. Additionally, the movement maintained its image by using symbols as well as choosing to wear black leather to represent cynicism.³¹ Without the development of a concrete image and symbolism, it is unlikely that the movement would have progressed beyond its beginning stages.

One of the most unique methods that the protestors employed in order to encourage momentum and communication was Popovic’s concept of

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²⁸ Ibid.
³⁰ *Bringing Down a Dictator*, directed by Steve York.
³¹ Ibid.
‘laughtivism.’ Laughtivism was successful because it was able to “corrode the very mortar that keeps most dictators in place: fear.”32 The use of humor, especially in nonviolent movements, has been used throughout Serbia’s history, namely in movements such as the ‘Cordon against Cordon’ action movement33.

External Factors

The Otpor! movement also benefited from external support from allies such as Europe and the United States. Otpor! received democratic assistance in the form of grants, training, material resources for political parties, and the development of independent media and civil society organizations.34 Once the Serbs decided that establishing democracy was the most effective goal and they had decided on the opposition candidates, the United States had specialists flown in to help them establish this new form of government. These new political parties were referred to as the Democratic Opposition Against Serbia. The American and European Allies sent pollsters and political consultants to train the candidates to win in a race against Milosevic, as well as stressed the importance of maintaining democracy after the candidates had been put into power.35

Additionally, towards the end of the movement, the police refrained from hindering the protest’s movement. The police themselves watched as their children joined the movement and campaigned on the streets. The movement included individuals from all over the country, which convinced both the police and military to stand down. Beyond this, the Otpor! movement also motivated taxi cabs to form slow-moving lines, and buses to park and block off major intersections.

The Arab Spring in Egypt

Background

The Arab Spring was a movement sparked in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread throughout other Arab countries such as Iran, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria in 2011 and 2012. These movements in the Arab Spring can also be referred to as demo-movements, which were defined as those types of new movements that lacked foreign leadership, had a democratic mindset, recruited people from all walks of life, and focused on the search for social justice. The Otpor! Movement inspired many of these movements and thus had many similar difficulties in organization. As in the Serbia, fear was a huge hurdle for individuals protesting in the Arab Spring. The people were afraid of the sectarian and religious strife; they feared the repressive apparatus of the regime itself and the “imperialist Zionist Western attempts at Arab integrity.”36

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32 Popovic, Blueprint for Revolution, 111.
35 Bringing Down a Dictator, directed by Steve York.
movements in countries such as Egypt were forced to overcome these fears in order to have a fighting chance against the oppressive and authoritarian regimes that they faced.

There were a variety of movements that contributed to the movement in Egypt, but for the sake of brevity, I will only discuss the impact of the Tahrir Revolution. The protestors of Tahrir Square chose National Police Day in order to protest against police brutality and the actions of the police in general. A couple of days later, there were protests in honor of the ‘Friday of Anger,’ which culminated in the larger Arab Spring protest movement in Egypt.37

There were three major reasons that the movements were able to lead to the ousting of Mubarak. They included the fact that Egypt’s largest opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood, began to mobilize and join resources with many of the protestors. Additionally, the role of the Internet grew and encouraged individuals from all walks of life and geographic locations to participate in the efforts. The last contributing factor is that the issue of Mubarak’s leadership went past simple political issues. Egypt’s lawyers, human rights activists, judges, and those involved in politics realized that the issue at hand was more of an issue of ethics rather than an issue that belonged on one side of the political line.

This protest was no longer simply an issue of ousting Mubarak; it became a plea for reform for the entire government and election system. At a meeting of the Alexandria judge’s club on April 15, 2005 nearly 1,200 judges threatened to withdraw their supervision of presidential and parliamentary elections if there was no guarantee of independent control at all stages of the election. Following this event, many other interest groups began to speak out for what they wanted as well. Shortly after the judges confirmed their position, other organizations modeled after the Kefaya movement began to spring up. For example, groups such as Journalists for Change, Doctors for Change, Workers for Change and Youth for Change also began to rally for the cause.38 Even though the protestors were successful in removing Mubarak from power, they were not attentive to the fact that many of his structures and his entire cabinet remained in place at the beginnings of the democratization process.

The Movement

One of the first factors that set Egypt apart from Serbia is that the huge youth bulge produced unofficial leadership composed of tech-savvy individuals between 15 and 24. For a long time, the education system in Egypt had been developed in order to encourage students to find jobs in the public sector. Due to this specialization in education, many youths were unable to find jobs in more technical fields once there was a scarcity or disinterest in jobs in the public sector. Since many of these graduated students could no longer find jobs, the unemployment rate in Egypt began to rise. The number of Egyptians living below

the poverty line rose from 17 percent in 2000 to about 22 percent in 2010.\textsuperscript{39} These factors among others fueled the youth to rise up against the government. Given the large number of youth in the country and their level of unhappiness with the government conditions, it comes as no surprise that their enthusiasm for change spread throughout the country.

These protestors in the Arab Spring used a variety of tactics inspired by the Otpor! movement, as well as several that they themselves created as the movement grew. However, despite the lengthy list of tactics that the protestors used, the movement can only be considered a partial success. In order to understand why the movement in Egypt falls into this category, it is important to understand the nature of the movement and the tactics they employed, as well as any external factors that contributed to its lack of success.

One of the most unique and effective tools used throughout the protests was the use of technology and social media to spread knowledge of the issues and to garner support. Leading up to the protests, Internet became highly accessible and the price of Internet usage went down from a quarter of daily income for the hour to about 5 percent and lower.\textsuperscript{40} Given the accessibility of the Internet, protestors were able to create Facebook pages, reach out to foreign and domestic publics, build linkages with likeminded groups, raise funds for group membership, activate support in times of crisis,\textsuperscript{41} and provide social services.\textsuperscript{42}

Other than the Internet, there were several tactics used that proved to be crucial to the movement. Following the revolutions in Tunisia, the Egyptians were ready to take a stand. One of the activists' first actions was to adopt a simple and poignant symbol for their revolution. The protestors used the fist from the Serbian Otpor! movement in order to begin their revolution. This fist became a symbol of success and gave hope to the activists in the Arab Spring. The symbol was also easy to reproduce and was able to hold global attention given its significance as a symbol across the world. In addition to a poignant symbol, the protestors also created a variety of slogans that they used in their protest movements. These slogans included 'We Are All Khaled Said,' 'Bread, Freedom, Social Justice,' and 'The People Want to Bring Down the Regime.'\textsuperscript{43} These chants were simple, clear and easy enough to communicate to the masses protesting on the streets. These chants also gave the protestors the feeling of unity and solidarity in the movement, as well as hope for the future. However, what is most instructive in these chants outside of the fact that they serve as good examples for future protestors is that they are vastly different in message. One of the issues that the Egyptians faced in their Arab Spring was the simplicity and directness of


\textsuperscript{40} Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 5.

\textsuperscript{41} Internet and technology played a crucial yet contested role in the Arab Spring in Egypt. Due to the time and length restraints on this paper, it is not discussed fully. The full discussion can be found in the more complete version of the paper.


their message. Despite their many avenues of cooperation, the participants were never entirely clear regarding the ultimate goal of the protests. Many of the participants felt that the communications on social media were motivating, but that they lacked a clear direction and organization.44

The military’s ability to turn away from Mubarak and support the people was also extremely important to success. Throughout most of the protests, the police were willing to do the bidding of Mubarak. For example, during the protests in Tahrir Square, the police were willing to use tear gas and beat the protestors into submission. The forces also resorted to using guns to shoot about 45 people, killing at least two. While the military remained mostly neutral for the first 14 hours, as the police and Mubarak’s forces effectively tortured the protestors in plain sight, the military intervened at the 15th hour.45 The military ultimately protected the protestors and stepped in to protect them against the violence used by Mubarak’s forces.46

External Factors

There were several external factors that contributed to the Arab Spring in Egypt as well. Due to independent newspapers such as Al Jazeera and the social media produced by the protest’s organizers, the international community was able to send resources and put international pressure on the regime to incite change. Before the Arab Spring, the United States sent about $24 million a year in aid to encourage democratic transition.47 The US continued to provide aid throughout the revolution and provided grants to the Egyptian Democratic Academy for issues such as human rights and election monitoring.48

Success

Given the fact that success can be defined as a sustained change in government in a pro-democracy direction, Egypt can only be considered to be a case of partial success given its inability to achieve sustained success. As mentioned earlier, the activists may have been successful in ousting Mubarak and bringing about democratic change, but once the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) stepped into power it was evident that democratic change was less likely.

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44 Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, The Arab Spring, 30-42.
45 There are several key arguments that can be made to explain why the army was willing to protect the citizens from Mubarak, which are expanded upon in the book by Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds.
48 Kirkpatrick and Sanger, “A Tunisian-Egyptian Link That Shook Arab History.”
Criteria for Success

As explored in the cases of the Arab Spring in Egypt and the Serbian Otpor! Movement, both movements were preceded by a long history of protests that contributed to the success of their nonviolent movements. As mentioned earlier, when Serbia was part of Yugoslavia, it had a history of protests against communist rule as well as several protests leading up the creation of the Otpor! Movement. Just as in the Otpor! Movement, the Arab Spring protestors engaged in street rallies, marches, and demonstrations among others. Despite the fact that it has been increasingly difficult to protest in the Middle East, Egypt also had a long history of protests dating back to the time of the British occupation. The Egyptians participated in their first nationalist movement committed to establishing democratic reform in the 19th century against the British. There was also the fact that there were a lot of protests in the region around the time of Egypt’s movement. Given Tunisia’s success with nonviolence, it seems likely that the Egyptian government was more prepared for the possibility and the people were more motivated as evidenced by the upheaval that later echoed all around the Middle East. A history of protest in a country is likely to make the country more open to protests in the future because not only is the country’s government seemingly more comfortable with the idea, but the people are more willing to test the boundaries of their nonviolent movements.

The second aspect of both the Arab Spring and Serbia is the fact that both had diverse and multiple leadership. In the Serbian case, the movement came straight from the people and spread throughout college campuses, households, and even rural farms. However, Srdja Popovic, the engineer of the movement and its tactics, was not identified until after the movement. This was a precaution taken in order to encourage the longevity and enthusiasm of the movement. If Milosevic’s government could identify the leadership of the movement, then their main goal would be to remove the leadership. Additionally, if the movement had a leadership to look to the entire time then it is likely that there wouldn’t have been as much motivation and creativity. It is possible that the movement had a likelier chance to experience the free-rider effect.

The Arab Spring also experienced a movement that did not have a concrete leadership. It was a revolution motivated by youth and the presence of technology, which helped to greatly contribute to its success. Given the fact that Egypt’s regime was quite violent with its protestors, the diversity of the movement’s membership and leadership prevented many of the organizers from getting tortured. However, given the research and case studies presented, it is not evident that this type of leadership is a requirement for success. Whereas this type of unofficial leadership was extremely effective in the ousting of Milosevic, it is highly likely that a more organized form of leadership could have greatly benefited the Arab Spring. It may have been helpful for the Egyptians to have a more concrete organizational structure. This diverse and multiple leadership is

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50 Khosrokhavar, The New Arab Revolutions that Shook the World, 44.
51 Brownlee, Mason & Reynolds, The Arab Spring, 15.
a significant factor in many protests all over the world. However, it is possible 
that in places like the Middle East with extremely violent authoritarian regimes, 
some form of hierarchical structure would have been better.

The third factor that ensured success in the movements like the Arab 
Spring in Egypt and the Otpor! Movement in Serbia was the size of the move-
ment and the broad support that it received. In both cases, the movements start-
ed small but expanded to include nearly their entire countries. The Otpor! 
Movement may have started on a university campus, but it grew to about 70,000 
supporters including individuals from the rural farms, universities, and churches.
The Otpor! Movement grew from a university free speech issue into a move-
ment that ultimately brought democracy to the country. The case was not much 
different in Egypt. The movement attracted a wide breadth of supporters total-
ning about 200,000 activists around the time of the death of Khaled Said.\textsuperscript{52} The 
Arab Spring was also extremely successful in attracting people from various 
backgrounds including students and textile workers in factories. One of the most 
crucial prerequisites for success in a nonviolent movement is its ability to achieve 
broad-based support. Given the fact that these movements are nonviolent in na-
ture, it is much more important to derive the power from the people and their 
numbers against the opposition.

Other than a broad base of support, the movements successfully main-
tained momentum. Since so much of the success of nonviolent movements is de-
pendent on the pressure that the protestors put on the opposition, maintaining 
the momentum in the movement is key to its success. In order to maintain the 
momentum both Egypt and Serbia alternated between large-scale protests such 
as bus blockades and structural violence, and smaller protests or activities. The 
progression of the movements from small-scale to large-scale movements allowed 
the protests to feel that they were working towards a larger goal and helped them 
maintain their levels of enthusiasm.

The fifth important criteri
on to ensure the success of nonviolent move-
ments is a clear and simple message that is broadcasted to all of the 
supporters. One of the biggest issues that the Arab Spring faced was that even with a great 
communication network and social media presence, many of the activists were 
quite confused regarding the goals of the movement. The social media pages 
provided an incredibly important organizational component, but there was no 
clearly stated goal. Thus, there were several mini movements that were created 
with slightly different goals, which took away from the overall power of the 
movement and its ability to successfully transition into a democracy. As a sub 
criterion of a clear message, there also needs to exist some slogans or chants that 
can communicate the message simply and effectively. The Otpor! Movement 
was extremely successful in communicating a clear message and this was reflec-
ted in their choice of slogans. One of the most well known slogans that they used 
was \textit{Gotov je}, which translates into 'he is done.' In other words, the activists were 
explicit in their goal of ousting Milosevic. And by encouraging the use of this 
chant, participants all over the country were encouraged to keep the main goal

\textsuperscript{52} Abdel Rahman Mansour, "My Arab Spring: Egypt's Silent Protest," \textit{Al Jazeera}, January 25, 2016, 
in mind, especially given the many things that the activists wanted to change in their country. The Arab Spring tried to recreate the simplicity of Otpor’s slogans within their own movement. One of their slogans was ‘The People Want to Bring Down the Regime,’ which achieves many of the aims of simplicity and accessibility that the movement was aiming for. However, before long several groups of activists began to create their own slogans including ‘Bread, Freedom, Social Justice.’ Slogans such as these are extremely clever and do encourage enthusiasm among the participants, however, they also detract from the overall message of the movement. In light of the fact the activists in the Egyptian case were unclear regarding the major goals of the movement, encouraging the creation of more complex slogans only worked to complicate the situation and confuse even more people.

The sixth criterion to consider is the effect of the use of visuals such as symbols on a movement. Visuals provide an easy way to spread news and enthusiasm of the movement to people all over the country. Additionally, visuals such as symbols are easily reproducible on all surfaces and do not require the individuals to be literate, which expands the base of the movement to previously inaccessible members of the population. The activists in Serbia started the movement by creating the symbol of a simple and poignant symbol: a black fist. This symbol was powerful and historical, having been used in fighting against the Nazis in World War II. Besides the power in its history, the fist was easy to reproduce on the sides of buildings, on banners, and even on schoolbooks. Before long, members of the government began to recognize the symbol and all that it stood for, especially when they were forced to encounter it on a day-to-day basis. The Arab Spring in Egypt drew from the Serbian experience and recreated a very similar movement of the fist within their own movement. The fist was a symbol of inspiration for the Egyptians following the stories of the great success by the Serbians in a similar endeavor. The symbol motivated protestors and was able to be spread throughout the country.

The seventh criterion for a successful nonviolent movement is that the movement is maintaining contact with and continuing mobilization of a broad base of support. In doing so, it is enabling the resistance to communicate its messages and allowing for resisters to participate in ways that are innovative and difficult to terminate by the government. This, of course, does not imply that every nonviolent movement must use the communication methods; it simply states that there must be variety. For example, the Otpor! Movement handed out fliers, created community activities with barrels with Milosevic’s face on them, painted the symbol in various places, and utilized traditional and foreign media to encourage international pressure among others. The Arab Spring also used a variety of methods of communication including various pamphlets, fliers and social media. An important sub criterion of these resources includes various forms of media including traditional state-run media, foreign media, and social media such as Facebook and Twitter. The Otpor! Movement at first used state-run media in order to broadcast the activities of the movement and involve citizens

53 Tadros, Reflections on the Revolution in Egypt, 39.
54 Popovic, Blueprint for Revolution, 27.
from all over the country. They then relied on foreign media to broadcast events and increase international pressure. In the case of the Arab Spring, they were unable to rely on the state-run media given the government’s strict control over it. Consequently, technology and social media became a really important aspect of the movement. Given the younger population, activists were able to effectively use social media to organize and reach international audiences. Even though the social media was not the driving factor of the protest’s success, it was extremely helpful for the success of the movement. The concept of the youth bulge is not a universal criterion. However, the presence of the youth population proved to be indispensable to the Arab Spring given the fact that without the youth, it is unlikely that the movement would have spread so effectively over social media, which ultimately contributed to the movement’s overall success. In the case of Serbia, there is no data supporting the fact that it was necessary to have a youth bulge, but the youth did contribute greatly to the movement with their participation and their original creation of the movement. Additionally, as mentioned before, participation from all levels of society contributes to the overall success of a nonviolent movement.

The eighth criterion that significantly impacts success is the limited intervention by either the police or the military. The police and military tend to be powerful forces under the control of the government. Throughout history, they have been portrayed as the enforcers and in certain countries such as the Middle East, they have forcibly pushed down and even tortured those that speak out against the government. Thus, the willingness of the police and military to refrain from intervening is extremely important to the success of the protest. In the case of the Serbian Otpor! Movement, the police had tried to intervene at the beginning of the movement to prevent the protests, but by the end, they had allowed them to occur. Many of the police officers were afraid to shoot out into the crowd or to use violence against the protestors because many of these protestors were family members or friends. Due to their willingness to step back, the final decisive protest on October 5th occurred with great success. The situation in Egypt was a bit different. The police were largely under the authority of Mubarak and played a huge role in torturing, kidnapping, and shooting the protestors during events such as the protests in Tahrir Square. Given a variety of factors explored earlier in the paper, the military ultimately defected from Mubarak and began to protect the protestors from harm later in the movement. It is likely that without the military’s willingness to side with the citizens, the protests would not have been successful or occurred for much longer.

The ninth criterion for the success of the nonviolent movement is the absence of fear or in other words, a form of resilience. Throughout history, one of


the most effective ways to eliminate fear and engage the citizens was through the presence of humor. Humorous protest actions were used throughout Central Europe against Soviet communism. The presence of humor in nonviolent protests also occurred in countries such as Thailand between 2005 and 2010. In Thailand, the nonviolent activists engaged in street theatre performances to ridicule the ruling elite. Those in Thailand also used street action to circumvent the consequences of the emergency decree that was imposed to prohibit public gatherings. The presence of humor or ‘laughtivism’ in both the Arab Spring and Serbia proved to be extremely important to the successes of each movement. Humor has been described as an effective ‘weapon’ of nonviolence. The concept of Popovic’s ‘laughtivism’ is the concept of using humor in a protest in order to “corrode the very mortar that keeps most dictators in place: fear.”

This involved activities that would make fun of Milosevic and his regime in order to build up the courage of the people and get rid of their fear. The same principle applied in Egypt, and given the country’s long history of political satire, it also proved to be extremely effective in corroding the fear of the movement’s participants through political cartoons and oral narrations telling tales that made Mubarak’s regime seem mostly incompetent.

The tenth criterion that contributed to the success of the nonviolent movements in Egypt and Serbia was a degree of external support. I would like to use the term ‘external support’ more broadly in order to include the possibilities of direct support to the movement and external influence such as international pressure on the regime through news sources. In the case of the Serbia, external support was directly provided to the movement from the United States and the European Union. These external agents contributed resources such as aid with the organization of political parties in order to help strengthen the opposition parties and make them viable alternatives to Milosevic’s regime. They also received aid in the form of grants, training, and the development of independent media and civil society organizations in order to ensure a successful democratization process post-Milosevic. In Egypt, the situation was slightly different. The international community, including countries such as the United States, provided resources and put pressure on Mubarak’s regime in order to encourage the process of democratization. The United States also gave Egypt grants for issues such as human rights and election monitoring. Additionally, activists from Serbia shared ideas and held training workshops, as well as continually supported other movements all around the world. Given the information presented in the case studies, it seems that external support provides a tremendous amount of aid to nonviolent movements, but it does not suggest that the external aid is necessary for success.

The final criterion to consider is the length of time that the protestors have to respond to the regime or government. For example, in the case of Egypt, one of the most difficult aspects of the nonviolent movements was the fact that the Egyptians did not have enough time to react to all of the events. Because all the

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Popovic, *Blueprint for Revolution*, 111.


Kirkpatrick & Sanger, “A Tunisian-Egyptian Link That Shook Arab History.”
events happened so quickly and consecutively, the Egyptian activists did not have enough time to plan and execute a strategy that would encourage success in the long term. There have also been similar arguments regarding the nonviolent revolution in Syria. According to Stephan, if Syria had had more time, it would have been able to further plan and diversify their tactics to encourage the local resistance and bring their activities together.61

Conclusion

Literature on nonviolence and tactics for success is growing on a daily basis. In this paper, I have ultimately argued that nonviolence is more effective than violence and have analyzed the case studies of the Arab Spring in Egypt and the Serbian Otpor! Movement in order to create a set of criteria to forecast when nonviolent movements can be successful. With further research and analysis, this set of criteria can be later used to predict the success of current nonviolent movements and shape the future of nonviolence.

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Reintegration Services in Areas of Limited Statehood:
The Cases of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo
Nicole Compton

After years of violence by warring rebel groups in eastern and central Africa, the implementation of effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs (DDR) are imperative for conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction efforts. Often overlooked, reintegration refers to the long-term process that involves acceptance of ex-combatants back into their communities and regaining productive levels of engagement. Through two case studies, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, this paper examines the provisioning of reintegration services to highlight the difficulties of implementing long-term peace-building strategies in areas of limited statehood. The research argues that the absence of the state in both countries had a negative impact on the provisioning of reintegration services. In addition, it argues that the role of the state and the ideal partnership between actors must change at different stages of the peace process in order to combat the negative impact of limited statehood.

Introduction

Peace does not begin when the guns fall silent. The equation of the cessation of armed conflict with a state of peace ignores social, economic, and political tensions that surface or intensify due to violence. It also ignores the tension created when the line between perpetrator and victim is blurred. During the transition period from war to peace, former combatants who are highly militarized, have no source of livelihood, and may have high levels of trauma, pose potential threats to the stability of countries emerging from war. Simply ending a war does not bring about peace. After peace agreements are signed, countries enter a post-conflict reconstruction phase. The desire to resolve conflicts, prevent conflict resurgence and create stable conditions for development have turned the international community’s attention to the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants.1

Disarmament refers to the removal of arms from the hands of combatants. Demobilization refers to the reduction in the size of an armed group by integrating them into the national army or returning them to civilian life. Reintegration

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refers to this long-term process that begins once ex-combatants are reintroduced to civilian life. It involves integrating ex-combatants back into their communities and helping them regain productive levels of engagement in the community. The nexus of security and development influences policy on DDR. Increased poverty, inequality, and stigmatization when former combatants return home escalate risk of future conflict. Ex-combatants returning to civilian life have terrorized their own communities and face stigma upon return home. Reintegration encourages more defections from rebel groups, allows communities and ex-combatants to heal, and prevents highly militarized individuals from being re-recruited. Thus, it is widely accepted among scholars and practitioners that effective reintegration of ex-combatants is an essential precondition to peace-building.

Reintegration is a long-term development project that takes significant resources and oversight. However, many states emerging from war have limited capacity to even provide basic public goods and services let alone long-term reintegration support. Many countries have ‘areas of limited statehood’ (territorial or policy areas) where the state has limited capacity to enforce their decisions or provide for collective services. In the absence of the state, other governance modalities exist. Many actors are involved in the provision of DDR, including the United Nations, the World Bank, international development agencies, donor states, and non-governmental organizations.

Reintegration as an area of limited statehood can be seen in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The two countries are at different stages of their reconstruction. DRC is still suffering from armed violence, whereas Uganda is void of armed conflict. This study analyzes the effectiveness and sustainability of reintegration services as an area of limited statehood within the DRC and Uganda in order to determine the ideal partnership between the state and development actors at different stages of a peace process. Scholars have discussed service provisioning in areas of limited statehood, as well as the importance of reintegration in peace building, but not in concert with one another. This research attempts to fill that gap.

Methodology

This research employs a qualitative analysis of 21 semi-structured interviews and secondary sources. The study relies heavily on primary data collected

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in Uganda within the towns of Gulu, Lira, and Kampala. Interviews were conducted with government officials, NGO informants, and academics that were chosen due to their expertise on the reintegration process. All interviewees were informed of the purposes of this research and those who provided consent to do so are referred to by their real name. The researcher drew on widely accepted practices for reintegration in order to establish a baseline criterion for effective reintegration and then used this criterion to determine the effectiveness of reintegration practices within the two case studies.

There were several limitations to the research. First, travel to DRC was not possible due to security concerns. Second, ex-combatants themselves were not interviewed due to ethical concerns, impacting the depth of the study. The analysis relied on reintegration providers rather than beneficiaries. These factors limited the scope of the primary data collected and the interview sample size used in this study.

**Key Concepts**

**Reintegration**

There is a misconception that restoring peace and stability are short-term objectives. Although short-term strategies may silence guns or bring emergency aid to vulnerable populations, they fail to resolve conflict if not followed up by long-term strategies. After armed conflict has ended, the transition from ‘relief’ to long-term development is difficult, but imperative. The neoliberal economic philosophy perceives poverty, underdevelopment and poor governance to be at the root of violent crime and conflict, which in turn undermines development and deepens poverty. Thus, conflict resolution requires a range of programs to bring about both negative peace (the cessation of direct violence) and positive peace (the overcoming of structural and cultural violence by changing attitudes). Reintegration of ex-combatants is one example of an important peace-building tool integral to conflict resolution.

Although the most important step in DDR, reintegration receives less attention in the literature and practice. Reintegration not only addresses security sector reform, but also creates a space for community reconciliation. While disarmament and demobilization are important for peace-building, they are short-term strategies, which have no potential for success without a long-term reintegration strategy. Scholars overwhelmingly agree on the output and outcomes that must be included in reintegration programs or policies. The best practices for reintegration that permeate the existing literature include support beyond rein-

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6 Risse, Governance Without a State, 207.


sertion, economic and social reintegration, psychological support, and support for vulnerable populations.

**Beyond Reinsertion** – The term reintegration is often used when describing reinsertion, the short-term process that refers to the act of returning a combatant back to his/her community. Simply returning an ex-combatant to the community or reunifying them with their families is not reintegration. Complete reintegration is a long-term process. This distinction is important for informing reintegration policy and practice.

**Economic reintegration** centers on enhancing ex-combatants’ abilities to support themselves financially, including the process of moving from survival assistance to gainful employment. Many ex-combatants have missed opportunities for formal education and lack the skills necessary to compete for jobs. Ex-combatants should be provided with viable forms of economic activity. This can be done through providing access to assets and credit, education opportunities, and vocational training.

**Social reintegration** refers to the role of the family and community in accepting an ex-combatant back into the community. Existing literature on reintegration argues that community participation is a crucial aspect of the process. Social reintegration should aim to build trust and confidence among and between former combatants and non-combatants to create an environment that enables other aspects of the peace process to move forward. Effective programs include community sensitization and information efforts to address fears related to the return of ex-combatants. Consequently, many argue that it is important for reintegration to take a holistic, community-based approach. Reintegration must be embedded within wider community plans for peace and development.

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13 Nicole Ball and Luc Van de Goor, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2006).


Locally Driven – There is no one size fits all to reintegration; local context matters. Local actors such as religious and political leaders are in the best position to identify needs and priorities of beneficiaries and thus, should be included in reintegration programming. Vocational training for economic reintegration must match the opportunities of local markets. Reintegration programs should involve beneficiaries (ex-combatants and community members) in the identification, design and management of programming.

Psychological therapy is critical to address the trauma of an individual and the community. Ex-combatants often confront severe psychological effects of their experiences when reintegrating themselves into their communities. These services include formal medical care or traditional cleansing ceremonies. Formal medical care must include counseling and access to professional psychiatrists. Traditional ceremonies and programming by religious leaders have also proven to be effective. These ceremonies symbolically admonish ex-combatants of their crimes and bring them back into the community.

Vulnerable population support for women, children and the disabled must be included in reintegration programs. Restrictive definitions of ‘combatant’ prevent women and girls from qualifying as a combatant, restricting their access to DDR programs. They also face extreme stigmatization, especially those who bore children in the bush, and endure severe psychological trauma as a result of being a victim to sexual violence. Second, despite increasing international attention on the use of child soldiers, there is still a need to increase research on the success and challenges of reintegration programming for underage combatants. Children recruited by armed groups have little formal education and forcibly lose further opportunities for emotional and intellectual growth.

The levels of poverty and inequality that arise when formerly abducted persons return home increases the risk for future conflict. Finally, ex-combatants with disabilities such as chronic pain, impairment or illness need targeted programming. Targeted programs are necessary because poor health or disabilities can inhibit economic reintegration.

17 Slaymaker et al., Community-Based Approaches and Service Delivery, 4.
18 Finn, The Drivers of Reporter Reintegration in Northern Uganda, 17.
19 Slaymaker et al., Community-Based Approaches and Service Delivery, 11.
21 Omach, The Limits of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, 99.
22 Finn, The Drivers of Reporter Reintegration in Northern Uganda, 3
25 Blattman and Annan, “Child Combatants in Northern Uganda.”
Limited Statehood

As a long-term development project, reintegration requires significant resources and oversight. However, many states emerging from war have limited capacity to provide basic public goods and services, let alone long-term reintegration support. The concept of 'limited statehood,' introduced by political scientist Thomas Risse, presents an alternative to traditional 'failed state' literature and social science debate on governance. Statehood, as widely accepted by many political scientists, is the central authority structure with a legitimate monopoly over the means of violence. 26 Fully functioning states command domestic sovereignty or the ability to “exercise effective control within its borders.” They have the capacity to make, implement, and enforce decisions.27 A failed state, often marred by violence or disharmony between communities, has lost its domestic sovereignty. Traditional governance discourse centers on this ‘ideal’ modern nation-state, a state with full international and domestic sovereignty. However, according to limited statehood literature, most states in the world today are neither completely failed nor completely consolidated states, but rather exist along a spectrum. Risse claims that most states, even those considered fully consolidated by traditional models, contain areas of limited statehood.

Limited statehood is rarely an attribute of a state entity, but rather areas of a state. Areas of limited statehood refer to those territorial or policy areas where the state has limited capacity to enforce their decisions or provide for collective services.28 In times of armed conflict, a state may have a monopoly over violence in one part of the country, but not the other. However, limited statehood doesn’t just have to do with controlling territory, but also providing public goods and services. A state may have a monopoly over violence, but lacks the capacity, for example, to provide a functioning public education system or sanitation system.

Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood

The western nation state model assumes governance to be state driven or synonymous with the state.29 However, Risse’s limited statehood theory does not link governance and statehood together. Rather, the two are analyzed separately. Governance is defined as “the various institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods.”30 Services may be provided by domestic, international, trans-

28 Ibid., 5.
national, religious, or multi-national organizations. Areas of limited statehood are not ungoverned spaces; they are governed by other modalities outside the state.31 Understanding statehood as separate from governance is important to understanding the actors involved in peace-building or development efforts. When looking at states through the lens of limited statehood rather than ‘fragile’ statehood, it allows for more nuanced analysis of different modes of governance and cooperation of actors.

Various combinations of state and non-state actors can be found governing areas of limited statehood.32 Many non-state actors are involved in the provision of DDR including, the United Nations, the World Bank, international development agencies, donor states, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). For the purposes of this paper, non-state actors include NGOs, not for profit organizations, and inter-governmental organizations (IGO) as well.

Democratic Republic of Congo Case Study

The DDR process in the DRC is one of the most complex and multi-faceted programs in the world. For nearly two decades, the eastern provinces of the DRC have been plagued by violence. The death toll in the country has reached 5.4 million and nearly 3 million people are displaced, making it the deadliest conflict since World War II.33 DRC has been trying to reintegrate ex-combatants from the numerous armed groups fighting in the country since the early 1990s. Local and international actors have realized the importance of reintegrating ex-combatants in peace building, but continued violence and an unstable political climate have complicated these efforts. While the state has substantial governing abilities in the western part of the country, the state’s capacity in the eastern part is limited. In the DRC, areas of limited statehood consist of territorial, social, and functional spaces. The central government’s limited capacity in the east constrains public service delivery. One such service is the provisioning of reintegration services. This section examines how reintegration has been implemented by discussing actors and programs focused on DDR in the country since the conclusion of the African World War in 2003. The DRC’s DDR programs emphasize national ownership in theory, but in practice the state has taken little ownership. The DRC has shown that reliance on state involvement during an armed conflict may be the wrong approach to ensure sustainable reintegration programs.

National DDR Plan

Congolese authorities estimated that in the spring of 2002, there were 330,000 armed combatants and 150,000 people in need of demobilization and

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31 Risse, “Governance Under Limited Sovereignty,” 11
32 Ibid., 3.
reintegration, including 30,000 children. In response to this unstable post-war context, the DRC launched its own National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program (NDDRP) in 2004, with funding from the World Bank and the United Nations. The DRC held a prominent place in the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), the regional DDR effort funded by the World Bank and a multi-donor trust fund. MDRP supported five national programs and 10 special programs in Africa with more than 40 national and international partners participating in its management. DRC projects were the most significant cost in the MDRP, with 50 percent of the entire budget devoted to projects in the country. The program provided a framework and partnership module, but emphasized national ownership of projects. MDRP acknowledged governments as the primary and legitimate representatives of national interests and institutionalized their central role in program delivery.

The objective of the national program was to disarm all willing combatants, demobilize those who met the conditions for return to civilian life, and reintegrate the demobilized “in the social and economic practices of the community of their choice with opportunities and conditions similar to those of other members of the community.” Under this national plan, disarmed combatants were transferred to orientation centers where they could decide whether to integrate into civilian life or integrate into the national army. Children were moved to separate child protection agencies. Those who decided to reintegrate into civilian life were taken to demobilization centers where they received medical screening, identity cards, and orientation about program benefits. Reintegration was broken into two phases. First, they were given a transport allowance, a Transitional Safety Net, and transportation to their preferred area of return. The Transitional Safety Net was a monthly installment of $300 for six months to support the ex-combatant’s daily survival. Second, ex-combatants could receive individual assistance through the NDDRP’s provincial offices. The local authorities served as liaisons between the ex-combatants and the resources available to them. Economic reintegration was provided to ex-combatants through vocational training that included apprenticeship training, basic start-up resources, and education and scholarship for minors. Finally, the NDDRP attempted to support reconciliation, strengthen social cohesion, and implement special projects for vulnerable groups like women and the disabled.

Implementing Actors

Actual program implementation is done by UN agencies, international NGOs, and local NGOs. In 1999, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC), renamed

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31 Sawyer et al., “The Eastern Congo.”
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
MONUSCO in 2010. MONUSCO supported the Government’s NDDRP, described above, and serves as the primary actor addressing foreign armed groups. DDR under MONUSCO’s mandate has two components. The first deals with illegal, foreign-armed groups in the DRC, including the FDLR, the ADF, the LRA, and the FNL; and the second is DDR support for Congolese armed groups.30 DDR of Congolese armed groups was done in partnership with the government and the UN. The government was responsible for handing over ex-combatants to the UN, but beyond transport, the government was not active when it came to the DDR of ex-combatants from foreign-armed groups.39 When ex-combatants of foreign-armed groups enter the DDR process or come to the DDR operational sites in the forest, they are flown by helicopters or transported by trucks to the transit centers in Uvira, Bukavu, Beni, Dungu, and Goma. They are expected to stay in these camps for a maximum of three days, where they are provided with clothes, access to a telephone, and medical attention if needed. When rebels defect in the DRC, MONUSCO processes them and then calls in corresponding organizations to meet the needs of the ex-combatant. Those who come from neighboring countries are repatriated to their respective countries upon their release from the camp.

Local NGOs’ main point of contact is the Congolese military and the UN office in their respective district. Local non-profits provide ex-combatants and community members with livelihoods, social reintegration, and psychological support. For example, Centre Resolution Conflicts (CRC) has been developing and implementing a grassroots approach to DDR in eastern DRC for over 10 years. Their approach emphasizes reintegration and promotes peaceful cohabitation between ex-combatants and other war-affected individuals. Upon returning to the community, an ex-combatant participates in short term projects like rehabilitating community infrastructure in order to gain self-respect, earn income, and improve community attitudes. Co-operatives are formed with a mixed group of ex-combatants and community youth. These co-operatives participate in skills training and conflict resolution training.40 Similarly, the NGO, Invisible Children, has developed several grassroots projects at all stages of the DDR process from Early Warning Systems and radio messaging to let rebels know it is safe to come home, to community sensitization programs and trauma healing training.41 Other NGOs facilitate similar social reintegration by addressing stigmatization of community members using awareness campaigns and community workshops.42

Since 2001, The United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) has provided financial and technical support to NGOs and govern-

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39 Adam Finck, Interview with Project Director at Bridgeway Foundation, February 18, 2016.
41 Interview with Pauline Zerla, January 20, 2016.
42 Ibid.
ments to implement DDR with a focus on child soldiers.\textsuperscript{43} Between January 2009 and June 2011, UNICEF and its partners supported the socio-economic reintegration of 7,619 children (2,011 girls and 5,608 boys) released from armed forces and groups.\textsuperscript{44} Save the Children, an international NGO, has lobbied the government for opening separate rehabilitation centers for children, while The International Committee of the Red Cross assisted child ex-combatants in reuniting with their families.

Analysis/Critique

Poor coordination and a lack of strong central planning affected the sustainability and effectiveness of reintegration. According to reports, the NDDRP in DRC socially and economically reintegrated 90,000 combatants out of a case-load of 208,000. Of those 90,000, 60,000 opted to integrate into the national army. Of the remaining 30,000 that were "reintegrated," many were re-recruited by rebel groups, a clear sign that reintegration was not successful.\textsuperscript{45}

Reintegration has been supported by an alphabet soup of donors and implementing partners. The number of programs, policies, and funding streams created a complex web of partnerships that is not only difficult to implement, but also difficult to decipher roles and responsibilities when studying them on paper. Through a close examination of the success and failures of each program, it is apparent that too much reliance on DRC’s government, when it didn’t have the capacity, weakened the success of reintegration programs.

Parts of eastern Congo have been described as the “wild west,” and it is often unclear who has the authority to do what.\textsuperscript{46} Standard operating procedures for regional and national DDR plans were ignored by actors and never worked due to the sheer number of actors involved. The disjointed alphabet soup of actors, from the UN and the World Bank, to the Congolese government, negatively impacted the success of DDR.

First, the regional program, MDRP, demonstrated that complex partnerships with a large collection of dissimilar organizations are inherently difficult to manage. Priorities and goals were outlined in the policy framework, but little effort went into the actual planning of how the multifaceted web of inter- and intra-organizational relations would actually be managed. Competing interests of donors within the country made it very difficult to achieve a coherent and streamlined approach.\textsuperscript{47} MDRP intended to provide coordination, but in practice had little capacity to coordinate and supervise NGOs actually implementing the projects in local communities. MDRP relied on the Congolese government, but the central government was not capable either as it was in the midst of the

\textsuperscript{43} Nduqimana, Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 13.


\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{46} Adam Finck, February 12, 2016

fighting. Second, MONUSCO has been unable to provide a strong framework for perform coordination. According to an expert at the UN, the Standard Operating Procedures are a mess and no one follows them. MONUSCO has also been described as personality dependent because its success or failure hinges upon its individual leadership. In addition, MONUSCO has been losing credibility due to its failure to protect civilians under its peackeeping mission. Its ineffectiveness has raised questions about foreign intervention and externally led DDR programs.

Finally, there is a strong dissonance between the central government and eastern DRC, both geographically and politically. Local NGOs and implementing partners act alone and no one has taken full ownership over reintegration. Both phases of the NDDR, supported by the UN and World Bank, were riddled with challenges that impacted the effectiveness of service delivery. These challenges included poor management, lack of donor coordination, continued violence, and insufficient funds. While a large number of ex-combatants were disarmed or demobilized, reintegration was less successful.

Although local NGOs and external development partners attempted to provide economic, social, and psychological support, the effectiveness was limited and unsustainable. For example, Centre Resolution Conflict is reliant on donors and inadequate funding has impacted their effectiveness. The organization also struggled to reach remote communities in unstable areas. These organizations work off separate budgets, without consultation with a national agenda. Although effective in local communities, they are not sustainable in the long run because of donor dependency. Even some large NGOs have been unsustainable; UNICEF was effective at addressing children’s issues until it lost funding last June for its programming in DRC.

Since 2011, there has been no formal government DDR plan. According to interviews with experts, MONUSCO is the only entity handling DDR in the DRC, but it is unclear who has the official mandate. The government is currently in the process of drafting a DDRIII. DDRIII is meant to review previous DDR programs to learn from past mistakes, but many experts are critical of the new plan, which is still in its design phase as partners fight over funding models.

48 Interview with Matthew Brucacher, February 22, 2016.
49 Adam Finck, February 12, 2016.
52 Mathew Brucacher, personal communication.
Recommendations

(1) MONUSCO must take leading role in overseeing reintegration by creating a strong monitoring framework that better outlines standard operating procedures.

(2) Monitoring must be ongoing and include a database that tracks ex-combatants and success indicators.

(3) National staff should be trained and utilized in the programs to prepare for the time to transition authority back to the state.

(4) The UN must build the capacity of local organizations and allow the agenda to be flexible to local conditions.

(5) Funding from the UN to local partners must be performance-based and grant acquisition must hinge on proven performance.34

Uganda Case Study

In the DRC, reintegration is impeded by continued armed violence. What happens when armed conflict stops? From 1986 to 2006, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony, waged war in northern Uganda. The LRA abducted men, women, and children to join the militia and wage war against their own people. From 1986 to 2006, 52,000 to 75,000 people were abducted in Uganda by the LRA.35 Uganda’s armed conflict ended in 2006, but the country is in a reconstruction phase, working toward lasting peace. Uganda is a divided country similar to the DRC, with a strong central state in the south and an underdeveloped northern region. The state has control over its territory, but areas of limited statehood exist across policy or sectoral areas. Reintegration is one of those services lacking state involvement. This case study examines Uganda’s current reintegration programs and gives historical context to reintegration at the height of the conflict. Learning from Uganda’s successes and failures can serve as a helpful tool for a country like the DRC, further behind in the peace process. Reintegration is stipulated in Uganda’s national development plan and implemented by numerous non-governmental organizations. In reality though, reintegration is disjointed with no central oversight or monitoring. Uganda has shown that state ownership and active involvement is crucial for sustainable reintegration in a state further along in its reconstruction phase, where armed violence has ceased.

Government Initiatives

The Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) was created to rebuild northern Uganda after the LRA violence left the region. PRDP 2, or phase two, which this paper focuses on, began in July 2012 and was programmed through 2015. This study analyzes the implementation of objective four of the


35 Pham, Vinck, and Stover, “The Lord’s Resistance Army and Forced Conscription in Northern Uganda.”
PRDP: peace building and reconciliation. Two program areas fall under this objective: ‘Reintegration and Resettlement’ and ‘Community Dispute Resolution and Reconciliation.’

The Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) coordinates the implementation of PRDP 2 and the PRDP Monitoring Committee (PMC) conducts oversight. The total budget was one trillion shilling or 300 million dollars. There are three funding streams for implementation: PRDP budget grant, on-budget special projects, and off-budget projects. Projects are funded directly by the government through donors giving to the OPM basket, or directly by donors funding their own projects. The third option is projects implemented directly by development partners. For example, the United States does not give money directly to the Ugandan Government, but implements projects through partner agencies. PRDP 2’s Strategic Objective Four relies almost entirely on off-budget funding. This means that development partners implement all initiatives supporting this objective of the PRDP, while the government fills a coordinating and oversight role.

According to the PRDP2, development partners are required to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the local government and OPM. NGOs operating within a town report to their corresponding sector heads for approval. By signing the MOU, the NGO declares who they are, what they do, where they operate, the targeted beneficiaries, and what they want the local government to do. For example, Thrive Gulu has an MOU with the district where they send in their work plan. NGO work plans are incorporated in the district development plan, including the budget being reflected as an income in the district budget. An MOU is necessary to avoid duplication of services and measure the impact of the NGO on the community. Local governments use the MOUs as a monitoring tool for services functioning within the district.

The Amnesty Act was put into law in January 2000 and provides the opportunity for those returning from the LRA to apply for a pardon (exemption or discharge from criminal prosecution). To receive amnesty, the individual must renounce involvement in the armed rebellion and surrender any weapons in his/her possession. However, only those who were abducted and remained in captivity for more than four months qualify. From 2000 to 2013, over 13,000 former LRA ex-combatants were pardoned. The Amnesty Act is the cornerstone of Uganda’s transitional justice model and has been successful in encourag-

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56 Interview with Martin Mapenduzi, October 27, 2014.
58 Martin Mapenduzi, October 27, 2014
60 Martin Mapenduzi, October 27, 2014
61 Interview with Dorothy Ajwang, November 20, 2014.
ing defections from the LRA, making it integral to the peace process.\textsuperscript{63} Through the Amnesty Act, the Ugandan Government intended to show that it was committed to reconciliation and peace.\textsuperscript{64}

Under the Amnesty Act, an Amnesty Commission and a Demobilization Resettlement Team (DRT) were established. The DRT draws programs for the de-commissioning of arms, demobilization, re-settlement, and reintegration of ex-combatants. The Amnesty Commission serves as an implementing partner of PRDP overseeing the Amnesty program and is the only section of SO4 that receives direct government funding. The Commission claims to serve several functions including demobilization, resettlement, reintegration, and information and referral services.\textsuperscript{65} In 2005, the Amnesty Commission began a program to support former combatants’ reinsertion into civilian life. The program’s resettlement packages included one mattress, cups, blankets, basins, jerry cans, plates, 3 hoes, beans, maize, and 263,000 Ugandan shillings (approximately nine US dollars).\textsuperscript{66}

Non-state Actors

As mentioned in the fourth objective of the PRDP, development partners also undertake reintegration services. NGOs within northern Uganda are the most involved actors in the reintegration process. During the height of the conflict in the 1990s and early 2000s, there were eight reception centers in the northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Apac, and Lira. These are short-term rehabilitation centers for ex-combatants when they first return from the bush to assist with reinsertion, the first step of reintegration. The reception centers were funded by international organizations like UNICEF or NGOs like World Vision, Catholic Charities, or Invisible Children. The centers offered psychosocial therapy, food, shelter, and family tracing. Services lasted for a few weeks or months.

In 2014, there were only two operating reception centers, but as of 2016 both have closed their doors because of a decreased defections and funding. Instead, ex-combatants are now taken by the Ugandan military to a center in Gulu where the Amnesty Commissions follows up with them. Unlike reception centers in earlier years, this center is run by the military rather than NGOs and simply assists with reinsertion rather than reintegration. It functions as a holding area until an ex-combatant locates his family or feels comfortable leaving. There is no psychological support and only one organization is assisting in family tracing. Once ex-combatants leave the reception centers or now the military holding area, they are supposed to be directed to the resources and services within the community.

These attempts at providing services beyond reinsertion are provided by NGOs and local community leaders who pick up where the reception centers

\textsuperscript{63} Transitional justice is an approach to justice in times of transition away from conflict [ICTJ website]. The approach usually includes a combination of restorative or punitive justice, recognizing the blurred lines between victim and perpetrators.

\textsuperscript{64} Uganda Amnesty Act, 2009.

\textsuperscript{65} Interview with Amnesty Commission Official, November 13, 2014.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
leave off. An organization, Pathways to Peace, created in 2014, traces families, provides food, clothing and vocational training. Some NGOs provide reintegration services for vulnerable populations like former child soldiers through psychosocial support, creative arts, education support, family tracing, and livelihood training. Many organizations, with the exception of Pathways to Peace, do not target ex-combatants directly. Rather they use a holistic approach that focuses on education, livelihood, and health concerns for the community as a whole. They attempt to reduce stigmatization and ensure social reintegration of ex-combatants.

In addition to NGOs, families and religious leaders play a role in reintegration. Every ex-combatant has a different experience upon returning home. Traditional ceremonies and collective healing rituals help many communities welcome ex-combatants home. These ceremonies and rituals “help” cleanse the returnees of their wrong doings committed while with the rebels.

Analysis/Critique

Reintegration in Uganda includes some of the best practices for reintegration. Important services related to economic and social reintegration are provided, and special attention is paid to vulnerable populations. However, the effectiveness, and most importantly, sustainability of these services is limited by the lack of a strong central plan and coordination between actors.

First, the Government of Uganda failed to monitor and coordinate the off-budget projects as stated in the policy of the PRDP. In principle, the plan was satisfactory, but in implementation it failed. The monitoring framework of PRDP2 attempted to address the weaknesses found in the first phase by requiring donors of off-budget projects to submit their plans to the OPM and provide updates to the PMC. Then, through the Northern Uganda Data Centre (NUDC), the OPM was supposed to perform spot monitoring of off-budget activities and raise findings to PMC. However, the OPM has not been successful in its efforts because implementation is too centralized. The OPM is too far removed from effected areas to have clear oversight. In reality, the OPM does not have time to be on the ground, highlighting a major gap in the implementation of the PRDP.

This study found that the government only intervenes in off-budget reintegration projects if the law is compromised; otherwise, oversight is

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67 Interview with Patrick Lumumba, November 13, 2014.
68 Interview with David Ocitti, January 7, 2016.
69 Interview with Jane Ekayu, January 8, 2016.
70 Interview with Eric Odong, November 3, 2014.
72 Office of the Prime Minister, Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan for Northern Uganda: Phase 2.
73 Interview with Norbert Mao, November 5, 2014.
74 Interview with Betty Ocan, November 5, 2014.
non-existent. Additionally, the NUDC is not as effective as it appears to be. A lot depends on the maturity of the district to feed the database. The OPM is reliant on the local government to give reports on activities within the districts, but reporting on off-budget projects is new for districts and often not consistent. Many respondents interviewed complained about the lack of a database to track government spending and programs.

In addition to poor coordination, the government did not prioritize reintegration and the program was riddled with corruption. Objective four of the PRDP was pushed to the periphery of discussion. Direct government funding was given to roads, school, water, police, and the judicial system law, but not reintegration. Instead of development where partners fill in the gaps of what the government was doing, it became the reverse. The government chose to wrap its program and budget around what the development partners were doing. PRDP money, for example, was used to buy the Prime Minister a limousine worth $200,000. This mismanagement occurs because of a lack of transparency, accountability, and oversight.

Although stronger than at the national level, local oversight has been minimal. The local government holds cluster meetings held by each sector head. However, after the conflict there is no longer a sector head dedicated solely to reintegration. In addition, oversight is difficult when information sharing only goes in one direction. For example, Thrive Gulu sends in their work plan and budget to the district, but the district has not done an independent evaluation of the organization. The only evaluation conducted was when the organization originally signed its MOU. The Community Development Officer (CDO) is responsible for following up with those who have returned and ensuring they are included in community programs, but the CDO in the town of Gulu received no funding as of 2014, severely limiting her capacity. Thus, it was impossible for her to follow up with the NGOs in the district. The CDO explained that her involvement with the PRDP was much more vibrant during the insurgency and has decreased since the violence ended.

The Amnesty Commission also suffers from mismanagement and requires immense improvements. Officially, it has the responsibility to monitor programs for demobilization, reintegration, and re-settlement of reporters. It is supposed to have community focal points to represent each sub-county where returnees can report to apply for amnesty or consult the Amnesty Commission after their certificate is certified if issues arise. In practice, the Amnesty Commission’s role is quite different. It takes limited efforts to rehabilitate and has not

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73 Interview with David Tshimba, November 4, 2014.
74 Norbert Mao, November 5, 2014.
75 David Tshimba, November 4, 2014.
76 Betty Ocan, November 5, 2014.; Martin Mapenduzi, October 27, 2014.
77 Norbert Mao, November 5, 2014.
78 Interview with Patrick Lumumba, November 13, 2014.
79 Interview with Gulu Community Development Officer, November 20, 2014.
80 Betty Ocan, November 5, 2014.
81 Interview with Amnesty Commission Official, November 12, 2014.
taken a leading role in the reintegration process.\textsuperscript{84} In 2006, it was reported that coordination between the UPDF, Amnesty Commission, and reception centers was poor.\textsuperscript{85} The Amnesty Commission lacks any viable method to assess those returning from the LRA who did not pass through a reception center.\textsuperscript{86} Amnesty claims to do follow-up visits and monitor the movement of all ex-combatants, but reception centers are unaware of this practice.\textsuperscript{87} Amnesty is not beholden to anyone but Parliament, so information sharing between it and development partners is limited in the name of national intelligence.

Finally, the lack of state involvement has put all of the responsibility on non-state actors, which are reliant on donor funding and unable to sustain long-term projects. Although other forms of governance take shape in the state’s absence, these forms of governance are not sustainable. During the conflict, there were over 800 NGOs in Gulu district. Donors were willing to give to reception centers and rehabilitation programs when the issue seemed urgent, but now as armed violence has subsided, donors are less invested. Reception centers and NGOs had to close their door because of the lack of donor funding.

Even during the height of donor attention, there was no streamlined process or coordinated framework. Due to limited oversight or streamlined monitoring framework for reintegration, the holistic approach to social reintegration made it difficult to track ex-combatants and identify gaps. There is very little dialogue between organizations focused directly on reintegration.\textsuperscript{88} Organizations like Children for Peace still operate and support ex-combatants through numerous programs in the town of Lira, but only one organization, Pathways to Peace, is actively trying to assist those still coming out of the bush. Without reception centers, it is even harder to track those returning home and only one trained psychologist practices in northern Uganda. There is no formal process after ex-combatants are taken to the CPU. Even the Amnesty Commission was supported by NGOs. In March of 2015, an organization called the Bridgeway Foundation gave money to the Amnesty Commission to grant over 84 ex-combatants Amnesty certificates; a government pardon funded by a nonprofit.

Recommendations

(1) Sustainability requires the Government of Uganda to become the chief strategist and implementer in Strategic Objective 4 of the PRDP
(2) There should be a partnership between the government and development actors, not reliance on the latter.\textsuperscript{89} NGOs are donor dependent and not sustainable.\textsuperscript{90}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{84} Martin Mapenduzi, October 27, 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Allen, et al.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Interview with GUSCO official, November 19, 2014.; Interview with World Vision official, November 20, 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Eric Odong, November 3, 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Norbert Mao, October 27, 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Eric Odong, November 3, 2014.
\end{itemize}
Amnesty should receive a budget line to support reception centers and deal with all aspects of reintegration, both social and economic.91

Conclusion

When a patient is in a coma, they are at the complete mercy of the doctors, but when the patient is recovering there is a partnership between the patient and the doctor. Once the patient is sent home, they are in control and only consult the doctors.

– Hon. Norbert Mao

These two case studies demonstrate that limited statehood negatively affects the sustainability and effectiveness of the reintegration process. However, this research concludes there are three conditions for successful service provisioning when reintegration is an area of limited statehood. Finally, this paper argues that within weak post-conflict states, the role of the state and the ideal partnership between actors change throughout the process. When armed violence is still prevalent, as in the DRC, reliance on the state by external actors inhibits successful reintegration, but where violence has subsided, as in the case of Uganda, lack of state involvement inhibits sustainable reintegration process.

Despite the weaknesses highlighted in the two case studies or the argument made by many scholars, non-state modes of governance or hybrid forms of governance can succeed in providing goods and services. In terms of reintegration, they must secure input legitimacy and establish a central plan that includes strong monitoring and oversight mechanisms.92 Next, programs must be locally driven or community based by involving beneficiaries in the identification, design and management of programming.93 In addition, the DDR process requires centralized, integrated funding systems, early finding and evidence-based planning; monitoring and evaluation on results-based outcomes, quantitative outputs and their political and security impact. National ownership is important to ensure that the intervention by external actors is informed by an understanding of the local context and conflict dynamics. However, if national ownership is not possible, the external actor must take responsibility for strong monitoring and oversight. Coordination of multiple partners requires high levels of institutionalization and streamlined oversight.

In DRC, the government does not have the capacity to coordinate with numerous actors and reliance on the state led to unsuccessful programs in the past. While the agenda must be set by local actors and communicated to the central government, implementation of reintegration services must be delegated to an alternate mode of governance. Many scholars say that ensuring national ownership of reintegration programming is essential for success and sustainability. However, this research acknowledges that government ownership is not an

91 Norbert Mao, October 27, 2014.
93 Slaymaker, et al., Community-Based Approaches and Service Delivery.
option for countries like the DRC across all territory or policy areas. Thus, an alternate actor must take the role of central planner.

In Uganda, reintegration is an area of limited statehood due to lack of political will. With limited funding and resources, the central government chooses to prioritize other development projects. However, national DDR frameworks are increasingly relevant when there is a relatively stable and legitimate government to exert control over the program. As armed violence ends and emergency aid response leaves, reintegration will not be sustainable without government ownership. Even where the government outsources the service to implementing partners, it is important for them to create the framework and monitor the quality of services provided.

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Plenums, Protests, and the Politics of Democratization in Macedonia

Aleksej Demjanski

Street protests, burning buildings, and occupied universities have become the emblem of frustration with the unending transition from socialism toward liberal democracy and neoliberal economies in the former Yugoslavia. Macedonia serves as a representative case of this post-socialist transition in the region and the broader landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. This research analyzes the impact of recent student protests and the formation of plenums on civil society’s role in the consolidation of democracy in Macedonia. Furthermore, this research examines whether these plenums are effective means of furthering democracy in the context of a captured state. Using a variety of previous data, established frameworks, and personally conducted interviews, the paper ultimately finds that the plenums are an effective means of furthering democracy for citizens pursuing a goal-specific issue within the context of a captured state like Macedonia. The same plenums, however, have limited efficacy for issues requiring broad political participation. Ultimately, this research should serve as a stepping-stone for further investigation into the impact of such initiatives on civil society’s role in the democratization process of Macedonia and beyond.

Introduction

Over the past few years growing disillusionment with the unending transition from socialism toward liberal democracy and neoliberal economics has sparked outrage amongst citizens across Southeast Europe. Street protests, burning buildings, and occupied universities have become the emblem of this frustration in the Balkans. Macedonia serves as a representative case study of this post-socialist transition in the region and the broader landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. Throughout the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s, Macedonia carried out an array of reforms in order to advance its prospects for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions – a major goal of the transition. This initially led to a plethora of praise from the European Union, (EU) which dubbed Macedonia the region’s poster child of European integration. However, due to a decades-long dispute with Greece over Macedonia’s constitutional name, the country has consistently been blocked from accession to both the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in turn stalling the integration process. Although the infamous name dispute has a lot of political and historical ramifications, what is crucial is that it has eliminated the incentives Macedonia’s political elites have to continue pursuing and implementing democratic reforms. Thus,

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Macedonia has seen significant backsliding on democratic reforms and the hardening of authoritarian tendencies by the political elite, in turn fueling the flames of the revolt being witnessed today.

Taking this context into consideration, this paper aims to analyze the recent outburst of dissatisfaction with the post-socialist transition in Macedonia and the impact it has on the country’s democratization process. First, this paper will analyze what impact recent student protests and the formation of plenums—horizontally structured general assemblies—have on civil society’s role in the consolidation of Macedonia’s democracy. Second, the paper hopes to understand whether these protests and plenums are effective means of furthering democracy in the context of state-capture, which is the form of illiberal democracy in Macedonia that more or less came about as a result of neoliberal economics and stagnation in the Euro-Atlantic integration process.

Methodology

In order to analyze the impact of the student protests and the formation of plenums on Macedonia’s democratization process, especially within the particular context of a captured state, this paper utilizes the following methodology: (1) a literature review of democratization and civil society, their intertwining relationship within an established framework, and how that plays out in Macedonia; (2) a short review of data on democracy in Macedonia from Freedom House; (3) a detailed review of data on civil society and civic engagement in Macedonia from a recent public opinion poll from the International Republican Institute, and finally; (4) the incorporation of 20 semi-structured interviews conducted with university students, professors, teachers, activists, analysts, and members of civil society organizations in Macedonia.

The interviews were used to gather information on and perceptions of the plenums, protests, ongoing socio-political crisis, as well as democracy, civil society, and the political culture in Macedonia. All interviews were conducted in Skopje, Macedonia between December 2015 and January 2016 in the Macedonian language with relevant contacts from the researcher and any other individuals that participants recommended. Interviews were audio-recorded and analyzed by the researcher for comparison with other qualitative data regarding democracy and civil society in Macedonia in order to extrapolate any impact the plenums and protests may have had on the perceptions of Macedonian citizens.

Literature Review

Democratization Theories

The study of the democratization process has dramatically evolved and expanded over the years. Early approaches to democratization theory related the prospects of a state and society democratizing to economic and social developments that would occur in line with modernization.¹ These arguments followed

the general claims that as states developed economically and embraced market economies their societies would gradually grow more democratic. However, as many states and societies adopted market economies and modernized without developing democratic practices, scholars began to rethink the simplicity of their original argument by incorporating more factors into the democratization process. Such factors include the impact of historical legacies and political developments on the initial transition process toward more liberal democratic statesociety relations. However, many scholars believe that this emphasis on factors such as elites disregards the socioeconomic conditions in a state as well as the role of the average citizen, thus restricting the analysis to a deterministic and ‘path dependent’ process. In the end, most of these early approaches that focused on socioeconomic conditions, modernization theory, and the role of elites have shifted from their deterministic perspectives towards understanding these conditions as being ‘favorable’ to the democratization process.

A more recent and comprehensive approach to the democratization process, most applicable to and useful in analyzing Macedonia (although not without flaw), is that by scholars Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan in their 1996 book, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Their framework for outlining the democratization process is split into two chronological phases: transition and consolidation. Furthermore, they also stipulate the importance of understanding democratization as a fluid process, which is not linear and does not culminate in the end goal of a perfect democracy. Although a state and society may completely transition to democracy, they are essentially forever consolidating it and this is where backsliding or democratic deficits may occur. This paper accepts the understanding of democratic transition and democratic consolidation used in the Linz and Stepan framework. However, it expands on and incorporates other relevant factors, which influence the democratization process in order to better accommodate the Linz and Stepan framework to the case study of Macedonia.

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4 Pridham, “Democratization in the Balkan Countries.”
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS
*Modified Visualization of Linz and Stepan Framework*

**Transition:**
- Agreement on political procedures to elect a government
- Government comes to power via free and fair elections
- Government holds de facto authority to make new policies
- There exists a separation of powers (executive, legislative, and judicial) which are not shared with other authorities

**Consolidation:**
- Political Society
- Economic Society
- **CIVIL SOCIETY**
- Rule of Law
- State Bureaucracy and Apparatus

**Factors Influencing Democratization Process:**
- Socio-Cultural
- Historical Legacy, Previous Regime, & Conflict
- International and External Forces
- *added to framework or modified*

*Figure 1* Modified Linz and Stepan Framework
Specifically, Linz and Stepan argue that a democracy is consolidated when democracy has become ‘internalized’ within all aspects of society. In other words, no factions within the state are attempting to undermine the democratic process, citizens of the state believe that democracy and ‘democratic institutions’ are the rightful form of governance, and, finally, all individuals within the state are held accountable to the laws and procedures of the state’s institutions. Furthermore, they stipulate that there are five essential ‘arenas’ of a consolidated democracy. These arenas are political society, economic society, civil society, the rule of law, and the state apparatus. This paper accepts these arenas as crucial to the consolidation of democracy and gives specific attention to civil society, considering this is where Macedonia’s protests and plenums belong in the democratization process.

Finally, this paper expands on the Linz and Stepan framework by incorporating elements from other theories of democratization into the discussion as factors that influence the democratization process. These include socio-cultural conditions, historical legacies related to previous regime type and the presence of conflict, as well as the role of external actors. Socio-cultural conditions refer to any traditions of democracy and civil society a state may have. Historical legacies refer to the type of regime in place before democratization takes place as well as any conflict that may have occurred during or prior to democratization. Lastly, the role of external actors refers to any history of colonialism or imperialism as well as the role of international or external actors involved in the democratization of the country. Of particular interest to this paper is how these factors impact civil society and its role in the consolidation of democracy. Below, the reader will find a visualization of the refined framework of Linz and Stepan’s democratization process, which includes transition, consolidation, and influencing factors.

Civil Society

The literature on civil society, like that on democratization, is quite extensive and hotly debated. In particular, the main debate surrounding civil society has been its place in the broader realm of society and what it includes. Initial perspectives on civil society struggled to articulate where the concept belonged in the broader polity. Thus, such theories often placed civil society within the realm of state politics and economics. However, this early effort just meshed the understanding of civil society with the realms of political and economic society. Scholars then began to understand that civil society deserved its own place within the polity and the subsequent discourse transitioned toward what should be included as part of civil society. Between the 17th and the 19th centuries, thinkers as diverse as John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Friedrich Hegel debated the concept in their own right. These scholars furthered the dis-

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6 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 7-15.
8 Ibid., 4-5.
course by reinforcing the idea that civil society held its own respective place in the polity, which was essentially non-political and rooted in associational life.

Adding to these ideas were Karl Marx and Antonio Gramsci in the 19th and 20th centuries. Both Marx and Gramsci noted civil society’s impact on the discourse of freedom and human emancipation outside of the political-economic-state nexus. Their research ultimately turned to what should be considered a part of civil society and what role civil society had on issues of economic growth, equality, and democratization. In this light, the relevance of civil society’s impact on the democratization process takes precedent.

With the end of socialism across Central and Eastern Europe, there has been a new swath of work on the role of civil society with regard to the newly ‘democratic’ states. Purposefully, this paper will utilize the definition of civil society provided by Linz and Stepan. This is done for two main reasons – first, it allows the paper to remain consistent in the scope of research and analysis and second, because the definition provided by Linz and Stepan is broad and incorporates more than just formal non-governmental organizations and associations. A condensed definition of civil society, as outlined by Linz and Stepan, is provided below:

By civil society we refer to the arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests. Civil society can include a manifold of social movements… and civic associations from all social strata… In addition to the whole range of organizations… we should not forget another part of society: ordinary citizens who are not a part of any organization. Such citizens are often of critical importance…because they turn up in the streets in protest marches, heckle the police and the authorities, express their opposition first to specific measures, support broader demands, and ultimately challenge the regime.9

This definition of civil society extending beyond formal organizations is crucial because it allows this paper to incorporate Macedonia’s plenums, seen as initiatives by ordinary citizens, within the framework of the democratization process.10 Subsequently, the paper can analyze the plenums as a subset of civil society and their role in the consolidation of democracy. Civil society serves a range of purposes in the consolidation of democracy. These include checking the power of the state and market, creating a space for open dialogue, challenging the regime, and expressing dissatisfaction related to the state’s political society, economic society, and the rule of law. Thus, although the plenums are a part of civil society they do not exist in a vacuum. Both the plenums and civil society as a whole interact with other arenas of the consolidation phase of the democratiza-

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9 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.
10 Interview conducted with a member of Macedonia’s Student Plenum.
tion process and post-socialist transition, such as the Euro-Atlantic integration and consolidation of a neoliberal capitalist economic order.

**Research Findings and Discussion – Democracy**

**Transition, Influencing Factors, and Consolidation**

The democratization process of Macedonia, specifically the transition phase, began in the 1990s immediately following independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. When analyzing Macedonia through the Linz and Stepan framework, it is generally accepted that Macedonia has completed the transition phase and is now in the process of consolidating its democracy. However, a major component generally accepted to be part of the transition – acceptance of the state’s territorial and political integrity or stateness – is still in limbo.¹¹ Both the name dispute with Greece and the brief ethnic conflict of 2001 between Macedonian security forces and ethnic-Albanian separatists challenge Macedonia’s stateness by questioning the country’s constitutional name, territorial integrity, historical legacy, and identity. This peculiarity in the case of Macedonia highlights the role of other influencing factors on the democratization process.

First, the historical legacy of Macedonia is an important factor in understanding state-society relations and their impact on democratization. Macedonia’s historical past includes authoritarian-oriented patriarchal state-society relations inherited from the conditions present in the Byzantine Empire, Ottoman Empire, and the most recent experience of a rather liberal but still state-centered socialist system under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.¹² The country’s history also includes ethnic conflict, referring to the interethic conflict of 2001.¹³ Ultimately, these histories represent a legacy of vertically structured political authority, which has influenced the state’s political culture.

Second, international and external actors in Macedonia, particularly the United Nations, NATO, the EU, and the United States, have had an important impact on the country’s democratization process. Almost all of these countries and organizations, which this paper dubs the international community, have been deeply invested and engaged in Macedonia either by resolving military and political conflict or by promoting civil society development and democracy.¹⁴ Disregarding their role would limit the scope of Macedonia’s democratization process.

Third, the socio-cultural conditions in Macedonia prior to the start of the democratization process, regarding traditions of democracy, activism, and en-

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¹¹ Diamandouros and Larrabee, “Democratization in South-Eastern Europe: theoretical considerations and evolving trends.”


gagement, are rather weak. The socio-cultural conditions and Macedonia’s political culture are reflective of its historical legacies rooted in the abovementioned authoritarian, patriarchal, and state-socialist state-society relations. Nenad Markovikj, a scholar on civil society in Macedonia, argues that this history presents itself in three manners: (1) Macedonian citizens prefer economic wellbeing instead of individual political rights; (2) they prefer to invest in a single individual rather than a system (i.e., democracy); and (3) they have a general lack of individual responsibility. This in turn has a crucial impact on Macedonia’s current consolidation of democracy and in particular the role of civil society.

Having examined Macedonia’s transition and the factors influencing the democratization process, it becomes clear that Macedonia is currently in the phase of democratic consolidation. Although the country has transitioned to and consolidated a market economy within the neoliberal capitalist system, there is still a range of issues impeding the state’s democratic consolidation. These include the country’s political society, the rule of law, state apparatus, and even civil society as explained in the Linz and Stepan framework. This struggle to consolidate democratically is the result of a neoliberal capitalist economy fused with Macedonia’s current political culture as noted above. This combination has led Macedonia to fail to consolidate its democracy and in turn allowed for the development of its present system of state-capture.

State-Capture

State-capture is the form of illiberal democracy that is most appropriate in defining the situation in Macedonia. In Macedonian, state-capture is заробена држава (zarobena drzava), which literally translates as ‘enslaved state.’ In the context of Macedonia, this means that the ruling DPMNE-led coalition penetrated and took control of all state institutions. Essentially, the state is the party and the party is the state. The ruling party in turn controls elections, the media and the judiciary, and uses the state to pursue personal business interests. Many citizens in Macedonia refer to this system of state-capture as rule by fascism, a mafia-style kleptocracy, a dictatorship, or a populist dictatorship. An analyst interviewed for this research even stated that “Macedonia is an Azerbaijan without oil,” referring to the authoritarian style rule of the Aliyev family of Azerbaijan, which is notorious for suppressing the media and controlling elections among other methods to remain in power. In Macedonia, the methods used by the ruling party include laws suppressing the freedom of expression, a restriction on media freedom and the censorship and jailing of journalists, and legal action against businesses unfavorable to the party, just to name a few. Key examples of Macedonia’s state-capture proliferate in the media and government institutions,

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15 See the Linz and Stepan framework visualization in figure 1.
16 DPMNE is used as an acronym here instead of the usual VMRO-DPMNE which the party goes by so as not to confuse readers with the VMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) movement of the 19th and 20th centuries, which the current party considers to be its namesake.
17 Noted in interviews with academics and political analysts in Macedonia.
18 Interview with a political analyst in Macedonia.
including the purported murder of critical journalist Nikola Mladenov and the ‘Black Monday’ incident in which opposition members and journalists were forcefully removed from budget voting in parliament. The ruling party’s reach also extends to election control, where they employ tactics such as bribing poor villagers with flour or cooking oil in order to garner votes.

Ultimately, for the ruling party’s leadership in Macedonia and typical of elites in other illiberal democracies, democracy starts and ends on the day of elections. Everything post-election is just a game of winner takes all. Furthermore, the revelation of wiretappings in the spring of 2015 by the main opposition party, SDSM, highlights government wrongdoing and serves to solidify this analysis. The conversations in the wiretappings primarily consist of high-level officials and ministers in the DPMNE-led government discussing incriminating topics ranging from stealing elections, covering up murder, and interfering in the appointment of judges all the way to planning the rape of journalists in jail, using derogatory language to refer to ethnic minorities, illegally purchasing land, and even plotting ‘a little war.’ This confirmed the extent to which the ruling party in Macedonia had captured the state and its institutions, in turn destroying their independence and legitimacy.

Democracy Indicators

Many international non-governmental organizations have also highlighted Macedonia’s gradual slip away from democracy and toward a captured state. Among those organizations is Freedom House, which has a special research project known as Nations in Transit, which monitors democracy in 29 post-socialist states across Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia. This regional focus, which includes Macedonia, provides detailed indicators on the level of democracy and progress, or lack thereof, in the democratization process of these states. Recently, Freedom House published its 2016 Nations in Transit reports including that of Macedonia, with the data reinforcing the general views of Macedonia’s captured state. Macedonia’s 2016 democracy scores and indicators compared to previous year’s show incredible decline from a score of 3.82 in 2007 to 4.29 in 2016 (the lower the score, the higher the democracy rating), as do the comparisons of these scores to those of other states in the Balkans with Macedonia ranking the lowest of the Balkan States. Further evidence of democratic decline can be seen in Freedom House’s 2016 Freedom of the Press report, which moved Macedonia’s media freedom ranking from “Partly Free” to “Not Free.” In the 2016 report on press freedom, Macedonia was ranked second to

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22 All of the wiretapped recordings are available online through Prizma, an investigative reporting project supported by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network.
last in Europe, barely beating out Turkey, and received its worst press freedom score since independence. Understanding Macedonia’s overall successful transition to democracy, as well as the factors influencing the entire process, is essential to understanding Macedonia’s democratic, or rather undemocratic, environment. It is within this context that the role of civil society becomes crucial and in which the plenums and protests arise.

Research Findings and Discussion – Civil Society

Post-Socialist Civil Society Development

When looking at the development of Macedonia’s civil society after the end of socialism it is important to understand the role of the socialist period as well as that of the transition in the 1990s. During the time of socialism, Macedonia’s civil society was scarce. It was the role of the state to fight for human emancipation, gender equality, economic equity, and other concerns we often associate today as being part of civil society’s battle in the polity. This understanding of civil society’s role, activity, and form was reinforced by the political, cultural and historical legacy of the region associated with authoritarian patriarchal state-society relations.

With the end of socialism in the 1990s and the beginning of the transition (Euro-Atlantic integration, democratization of society, and the embrace of a market economy in a neoliberal capitalist order), Macedonia’s civil society was provided an ‘opening,’ so to speak, to develop anew from its previous form. From a formal point of view, many Macedonian citizens were unaware of ways to organize nongovernmental organizations, and so the EU and even United States were heavily involved in providing assistance to Macedonia. Thus, the 1990s saw a boom in the number of formal civil society organizations.

However, as privatization took place, many nongovernmental organizations began seeking special interests through political parties and politicians in Macedonia. Through collaboration, the political parties and the nongovernmental organizations were both able to benefit. Ultimately, this led to the politicization or more aptly the ‘partyization’ of the formal civil society sector in Macedonia. The politicization of civil society organizations in Macedonia led to general public skepticism as to the ‘fairness’ and independence of these organizations. Many organizations have come to be labeled as the ‘extended arm’ of this or that political party that works to advance those interests rather than the interest of society at large. This analysis of the civil society environment in Macedonia and the general public perceptions of it are reinforced by indicators on civil society from public opinion polls.

25 Markovic, “From Post-Communist to Uncivil Society in Macedonia,” 138-161.
26 Ibid., 161-163.
27 Interview with member of Macedonia’s Student Plenum.
Civil Society Indicators

One of the most recent public opinion polls done in Macedonia, with relation to civil society, is the International Republican Institute’s Survey on Public Opinion in Macedonia released in November of 2015. The survey and data tested the perceptions of Macedonian citizens on their overall wellbeing, economic situation, the political crisis in the country (related to state-capture), their engagement in civil society, and their general opinions on Euro-Atlantic integration.\textsuperscript{28} Below the reader will find three different graphs from the survey. The first graph relates to Macedonian citizens’ political culture and knowledge of the formal civil society sector. The second graph shows the perceptions people have of why others participate in civil society organizations. The last graph shows the level of participation in both formal civil society organizations and informal civil society activities.

Figure 2, below, depicts data on how informed Macedonian citizens are of nongovernmental organizations or citizens’ associations in their community. The most recent data shows that 70\% of those surveyed are uninformed of any nongovernmental organizations (NGO) or similar groups in their community, or what they do and the services they offer. This shows a sort of reluctance on the part of citizens to engage with the formal civil society community.

Figure 3 shows the perceptions of Macedonian citizens as to why their fellow citizens participate in formal nongovernmental organizations. A majority (32\%) responded that this was for personal interests. This is related to the politicization of civil society within the context of a captured state as previously described. Citizens believe that engaging in civil society is a way of engaging politically and for one’s own personal benefit. Finally, Figure 4 shows whether participants of the survey engaged in activities to address social problems in their community over the past 12 months. These are more informal aspects of civil society, which may not be related to formal nongovernmental organizations. The survey included participation in a protest, filing a complaint, and initiating or supporting an online petition. The most recent data shows that, once again, the vast majority of citizens – 89\% – did not engage in any such activities. This again highlights a political culture that avoids individual responsibility and doesn’t encourage citizens to actively participate in building the future of their community.

Which of the following statements best describe your knowledge about nongovernmental organizations or citizens’ associations in your community?

![Survey Data on Knowledge of NGOs or Citizens’ Associations](image)

**Figure 2** Survey Data on Knowledge of NGOs or Citizens’ Associations

According to you, what is the motivation (principal reason) that citizens in Macedonia become members of citizens’ associations (NGO)?

![Survey Data on Motivations for Participating in NGOs](image)

**Figure 3** Survey Data on Motivations for Participating in NGOs
Toward Social Movements and Plenums

It is within this formal civil society environment – one in which the current political culture discourages individual responsibility and is comprised of politicized nongovernmental organizations – that a select group of citizens, university students as well as activists, began to seek new forms of engagement toward the political process of democratization. These new forms of engagement – plenums and protests – became a means to further democratize their society within the context of a captured state, closed society, anti-activist political culture, and politicized formal civil society.

Research Findings and Discussion – Student Plenum

Origins of Plenum

Macedonia’s first and most influential plenum, the Student Plenum, was formed in the fall of 2014 after university students sought to organize against a law proposed by the Ministry of Education and Science. The law sought to refine the existing Law on Higher Education and implement ‘external testing’ or state-run exams at all public and private universities in the country. Immediately, students grew upset because this refinement would require more testing, infringe on their freedom and most importantly, harm the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of the university. Within a few weeks an informal student led initiative at the Saints Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje (UKIM) began to
organize meetings and discuss what course of action to take in order to force the government to repeal the law.\textsuperscript{29}

The students at UKIM ultimately decided to form a plenum, giving birth to the Student Plenum, which was inspired by similar decisions and forms of activism utilized by students and citizens in Southeast Europe. Particularly influential was the Croatian student movement in 2009, which was very active as evidenced by the creation of a handbook for protesting and forming a plenum known as \textit{Blokadna Kuharica, The Occupation Cookbook}.\textsuperscript{30} This cross-national transfer of ideas and tactics has been noted before in the region and is referred to as diffusion. Scholars Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik have referred to diffusion within the context of illiberal democracy in terms of electoral revolutions.\textsuperscript{31}

So much like their Croatian counterparts, the decision to form a plenum by Macedonian students was twofold. Firstly, since such a structure had previously not been utilized in Macedonia, it could be an effective means of achieving the stated goal as compared to the traditional street protest. Secondly, the horizontal structure of the plenum allowed for a diversity of students based on ideology, political party affiliation, ethnicity, field of study, and so on to unite and jointly communicate their complaints and coordinate their demands.

Once the Student Plenum was formed it organized multiple protests, notably on November 17, December 10, and December 26 alongside other guerilla actions against the university’s student parliament and government. The December 10 protest organized by the Student Plenum and supported by pensioners, contract workers, activists, professors, teachers, parents, and high school students was the largest student protest in Macedonia’s twenty-three years of independence. Students shouted “Автономија!” (Autonomy), “Нема правда, нема мир!” (No justice, no peace), and “Сега не слушате?” (Can you hear us now?) while they marched through the streets to Skopje.\textsuperscript{32} However, instead of listening to the students the government pursued a smear campaign against them claiming they were manipulated by the opposition and even Soros (referring to George Soros’ Open Society Foundations).\textsuperscript{33} The reference to Soros is important because the DPMNE-led government has campaigned to label all those critical of the government as ‘enemies of the state’ and ‘traitors’ affiliated with external boogeymen.

Ultimately, in January of 2015 the government, disregarding the student’s demands, went ahead and passed the controversial law. In turn on February 4, the Student Plenum announced that within a week they would occupy university campuses. As promised, on February 11 thousands of students walked onto the main square of UKIM shouting “Окупираме за да ослободуваме” (We occupy to liberate) and occupied the university proclaiming an ‘autonomous student zone’ with an alternative curriculum and entertainment provided by students,
The occupation ended after two weeks when Macedonia’s DPMNE-led government acquiesced to the student’s demands, declared the previously passed law to be in a moratorium, and agreed to include students and professors in talks to draft a new law on higher education.

This was a historic moment for the entire country. Under the DPMNE-led government, there was a perception that the ruling party and their policies were unstoppable. The government’s acquiescence to the student’s demands shattered this perception and stood as a symbol of resistance in Macedonia. During and after this victory, many other plenums sprouted up in order to address various issues affecting them. These included the Professors Plenum, High School Plenum, Teachers Plenum, Parents Plenum, Journalists Plenum, and even a Citizens Plenum. However, none of these were as successful as the original Student Plenum. The success of the Student Plenum lies in its structure and goal oriented discourse.

Structure of Plenum

The plenum is a unique form of engagement within a captured state. The plenum, as stressed by its members, should be viewed as an initiative rather than a formal organization. The plenum was fully horizontal in structure and leaderless in order to avoid a vertical power structure allowing equality between all members. This avoidance of vertical power structures and organizational formality was done for three reasons. First, vertical power structures are not based on equality and the students wanted to avoid elitism within the movement. This initiative was for the students, by the students, and of the students. Second, this was done so that when taking action against the government there would be no one the government could target to bring down the movement. Third, due to the nature of civil society in Macedonia being politicized and subordinated to political parties, it was clear that a formal organization wasn’t in the interest of the group and its goals.

The structure of the plenum also allowed it to exist longer and engage on a goal-specific issue. The plenum created a space for discourse that could be called on at any time in order to plan future actions. Thus, the plenum’s structure ensured the stability and longevity of the initiative while it was making demands. Lastly, due to Macedonia’s ethnic, religious, political, and ideological diversity, the plenum’s structure was able to focus all of that diversity toward a single goal. Ultimately, the plenum’s structure is ineffective when the demands are broad. However, the students’ demands were specific and it allowed them to craft a specific plan, target a goal, and succeed.

35 Interview with professor in Macedonia.
36 Interview with member of Macedonia’s Student Plenum.
37 Interview with professor in Macedonia.
Goals and Outcome of Plenum

The goal of the Student Plenum from its inception was the termination of the proposed and then passed new Law on Higher Education. However, their most important cause was fighting for student freedom, rights, and the preservation of the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of the university. That autonomous university served as a bastion of freedom, learning, and critical thought within a captured state and closed society. With the proposed law, that freedom came under attack and fighting to preserve the university became a necessity. In order to fight for all of these various issues, it was best to target the single thing confronting them – the proposed law itself. For that reason, there was one goal: to repeal the law. This made the plenum’s structure effective and in turn successful.

What allowed the Student Plenum to succeed in achieving that, however, is multifold. First, by targeting a specific goal – terminating and then repealing the law – a diverse group of students in a highly politicized society were able to rally around a cause. Of course, there was debate and discussion during the plenary meetings as to what actions to take, how to plan and accomplish them, as well as who would interact with the media and government. Yet, the main goal of the plenum stayed the same and it remained singular. Second, the students pursued activities that were both typical and atypical of protesting and challenging the policies of the government in Macedonia. This included the usual street marches and protests, but also the employment of comedy by turning the media’s smear campaign to their advantage, garnering support from students across the region, pursuing ‘guerilla actions’ by campaigning with posters and banners in the middle of the night, and finally, by actually occupying Macedonia’s largest university. Such an occupation had never happened before. Ultimately, the Student Plenum’s structure, the manner in which the students protested, and the importance of having a singular specific goal made their initiative successful.

Relevance to Democratization

In a Macedonia that has seen backsliding on democratic reforms and a failure to consolidate democracy, the experience of the Student Plenum serves as a lesson for future means of furthering democracy. Within the context of a captured state, a closed society, and a neoliberal capitalist socio-economic system, which have led to the politicization of civil society and the elimination of the traditional means it has to checking and balancing authority, it is no surprise that the plenum was utilized. There was no other outlet, so to speak, in which citizens could express their disillusionment with a variety of issues and effectively chart a course of action to improve their wellbeing. The Student Plenum came to serve as an autonomous free space in which direct-democracy was implemented as an effort to confront the democratic deficit of the state, economy, and formal civil society. As a result, the plenum enhances civil society’s role in the consolidation of democracy by serving as an effective means of further advancing democracy in a captured state.

38 Interview with member of Macedonia’s Student Plenum.
Important to note here, however, is that the plenum is not effective when it has multiple goals and requires the engagement of larger groups of citizens in the political process of democratization. At the height of the Student Plenum’s activity, scholars and activists in Macedonia had been calling for the “plenumization of society” as a means to free the captured state and further democracy. Unfortunately, within the current political context of Macedonia and due to the plenum’s structure, such a feat is currently impossible. In other words, there cannot be a plenumization of society to free the captured state. First, freeing the captured state requires multiple goals, which engage with many arenas of the democratization process, not just civil society. Actors that are not part of civil society, such as politicians and the private sector, must be involved in such a process. Thus, the plenum alone is not the vehicle for this. Second, the plenum’s horizontal structure within the current context of Macedonia’s captured state and capitalist economic system doesn’t allow for the plenumization of society. The plenum is ineffective in freeing the captured state and what is required is a larger movement, which may include organizing citizens within a vertical power structure.

Conclusion

As this analysis has shown the Student Plenum of Macedonia is a successful means through which citizens living in an illiberal democracy can utilize to further democracy. The plenum’s structure serves as a vehicle for success when it comes to singular goal-specific issues. Furthermore, it symbolizes a unique form of direct-democratic organization and engagement within a captured state, which exhibits a closed anti-activist political culture and politicized formal civil society. The plenum ultimately serves as a free autonomous space, within civil society, which creates an opening for citizens to push forth democratic reforms through an inclusive and horizontal process.

As disillusionment with the post-socialist transition in Southeast Europe continues to spark revolt against the rising authoritarian trappings of illiberal democracy, it is crucial to understand how citizens interact in such phenomena and make efforts to democratize their societies. Academics and policymakers must remain aware of such means to further democratize these societies if they seek to continue analyzing the democratic process or engage in democracy assistance programs. Without taking into consideration these emerging and effective tactics being utilized by citizens, scholars will fail to close the existing research gap present in understanding the role of informal or non-standard civil society on the democratization process. For Macedonia, until now, no other such form of engagement has been as successful in operating democratically while also enhancing democracy within the captured state. Ultimately, the plenum should serve as an example for citizens across the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe seeking new means to counter growing illiberal democracy.

39 Interview with a political analyst and professor in Macedonia.
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The Clinton Administration of the United States played a significant role in the negotiations of two defining peace processes of the 1990’s: Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine. Despite heavy U.S. involvement in both negotiations, Northern Ireland is continually designated as a success in the field of conflict resolution while Israel and Palestine failed to reach a final agreement, eventually collapsing into another decade of violence. Despite the individual complexities in the histories of each conflict, both are categorized as ethno-sectarian intrastate conflicts, with religious identity and acts of terrorism acting as defining factors in each. These conflicting conclusions beg the question of why the United States was able to successfully broker peace in one situation and not the other. Rather than solely attribute the differing outcomes of negotiations to internal differences, this research examines whether the U.S. relationship with the actors at hand and their strategic interests in the regions played a hand in the respective negotiations’ outcomes. The data collection process utilized previous arguments on the topic, newspaper accounts chronicling the negotiations, governmental documents, the statements and interviews of key actors throughout the processes, and the expertise of several professionals and academics in the field. While the internal differences between the conflicts contributed to the outcomes, the complexity of U.S. relations with the actors and its strategic interests in the area had a more detrimental impact on the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations than the Northern Ireland negotiations. This research investigates the assertion that neutrality is always beneficial in third party mediation of intrastate conflicts, determining that while it is sometimes beneficial, bias and strategic relations between the mediator and the disputants can aid the peace process when utilized correctly.

Introduction

Within the field of conflict resolution, the role of a neutral third-party mediator is often a pivotal aspect of the peace process between two conflicting groups. However, upon examining the identity, motives, and approaches of the third-party mediator, it becomes apparent that its level of neutrality has a vital impact on the success of the peace process’s outcome. This study seeks to explore how the identity of the mediator, including its strategic interests and its relations with the disputing parties, impacts its perceived neutrality in its approach to the peace process. Further, the study will assess whether neutrality is an essential component of successful third-party mediation.

This study will apply a comparative analysis of the U.S.’s role as a mediator in the Northern Ireland and Israeli-Palestinian peace processes under the Clinton administration. Despite the individual complexities and histories of each conflict and region, they are both characterized as ethno-sectarian, intrastate conflicts. The issues of borders, minority rights, religious identity, and terrorist
paramilitary organizations are all defining factors in each of them. These peace processes both occurred throughout the 1990s and were mediated by the United States, but reached significantly divergent outcomes at the end of Clinton’s second term. While Northern Ireland is continuously exemplified as a success story in the field of conflict resolution, Israel-Palestine failed to reach a final agreement and the peace process collapsed into violence once again.

Therefore, by asking why the United States was able to successfully broker peace in one conflict but not the other, this research will examine the impact that the U.S. mediator had on each peace process. Although there are internal differences between Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine that contributed to the outcome of their peace processes, this study will solely focus on the external factors. Thus, examination of the United States’ identity and methodology in mediating the two different peace processes will be examined to answer the question of whether neutrality is a necessary component of third-party mediation.

**Conflict Resolution Theory: Third-Party Mediation**

Theorists within the field of Conflict Resolution differ not only on the most effective strategies utilized in third-party mediation and the varied reasons to engage in third-party mediation, but also on the very definition of mediation itself. This research will apply Jacob Bercovitch’s broad definition of mediation in discussions third-party mediation in this study. Bercovitch, a leading expert on international mediation, defines mediation as “a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.”

Employing this definition of mediation, this research will review scholars’ views and discussions on: (1) the reasons for third-party mediation in intrastate conflict, (2) the different styles and methods of third-party mediation, and (3) how the identity of the mediator and the issue of impartiality impact the peace process and its outcome. Furthermore, this study will employ the following definition of neutrality with regards to a third-party mediator: a mediator who does not let personal or national interests impact their methodology and approach to mediating a peace process, and aims to mediate in a way that is even-handed and whose methods do not reflect favor, nor disfavor, of one disputing party of the conflict over the other.

**Reasons for Third Party Mediation in Intrastate Conflicts**

On either side of the disputing parties, there is a multitude of reasons that they choose to engage in third-party mediation as a strategy of resolving their conflict. Depending on the strategy employed, mediators often help the conflicting parties by opening a channel of communication between them that was previously unavailable due to mistrust. The mediator can put them in contact with

one another, gain the trust and confidence of the disputing parties, and clarify issues and formulate agreements. These small steps can lead the disputing parties to realize new possibilities and open up new political spaces. On a more practical level, the disputing parties may be incentivized to partake in the mediation process with increased financial or diplomatic support, or on the other side, sanctions for refusal to cooperate. However, there are substantial obstacles that would prevent the parties from participation, despite the perceived benefits of mediation. The largest of these obstacles is often the reluctance to surrender sovereignty, both sides often preferring to hold control over the management of the resolution process.

Further, there are several reasons why a state, organization, or individual would choose to engage in a peace process as a third-party mediator. First, there are perceivably altruistic reasons why an actor may engage as a mediator. If a conflict has escalated to a certain degree, humanitarian concerns regarding loss of life and suffering, as well as the impact of refugees, may encourage an actor to become involved. However, especially at a state level, there are often ulterior motives for an actor taking on the role of a mediator in a conflict. Improved relations with the disputing parties, improved status, the prestige of being involved in the peace process, and a continuation of foreign policy by other means are all alternative factors that may influence the decision to become a mediator. Furthermore, depending on the strategy employed during the mediation, the mediator may take on the role as a low-cost form of intervention and as a method of exerting influence over the trajectory of the conflict if the outcome is of special interest to them.

Mediation: Styles, Methods, Approaches

There are several methods and strategies that a mediator might employ during mediation, and the effectiveness regarding the characteristics of a mediator has been debated within the field of Conflict Resolution. A sample of these characteristics of the mediator include but are not limited to whether third party intervention should be impartial or partial, coercive or non-coercive, state based or non-state based, and whether the mediation should be carried out by insiders or outsiders. Furthermore, scholars such as Wilkenfeld and Kydd agree on three chief approaches to mediation: (1) Facilitative (or Communicative), (2) Formulative, and (3) Manipulative (or Coercive).

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3 Ibid.
In the Facilitative approach, the mediator’s primary role is a channel of communication between the parties of the conflict.\textsuperscript{9} This can be accomplished in a set of technical tasks, such as organizing the physical space for the mediation, collecting information, and setting the agenda in regards to the issues discussed. In the Formulative approach, the mediator takes on a more assertive role and is no longer solely a channel of communication. Using this strategy, the mediator may provide the peace process with substantive contributions, such as conceiving and proposing new solutions to the disputing parties.\textsuperscript{10} Lastly, in the Manipulative approach, the mediator attempts to influence the outcome and persuade the disputing parties in order to produce a resolution that is beneficial to their own interests. In conceiving and proposing new solutions, the mediator will use its position and leverage to coerce the disputing parties into the settlement that they see fit.\textsuperscript{11} In order to accomplish this, the mediator will provide incentives to the parties or threaten them with sanctions or penalties in order to create a specific outcome.\textsuperscript{12} When a mediator takes on this role, their ability to be seen as an impartial or neutral mediator severely diminishes due to their actions in attempting to influence the results.\textsuperscript{13} It is important to note that none of the three outlined dominant approaches to mediation, nor the question of a incremental vs. non-incremental strategy, are mutually exclusive approaches. Depending on the context, a combination of approaches and strategies may prove to be the most successful in reaching a resolution that does not relapse into the recurrence of violence.

The Identity of the Mediator & the Issue of Neutrality

Within the field of Conflict Resolution, it is debated among scholars whether the identity of the mediator plays a significant role in the mediation process and whether neutrality is beneficial or disadvantageous in the mediation process. Regarding the identity of the mediator, a wide range of actors may take on the role of mediator in international conflicts. Some scholars believe that the identity of the mediator is essential in the mediation process, and that the mediator may change the structure of the conflict, especially when engaging in a coercive approach.\textsuperscript{14} They emphasize that the characteristics of the disputing parties often impact the strategy or approach that the mediator will take, and the likelihood for the successful third-party mediation of the conflict.\textsuperscript{15} However, other scholars believe that the identity of the mediator is a secondary factor in determining whether mediation will be successful. Rather, it is the individual characteristics, such as being perceived as independent and credible, that are more important to success than the state or organization that the mediator identifies as.

\textsuperscript{9} Wilkenfeld, Young, Quinn, and Asal, \textit{Mediating International Crisis}, 70.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 72.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 73.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
Regarding neutrality and the importance of neutrality in third-party mediation, the opinion among scholars is once again split. For the purpose of this study, the neutrality of a mediator will be defined as the mediator’s ability to remain impartial to the disputing parties and refrain from an unbalanced position in both the creation and proposal of settlements. Proponents of neutral mediators argue that impartiality is central to successful interventions in many situations, and that the disputing parties’ motivation to engage in third-party mediation and their confidence in the mediator is enhanced when both parties perceive the mediator as an impartial, yet skilled, participant in the process. While theoretically beneficial, other scholars state that it is not realistic because the mediator needs to engage in behavior in which they are able to elicit information and exercise influence. Therefore, they need leverage or resources that will enhance the mediator’s ability to influence the outcome; characteristics that a neutral mediator cannot possess. Scholars Zartman and Touyal reiterate this point in asserting that the mediator’s task of reframing and persuasion is better achieved when they possess resources that both parties value or desire, rather than when the mediator is unbiased.

By using both the Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine cases, two intrastate conflicts that experienced third-party mediation during the same time period at the hands of the same mediator, this research will seek to fill the gaps within the study of the importance of the identity and neutrality of the third-party mediator in resolving intrastate conflicts. Utilizing a comparative analysis of the conflicts, U.S. involvement in both conflicts, and the methods and strategies employed by the U.S. in mediating both conflicts, this research will evaluate the significance of the mediator’s relations with the disputing parties and whether neutrality is an essential characteristic of an effective third-party mediator.

The History of the Northern Ireland Conflict

From 1994 to 1998, an official Northern Ireland peace process was conducted as a response to the Nationalist and Unionist groups that had been engaging in paramilitary violence for more than two decades. The violence between these two groups was a reaction to deep-rooted hostilities between the predominantly Catholic Nationalists and Protestant Unionists of Northern Ireland. Catholic grievances regarding economic, political, and social status accumulated in the Northern Ireland Civil Rights movement in the late 1960s. Inspired by the African-American civil rights movement in the United States, several groups of Catholic citizens created their own movement that demanded equal rights for all citizens.

By 1968, civil rights marches became the primary method of gaining attention and demanding reform. Although non-violent by nature, almost every one was met with Protestant counter-demonstration and marches were prone to sporadic violence between the two groups. In 1969, the violence escalated further. When a Unionist group marched through the predominantly Catholic city of

16 Bercovitch and Jackson, Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century, 36.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
The U.S. Mediator

Derry, Catholics began throwing stones at the marchers. In response, the police responded to them with baton charging, which marked the beginning of the controversial role of the police, and later the British army, in the conflict. The escalation of violence during this period accumulated in the event known as Bloody Sunday in 1972, in which several Catholic Nationalist protestors were shot dead by the British army. There was a massive Nationalist outcry that led to rioting and the acceleration of an Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing campaign.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the conflict continued between the two groups. The British government began practicing internment, or imprisonment without trial, of many suspected nationalist paramilitary members. Furthermore, bombing campaigns by both the IRA and unionist paramilitaries continued to increase in number and intensity. In 1985, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed by the British and Irish governments in an effort to create greater cooperation in solving the conflict. This marked a shift towards positive developments in the conflict, leading to secret talks between political leaders of Northern Ireland. By the time that President Clinton was elected in 1992, the foundations were laid for U.S. involvement in aiding the peace process.

The History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

In September of 1993, the historic handshake between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat marked the beginning of the Oslo Accords, or the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations that occurred throughout the Clinton administration. The pursuit of a peace process was attempted in response to the ongoing violence between the state of Israel and the native Palestinian inhabitants in the aftermath of mass Jewish immigration to Palestine and the subsequent establishment of the state of Israel. In 1948, the UN passed Resolution 181, which called for two separate Israeli and Arab states. However, the Arabs rejected the resolution because it gave more land to Israel. Following increased violence, Israel declared itself an independent state. This caused war to break out between Israel and a coalition of Arab states consisting primarily of Palestinians, Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, and Syria. While it is referred to as the War of Independence by Israel, the Arabs fittingly refer to it as the Nakba, which is Arabic for Catastrophe. On the heels of a military victory, the UN passed another resolution that granted the Palestinians the ‘right to return,’ a principle dealing with the Palestinian refugee status that would become a controversial issue in future Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

In 1967 and 1973, Israel won two more military victories against the Arab states, solidifying their occupation of Palestine. The UN and the majority of the international community condemned Israel’s annexation of the land gained in the war, as it was against international law. However, Israel held onto the land rather than choosing to engage in a ‘land for peace’ agreement. While Israel won the military wars between the states, Palestinian paramilitary organizations rose in the decades following the 1967 war. In 1972, Israeli athletes were killed by Palestinian terrorists and other incidents of terrorism continued throughout the decades. In 1987, after two wars and continuous violence, the first Palestinian uprising, or Intifada, broke out in the West Bank and Gaza. Anger and outburst transformed into a coordinated rebellion against the decades-long occupa-
The intifada did not end until the Madrid Conference of 1991, which laid the first foundations for a U.S. mediated peace process.

The Madrid Conference was a peace conference co-sponsored by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, aimed at initiating negotiations between Israel and delegations from Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. Following the conference, Israeli and Palestinian delegates engaged in secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway in which each party recognized the legitimacy of the others and renounced violence. This compromise and recognition allowed for the United States to increase involvement in the conflict and initiate the peace process that came to be known as the Oslo Process.

The United States as a Mediator: the Northern Ireland Peace Process

Reasons for U.S. Involvement in the Northern Ireland Peace Process

Although the Clinton administration was the first to become directly involved in the resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict, the foundation of U.S. involvement in Northern Ireland can be traced back to the Carter administration in 1977. During this time, the ‘Four Horsemen’ as they were called, began to push a formal US policy toward both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland that had not yet existed. These ‘Four Horsemen’ consisted of four Democratic government officials: Governor Hugh Carey, Senator Ted Kennedy, Senator Daniel Moynihan, and Congressman Thomas ‘Tip’ O’Neill. In August of 1977, influenced by Tip O’Neill, Carter released a statement on Britain’s engagement in Northern Ireland.

In his statement, Carter spoke of human rights, condemning the violence and urging Americans not to finance any violent groups, as some Irish-Americans empathized with and financed the nationalist IRA. This statement was significant for two reasons. First, it was the first time a sitting President showed interest in the Irish conflict and showed a willingness to engage by supporting the countries economically through investment and through any peaceful solutions that the parties agreed to. Second, Carter began to truly unravel the conflict in Northern Ireland by focusing on the people of Northern Ireland, rather than solely the states of Ireland and Great Britain. Nevertheless, Carter appeared impartial in his first statement, maintaining strict neutrality in the face of U.S. relations with both Britain and Ireland.

Throughout the 1980s, during the Reagan administration, the Four Horsemen continued to interact with Northern Irish politicians such as SDLP leader John Hume. John Hume was notable for his non-violent views and is credited with persuading American leaders such as the Four Horsemen to take a position that opposed IRA violence. Throughout Reagan’s presidency, multiple figures began to influence him and spark his interest in Ireland. Irish Ambassa-
Sean Donlan offered to trace Reagan’s genealogical roots, suggesting that
President Reagan had strong Irish roots. After this, it was Reagan who initiated
the tradition of the annual St. Patrick’s Day party at the White House that is still
held every year. However, Reagan’s most important role in Irish affairs was
through the influence that he had over British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher. Reagan, influenced by his own friendship with Tip O’Neill, viewed a
strong Anglo-Irish relationship as a favorable development. For her own part,
Thatcher faced growing criticism internationally regarding Britain’s treatment of
the conflict. She knew that by including the Republic of Ireland in the manage-
ment of the conflict, she could share the criticism with the Irish government.
Therefore, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was signed. This was an essential
document in the Northern Ireland peace process that confirmed that the Repub-
lic of Ireland would adopt a consultative role in Northern Ireland, while main-
taining Northern Ireland’s constitutional status.

Clinton’s direct predecessor, President H. W. Bush, did not remain in-
volved in the Northern Ireland to the same extent as President Reagan or Pres-
dent Carter. He did not positively or negatively affect the process of U.S. in-
volveinent, simply not making it a priority on his own agenda. However, his dis-
interest alone influenced the substantial role that President Bill Clinton would
hold in the Northern Ireland conflict. Bush’s indifference in Northern Ireland
alienated the Irish-American lobby, who had worked in correlation with the
Four Horsemen to ensure U.S. involvement in Ireland. In 1991, a new organi-
ization in the Irish-American lobby was created, called Americans for a New Irish
Agenda (ANIA). In response to Bush, its creator Niall O’Dowd saw Clinton as
the best Democratic candidate to support who would deliver on commitments
made to the Irish American lobby if he was successful in the election.
This time also marked a shift in the Irish American lobby. Adding to the influence of
the Four Horsemen was the rise of a number of Irish-American entrepreneurs
who used their role in corporate America to contribute to the influence of the Irish
American lobby. Throughout his election campaign and after his election,
Clinton made several commitments in regards to Ireland, marking the initiation
of Clinton’s involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process.

The reasons for President Clinton’s involvement in the Northern Ireland
peace process throughout the 1990s were largely founded in the actions of his
predecessors’ and the influence of the Irish-American lobby. However, there
were three reasons that the Clinton administration was able to engage in the re-
gion and the conflict to a degree that past administrations were not able to: (1)
internal developments in the conflict, (2) the end of the Cold War, and (3) Pres-
dent Clinton’s ambitions for a strong legacy in foreign policy.

First, after 1985, secret talks between the British government, Unionist poli-
tical parties, and Sinn Fein (the political wing of the IRA) began to explore op-
tions for peace in Northern Ireland. In 1993, the British and Irish governments

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21 Interview with Paul Arthur.
23 Roger MacGinty, “American Influences on the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” The Journal of
welcomed the notion self-determination for the people of Ireland and echoed the sentiment that the British government had no "selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland." Second, the end of the Cold War in 1991 immediately preceded President Clinton’s presidential victory in 1992. Despite the fact that Britain considered Northern Ireland an internal issue not privy to outside involvement, the United States showed interest in the conflict, suggesting future involvement in the affairs of another sovereign state. Although there was never serious contention between the United States and the United Kingdom over involvement in the peace process, the end of the Cold War granted the United States the opportunity to assert their own involvement in British affairs without the fear of counter-pressure. Third, it is speculated that President Clinton’s involvement in Northern Ireland is largely connected to concern regarding his legacy. Clinton’s campaign platform was largely based on domestic and economic issues. However, presidential legacies are often concocted of successful endeavors in the field of foreign policy. In this respect, President Clinton needed a victorious foreign policy feat. With involvement in other peace processes failing to produce a substantive, clear solution, Northern Ireland presented a unique opportunity.

Methods to Mediation: The U.S. Approach to the Northern Ireland Peace Process

As defined by Wilkenfeld’s three primary mediation styles, the United States via Chairman George Mitchell acted primarily as a facilitative and formulative mediator in the Northern Ireland peace process. His greatest asset to the parties of the conflict was the communication channel that he and his team provided when the parties could not engage in face-to-face conversations about the issues at hand. His team also assisted in the creation of agendas and documentation throughout the process. As is characteristic of the facilitator approach to mediating in conflict, George Mitchell strived to remain neutral to the parties at hand and highlighted the importance of an inclusive peace process.

Throughout the peace process, the former senator took on three key roles. He was the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Economic Initiatives in Ireland, he led the International Body on Decommissioning of Weapons, and most importantly, the Independent Chair of Negotiations. Mitchell was an independent negotiator but remained a representative of the United States government behind the scenes, if not on the surface. Multiparty talks for the peace process began in June 1996. Upon Mitchell’s acceptance of the role, he declared his intentions to remain impartial. Negotiations took place within three different strands, each addressing key issues of the conflict. The first strand, chaired by the British government, revolved around the political arrangements of Northern Ireland and the Northern Irish political parties. The second strand, seen as the most difficult to resolve, was chaired by Mitchell himself and addressed relations and institutions between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

Ireland. The third strand revolved around relations between the British and Irish governments. Although it was conducted directly by these governments themselves, other participants and chairs were kept informed on their discussions.\textsuperscript{26}

Despite scheduling setbacks and apprehension regarding any agreement, the Belfast Agreement was eventually signed by the parties on April 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1998. The agreement acknowledged the legitimacy of both views regarding Northern Ireland’s status as a member of the United Kingdom, and established that Northern Ireland would remain part of the union until the majority of the people of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland wished otherwise. However, it recognized the rights of the Northern Irish to identify as Irish, British, or both, and to hold either or both British and Irish citizenship. The agreement was voted on by voters in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on May 22, 1998, and went into effect upon majority approval.

In regards to Chairman George Mitchell’s role as the key mediator, it becomes evident that the methods he utilized throughout the process, as well as his identity as both an Independent Chairman and a United States representative, largely impacted his success in establishing a final agreement. Mitchell’s approach was incremental in nature, but he rightfully understood the importance of an expiration date on the peace process. However, Mitchell was only successful in initiating a hard deadline with only a few months to prepare for final negotiations because the core, most difficult issues were already being discussed by the parties. In the fall of 1997, feeling that it was important that the discussions go beyond generalities, Mitchell asked that all parties submit position papers on each subject, then restate orally during the talks what was already submitted.\textsuperscript{27} However, although all of the positions were on the table, he stated that he needed a spark to initiate real progress.\textsuperscript{28}

In February of 1998, Mitchell asked the governments to prepare a detailed paper on north-south institutions that “required extensive negotiations between the governments, acting on their own and as proxies for the two sides.”\textsuperscript{29} The end result was six paragraphs and fourteen key questions that needed to be addressed in any agreement, in which Mitchell then initiated a discussion with the parties where they could respond to the questions. This method allowed Mitchell and his team to determine where common ground could be sought and where distinct differences still remained.\textsuperscript{30} Although the peace process was an incremental one, Mitchell’s insistence on discussing the most difficult questions throughout the process allowed the parties to enter final negotiations ready to establish an agreement.

It was not only important within the incremental approach to establish trust and confidence between the parties and governments, but also between the conflicting parties and Mitchell himself. Rather than being directly inserted into the process as the Independent Chairman, Mitchell first served in other roles in which he was able to gain the trust and prove his capabilities to the governments.

\textsuperscript{26} Mitchell, Making Peace, 120.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 120.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 123.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 137.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
and the political parties. Mitchell himself recognized the importance of influence and trust over any official title from his time spent as the Senate Majority Leader: “Although a modern majority leader has certain defined powers, ultimately his influence is based on his ability to persuade his colleagues. That in turn is based on how much they respect (or fear) him.”

Beyond the role of trust and incremental methods in succeeding in a peace process, the identity of George Mitchell as a U.S. representative and as an independent chairman influenced his ability to assist the parties in establishing an agreement. As a world hegemon with strategic ties with both the British and Irish government, both the U.S. perspective and its resources positively contributed to the peace process. Additionally, Mitchell’s title as an ‘independent’ chairman allowed him to freely mediate the peace process from a more balanced and neutral perspective. Mitchell had the opportunity to gain more trust and confidence from the parties while holding steadfast to positions on issues that were independent from the views of the parties themselves. He was also free to take the viewpoints of the parties into considerations in regards to the methods he utilized as a mediator. Thus, the actions and methods utilized by Chairman Mitchell throughout the peace process led to a fairly successful resolution to the Troubles.

The United States as a Mediator: The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

The Reasons for United States Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

The reasons for the U.S. involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process of the 1990s can be traced back to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. When Israel declared itself an independent state, the United States was among the first handful of states to recognize it. Since its recognition, the United States involvement in Israel and the broader Arab-Israeli conflict was largely influenced, and even determined, by Cold War politics in the Middle East.

The first period of U.S. involvement in Israel-Palestine was marked from the declaration of the State of Israel in 1949 until the Israeli victory in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. During this time, the United States and Israel had yet to form a strategic bond they share today, but the United States began to provide economic assistance to the new state in the form of small grants. This aid was mostly limited to economic assistance, but even then, the United States was hesitant in the amount of aid they provided, in an effort to remain uninvolved in the Middle East controversy and not to alienate other Arab states. Once again, the interwoven Cold War politics of this relationship cannot be understated. At this time, many U.S. policy-makers did not want to alienate the Arab states in fear that it would push them towards the Soviet Union. However, the Israeli victory in the 1967 war opened the door to the modern U.S.-Israeli relationship.

31 Mitchell, Making Peace, 57.
After Israel’s victory, they were in a stronger political and strategic position in the region. Given its own democratic institutions, Israel could now be seen as an American ally in the Middle Eastern stage of the Cold War. Furthermore, in
the 1967 war, Israel defeated Egypt and Syria, both of which were close Soviet allies. From this point onwards, Israel was seen as a block against growing radicalism in the region and the communist influence; the United States shifted from providing general economic aid to investing in the state as an ally. From 1971 to 1973, U.S. economic aid to the country increased from $186 million to $433 million. In 1973, a third Arab-Israeli war broke out. While other states cut off ties with Israel or declared neutrality, such as Britain, the United States continued to aid Israel throughout and after the war. Even when the United States faced an oil embargo, they did not falter in their support for Israel.

In 1979, U.S.-Israel-Arab relations reached a turning point when the U.S. mediated a peace agreement between the state of Egypt and Israel. The agreement was overseen by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. The agreement was based on UNSC resolution 242, essentially following the ‘land for peace’ framework. In order to establish normal diplomatic relations with Egypt, Israel agreed to completely withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula. Although the status and self-governing rights of Gaza and the West Bank were agreed upon within the peace framework, the core controversial issues of Jerusalem and the Palestinian right to return were never addressed.

George Schultz, the Secretary of State under President Reagan from 1982 to 1989, explained U.S. relations with Israel in the period after the 1973 war. In a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee in 1985, he spoke of both the reasoning for and the importance of the U.S.-Israel relationship. He echoed Cold War strategic priorities when referring to America’s responsibility to the defense of freedom and democracy, and stated that the United States “has a responsibility to stand with those who share our hopes and dreams,” referring to the state of Israel. 

When he speaks specifically of the U.S. support for the creation of the state of Israel, he states that it is a “moral response” to centuries of persecution, and that its creation “marked the entrance on the world stage of a new democracy, a new defender of liberty, a new nation committed to human progress and peace.” Therefore, Schultz draws on the similarities between United States and Israel in their values, suggesting that these values make Israel a unique asset in the Middle East. Schultz then outlines the ways in which the United States will always continue to support the state of Israel, emphasizing America’s commitment to ensuring Israel’s security; both because of moral commitment and its strategic position within the Cold War:

That is why we must always make clear to the world-through our material and moral support of Israel, our votes in the

33 Ali, “Aid for Development or Foreign Policy,” 388.
34 Ibid., 389.
36 Ibid., 123.
United Nations, and our efforts for peace- that we are a permanent, steadfast, and unshakable ally of the state of Israel...the American people and the people of Israel both know what is at stake in the struggle against the spread of Soviet power- not just territory and natural resources but the very way of life for which both our nations have shed so much blood and made so many sacrifices.\(^{37}\)

Although it is important to note that this was Secretary Schultz’s viewpoint, it is notable in that he held the position of Secretary of State, the role responsible for U.S. diplomacy and undertakings such as peace processes, for six years.

Therefore, when President Clinton assumed office, a strong foundational bond between the United States and Israel was already deeply engrained in American society and foreign policy. In regards to the reasoning behind the Clinton administration’s involvement in the Oslo peace process, the beginning of Clinton’s first term fell on the heels of the Madrid Conference in 1991. The conference had opened prospects of Arab-Israeli peace and led to secret talks between Israeli and Palestinian leaders in Oslo, Norway. The reasons for the U.S. role in the Oslo peace process are fairly obvious, given its hegemonic role, its relations with Israel, and its general strategic interests in the region. Furthermore, President’s Carter’s mediation between Israel and Egypt was victorious and is regarded as a major breakthrough in peace negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict. When President Clinton was elected in 1992, he hoped to build on the momentum and offer that the United States assist in the peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including the Palestinians. In a historic moment in September of 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat shook hands on the White House lawn beside President Clinton after their governments had signed the official Oslo I Accord, cementing the U.S. involvement in the forthcoming peace process.

Methods to Mediation: The U.S. Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

The United States role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process seemed similar to their role in the Northern Ireland peace process: as a facilitator and communicator between the chief parties of the conflict. However, the procedural approach that the United States pursued was largely incremental, meaning that the administration supported the technique of building trust over small, incremental measures and leaving the discussions over large issues, such as Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements, to final negotiations. This was unlike the incremental approach in Northern Ireland in which the difficult issues were discussed throughout the process. This incremental approach proved to be a substantial flaw in Clinton’s mediation approach. This approach was defined as ‘perfo-

\(^{37}\) Schultz, “The United States and Israel,” 123.
mance-based,’ in which the entire peace process was gradual, where the implementation of one step would occur only after the previous one was completed.\(^{38}\)

In reality, there were several errors made in the attempt to utilize this approach, the largest being the failure to implement any of the agreed upon measures. The Clinton administration failed in its role as a mediator to hold the parties accountable to the agreements they signed. The United States would have been more effective in monitoring the parties’ implementation measures, if they had held them accountable to their agreements, fairly reported violations, and made clear consequences of failing to follow through on or breaking agreements.\(^{39}\) However, the Clinton administration chose instead to sacrifice the issues of implementing agreements because of the desire to keep the process alive at all costs. The process paid for this when Camp David II negotiations began. In July of 2000, a summit meeting was held at Camp David with President Clinton and his negotiating team acting as the mediators between Chairman Arafat and the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Given the general lack of progress in the years following up to the summit, Clinton attempted a last ditch effort to reach a conclusion to the peace process before leaving office. This initiative was rushed and ill-prepared, given that there was no trust or confidence between the parties going into the mediation because no agreements had been acted upon.\(^{40}\)

Another faulty component of the U.S. mediation was the role that President Clinton himself played. More so than in Northern Ireland, the President was more active in the process and was seen as the central mediator. Although there are benefits to increased presidential involvement in such a mediation process, his role was not strategically utilized. The Presidential role is best reserved for end negotiations; in order to avoid devaluing his power, the President should not be seen as overtly and directly accessible. The President’s direct role in the process and the discussion of U.S. interests influencing the peace process is directly tied to general issues in third-party mediation and U.S.’s interests in Israel. Generally, third party mediators can restrain the peace process when their own interests affect it, and when they impose their own perspective on it, whether intentionally or not.\(^{41}\) On the one hand, Clinton’s wide domestic and congressional support for the peace process was beneficial to sustaining it. However, because of the need to appease Congressional views, Clinton failed to rebut any Israeli practices that were harmful to the peace process but beneficial to U.S. interests or policies.\(^{42}\) This was the foundation of the neutrality issue in the U.S. Mediation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

First, the very rhetoric throughout the peace process conveyed the strength of the U.S.-Israeli bond and the commitment that the U.S. had to maintaining it. As early as 1993, the language of President Clinton reflected the long-standing commitment to Israel even as his administration took on the role of the third-


\(^{40}\) Ibid.


party mediator in the peace process. Beginning in 1993, but continuing through the end of the peace process at Camp David in 2000, Clinton’s rhetoric and position regarding the U.S.-Israel relationship was framed similar to George Schultz’s speech in 1985: the role of the United States is to protect the security of Israel. In an exchange with reporters in 1993, President Clinton reported the conversation that he had just had with Prime Minister Rabin: “When we first met, he [Rabin] told me that he was prepared to take risks for peace, and I told him that it was the responsibility of the United States to do everything we could do to minimize those risks.”43 Minimizing risks to Israel was often stated as a goal in the ongoing peace process.

During Camp David II negotiations, the United States relationship with Israel compromised their ability to take a clear, separate stance from the Israeli government in negotiations and when formulating agreements. To begin, the U.S. negotiating team itself only had expertise regarding Israel, and were not knowledgeable regarding the Palestinian positions or even Arab culture more generally.44 One former state department official reported, “There was no expert on our team on Islam or Muslim perspectives. So when it came to dealing with Jerusalem, there’s some very embarrassing episodes that betrayed our lack of knowledge or bias.”45 This lack of knowledge, along with a general lack of strategy or policy going into the talks, led the United States to often take on Israel’s position rather than attempting to bridge the positions between the disputing parties.

The U.S. position was highlighted in an account of Camp David II negotiations written by a Palestinian member of the talks. Akram Hanieh stated that President Clinton followed the traditional American role regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and summarized this tradition in three points:

1. Washington exercises its role according to the needs, requirements, and concerns of the current Israeli government;
2. Washington accepts Israel’s main demands as givens that cannot be questioned;
3. American administration requires “flexibility” and “concessions” in equal measure from Palestinian and Israeli sides (Israeli steps should be matched by Palestinian steps).46

He affirmed that Clinton and his negotiating team did not refute any Israeli requests regarding negotiating issues and that both Barak’s government and Israeli security remained at the centerfold of the conversations.47 Furthermore,

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44 Ibid., 52.
45 Ibid., 53.
46 Ibid., 79.
The last point can be viewed from a neutral lens, it ignores the basic power structures and the reality of the conflict itself, which will be discussed further in the paper. Similar to the view of the U.S. diplomat, Hanieh pointed out that the inability to act as an honest broker was consistently exemplified in the unified stance of the Israeli delegation and U.S. peace team. Furthermore, he affirmed that while the President was well-intentioned in his approach to the conflict, his role as a direct representative of American interests and policies severely damaged the peace process and final negotiations:

President Clinton often listened with great attention and understanding to the Palestinian viewpoint and on many occasions argued against the views of his advisors in front of Palestinian negotiators, but in the last analysis he had his own calculations and restraints, America’s permanent policy supporting Israel and the pressure of Congress.

President Clinton and his team were ultimately unable to help Israel and the PLO reach an agreement at the 2000 Camp David Negotiations. The summit ended with a joint statement that served as a framework for future negotiations, although no substantial progress followed. Since then, the peace process has been sporadic and ultimately ineffective, with very little prospects for a durable resolution between the two parties. On the heels of Camp David’s failure, renewed rounds of violence and uprisings occurred between the parties. The Oslo peace process that the Clinton administration had pursued so intensely had officially ended.

**The Question of Identity and Neutrality**

The greatest difference between the United States role as a mediator in the Northern Ireland and Israeli-Palestinian peace processes was how the strategic bonds between the United States and the parties of the conflicts were utilized. A majority of scholarly work produced by academics and experts in the field of conflict resolution concur that effective third-party mediation requires a neutral third-party mediator to act as a channel of communication between the parties, and when warranted, contribute objective solutions to the peace negotiations that do not favor one party over the other. However, while this approach to neutrality is beneficial in theoretical studies, the question of neutrality is more complex when examining the concept from the lens of a real conflict. As this case study has shown, neutrality is but one path that a third-party mediator can pursue in order to achieve successful peace negotiations. However, cases such as Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine suggest that strategic relations between the third-party mediators and the conflict’s parties have the potential to be beneficial when the relations are utilized in the correct way.

In Northern Ireland, the United States was able to use strategic bonds between itself and all parties in order to ensure neutrality and a balance of power

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48 Ibid., 92.
49 Ibid.
in peace negotiations. The United States' bond with Britain stems from shared western liberal democratic ideas and their strategic mutual allegiance throughout the Cold War. The United States shares a cultural and historical bond with the state of Ireland, both North and South, because of the centuries of Irish immigration and the Irish-American influence in the U.S. Furthermore, all parties of the conflict hold the same western liberal democratic ideals that the United States does. Even within Northern Ireland, the United States did not exert a bias in favor of the Unionists or the Nationalists because they had ties to both groups, due to the U.S.-British relationship, the U.S.- Irish relationship, and the overwhelming influence of the Irish-American lobby.

Furthermore, their involvement correctly recognized the power dynamics of the conflict itself. Given that the Republic of Ireland had marginal influence in the affairs of the era of the Troubles prior to the Anglo-Irish agreement, the conflict essentially existed between the Protestant Unionists, who had the backing and support of the British government and army, and the Catholic Nationalists. While vehemently condemning the paramilitary violence of the IRA, the United States recognized that British power was on the side of the Unionists and resisted pressure from the British government to favor Unionist views. The U.S. correctly utilized their strong relations with the British in order remain steadfast in their own decisions and views as an independent third-party mediator. Moreover, George Mitchell and his negotiating team had their own clear strategies that sought to bridge the opposing views of the parties, rather than adopting one party's view as their own.

However, the United States took a contrasting and less effective approach in its mediation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Throughout the peace process, the United States remained tied to its bias in favor of Israel. Israel had been a long-term strategic ally to the United States against Soviet influence and was also perceived by the U.S. as a beacon of democratic western ideals in the Middle East region, despite its treatment of Palestinians as third class citizens. In this case, the strategic values of the United States were too reliant on Israel, and the U.S. negotiating team was unable to stop themselves from letting their own state's interests impact the peace process. In the case of Israel-Palestine, the United States would have been more successful by following two alternative paths to third-party mediation: (1) neutrality or, (2) taking the opportunity to utilize their strategic relationship with Israel in order to balance the power dynamics of the conflict, therefore increasing the chance for peace between the parties.

Had the United States been able to ensure a policy of neutrality in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the chances for success would have increased because of its ability to act as a channel of communication that both parties trusted and because of its ability to set forth concrete suggestions that would have been more acceptable to both parties. The United States could have utilized both its new status as a single world hegemon in the post Cold War era and its strong ties with Israel to reestablish a balance of power between Israel and the Palestinians in regards to the peace process.

A major setback in the United States approach to mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was their inability to recognize the power dynamics between Israel and the Palestinians, mistakenly treating the two parties as two internationally-recognized, independent states. In Northern Ireland, the conflict was between two parties within the state of Britain. Although United States's pressure,
or ability to withstand British pressure, was necessary to successfully mediate the peace process, the United States was able to engage in a more neutral approach because the power dynamics between the Catholic Nationalists and the Protestant Unionists were more equalized. Although a key issue within the conflict is that the Catholic Nationalists were an oppressed minority within the state of Britain, it is also evident that this party had the support of both the state of Ireland and the Irish-American lobby. This is not the case with the Palestinians of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

First, despite aspirations among the Palestinian people, the Palestinians are not a part of an established independent state. Rather, they are increasingly taking on the role of the oppressed minority within the state of Israel, similar to the viewpoint of the Catholic Nationalists in British Northern Ireland. However, the difference is that the Palestinian people do not enjoy the same amount of outside support that the Catholic Nationalists had. In the years following the last Arab-Israeli war in 1973, Arab unity over the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had diminished. The Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979 and the Jordan-Israel peace treaty in 1994 founded the precedent of establishing diplomatic and economic ties with Israel in spite of no resolution for the Palestinian track of the conflict. Unlike in Northern Ireland, where Britain and Ireland were united in their efforts to promote intergroup cooperation, the other Arab states in the region had reservations regarding the Oslo Process because of their own relations with Israel and their fear of an emerging Israeli hegemony in the region. Furthermore, no Arab-American lobby existed or presently exists to the same caliber of the Irish-American lobby, and certainly not to the same caliber as the power of the Israeli-American lobby. If anything, Americans often viewed Arabs with hostility due to the media’s stereotyped perception of them as terrorists.

Despite the rhetoric surrounding the peace process regularly stressing the need for Israeli security that stems from frequent Palestinian terrorist attacks, the reality of the conflict is that the asymmetry in power between the state of Israel and the displaced Palestinian people is immense. Both sides need assurance of security, not just the state of Israel, which can be seen in the encroaching Israeli settlements that continued to expand even throughout the peace process. Furthermore, it can be argued that the Palestinians have a greater need for security given the fact that they are currently a stateless people that are subject to the laws of the Israeli state regardless. However, because of the U.S.-Israel relationship and the interests that tie them, this power disparity was never addressed. While foundational a neutral approach to the conflict was necessary, the United States should have gone a step further in addressing the power disparity by advocating for the Palestinians to a greater extent.

Thus, as these case studies have shown, the identity of a third-party mediator can have an immense impact on the processes and outcome of a peace process. This is not to imply that the context of a conflict is less important to the outcome of a peace process than the identity of a mediator. On the contrary, the identity of the mediator is significant because of its influence on a peace process within the specific context of the conflict. In the Northern Ireland conflict, the identity of an American mediator, the assigned independent Chair of Negotia-

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tions George Mitchell, allowed for Mitchell to utilize American resources in mediating the peace process. However, because he was an ‘independent chair,’ he was able to focus on resolving the conflict through the lens of each disputing party, dealing only with the core issues of the conflict rather than how a certain resolution may impact his own country. In the case of Northern Ireland, it was essential for Mitchell to remain neutral because the disputing parties share balanced power dynamics.

However, the identity of the mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process only harmed the process and led to its ultimate failure. Given the context of the conflict itself, a more effective mediator would advocate for the Palestinian side, the party that is severely less powerful militarily, economically, and politically than the state of Israel. However, the identity of the U.S. mediator as the U.S. President, officially representing the American state was significant in deteriorating the process. The President of the United States is unable to separate their role as a third-party mediator from their role as an official representative of the American state who must always put U.S. strategic interests first. Therefore, given Clinton’s identity and inability to remain at the very least neutral, or more significantly, an advocate of the Palestinian position, the U.S. President was unfit to be the third-party mediator for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Conclusion

Thus, given their parallel time periods, mediators, and general conflict types, these two case studies provided a unique opportunity to conduct a comparative analysis of how the identity of a mediator and their perceived neutrality impact their success in resolving a conflict. I conclude that given the particular context of any conflict, the identity of the third-party mediator plays a significant role in their ability to mediate. This identity includes both the title of the mediator, such as independent chairman or president, as well as their ethnic-national identity. When this identity causes the mediator to relate to or favor one party over the other, or reversely disfavor and discriminate against a particular party, its neutrality is threatened. This neutrality is essential to third-party mediation in the case of an intrastate conflict in which there is a general balance of power. However, a strategic bias may be more beneficial than harmful if it is utilized in order to correct power disparities between the parties rather than to advance the mediator’s own strategic interests. Future mediators of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should keep this lesson as well as the case of Northern Ireland in mind in future approaches and attempts to resolve the long-standing conflict.
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Theme 3:
Identity Formation and Social Change
Presently, Black youth worldwide are rising to confront old frustrations of inequality. Specifically, in the United States and South Africa youth of the millennial generation are demanding society to progress past the status quo. The #BlackLivesMatter Movement and the #RhodesMustFall Movement are proving to be calls to continue the freedom struggles of previous generations such as the Civil Rights Movement and Anti-Apartheid. Twenty-one years after the end of apartheid and fifty-one years after the Civil Rights Act, the consequences of the past continue to define Black millennials’ social experiences, identities, and perspectives. Black millennials were born in a time of greater political freedom than their ancestors, yet they continue to strive to create spaces of freedom. This research investigates the forms of freedom black youth seek and understand it to be.

Introduction

All we wanna do is take the chains off
All we wanna do is break the chains off
All we wanna do is be free
All we wanna do is be free.¹

August 15, 2014, Jermaine Lamarr Cole, commonly known as J.Cole, released a song via Soundcloud with the following message: “Rest in Peace to Michael Brown and to every young black man murdered in America, whether by the hands of white or black. I pray that one day the world will be filled with peace and rid of injustice. Only then will we all Be Free.” ² Cole like many young, black Americans arrived in Ferguson in the aftermath of Mike Brown’s death angry, confused, questioning and declaring #BlackLivesMatter. For black American youth, this was the catalyst for change to continue the struggle for freedom similar to that of their ancestors before them.

The black American narrative for freedom began with the arrival of African slaves in chains. The chain has always symbolized the bondage of black bodies physically, psychologically and metaphysically. The end of the Civil War represented the “physical” removal of chains and the “freedom” of slaves. After the

² Ibid.
Civil War, black Americans continued in their struggle for political and economic freedom. The end of the Civil Rights Movement constituted political rights to black Americans and many others. In the American narrative, the Civil Rights Movement was the last greatest struggle for freedom and it was ‘successful.’ Following this movement, different narratives arose leading to the belief that the struggle to be free ended with the granting of limited political rights.

However, in 2016 the 9.7 million black millennials in the United States can see or have questioned the injustices that continue to reflect the physical bondage of the chain. Furthermore, the chain is felt not only in the United States but also by the black millennials in South Africa.

Presently, in South Africa those born after 1990 make up half of the country’s population, 27 million. Like their fellow black millennials in the United States, young South Africans are part of a generation deemed post-racial and ‘free.’ Further, this generation, born without any recollection of the apartheid regime, is deemed the “Born Free” generation. The “Born Free” generation lives in the progressive, democratic, rainbow society, South Africa was meant to be. This generation of black South Africans is the first generation to have full franchise rights, and freedoms of speech and association. Generally, this generation has more opportunities than previous generations. Yet, when a Black South African student decides to throw feces over University of Cape Town’s Cecil Rhodes statue, campuses and students erupt as the #RhodesMustFall Movement that has branched off to the #FeesMustFall and #Shackville movements. For an entire month, black students across the University of Cape Town campus protested for the removal of this statue because of what it represents. The approach to the removal of the statue is to continue the decolonization of an African country. The “Born Free” generation exhibits through the #RhodesMustFall Movement that the efforts to make freedom a reality are not done.

Black millennials are the beneficiaries of a society moving towards democracy and equality, yet they are the heirs of past systemic oppression. Twenty-one years after the end of apartheid and fifty-one years after the Civil Rights Act, the consequences of this past continue to define their social experience, identity, and perspective. I explore how these generations conceptualize freedom. Both generations were born in a time of greater political freedom than their ancestors, yet, these generations continue to search to create spaces of freedom. The movements of these generations are transformative as they do not move towards singular goals or defined accomplishments. #BlackLivesMatter is a notion that all people can accept and be visionaries for their personal missions for why black lives matter. #RhodesMustFall creates the necessary dialogue to continue the removal of apartheid and colonial influences in higher education and daily living. My research investigates what forms or realms of freedom black youth seek and what they understand freedom to be. As decades pass and oppression continues the legacy of strife associated with the color of skin continues. The present

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era of democracy and equality have yet to become the lived experiences for all citizens of these nations. Utilizing moments and key figures from the Civil Rights Movement and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, this paper will attempt to provide an understanding and document the evolution of the idea of freedom within the Black struggle to be free.

**Methodology**

This project employs a qualitative analysis of 40 in-person, Skype, and phone interviews (25 South African and 15 American) between July 2015 to January 2016. The study population is black, young adult millennials, male and female, and has some level of education, American and South African, between sixteen and twenty-six years old. The interviews included individuals who were often knowledgeable of self, history, and societal attitudes towards blackness, and others who never pondered the ideas. Their perspectives shape a small piece of a larger narrative, however, limited by funds, travel, time, language, into the lived experiences of black millennials in South Africa and the United States. Further, this study attempts to reflect on how these young people conceptualize freedom and blackness, interpret past struggles for freedom, and construct a future of equality.

**The Generations yet to be free**

The older generation understood freedom (in the political sense) as having the vote or having a say in the construction of the constitution. My understanding of freedom goes beyond this and calls for a full re-articulation of what it means to be a human being in a particular space, and for a full acceptance of that basic humanity in all spaces.³

The Millennial Generation is defined using various years but is usually placed between 1980 and 2000. Members of the millennial generation are typically children of the Baby Boomer generation and are now the teenagers and twentiesomethings of the world. The personality of the millennial generation is characterized as “…confident, self-expressive, liberal, upbeat, and open to change.”⁶ These characterizations are critical to how and why millennials have chosen to start and lead movements to create greater change.

This research focuses on the Black Millennial experience in South Africa and the United States. This research will provide particular emphasis to the millennial experience of the “Born Free” generation and the Post Hip Hop Generation.

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³ In person interview, July 2015.

The “Born Frees” is the nickname given to the generation of South Africans born in 1994 during the country’s first free elections. The “Born Free” generation accounts for nearly 40 percent of the population. However, as the first free generation, this generation is going through its times of frustration. The black born free generation in the last year has emerged to voice their disappointments through nationwide student protests. The first protest was for ‘decolonizing’ their university campuses through the removal of colonial figures present on their campuses – #RhodesMustFall Movement. The second nationwide protest began with a communal student effort against rising tuition – #FeesMustFall Movement. The firm response from the “Born Frees” to use protesting as their medium of freedom expresses progress, but also the discontent this generation has with continued injustices and the legacy of apartheid that still permeates in their society.

The idea of being “born free” is complex within the South African context. The complexity of being “born free” begins with barriers placed upon individuals based on apartheid laws and classifications. During the apartheid regime, an individual came into a society with limitations on their development within society. Based on race, persons were limited in access to areas, jobs, housing, and social well-being. Concisely, to be black and born during apartheid, meant to be born into inequality, injustice, and oppression. Therefore, 1994 represents the divide between those who were born without freedoms and those who were “born free.” Being “born free” is greater than opportunities, but signifies that a member of the “born free” generation has rights, equity, and justice as a citizen of South Africa.

However, South African President Jacob Zuma finds the ideology of having a “Born Free” generation to be problematic. Zuma speaks from his position as a participant in the liberation struggle against apartheid. He believes that the term is liberal and “it says you have no history, and if you have no history you are like a tree without roots.” Zuma made this comment in 2014 before the first elections in which the “Born Free” generation would be eligible to vote in. Zuma sees South Africa’s narrative through the eyes of liberation. The liberation which he and other leaders fought for was against a white supremacy regime in which the African National Congress (ANC) came out victorious, but it was a struggle for survival. Thus, the notion to be born free, he believes, disconnects the liberation struggle from the growth of the South African society today. Since, the rise of student social movements over the past year, President Zuma may have changed his mind on whether the “Born Free” generation remembers their history. Their history is evident in these student-led movements. If the roots of post-apartheid South Africa are the achievements of the liberation struggle, then the growth of the tree is the accountability to grow from and maintain those achievements.

In America, the context of persons born in 1994 will be formed around the “hip-hop is dead” discourse, referencing the change of not only the end of a musical era, but also the political and reality changes hip hop artists spoke about and utilized their music as a medium for. This particular discourse focuses on the unfortunate continuation for hip hop to be “paradigm of youth resistance and social change in the post-Civil Rights Era.” However, the expected paradigm of youth resistance according to many did not last past the 1990s. Essentially, declaring that hip-hop was no longer a tool of the disenfranchised that kept the spirit of the Civil Rights alive. “Hip hop is dead” represents the end of an era of music being the voice of marginalized communities and people. Hip Hop died when it became a for profit industry and not a representation of oppressive structures that are experienced daily in communities of color.

From this death arose a new group of young people, that Asante Jr. calls the “Post Hip-Hop Generation.” The Post Hip Hop Generation refers to individuals born at the end of the Golden Age of Hip Hop in the mid-1990s. Asante Jr. says the post-hip-hop generation is “a new generation of black youths in search of a deeper understanding of themselves in a context outside of the hip-hop monopoly.” The post-Hip Hop generation is defined by the inability of music to reflect their marginalized realities. The hip-hop generation refers to “blacks born after the civil-rights movement [whom] may have once captured the essence of the rebellious, politically discontent twenty-somethings of the 1980s and ’90s.” The hip-hop generation dealt with the changing of urban spaces, violence, and dialogue around black spaces. Thus, the post-Hip Hop generation specifically refers to individuals born in 1994 and later because this point is regarded as the end of the Golden Age of Hip Hop, end of the conscious hip-hop, and the start of Hip Hop being commercialized by corporations. The previous generation utilized hip-hop as a form of communication to relay the message for the need of liberation from oppressive factors within their communities.

Both generations follow a particular history of a particular struggle, thus they exist in this “post” period. Post as a prefix refers to the time after a particular instance. Post periods are not defined by what has happened in that period, but by what has happened before. Thus, the Born Free in post-apartheid South Africa will always be compared to the youth of the apartheid era because apartheid history narrates how post-apartheid culture has developed and should be narrated. To be Born Free means that their actions or experiences cannot be predicted by apartheid because this generation can only relate to the legacy of apartheid in their society and not the complete structure. Post-hip-hop America often represents a move away from conscious social dialogue through hip hop music. In this post-era, the generation raised in similar environmental spaces to that of the hip-hop generation came to know hip hop as a dialogue of all people.

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Thus, the post-hip hop generation will effect change differently and express their ideas and perspectives outside of the commercialized versions of hip-hop. The post-era in which these groups of black millennials are coming of age are often only related back to what has been done before. However, the movements over the last year and a half reflect a notion that in these post-eras the generation will not forget but build upon and grow their societies and opportunities.

**The State of Blackness**

I am weathered but still elegant, oh dear sisters in Jerusalem, weather-darkened like Kadar desert tents time-softened like Solomon’s Temple hangings. Don’t look down on me because I’m dark, darkened by the sun’s harsh rays. My brothers ridiculed me and sent me to work in the fields. They made me care for the face of the earth, but I had no time to care for my own face.\(^{12}\)

This scripture passage always began Solomon Plaatje’s column in his gazette or published writings. Plaatje was a founding member of the South African Native National Congress, which became the African National Congress (ANC), and a key voice in the struggle for enfranchisement and liberation of African people. This particular scripture describes the experience of an oppressed person of color. The man with the darker skin works harder and is mocked by others. Most importantly, the last line reveals the physical objectivity of the black body. Plaatje and his fellow comrades founded the South African National Congress, in 1912, to provide a forum and voice for the oppressed native population of South Africa. The main goal was to provide rights and voting power to the black and colored people of South Africa under British rule.

Plaatje became an activist for African liberation across the continent. Plaatje began as a moderate when it came to issues of rule between native populations and the white settlers. Through his writings he made it clear that he was not seeking equality with white settlers, but wanted the settlers to respect the land of the native populations. However, as years passed and as South Africa got closer to liberating itself from the British, the tougher and more oppressive laws against native populations became. This change can be traced through Plaatje’s writings as he sought help from the British Empire to stop the changing of land laws within the country and found no help. However, by the early 1920s Plaatje stated that the “South African Native today finds himself an exile and a helot in the land of his ancestors.”\(^{13}\) In 1924, the South African Native National Congress became the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC began with these roots of founders who understood that often times there is a burden to hold with the color of one’s skin. Thus, there will always be a fight to participate in, as before they could establish the mission of equality and enfranchisement, one must understand the circumstances that are defined by being black.

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\(^{12}\) Song of Sol, 1:5-6 NIV.  
\(^{13}\) Plaatje, Sol T. 1876-1932 (Solomon Tshekisho) and Brian Willan, Sol Plaatje: Selected writings (South Africa: Witswatersrand University Press, 1996).
To be Black is to “draw on a collective reservoir of resistance, pride, and hopes.”\(^1^\)\(^4\) Vargas describes blackness as a continuous process, which refers to a black individual’s experience in particular contexts that will remind one of their blackness. Thus, often black individuals will continuously adjust their personal definition of blackness based off of two processes: “the various vectors of historical racialization emanating from hegemonic institutions and practices, and...the acquired historical consciousness...of what it means to be black.”\(^1^\)\(^5\) Therefore, blackness is a process. This ideology of blackness allows space for many different narratives of how to be black and the ability for blackness to be ongoing and ever-changing.

By 1940, the ANC began to lose touch with younger black South Africans due to the ANC’s elitism. The organization had begun to reflect a male, academic, elitist, and moderate movement for the rights of black South Africans. The ANC Youth League formed in 1944. They wanted to do more than politely go against the system. They aimed to build a movement that would bring change to all. The early members of the youth league are recognizable names in the anti-apartheid movement such as Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandela. When the apartheid government came to power in 1948, the ANC Youth League released their “Programme of Action.” The Programme outlines the ANC’s commitment to nonviolent protests. This shift brought the anti-Apartheid struggle to global recognition and the ANC as a lead organization in threatening the apartheid regime.\(^1^\)\(^6\)

The ANC Youth League’s “Programme of Action” defined their purpose as the desire for national freedom. Their definition of freedom is “freedom from White domination and the attainment of political independence.”\(^1^\)\(^7\) They desired a freedom without compromises. However, it was still a fight for political rights and self-determination of black South Africans as Africans. Their objectives covered educational, cultural, and economic realms. The ANC Youth League desired a freedom that was reflective of African nationalism, which “is a political movement for the unification of Africa (Pan-Africanism) and for national self-determination.”\(^1^\)\(^8\) The ANC’s focus on African nationalism was to bring together the struggle of anti-Apartheid with that of African independence. The desire to relate the South African Apartheid struggle with that of African independence struggle narrative was to align with African liberation narrative, but also that of black liberation worldwide. ANC Youth called for action and the recognition of the African people’s political, economic, and cultural rights. Freedom to the ANC Youth League in 1948 was the removal of white supremacy – a mission

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\(^{15}\) Ibid., 476.


that required the black South African to take a stand and become motivated by
the society greater and outside of them. However, as time evolved the struggle
for self-determination as determined by ANC became less focused on a singular
racial group and more on the unification of a democratic, inclusive South Africa.
This change in the focus led to splits from the ANC.

In the 1960s South Africa experienced a political vacuum as many key par-
ties like the ANC were in exile or under extreme surveillance. Young black
South Africans were looking to be recognized within the grand struggle against
Apartheid and for continued acknowledgement as the Apartheid regime
appeared to be growing. National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) was
a predominantly white student organization that became sympathetic to the
plight of Black South Africans, which increased the participation of Black stu-
dents in NUSAS. In 1967, Steve Biko, a medical student and a member of the
Student’s Representative Council (SRC) at Natal University, attended a NUSAS
conference and witnessed the injustices within the student body government. Bi-
ko would move to create a student group led by black students at a University
Christian Movement (UCM) conference in 1968, an interdenominational reli-
gious organization. After caucusing with fellow black students, the South African
Student Organization (SASO) was born. SASO’s mission was to liberate the
black South African from white supremacy, and alleviate the oppressive state in
which black persons form their identity.19

The Black Consciousness Movement began with the SASO slogan “Black
man, you are your own.”20 This phrase brought into consciousness the desire
and the power black South Africans have. The Black Consciousness Movement
arose as an option for black South Africans to liberate themselves through soli-
darity. The idea emerged amongst black college students and began to spread
through groups of youth throughout South Africa – many of whom were young,
urban, educated, and economically privileged. The tenets of Black Conscious-
ness were always centered on the consciousness of oppressed ethnic identities
and their power.21

The key components of the Black Consciousness philosophy were freedom
from psychological oppression, black awareness, and pacifism. The idea of psy-
chological oppression focused on the natural oppression of being black no matter
the educational or economic privileges or disparities one may experience. The
idea of mental liberation served as the primary source and attraction to the
Movement. The rhetoric of Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement
strongly counteracted the Apartheid regime’s oppressive action and language.22
The second component, black awareness, is the call “to assert Blackness and to
resist forceful attempts to denigrate Black history and Black culture.”23 Black
awareness was implemented through a form of advertising in literature, art, mu-

19 George M. Frederickson, Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and
20 Robert Fatton Jr., Black Consciousness in South Africa (Albany: State University of New York
Press,1986), 68.
21 Ibid., 67-71.
23 Ibid., 223-225.
The Black awareness component was to force people to confront and deal with Black history as a point of inspiration and not one that they should be ashamed of. Further, once a black individual realizes and reaches a point of awareness, they will free themselves and are liberated.\textsuperscript{24} The third component, pacifism was how supporters of the Movement protested, but this form of pacifism could only happen after one felt liberated through black awareness. Often, the pacifist action is also what made the Black Consciousness Movement distinct from the underground organizational violence of the ANC and PAC. These tenets of the black consciousness philosophy allowed the philosophy to be used in various avenues and ways. Even more, the flexibility of the black consciousness philosophy allowed it to be used internationally and as a mode of motivation for marginalized groups to feel united in their struggle for justice.

Like Biko and his comrades, this move to go one step further than the previous generation of activists was also felt by young black Americans. June 16, 1966, Stokely Carmichael stood in front of an audience and shouted the words ‘Black Power.’ Stokely Carmichael was chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Carmichael and other members of SNCC at that time were disagreeing with King and elder leaders of the Civil Rights Movement on inter-racialism and nonviolence. Carmichael and young black Civil Rights activists felt as though the presence of white people hindered the movement. Biko and Carmichael represented the radicalization of black youth in both countries and the move towards a different approach to acceptance and the understanding of blackness and freedom.

Carmichael’s words gave rise to the Black Power Movement in the US. The core of that radicalization focused on the removal of nonviolence tactics and overcoming white liberalism. SNCC’s radicalization allowed the young people to reach communities not yet attained by the Civil Rights Movement. The radicalization of the group matched grievances of black people living in cities outside of the South, experiencing police brutality and urban economic experiences. Their base of support changed when they rejected nonviolence. While the Civil Rights Movement maintained a significant influence in the South and amongst rural, uneducated black people, Black Power spoke to a broader spectrum of black experiences in the United States. Within SNCC, Carmichael began to recruit members to his frame of thinking and began to split the group. Carmichael, as chairman, expelled white members and eventually left to join a group reflecting his ideas, namely the Black Panther Party.\textsuperscript{25}

The notorious group that embodied Black Power was the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense founded on October 15, 1966, in Oakland, California; a group that Carmichael would become known as an honorary prime minister to.\textsuperscript{26} The Party’s platform stated, “We, therefore, believe that all Black people should arm themselves for self-defense.”\textsuperscript{27} The Black Panther Party openly accepted violence and explained violence as a necessity to complete the mission of

\textsuperscript{24} Brewster, \textit{After Soweto}, 225-226.
\textsuperscript{25} Fredrickson, \textit{Black Liberation}, 293-296.
\textsuperscript{27} Huey P. Newton, \textit{To Die for People} (New York: Writers and Readers Publishing, 1995), 5.
Black Power. Many observers of the party found their imagery to reflect violence. “Black Panthers strutted around in their black jackets, black berets, and tight-fitting black pants, their pockets bulging with side arms, their clenched fists high above their defiant heads.”28 Their appearance to white citizens of the United States was threatening. Thus, making them a target of the federal government. Further, Party members patrolled neighborhoods with weapons visible and served as heavily armed bodyguards to influential members of the Black Power Movement. Notably, the Party’s armed presence at a California legislative session was in protest of the state outlawing loaded weapons for private citizens, which exhibited their commitment to armed defense.29 Though they did not fire any weapons their display of violence brought attention to the Party’s initiatives. Even more, from 1967-1969, there were some shootouts between police and Party members. Black Panther Party trained citizens and aligned with the use of weaponry according to Marxist revolutionaries. The Black Panther Party combined some ideologies that were relevant to how the organization ran. For instance, Frantz Fanon, African scholar and liberation activist, believed violence and liberation were one in the same. The Party compared their struggle to that of Castro in Cuba and Che Guevara. They felt that Black Power could only be achieved with the removal of a white-dominated America.

Further, there are key parallels that many scholars draw between the emergence of Black Consciousness and Black Power in the United States. The time frame, under which both movements emerged were similar – coming from the inspiration of communist influences and Marxist beliefs that support blackness. In addition, Black Power and Black Consciousness focused on the mental liberation of black people. However, the political atmosphere and the length of what each could achieve differed greatly due to the state oppression of each group. Black Consciousness emerged in a police state environment under which they tried to assist others. Black Power develops in a more liberating political climate after the Civil Rights Movement achieved its political goal of the Civil Rights Movement, the Voting Rights Act and Civil Rights Act. The mission and the attraction of the citizens of their specific countries differed.30 Both remained radical to the movements of the time and normalized advancements of people of color at the time.

The Black Consciousness Movement “sought to develop a culture of the oppressed as a means of transforming the whole of society into a new and superior ethical order.”31 A limitation of this conceptualization is exhibited for the purpose of the Black Consciousness Movement. This movement is rooted in changing the mind of an oppressed person. The Black Consciousness Movement continues to live because its goal is to empower the oppressed person. Therefore, as long as there are oppressed people, the Black Consciousness Movement will continue to transform and liberate starting with the individual.

31 Ibid., 294.
The Black Consciousness Movement became a spirit and a voice that all oppressed citizens of South Africa could relate to and remains a central ideology in bringing people together for a cause to liberate one’s self. Though the actual Movement was short-lived due to the oppressiveness of the state, organizational structure, allied organizations, and the lack of acclivity of the philosophy to organize, the movement has been necessary. As college-aged South Africans in 2016 revisit the unfinished business of the past, many began with the Black Consciousness Movement. In 2016, a nation that has been politically emancipated is seeing a new generation continue to fight for the minute oppressions of mental freedom. Through the #RhodesMustFall Movement, this struggle for the ongoing decolonization of the mind utilizes the same tenet mentality as the Black Consciousness Movement. Therefore, demonstrating that there is no time frame on the effectiveness of the philosophy. To reach a state of self-consciousness for all people requires mental liberation, an awareness, and the pacific act of knowledge against one’s enemy.

In present day movements, the understanding of blackness has taken an even more individualistic spin. The commercialized imagery of blackness appears in the United States in the form of the glorification of poverty that may be exhibited through music and clothing. Even more, the misinformation that one’s black skin equals a tiring list of insulting stereotypes. The black millennial generation is not situated in one form of ‘how to be black’, but many. In the 20th century movements, if one did not abide by the collective understanding of blackness they were outsiders. However, even in the structure of these present day movements names, blackness and freedom are left up to one’s interpretation. When stating #BlackLivesMatter, that can be applied to many instances not solely focused around police brutality. Similarly, with the #RhodesMustFall Movement, the movement has grown to an idea that something must fall, in order for one to be free. Thus, whether that something is fees, housing problems, or other statues the idea behind the movement allows it to reach a larger audience. Therefore, the state of blackness is one’s own to define, but there is a commonality to one’s black experience that can always ultimately only be understood by other black people.

The Experience of Unfreedom

[Freedom] is the fundamental fabric of our coexistence in society and without it, there is prejudice, violence, and overall conflict. Freedom allows us to function at our optimum level of comfort and gives assurance that one is the custodian of their own wellbeing.32

The experience of unfreedom relates to those who are oppressed and define freedom by standards placed upon them by the experience of the oppressor. Black Freedom emphasizes struggle and pain.33 Thus, the struggle for freedom

32 In-person interview, August 2015.
in black liberation movements is often to relay that the mission to be free is not only the experience of black people but of other groups also. Often, because black freedom is defined in the removal of pain or an obstruction of justice, the struggle to be free is overlooked and seen as a personal problem and not a problem of society. Thus, demonstrating how freedom can be conceptualized in various ways.

There are fundamental conceptions of freedom within Western political thought: liberal freedom, freedom as autonomy, participatory freedom, and freedom as a collective deliverance.\(^{34}\) Liberal freedom focuses on what actions one is restricted from or constraints one is free from. Further, all citizens are treated equally and protected by rights and liberties administered by the state. Freedom as autonomy refers to the changes within oneself that may not be represented by tangible gains. This form of freedom is often demonstrated in self-pride or self-respect. Participatory freedom is how citizens utilize their voice, vote, and communities as a way to connect one’s human right with that of their citizen rights. Freedom as a collective deliverance focuses on the religious idea of freedom as being the narrative of deliverance.\(^{35}\)

Frantz Fanon, through his dialogue of black liberation and his belief in revolutionary humanism, links humanism to the problem of freedom. Fanon’s conception of human freedom goes together with recognition. Fanon describes the state of freedom for the Black individual as their complete break with past oppression. Thus, for the black individual to exist in a state of freedom, they must recognize that their history is not their destiny. Mostly, Fanon believed in destroying the obstacles in the path of obtaining freedom and realizing full humanity. His revolutionary humanism was a way in which both the oppressed and oppressor can develop a search of justice for the self and others.\(^{36}\) Fanon’s freedom remains focused on those who are colonized and their souls. The route to freedom, according to Fanon, is a complex struggle for recognition and acknowledgment.\(^{37}\)

During the Anti-apartheid movement, the ANC and other antiapartheid groups came together to formalize one document that would unite their personal experiences of oppression and make it a political statement. This would happen at the Congress of the people, and there they designed a charter to create a South Africa opposing the apartheid regime. The Freedom Charter was a people’s document. The Charter is a response to the oppression of the apartheid regime. The charter specifically spoke to the lack of political representation for black South Africans. As a people’s document, the Freedom Charter sought “To win the support of all those who oppose apartheid, all classes, and strata who have an interest in its destruction.”\(^{38}\)


\(^{35}\) Ibid.


The Charter offered “a utopian vision of an open and democratic society in which all would have access to political and legal rights, housing, education, and economic opportunity.” This charter in 1955 attempted to relate the decolonization of other African nations to that of the struggle for freedom happening in South Africa. Foremost, this charter called for a united South Africa. The words “We the People of South Africa” corresponds with the idea of a greater South Africa, one in which races are united, and all citizens are due a just democratic system.

The Freedom Charter ends with the following phrase, “THESE FREEDOMS WE WILL FIGHT for, SIDE BY SIDE, THROUGHOUT OUR LIVES, UNTIL WE HAVE WON OUR LIBERTY.” Sutner and Cronin argue that supporters of the Charter seek no revenge against whites who also support the document. However, they also acknowledge that this very phrase caused a split in the movement as many supporters began to question whose support the document represented. Further, black consciousness thinking questioned the inclusiveness of all people in the Charter. Thus, creating a split in anti-Apartheid organizations. There were organizations that partnered with white sympathizers in a belief of an inclusive, democratic and equal South African Society, while others did not. Further, many felt the fuel of black empowerment needed to be done alone before aided by other parties and persons.

The Freedom Charter brought together persons against the apartheid regime; as the Congress of the People the definition of the enemy and ally changed. The Freedom Charter defines the citizen of South Africa as anyone who lives in the country. The mission began as an incorporation of an ideal for a greater society. This greater society however, had to include more than the struggle of black South Africans to receive the attention and international support. Thus, reflecting the frequency of black struggle and pain to remain invisible, unless jointly defined with white allies or a change of the language. After this Charter, the ANC and their mission to liberate South Africa slowly became acknowledged; however, there was a change in whom many felt they were fighting for.

The complex struggle of freedom amongst black millennials in many ways may appear to be minute. When students stand to protest in front of an inanimate object or a court, there is a level of freedom to do so that is not understood by those who look on. The protest in front the Rhodes statue is revolutionary because there is recognition that his injustices against black South Africans is still a reality. Thus, he should not be memorialized for that reason. A protest in front of a courthouse awaiting justice to acknowledge its blindness is a reality that has yet to happen. These were the experiences of unfreedom that have continued be the daily lives of many black people. Thus, in order to be free there should be recognition and acknowledgement that the struggle never ended.
A Future of Equality

The past generation gave us democracy; it’s now up to us to build a nation and bring true freedom.42

In answering the interview question “what role will your generation play in changing the present and future?”, there was a common sentiment that the black millennial is building upon the benefits they have been given. For example, in the context of the #FeesMustFall campaign, a respondent said “our parents fought for us to have textbooks, it is now our role to reason beyond them.”43 The black millennial is continuing the struggle “until true freedom is achieved.”44 The black millennial is opening up space to rethink old ideologies and challenge their presence and prevalence in contributing to present inequalities. The movements of this generation conceptualizes freedom as the equation of unity and equality.

The idea of unity is accepting all forms of blackness and the issues associated with one’s identity. Equality is the mission of these movements. From #RhodesMustFall to #BlackLivesMatter one can observe the ongoing revamping and adaptation the movements partake in to create a voice and fight for all who are involved.45 However, the hope to create the world in which we are equal and all lives are valued continues to stand as a problem.

According to Greta Fowler Snyder, a politics of multivalent recognition re-values blackness by drawing attention to diverse ways of being black. It stretches the symbolic boundaries of black identity while maintaining its importance, which constitutes a third way between essentialism and deconstruction.46 Snyder identifies previous movements like the Civil Rights Movement as practicing politics of monovalent recognition, which focused on producing a fixed identity and revaluing of history for the overall collective and group. The fixed identities of blackness created conceptions and may reinforce problematic issues internally and externally when organizing a group. For instance, the recognition of differences in appearance between those of the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Panthers serves an important role in the monovalent recognition of each movement’s purpose. The Black Panthers utilized an aggressive appearance to exhibit their interpretation of blackness while the Civil Right Movement displayed a different interpretation. In a way, black millennials are engaged in a politics of multivalent recognition, #RhodesMustFall and #BlackLivesMatter are not conforming to one identity or one theology. Participants in the present day Movements interpret the mission and goals differently. The journey to holistic freedom for a

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42 In-person interview, July 2015.
43 Skype Interview, December 8, 2015.
44 Ibid.
person comes from himself or herself, and how he or she chooses to participate in adding to the freedom of black people overall is his or her choice. The purpose of these movements is to allow the continued space of growth and achievement of black liberation.

However, in a divided, individualistic society, black millennials have a harder more challenging time than most. These movements appear to have an unclear political agenda, yet are firmly focused on continuing to free the minds and change the social climate of their country.

The Born Free and Post Hip Hop generations are in different places regarding their countries’ narratives of black movements. The Born Frees are the first “free” generation after the end of the apartheid. While the Post Hip Hop Generation is three generations removed from the legal successes of the Civil Rights Movement, they continue to struggle within the same structural oppression their ancestors did even in the “progress” made since the Civil Rights Movement. Both generations have decided to become ongoing agents of pointing out what continues to be wrong with their countries institutions and state of affairs. In order, for their movements to continue the mission of setting minds free, multivalent recognition politics will be a resource that can not only unify the generations themselves, but also consolidate them with generations of the past. The way forward towards full black liberation, a liberation of equality and strength, is through unification, acceptance, and the continued hope of better days.

As young black millennials continue on in the strife to identify equality for all, the mission of freedom relies upon them answering the call and reminding themselves that “We are the ones we’ve been waiting for.” 47

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Migration, Gender, and Amazigh Identity in Morocco:
Janie McDermott

This essay explores the voices and experiences of young Amazigh female migrants in Morocco. Using eight in-depth interviews with Amazigh women who have migrated internally with their families, this study sheds light on how these women navigate complex state, kin, and social pressures. Rather than leading to a deterioration of Amazigh identity, family centered migration has contributed to a reconfiguration of an Amazigh female identity that is no longer confined to the village. Village norms have become mobile, and as family-centered as opposed to individual migration continues, the connection between Amazigh female identity and place is becoming thinner. Migration does not erase past identity, but instead adds a new dimension, further complicating these women’s lives. The study concludes that female Amazigh migrants have the potential to reconfigure understandings of tradition, authenticity, and women’s roles. They act as agents in spreading these ideas to their sending communities as social remittances.

Introduction

The Amazigh, the indigenous population of North Africa, have long faced cultural, economic, and political marginalization at the hands of the Moroccan state and informally within Moroccan society.1 As a result, the preservation of Amazigh culture and language has been a priority within rural Amazigh communities throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.2 Women have traditionally been understood to be the gatekeepers of this culture. To encourage the continuation of this legacy, women have historically remained monolingual and stayed on their ancestral land. Until recently, education and business in Morocco have been conducted exclusively in Arabic and French. As a result, Amazigh women have largely faced informal exclusion from academic and professional spaces. Furthermore, informal pressures on women to not migrate limit female opportunity because of the lack of professional or educational opportunity in the countryside. By contrast, nearly all Amazigh men learn Moroccan, Arabic and French in government or religious schools, and many eventually migrate to urban areas to work or attend school within Morocco or international-

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This migration is so widespread that many rural economies in Morocco have become dependent on male migrant remittances.\(^4\)

Recently, ideas on female education and migration in rural Morocco have begun to shift. In de Haas and van Rooij’s 2011 study of women in the Toghda Valley, an Amazigh region in Morocco, all respondents below 40 years old cited their daughters’ education as a priority.\(^5\) This is consistent with an overall increase in the number of girls enrolled in primary education. Illustrating the rapidity of this shift, over 90 percent of the women surveyed between ages 35 and 39 had never attended school.\(^6\) This study seeks to analyze the experiences and voices of young Amazigh women coming of age in the context of these shifts. Specifically, it seeks to explore how migration has impacted women’s understandings of their own Amazigh linguistic and cultural identities, and how women perform these identities.

**Aims and Methodology**

Most migration studies on rural Morocco focus on male migrants, given that they have historically and presently made up the vast majority of migrants, or on women whose husbands have migrated.\(^7\) While anthropologist Ruba Salih has written extensively on Moroccan female migration, her focus is predominantly on Arab-speaking urban women who have migrated to Europe.\(^8\) This study, therefore, hopes to fill a gap in the literature by exploring Morocco’s Amazigh female migrants more deeply. Furthermore, it aims to explore Amazigh female migrants in the context of their traditional roles as gatekeepers of Amazigh cultural and linguistic identity, an aspect that is seldom mentioned in migration studies. Additionally, this study seeks to provide insight into the experiences of Amazigh women, a group often targeted by development initiatives, both state-sponsored and private. As of 2014, 40.3 percent of Morocco’s population was rural.\(^9\) An overwhelming majority of this population lives in poverty. Following the popularization of Women in Development (WID) as a development strategy in the 1970s and 1980s, Morocco’s rural women, who are overwhelmingly Amazigh, have come into sharp focus within Moroccan development organizations. According to a 2011 study by the Institute for Women’s Policy Studies, Moroccan Amazigh women lag behind their Moroccan Arab counterparts in equality and development measures including education, workforce

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\(^1\) Hoffman, *We Share Walls: Language, Land, and Gender in Berber Morocco*, 74.
\(^5\) Ibid., 50.
\(^6\) Ibid., 51
\(^7\) Ibid., 43.
participation, household decision-making, and freedom to visit the doctor.\textsuperscript{10} In addition to international development NGOs, the Moroccan state has become increasingly interested in rural women’s development. Given that migration is one of few livelihood strategies available to Morocco’s rural populations, an understanding of the experience of female Amazigh migrants is critical for development goals related to gender equality.

This study will use eight in-depth interviews with Amazigh women who have migrated internally to urban centers within Morocco, secondary ethnographic and quantitative studies, and interviews with Moroccan specialists. The women interviewed range from 18 to 27 years old. All have migrated with their families from Amazigh villages within Morocco to large cities of Casablanca, Rabat, and Sale. Interviews were conducted in a mix of French, Modern Standard Arabic, Moroccan Arabic or darija, and English, depending on the preference of the participant. All women are currently university students and live with their families in neighborhoods with a high density of Tamazight speakers.

The study will adopt the approach of ‘ethnographies of the particular’ as outlined by Lila Abu-Lughod. That is, rather than essentializing, I aim to highlight the complexities of the lives of the particular women I interviewed.\textsuperscript{11} Secondly, demographic studies on Morocco’s Amazigh are inconsistent. Several major demographic studies in Morocco classify Moroccans as ‘Arab-Berber’, making no distinction between the two. For those who do differentiate, the numbers vary widely. According to the 2004 Moroccan census, 28 percent of the country’s population speaks Berber.\textsuperscript{12} However, this number is contested by many Amazigh activists and NGOs who assert that as high as 70 percent of the country’s population speaks Tamazight as their first language. This wide variation in assumed percentage of Amazigh in Morocco was also captured in my interviews and in informal conversations. This is further complicated by the fact that considerable language loss has occurred since Morocco’s independence. Therefore, the number of Tamazight speakers does not correspond with the number of people who are ethnically Amazigh.

I assert that, rather than leading to a deterioration of Amazigh identity, family-centered migration has contributed to a reconfiguration of Amazigh identity that is not confined to the village. Village norms have instead become mobile. As family-centered as opposed to individual migration continues, the connection between Amazigh female identity and place has become thinner. These changes have created more complicated social and economic roles for women, where traditional and urban identities have become compatible. This stands in contrast to twentieth and twenty-first century activist discourse, which imposed a dichotomy between rural women who preserved Amazigh identity and urban women who assimilated into urban, Arab-dominated spaces. Furthermore, female migrants have the potential to reconfigure understandings of tradition and


authenticity as well as gender roles, spreading new ideas of their Amazigh women identity to their sending communities as social remittances.

**Historical Background**

While Amazigh and Arabs have both lived in Morocco for centuries, tension between the two groups is a largely recent phenomenon, the roots of which lie in Morocco’s history of French colonialism. Both Amazigh and Arabs are almost unanimously Sunni Muslim, following the Maliki School of jurisprudence. The two groups coexisted in Morocco for centuries despite speaking different languages and having distinct cultures. As historian James McDouggall argues, constructions of Arab and Berber identities have shifted greatly and taken new meanings over time.

However, during the early days of French rule, a divide between the two was codified. The French were no strangers to the “divide and rule” policy in North Africa, having implemented a similar strategy in Algeria to divide Algeria’s Jewish and Muslim populations. Beginning in the early 1900s, the French sought a similar strategy in Morocco, this time between Amazigh and Arabs. In 1915, a Committee of Berber Studies was established in Rabat to understand Amazigh customs and culture. Observing some practices that appeared animistic and contrary to Islamic tradition, French ethnographers mistakenly understood Amazigh attachment to Islam to be superficial. Furthermore, they reimagined Islam as an Arab religion despite not being understood as such previously by native Moroccans, both Arab and Amazigh. Accepting these interpretations, French colonial officers believed that if they isolated Amazigh from Arab, and thereby Muslim, influence, the Amazigh could assimilate into French culture and become strong French colonial subjects. The stereotype of Amazigh as insincere Muslims persists today and is bolstered by the use of Arabic as the language of the Holy Quran.

The categorization of Arabs and Berbers was codified with the issuance of the Berber Decree by the French in 1930. The Decree formally divided Morocco into Berber and Arab zones. Berber zones were granted greater autonomy and were permitted to continue to be ruled by customary law, or izarf. Meanwhile, a French-style school was established for elite Amazigh, creating a pipeline of obedient colonial subjects who worked alongside French Native Affairs Officers. Following Morocco’s independence from France in 1956, the country

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16 Ibid., 16.
18 Ibid., 16.
underwent a period of state-led Arabization, to consolidate its new national identity. Hostility towards Amazigh language and culture remained strong given its prioritization under the protectorate, and Amazigh cultural identity came to be seen as a colonial invention designed to divide Moroccans. Furthermore, the 1950s nationalist movement, led by the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, was made up mostly of Arab Francophone elites who saw unification around one linguistic and cultural identity as a more effective nation-building strategy. This unifying identity was ultimately designated as Arab-Islamic. Ignoring the large portion of the population who were not native Arabic speakers, the Arab Moroccan monarchy asserted that Morocco was a monocultural and monolingual state. Thereafter, Amazigh identity was viewed as a barrier to national unity, while aspects of Morocco’s Arab-Islamic past were highlighted. Arabic became the official language of the state, and history books selectively glorified Arab history directly at the expense of Amazigh history.  

It is within this context of post-independence hostility that Amazigh began to emerge as a cultural identity and movement. Spearheaded by Moroccan academics and activists, the initial Amazigh movement focused on the promotion of Amazigh studies and legitimization of the language of Tamazight, which had previously not been considered a language. According to Sadiqi, Amazigh activists of this era also adopted the discourse used by international bodies such as the United Nations, using for the first time, terms such as ‘‘multilingualism’, ‘multiculturalism’, ‘human rights’, ‘secularization’, ‘diversity’, ‘modernity’, and ‘universal values.’”

This, combined with the activism of the increasingly large Amazigh diaspora community, led to an internationalization of Amazigh issues. Since the ascension to the throne of King Mohammed VI in 1999, the political climate towards Amazigh matters has softened significantly. This shift is exemplified by two major changes that have occurred since Mohammed VI’s ascension. First, King Mohammed VI established the Moroccan Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) in 2001, a research center for Amazigh studies and language promotion. Secondly, the February 20th Movement, the Moroccan counterpart to the 2011 wave of Arab Spring protests, included Amazigh rights as part of reform demands. In response, King Mohammed VI issued a new constitution in 2011, which designates Tamazight as an official language alongside Arabic, proclaims a commitment to multiculturalism, and acknowledges Morocco’s Amazigh roots as an integral piece of Moroccan national identity.

21 Sadiqi, Moroccan Feminist Discourses, 26.
22 Ibid., 16.
The Linguistic Landscape

Tamazight is divided into three dialects: (1) Tashilhit spoken by the Shla people of the South, (2) Tamazight spoken by the Amazigh of the Middle Atlas Mountains, and (3) Tarifit spoken in the northern Rif. While some activists insist this division is engineered to further factionalize Morocco’s Amazigh, the reality is that native speakers of one dialect are unable to understand Amazigh from another region of Morocco.

Tamazight also has historically been labeled a ‘female language’. Due to its marginalization in the public sphere and the lack of symbolic power associated with it throughout the 20th and 21st century, Tamazight has been primarily spoken in the private sphere. While many men also speak Tamazight languages as their first language, they generally are able to navigate the public sphere using a mixture of Moroccan Arabic and French, with limited use of Tamazight. Rural Amazigh women, by contrast, have not worked or attended school until recently, remaining in the home instead. For this reason, the vast majority of monolingual speakers are women. In addition, the contexts in which Tamazight is used are those traditionally understood as feminine: in the home and to children.

As linguist Sadiqi notes, there is a growing gap between the global Amazigh movement and day-to-day interactions regarding linguistic politics. The gendered distribution of linguistic power is often not acknowledged by the Amazigh activist movement, which is primarily made up of urban, educated men. The goals of the Amazigh activist movement have historically been to increase the status of Amazigh identity and to legitimate Tamazight, rather than increase access and opportunity for those most impacted by the culture and language’s marginalization. For example, in an effort to minimize communication problems between geographic pockets of Amazigh, many Amazigh activists have pushed, often successfully, for a standardized version of Tamazight similar to Modern Standard Arabic. Beginning in 2011, this version of Tamazight has been taught in schools across Morocco using Tifinagh script. Scholars Katharine Hoffman and Fatima Sadiqi both have reported that the standardized version is unintelligible to monolingual women, who speak a single dialect of Tamazight.

Three subjects interviewed for this study echoed this sentiment and expressed confusion as to why this version was taught in schools. One participant commented:

So it’s hard, it’s hard really. When they mix between Rifiya, Tamazight and Tashilhit in one book, in one system, to make the children learn it – it will be hard. I prefer to choose one

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Sadiqi, Women, Gender and Language in Morocco, 46.

Michael Peyron, Interview by author, Rabat, January 4, 2016.

Sadiqi, Women, Gender and Language in Morocco, 224.

Ibid., 226.


Hoffman, We Share Walls, 126 and Sadiqi, “Language and Gender: The Berber Case,” 27.
type of Tamazight. For example in Rif, they are going to teach Rifīya. In Atlas, they are going to teach Tamazight.

**Gendered Migration**

As migration anthropologists Sarah J. Mahler and Patricia Pessar argue, migration is not a strictly economic or political process; rather, it is a sociocultural process governed by local gender, kinship, and institutional norms. The case of rural Morocco is no exception to this phenomenon. Amazigh migration patterns have historically been shaped by gendered ideas of labor distribution, and cultural and linguistic preservation that have resulted in a large disparity between male and female migrants. Linguistic anthropologist Katherine Hoffman describes the traditional lack of female migrants as part of a strategy to preserve Amazigh language and culture.

Because they have typically not left the village, women are considered pure Amazigh, uncontaminated by mixed urban spaces. Furthermore, as women in Amazigh villages tend to be monolingual Tamazight speakers, they are considered to speak a purer Tashilhit, which can be passed onto their children. For many male migrants, village land becomes a nostalgic symbol of their Amazigh roots. Women are often bundled into this nostalgia and are in turn seen as tied to the land. As Hoffman outlines, women engage in ‘performing authenticity’ upon the return of male migrants. That is, women perform the traditions and rituals that migrants have sentimentally come to associate with their homeland.

Both Hoffman and Sadiqi analyze this dilemma using Naile Kabeer’s framework for women’s empowerment. Kabeer conceptualizes empowerment as the ability to make strategic life choices, outlining three connected dimensions of choice: (1) access to resources, (2) agency, and (3) achievements. Hoffman argues that a conscious unwillingness to educate women for the sake of cultural and linguistic preservation sacrifices Amazigh women’s rights. Similarly, Sadiqi contests that given the high level of social capital associated with multilingualism in Morocco, the restriction in language education for rural women is disempowering. Limiting female migration, a necessity to obtain an education or employment, for the sake of cultural preservation similarly denies women agency. Given the paucity of economic opportunity within rural villages, many households turn to migration as a livelihood strategy. Furthermore, given the lack of universities and even secondary schools in rural Morocco, migration is necessary to pursue higher education. Informal restrictions on female migration represent a compromise of women’s agency, limiting their prospects for empowerment.

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32 Hoffman, *We Share Walls*, 70.
33 Ibid., 72.
35 Hoffman, *We Share Walls*, 77.
36 Sadiqi, *Women, Gender and Language in Morocco*, 166.
Land as an Endangered Amazigh Good

Anthropologist Paul Silverstein builds off of Hoffman’s work, noting that Amazigh activists have increasingly cited the land itself as an endangered Amazigh good and feared emigration posed a direct threat to Amazigh identity. Furthermore, he argues that the Amazigh political movement is largely the product of the diaspora, chronicling the irony that emigration within Amazigh political discourse is cited both as the “primary cause of cultural deracination and the condition of possibility for realizing that cultural deracination is a problem in the first place.”

In contrast to the traditional (and male-dominated) Amazigh activist discourse that declares Amazigh identity and the physical countryside as indivisible entities, six participants stated their belief that being Amazigh is not linked to a location. Five participants specifically said that Amazigh is in their blood, evoking a sense of a mobile identity. One participant commented:

Of course you can be Amazigh wherever you go. Even if you go to Chile, you’re still Amazigh. It’s in our blood. It’s going with our blood. I know a friend who was studying with me. He went to America last year and he still preserves his identity, his Amazigh identity. He walks in the streets speaking Tashilhit. He wears the Amazigh clothes. He does whatever he wants, but he still respects and keeps his Amazigh identity. So you can be Amazigh wherever you go. All over the world, you can find Amazigh people. They’re still Amazigh. They’re still speaking Tamazight. They still have their culture and they still take it into consideration.

This stands in stark contrast to mainstream Amazigh activist discourse which views geography as a fundamental component of Amazigh identity. Given women’s traditional role in preservation, this shift poses implications for perceptions of preservation as compatible with women’s development.

Migrant Households

While I set out to interview Amazigh women who migrated as individuals, I quickly discovered that the majority of Amazigh women who left their villages were joined by entire kin clusters. Many families viewed migration as the only option for their daughters to access opportunities but felt uncomfortable sending them into big cities alone. One participant, when asked if she migrated alone, commented:

No, [I came to Casablanca] with my family because my family is conservative. They can’t send a girl to another city to finish

38 Ibid., 104.
her studies alone so they should come with me. That’s why. And that’s all (laughs).

Another commented:

They [my family] live here in Casablanca. We came so I could go to high school because there aren’t any in the countryside.

Participants also viewed their migration as temporary. While it was necessary for them and their families to move to large cities in order to go to school or work, they maintained close ties with their villages, visited often, and for the most part, intended on returning. Migration was not a rejection of their culture or home; rather, it was a temporary strategy pursued to increase access to opportunity.

This pattern is also consistent with the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) theory popularized in the 1990s. In contrast to the neoclassical models of migration that prevailed in the 1980s that focused on migration exclusively as an individual decision, NELM views migration as a livelihood strategy that involves entire households.39 NELM also challenged notions of the return migrant as a failure, instead insisting that migration was often only intended to be a temporary situation.40

Transitions

While migration from Amazigh villages to urban centers entails no border crossing, all participants described their transition as though they had migrated to another country. During one interview in a participant’s home, the interviewee translated Tashillit words from her monolingual mother.

She said she wants you to feel welcome in our home because she remembers when she first came to Casablanca, and what it feels like to be in a place where you don’t know the language or the culture.

Four participants specifically used the phrase “culture shock” to describe their transition. Another participant described her transition to life in Casablanca when she was 15:

First time I was in Casablanca? What can I say about it? It was like oh! Culture shock! (Laughs) Oh my god! What is that! Because it was a small…a small village, not even a city. A small village! Oh my god. I was like how do people live in Casablanca this way? I can see that people are free to do whatever they want and that was forbidden in our village. For example…I

39 It is important to note, however, that households are not inherently egalitarian entities and that power structures, often shaped as they are by cultural and social norms, prevail.

40 De Haas and Van Rooij, “Migration as Emancipation?,” 45.
saw a girl walking with a boy for the first time when I came here. Oh my god, she’s walking with a boy without caring about the others seeing! This is the first time I saw girls smoking in public places. It was like, ‘what?! Ah! What are they doing? Do their parents know what they’re doing here?’ That’s it. I mean this was like a culture shock for me. Do you know what culture shock is? It was a culture shock for me, and it was very very very hard to coexist.

This shows that internal migration can be equally as disruptive as international migration, particularly in nations whose borders contain distinct clusters of sociolinguistic groups like Morocco.

**Consolidating Identities**

Contrary to the assumptions of many Amazigh that female migration would lead to a deterioration of Amazigh culture, I found that migration instead often serves to reinforce and consolidate cultural identities. Sociologist Peggy Levitt argues that racist or otherwise ‘othering’ experiences in receiving communities reinforce migrants’ attachments to their home communities. Migrants, realizing they may never gain full membership into their new community, feel increasingly bound to their community of origin.\(^41\) Writing about Dominican migrants in Boston, she refers to the maintenance of strong ties to a home community as an “insurance policy that guaranteed belonging in a place where they would always be respected, welcomed, and admired.”\(^42\)

A similar connection exists for Amazigh female internal migrants, who are often negatively characterized within urban Morocco as illiterate, traditional, and folkloric. Participants reported that their attachment to their Amazigh identity and to their home communities strengthened as a result of their migration. Three participants mentioned that they did not fully understand the extent of discrimination against the Amazigh until migrating to Arab-dominated cities like Casablanca, Rabat, or Sale. One participant stated:

> I knew about it (racism) because, even in my village, there were some teachers who were racist. Can you believe it? Teachers who were racist? Teachers say ‘I don’t like Amazigh people’. But why? We were treating them well, respecting them, giving them whatever they want, but moreover they are still racist. They say Amazigh people are not good enough to be with us in one society, to coexist with them. I knew about it, but…I did not believe it one hundred percent. But when I came here and I saw how the people treated an Amazigh person, I knew for sure that racism exists in Morocco between Amazigh and Arabic, and we should make it disappear as soon as possible.


\(^{42}\) Ibid.
Another commented,

It [the society] is very divided into Arab, Amazigh, etc. Arabs will go with Arabs, Amazigh with Amazigh, Jabala with Jabala. It’s racism. For example, if someone works in a store here, and someone is Amazigh or Arab and the person working is from your town he will favor you. The Arab will pick the Arab.

Three participants reported that this racism and negative stereotypes about Amazigh made them more likely to conceal their Amazighness in public spaces. However, another three participants mentioned actively revealing that they are Amazigh in mixed spaces.

I’m proud to be Tashilhit. Sometimes I prefer to speak with an Arabic person in Tashilhit because maybe...as you know we are a little bit racist here with Arabic and Amazigh. You know it! There are some people who are very racist about Amazigh people so I prefer speaking Tashilhit in front of them. I don’t care if they understand it or not. They should learn my language as I learned their language. Is it true or not?

This reveals the potential of migration within Morocco to intensify, rather than weaken, Amazigh identity.

**Performing Identity**

As Erving Goffman argued in his 1959 book “The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life”, everyday social exchanges can be understood as performance. Goffman writes:

> When an individual plays a part, he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered before them. They are asked to believe that the character they see actually possesses the attributes he appears to possess, that the task he performs will have the consequences that are implicitly claimed for it, and that, in general, matters are what they appear to be.

Judith Butler further extended this idea of everyday performance in her 1988 essay “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory”, arguing that identities, specifically gender, are also performed. Instead of viewing it as a fixed and authentic expression, Butler argues that gender is constructed in a particular time and is consequently “insti-
tuted through a stylized repetition of acts. \footnote{Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Construction: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory,” \textit{Theatre Journal}, 40 no. 4 (1988): 519.} Similarly, I argue that Amazigh femininity is a performed identity, particularly among migrants who often become more conscious of themselves as ‘others’ in urban spaces. Notions of Amazigh authenticity are constructed and then performed, both to non-Amazigh and Amazigh, in the village and outside of the village. Furthermore, these understandings are ever-shifting and continue to evolve over time.

Six of the women I spoke with use more tangible elements of Amazigh culture such as clothing, food, and rituals to perform Amazighness in an effort to showcase their Amazigh identity in urban spaces. It also serves as a way to maintain links to their villages. Similar to what Hoffman observed among returning male migrants who were clearly outsiders to rural life, several participants took great pleasure in performing and then recording everyday tasks associated with village life. \footnote{Hoffman, \textit{We Share Walls}, 80.} Throughout interviews, participants who were explaining life in the village to me showed videos on their phone of them fetching water from the well, taking part in Eid celebrations, and singing \textit{ahwash}, traditional songs sung by women in the village. While ordinary to someone who lives in the village year round, to women who spend the majority of the year in an urban center, these actions serve as proof of insider status within their community despite their separation.

This was true in spite of the fact that six participants admitted to not totally feeling like insiders when they returned. For example, one participant who migrated when she was twelve years old admitted hesitantly that she does not know how to weave carpets, and that she does not know all of the steps of the traditional group dance performed at wedding ceremonies. However, she still firmly and proudly asserts that she is fully Amazigh and routinely posts ‘selfies’ of herself in traditional Amazigh dress on her Facebook page. Despite living in cities and admitting to sometimes being outsiders when they return to the village, five respondents asserted that they are Amazigh \textit{Mia fil mia}, or one hundred percent.

Anthropologist Ruba Salih found a similar phenomenon in her 2001 study of Moroccan (though not specifically Amazigh) female migrants’ return trips from Italy. She describes returnees’ active desire to participate in traditional or religious rituals such as weddings, trance ceremonies, and circumcision ceremonies. \footnote{Salih, “Reformulating Tradition and Modernity,” 226.} She argues that this is done to acquire symbolic capital through integrating into their home culture. Like Levitt, she views this as the resulting of ‘othering’ in the receiving country. The characterization of Muslim women in European societies as ‘traditional’ and ‘passive’ as opposed to ‘modern’ and ‘secular’ European women fuels a desire for migrants to highlight their status as insiders within Moroccan culture upon return. \footnote{Ibid., 229.}

Social media in particular provides an outlet for female migrants to perform Amazighness. On social media, female migrants simultaneously can be seen by friends and family in their sending and receiving communities. Amazigh
pride is a common theme among all five participants who are active on social media, with one participant even using the name Tresor Tamazight or “the Amazigh Pearl” instead of her real name (see Figure 1).

Other participants commonly share images of the Amazigh flag, traditional wedding dress, henna, and of the village itself. In doing so, they both display their Amazighness for acquaintances in their urban lives and also connect with friends and family from their villages.

Also significant, many memes and images posted by participants specifically speak of Amazigh female identity, showcasing how the Internet provides women with new ways to engage in Amazigh activism. While the Amazigh activist movement has traditionally been male-dominated, often meeting in spaces where women are not welcome such as bars or men’s cafes, the internet gives women access to conversations on Amazigh identity.

These posts on Amazigh womanhood also reveal the maintenance of gendered norms of cultural preservation in spite of migration. One post by a participant features an Amazigh woman in traditional dress with a caption that says, “Free Amazigh woman, and my head is high”. Another, posted on International Women’s Day, features a collage of photos of rural Amazigh women with the caption: “May you always be strong, may you always be ambitious, always smiling, always steadfast in the face of poverty and the harshness of life and the injustice of those who do not fear God. May you always create a population who is proud of the homeland, for in your womb is the future of the homeland.” Rather than subverting or rejecting norms following migration, the female migrants I spoke with maintain their assigned social tasks as Amazigh women while adding new layers as urban women. Furthermore, their commitment to traditional Amazigh womanhood is put on display for their peers. The performative nature of these posts and the intended audience is highlighted by the choice to post in Arabic rather than in Tamazight.

![Tresor Tamazight](image)

Figure 1 The Amazigh Pearl
Migration, Gender, and Amazigh Identity in Morocco

- Figure 2: Traditional Amazigh Dress
- Figure 3: Traditional Amazigh Jewelry
- Figure 4: Free Amazigh Woman, and My Head is High
- Figure 5: Collage of Rural Amazigh Women Posted on International Women’s Day
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Participants also use new online platforms to connect with their relatives in the village, providing a new means of maintaining strong ties to their homeland. For example, one participant shared a photo with her cousins in traditional Amazigh skirts during a visit to her village with a caption reading “Allah made us cousins, because he knew our moms couldn’t handle us as sisters. [The most Unforgettable moments that I ever had in my life, I had it with my Cousins & sisters] Thanks For being apart of my life.” In giving migrants a platform to maintain connections to friends and family in their village and to publicize these maintained connections, the use of social media further facilitates the mobility of village life.

Social Remittances

The impact of female Amazigh migration also has the potential to spread beyond the migrants themselves and impact entire communities through the transfer of social remittances. Social remittances, a term coined by sociologist Peggy Levitt in 1998, refers to nonmonetary transfers that are exported and imported in the migration process, including “norms, practices, identity, and social
capital.” They illustrate the potential of migration to transform not just the behaviors of migrants, but entire communities. For example, in Levitt’s 2001 book *Transnational Villagers*, Levitt notes that Dominican migrants returning from the United States adopted a vision for social change that they learned from the Black Power movement in the United States. In the case of the Amazigh, the wave of Amazigh political activism that began in diaspora communities in France following Moroccan independence which then spread to Morocco can be viewed as a form of social remittance. Salih also describes the role of social remittances in Morocco. She asserts that female migrants returning from Italy often become important agents for challenging the discourse on tradition and modernity, which is then transferred to entire communities.

Female migrants in this study also participate in the exchange of social remittances particularly around ideas on their Amazigh identity and gender roles. Five participants noted that their time in urban Morocco had changed their ideas on women’s roles and that they hoped to return to their villages. One participant commented:

> Personally, I believe that a woman can invent something. She can give something to this world and change the world. She is able to change the world so she is able to change the village. If she’s working or giving her efforts to a work or a job, she will make the change.

Two even spoke of plans to return to their villages and work on projects that promoted opportunity for women and challenged stereotypes of girls who leave the village.

> What I want to do if I go back to my village is to do something to make people more open-minded. I don’t want to go there and sit at home, doing whatever, or going to the daar as we say. No. I want to build schools, to build cooperatives. And I want to try to change that image they have of Casablanca because they think that every girl who goes to Casablanca is doing something bad. You know, she’s doing forbidden things. But that’s not true. We are living in Casablanca, we study and we are going back home. We aren’t doing anything bad. We respect our religion. We respect our culture. It’s all about education for a girl.

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50 de Haas and van Rooij, “Migration as Emancipation?,” 45.
It is worth noting, however, that this realization did not come at the expense of rural Amazigh culture. Participants did not feel that women working or acquiring higher education was incompatible with performing traditional songs and handicrafts, or with the more conservative values associated with the countryside. One participant who migrated as a child commented:

It’s necessary to pass onto your child Amazigh traditions, even in marriage. In marriage, it is necessary for Shilha people to marry someone who is Amazigh; Amazigh traditions in marriage are necessary. For the bride, it is necessary that she wear Amazigh clothing. Everything is Amazigh….everyone is in Amazigh clothing, listening to Amazigh music, and everyone there is Amazigh.

This signifies a complication of women’s roles in urban spaces. They exist as Amazigh, traditional, and urban simultaneously. It also shows that these women do not understand themselves to be or wish to be understood as rebels within their community.

**Mothers**

While six participants expressed that they had faced discrimination as Amazigh after migrating to urban centers, they also were aware that their mothers faced greater barriers. Because all interviewees spoke Moroccan Arabic, and often, Classical Arabic and French comfortably, they themselves did not experience linguistic barriers to access. However, because all had migrated with their families, including their monolingual mothers and aunts, they observed the barriers to access experienced by monolingual Tamazight speakers firsthand. One interviewee related her belief that Arabic speakers should make an effort to learn Tashilhit back to her mother’s vulnerable position relative to the majority of urban Arabic speakers:

We should learn the other languages, is it true? You should learn Tashilhit and I will learn Arabic. So then when we’re together we can use which language we want. Because sometimes, for example my mother, she doesn’t speak Arabic very well. So she finds problems communicating with an Arabic person. She also prefers to speak Tashilhit. So the Arabic person should learn Tashilhit first. Because my mother she has never been in school, so that’s it. That is really the problem. You, you were in school, you’re well educated. So why didn’t you start learning Tashilhit?

Another commented on her mother’s inability to socialize after relocating to Sale:

My mother only speaks Tamazight. She isn’t social. The rest of people don’t know Tamazight, and she only can speak Tamazight.
The fact that the younger generation of female migrants relocates alongside their families provided them an opportunity to view their experience as Amazigh migrants not just personally, but through the eyes of their mothers, aunts, and grandmothers. This also gave them the role of intermediary between their female elder relatives and their new community.

In addition, these families tend to live in neighborhoods with large concentrations of other Amazigh families, blurring the demarcations between rural and urban. One participant commented:

And here in this neighborhood of Sale, most people are Amazigh. Everyone here is Amazigh from the mountains. There are a lot of them. They came from those areas to live here in Sale.

In contrast to the main streets of Rabat, Casablanca, and other large cities in Morocco, in these neighborhoods it is common to hear Tamazight in the streets as well as inside the home. This further enables mobility of village norms.

Migration of full families also created a more distinct contrast between their private and public worlds that may not have existed. Take for example a 26-year-old migrant who came to Casablanca with her family when she was 16. When I conducted my formal interview with her at her college, she spoke with me and her friends in Arabic. However, the second we entered her home, she switched immediately to only speaking Tamazight. Despite communicating with her in Arabic for the past few hours, her home was not a designated Arabic space. In the beginning, she spoke French with me and Tashilhit with her family. As the night progressed, however, she spoke less and less French, instead opting to have her younger sister translate her Tashilhit into English.

**Conclusion**

Migration from Amazigh regions of Morocco has a gendered history that is deeply linked to the formal and informal processes of cultural, economic, and political marginalization as well as the widespread rural exodus that has resulted from the decline in agricultural production. As a result, the preservation of Amazigh culture and language within rural Amazigh communities throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has been understood as the responsibility of women, who have in turn remained monolingual and physically remained in the homeland.

While an increasing number of women have begun to migrate from Amazigh villages, typically with their families, this process has received little to no attention in the existing literature on Morocco’s Amazigh. This study, therefore, aimed to explore how family-centered migration has impacted the construction of Amazigh female identity. Rather than leading to a deterioration of Amazigh identity, family-centered migration has contributed to a reconfiguration of an Amazigh female identity that is not confined to the village. Village norms have become mobile, and as family-centered as opposed to individual mi-

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Migration continues, the connection between Amazigh female identity and place is becoming thinner. I found that the female Amazigh migrants I spoke with do not see themselves as going against the grain or rejecting village life. Rather, they maintain a close affiliation with the members of their village and continue their assigned social tasks as Amazigh women. Migration does not erase past identity, but instead adds a new dimension, further complicating women’s lives. Finally, female Amazigh migrants have the potential to act as agents for reconfiguring understandings of tradition and authenticity as well as women’s roles, and spread these ideas to their sending communities as social remittances.

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JOINING THE STRUGGLE(S):
Decolonization Processes and Gujarati Muslim Diasporic Belief in South Africa

Anabelle Suitor

This paper examines how Islam is constructed amongst Muslims in the South African Gujarati diaspora. It employs 24 life histories along with analysis of the Islamic media, and the work of academics, religious scholars and activists. The Gujarati Muslim diaspora is a historically deep diaspora, living in South Africa since the 1880s and Southern Africa since the 18th century. The responses developed by the Gujarati Muslim diaspora to colonization and local and global decolonization processes, of which includes the overcoming of Apartheid, impacted the ways in which they practiced and presented religion, and perceived religious community. This paper concludes that struggle, which builds the post-colonial nation, also shifts the community’s understanding of, and practice of Islam. The decolonization struggle also opens a space through which Islamic pluralism can exist. This paper hopes to contribute to the literature on Muslim diasporas by emphasizing that experience in the ‘hostland’ can ultimately shape a community more than connection to a ‘homeland’ or to the imaginatively ‘homogenous’ Muslim community.

Introduction:

In the post-9/11 global space, there has been much debate and discussion about the place of Muslim diasporic communities in non-Muslim states. There has been literature produced on the Muslim ummah – global community – as a diasporic model. Connections with the broader Muslim community are important, particularly when illustrating the internationalist Muslim ties produced with Islamic Revivalist movement, such as the Muslim Youth Movement. However, I step away from the dominant discourse of the ummah and diaspora. Pnina Werbner, in her study of Pakistani British diasporic identities, concludes that “Internal conflict and disagreement are thus reproductive of transcendent ethnic identities.” Her focus then, is on a debate between a connection to the homeland – South Asia, and connection to the international – the ummah. However, I draw disagreement as produced by certain types of engagement with the ‘hostland.’ In anti-colonial struggle, ideas promoted in various parts of the ummah are reinterpreted towards the structural conditions of the ‘hostland.’ In the South African Gujarati case, conflict does not necessarily arise from how one relates to one’s homeland, but rather how one relates to the politics of decolonization.

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In my study, I focus on how the religious experience and expression of the Gujarati Muslim diaspora in South Africa has been shaped by their interaction with social movements of the ‘hostland.’ This community is unique, as it is a historically deep diaspora – claiming a presence in South Africa since the 1860s, and a presence within Southern Africa since the 18th century. They currently make up just under two percent of the population of South Africa, but have contributed significantly to the social fabric of the country. There are similarities in their experiences to that of Muslims living in the West. However, South Africa is a decolonized state – with a national culture built upon the decolonization struggle. Through the promotion of means of religious and cultural debate, I highlight how Gujarati Muslims have both been able to challenge colonial hegemonies within and outside their communities. I argue that as Gujarati Muslims engage in struggle, this South African “national culture,” as defined by Fanon, bleeds into and affects their practice of Islam, providing a space for Islamic pluralism. I highlight the development of religious debates and contestations, which challenge hegemonies both within and outside of the community. Throughout my paper I aim to illustrate how the experience of engaging with particular struggles in the ‘hostland’ shapes religious belief. By recognizing the plurality of opinions and interpretations that exist, this paper illustrates that Islam cannot be viewed as inherently intolerant or unprogressive as the dominant rhetoric goes. Islamic hegemonic discourses are created and shaped by social or historical processes. Muslim diasporas have a unique place within these processes and thus, in writing these discourses, I will discuss these concepts through my analysis of education and religious observance of the Gujarati in South Africa.

**Methodology:**

For this study, I relied on individual and group semi-structured interviews coupled with a review of secondary source historical texts. I stayed for 20 days in South Africa with two families of Gujarati Muslim origin in Lenasia, Johannesburg’s Indian township, and Overport, outside of Durban. I interviewed 13 individuals in Johannesburg, and 11 individuals in Durban. I engaged in participant observation while in each city. While I sent out emails to various Muslim organizations to connect with many individuals, I was also connected to individuals in Johannesburg through a friend from my mosque in Washington, DC who was of Gujarati South African origin. I used the snowball method, and referrals to connect with many of my other interlocutors. It was difficult for me to connect with those who represent society’s more non-political conservative elements. Most of my respondents did have an activist bias, as these were the networks I had access to.

**Diaspora**

The Gujarati community has been far enough removed from their homeland of Gujarat that constant transnational movements to a certain ‘home’ or

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family in Gujarat do not exist. Many, especially in the younger generation, don’t speak Gujarati. Some of my interlocutors were even offended with use of Gujarati, as they assumed that that implied their home being in Gujarat and not South Africa. Thus, home is firmly rooted in South Africa. Besides tourism, religious education, and sometimes research, many do not travel to Gujarat, or India. For older generations, although there may be no physical connection to the home village, it carries a social connotation. Due to class similarities, residential patterns and familial connections, Gujaratis too, though perhaps unwittingly, often group together. Gujarat is important, because it has social meaning that is produced in the diasporic space.

Kachig Tololyan, the head of the journal Diaspora, describes how diasporic identity is not produced simply around the identity of the home. A community organizes and navigates itself together through contact with a range of outside influences. These “norms and knowledges” produced in the diasporic community are “heterogenous, and everchanging.” The experience of the ‘hostland’ is integral to the formation of “norms and knowledges” of diaspora, even though the ‘hostland’ is not experienced as it would be by its non-diasporic South Africans. Tololyan places his emphasis on the uniquely located diasporic community as the agent of themselves. Diasporic community uniquely interprets, challenges, and assumes the experiences and struggles of the ‘hostland.’ These interpretations, challenges, and assumptions ultimately become ontologically significant for the diasporic community.

Situating the experience of Muslim communities within colonial processes is important as well. Members of the Muslim community often internalize assumptions of Islam as homogenous. Not all Muslims are aware of the hegemonic processes that have produced dominant, and ‘correct’ interpretations of religion. It is outside the aim of this paper to prove any one interpretation of Islam as textually correct or incorrect. Rather, I point to how historical processes promote certain readings of certain texts. In decolonization, there is a search for solutions to recover from dramatic colonial ruptures, and thus, multiple Islamic interpretations are able to exist. But because we live in a postcolonial present, everything has been shaded by colonial processes, including the decolonization processes. This is an important interjection to make.

Generation

Within this study, I also found generation to be a significant point of ideological difference. I segment my interviewees into four groups. My oldest group, which I had two interviews from, was those who were politically active in the 1950s – between 70-80 years old. The next group, and the one that was most represented in my study, was those who were 60-70 years old, and became politically active in the 1970s. Most people in this group were involved with the early stages of the Muslim Youth Movement. Although committed to ideas of social justice, they were more politically conservative, and their religious thought was very much influenced by transnational Islamism, such as with the Ikhwan, the

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Muslim Brotherhood, and Jamaat-e Islami found in Pakistan. The next generation is the 40-50 year olds who became politically active in the 1980s. I had five interviews from this group. Many were involved with a Muslim Youth Movement that espoused more radical ideologies in relation to race and feminism. The last generational group, of which I have only two interviews with, was those who were 20-30 years old and came to political-consciousness in the 2000s. I spent most of my time with members of the youngest two generational groups. Although I have fewer interviews with these groups, my participant observation occurred primarily with them.

While gender was significant, gendered activism was mostly relegated to those in the 40-50 and 20-30 generational groups. Before that, Islamic political activism tended to be very male dominated. Women like Zuleikha Mayat, although a devout Muslim, often had to relegate their activism to cultural spaces. I make generational differences explicit throughout my study, as it reveals how social movements engaged with and impacted community-held religious belief.

In my study, generational differences factored most significantly in encouraging difference of opinion. Lara Deeb and Mona Harb describe this effect for Lebanese Shi’is in South Beirut – many whom are Hezbollah supporters, and activists. They find “generational categories to emerge in relation to specific cultural and political-economic contexts and via social processes.”4 This does not mean those within the same generation have the same personal experiences, but rather, they grow up with beliefs informed by the same social processes. In South Africa, the decolonization process took multiple forms across multiple generations. Because of this, those from different generations confront different hegemonic thought processes. Thus, Islam is interpreted differently based off of what decolonization meant when. However, it is important that the decolonization processes, as a broad movement, gives these different interpretations spaces to interact with each other.

Background:

The Gujarati community in South Africa provides a particularly important case study, due to the comparisons that can be made between early and modern histories and migration networks. Gujaratis have maintained a significant presence in the Eastern African coast since the 16th century, and Southern Africa since the 18th century. The emergence of an Empire – first the Portuguese, then the British – reconfigured the Indian Ocean world. Existing networks did not all go to waste, but rather, they were redirected, reframed, and morally restructured. In the 1860s, after the English took over South Africa, they brought Indians over to work as laborers on Natal’s sugarcane fields. Indentured migration was followed by “Passenger” migration in the 1880s and after, who were primarily though not totally, of Gujarati-speaking origin. They are called Passengers, because unlike the indentured population, they came paying for their own pas-

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sage on ships to South Africa; most stayed with, and worked with family members in South Africa.5

South Africa was to many of the Gujarati Passenger community the means through which they could escape poverty, and some of the more violent aspects of their British Indian subjugation.6 By hawking inexpensive, mass-produced items, Indians created spaces where African and indentured communities could become the sites of demand, and by capital necessity, sources of labor supply. The Gujarati merchant, as intermediary, became the means through which the British could, without visibility, integrate indentured laborers and African populations into processes of global capital. Thus, Passenger communities in South Africa were, unwittingly necessary in both processes of Indian subjugation, and South African subjugation.

A Middleman Minority

Ashwin Desai, in his analysis of the 1985 anti-Indian riots in Inanda, a township of Durban, titles the Indian community in South Africa as a ‘middleman minority.’7 The middleman minority serves an intermediary position within society. They are economic liaisons between the dominant, and powerful strata of society and the most vulnerable and powerless stratum of society.8 These communities are often constructed as the “scapegoats par excellence” because of their visibility, accessibility, and vulnerability.9

Visibility, accessibility, and vulnerability are interrelated. In South Africa, the Indian community, particularly the Gujarati merchant community, had a visible connection to power or wealth (while the true holders of power and wealth remain invisible). As intermediaries, it was Gujarati businesses that sold to Africans, and Africans were able to interact with them. The middleman minority serves as a function through which colonial whiteness can see and not be seen.10 The visibility of the middleman’s success as compared to the distant and invisible white success often put Indian merchant communities as the subject of reaction towards. Goolam Vahed titles this “white structural violence.”11 The spatial layout of Apartheid and the Group Areas Act served to cement the Indian community as this position of buffer, or in between white and black communities. The Gujarati Passengers’ success was dependent upon how wide a legal window xenophobic legislation had allowed open. Anti-Indian legislation, such as the Asiatic Land Tenure Act of 1946 constantly put Indian businesses under

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9 Ibid., 257-259.
10 This idea of colonial whiteness ‘seeing and not being seen’ is discussed in great detail for the case of Egypt in Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 24.
threat. The window would open up only to slam shut moments after. This affected the Gujarati community disproportionately as they made up much of the Indian mercantile class.

Similarly, many Indians did not have citizenship until 1961, and faced constant threat of repatriation. This scared away many Indian communities from social involvement, and even from forming the mechanisms necessary for community protection from anti-racist legislation. Goolam, from Lenasia expressed,

> You see, the thing is with our parents, they wanted to, because they were only surviving, they were even scared to do anything different. Because first of all, they only used to speak Gujarati, so now they had to learn the other languages like Afrikaans and English, and then, they were scared that if they were to do anything wrong, they would be sent back to India...then after them, when we grew up, we went to a different phase. You see, so we starting to get more established, more knowledgeable. We understand English, Gujarati, Afrikaans...So now that you’re more confident, and you know they can’t send you back now. That is when the Muslim Youth Movement started, that is when we got involved, and then things started changing, you know?  

Although certain elite organizations such as the Natal Indian Congress represented political activism for older generations, engagement with these organizations was confined only to the educated male elite. Capital, transnational connections, and the accessibility of exile allowed these elements to be socially active. Goolam’s parents, however, did not have the luxury for political activism. Citizenship, and new abilities to navigate and identify with a broader South African space would give their children that opportunity.

Islam in South Africa

Islam has a distinct physicality within the South African urban space, and a long history, despite Muslims making up only two percent of the population. In the Cape Colony, the Dutch depended heavily upon a slave population primarily from other Dutch colonial possessions for labor. The Gujarati Passenger community was able to fund themselves in ways that the Cape Malay and the indentured communities were unable to. As each community is geographically separate and follows different madhabs—schools of thought—they remain distinct. Islam was constructed in Natal and Transvaal as an Indian religion, and thus, became viewed as something connected to culture.

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The Gujarati Muslim community in South Africa was impacted by broader trends within British colonial history. In India, the British ultimately were the ones to decide which schools of Islam would dominate by rewarding those who did not engage in the struggle against empire and punishing those who did. After rebellions, quieter schools, such as the School of Deoband, received acceptance from the colonial state at the expense of other schools. Similarly, the British, encouraged a single Muslim personal law, which favored one interpretation of the Sharia over the traditionally more informal and pluralistic forms of Sharia. Furthermore, these ideas were pushed towards the ulama, while the West presented a secular neutral as inherently opposite from the Muslim ulama’s ‘religious irrationality.’ The subsequent pushback from Muslim intellectuals around the world would form a reformist tradition and revivalism which would ultimately shape how the Muslim community would deal with colonialism and its vicious symptoms such as racism and patriarchy.

Racialized Civilization and Early Indian Activism

Indians placed their demand for rights in the terminology of Imperial citizenship. By using this language, Indians attempted to earn similar rights to the ones that Europeans had, often, at the expense of Africans. Indian activists, like Gandhi, characterized the African and the Indian at different civilizational levels – and saw their conflation together as an injustice. With the proliferation of anti-Indian legislation and discrimination, Indians in Africa became aware of their place outside of the British civilizing mission. A broader Indian consciousness was developed for an Indian diasporic discrimination; the limits of Indian British subjectivity were defined. From this vantage point, Indians, in Africa and in India, became increasingly aware of the structural violence of the Empire, though still through the ‘master’s tools’ of racialized civilizational discourse.

The basis for apartheid was a belief that races, due to their level of development, needed to be separated so that they could develop on their own time. The main ambition until 1961 was that Indians would go back to India. However, when that was revealed to be impossible, they too were co-opted into the Afrikaaner’s differential civilization rhetoric. The Indian merchant was then, again, painted as a threat to both indigenous and white development, and necessarily segregated. In the Apartheid and Imperial spaces, this civilizational rhetoric proliferated as the dominant rhetoric. However, Indian marginalization by this rhetoric became increasingly apparent, especially to those from the upwardly mobile merchant class. This community then realized that a paradigm shift was necessary for the procurement of their rights.

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16 Ibid.
17 Vally and Pani, 92.
18 Ibid., 90.
National Culture and Political Islam:

Politicians, activists and citizens have had to debate, following Apartheid, what South Africa’s national identity and national culture would be. Frantz Fanon describes national culture as the “collective thought process of a people to describe, justify, and extol the actions whereby they have joined forces and remained strong.” And thus, national culture is formed in the process of the liberation struggle. The national culture of nations like modern South Africa – which came to freedom, independence, and decolonization through a process of struggle – is centered on the ideology of struggle. The multi-ethnic South Africa is able to form into a nation when the ideology of struggle Bleeds into the cultures, communities and religions that live there.

The anti-Apartheid struggle in South Africa was instrumental in reconstructing and enlivening the face of Islam within the Gujarati Muslim community. Farid Essack, a prominent South African Muslim scholar and activist, highlights in *Quran, Liberation, and Pluralism*:

Far more significant than the interreligious connection in this debate, though, is the South African ‘struggle connection’...Alongside most of the progressive forces in the country, they (the MYM and the Call) have made the connection between the struggle against the dehumanization of racialism and that of gender oppression. The struggle has, furthermore, taught them that people’s humanity is in large measure given meaning to the extent that they, especially the marginalized, are empowered and, on the other hand, the powerful, even the religious ones, are disempowered.

Whereas Fanon highlights that national culture is formed through the process of struggle, Essack highlights the way in which the struggle bleeds back into the religious makeup of the communities engaged. Previously, I mentioned the ruptures produced in the Colonial process, and how this affected religious, and Indian identity in South Africa. This sets the context for me to illustrate throughout the remainder of this paper, how the decolonization process in South Africa has shaped the religious practices of the Gujarati Muslim community. I will next look at the Islamic revivalist movements that have occurred in the anti-Apartheid struggle.

The Arabic Study Circle

The Arabic Study Circle was formed in 1954. Most religious knowledge prior to that time was presented through lectures from India and Pakistan, and was in Urdu. After a series of English-language lectures, it became clear to many of the Muslims in South Africa that a deeper understanding of Arabic was essen-

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21 Frantz Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 168.
tial in order to understand the Quran and better understand the religion. Searching through the text, and searching outside the community to find the meaning of the text would lay the foundation for anti-colonial political Islam in South Africa.

Lectures from English-speakers from the Middle East were made available, as were lectures from the United States. Arabic was not widely learned, despite the efforts of the Arabic Study Circle. However, the transition from Urdu to Arabic to English to Arabic brought Muslims in broader connection to the English speaking Muslim world. The Ikhwaan – the Muslim Brotherhood – and Jammat-ul-Islami influenced many of the English-speaking lectures coming from the Middle East and the United States. They promoted a style of Islamic political organization that challenged the ideology of colonialism and encouraged social welfare, both of which were very relevant to the South African context. The United States was particularly important, as American Muslims were also made up of smaller diasporic communities living in a racially discriminatory state. With the shifting of linguistic mediums, there was a shift away from the traditional quietest Indian ulama that held hegemony over South Africa. English, although not an ‘Islamic language’ like Arabic or Urdu, was an international language that gave the Muslim community in South Africa a unique connection to Islamic literature of multiple different movements and traditions.

The Muslim Youth Movement (MYM)

The Apartheid Regime discouraged Muslim engagement with broader internationalist movements. Before the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM), Islam was recognized as broad cultural identities and phenomena. Scholars then had little connection to broader reform movements. South African Muslims were physically disconnected from other Muslim communities due to Apartheid’s authoritarianism. However, with the proliferation of new media forms and English language scholarly literature, Muslims were able to connect with other Muslim communities. Many of these communities were able to provide answers to Apartheid’s colonialist oppression.

In searching for answers, the MYM produced the Islamic Book Center, which encouraged the reading of revolutionary scholars like Syyid Qutb from the Ikhwan and Mawdudi from Jamaat-ul-Islamia, whose anti-colonial and anti-state views could be applied to the modern context of Apartheid. Although speaking to very different contexts in Egypt and Pakistan respectively, these scholars’ works were reinterpreted for their socially just and revolutionary messages. Islamization would be used internally for the community, instead of externally for the society. Engaging in the anti-Apartheid struggle would be understood as a religious sanctified jihad or struggle. Although these organizations were primarily Sunni, the ideology of the Iranian Revolution and scholars like Ali

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23 Ismail Manjra, Founder of the Arabic Study Circle Interview, January 13, 2016.
24 Zeinoul Abedien Cajee, Former MYM Member, Founder of Awqaf, Interview, January 5, 2016.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
Shariati factored significantly in creating the revolutionary consciousness of South African Muslims.\textsuperscript{28} Similarly, they also encouraged the learning of ideologies like socialism and Marxism.\textsuperscript{29} The works of these scholars would be engaged and discussed through the \textit{halqa} or religious study group.\textsuperscript{30}

Meeting with other Muslim activist figures was also very important in developing the religious consciousness of Muslims in South Africa. Some scholars, like Fazlur Rahman Ansari, visited South Africa. The MYM travelled abroad to meet with other scholars and other Muslim Youth groups.\textsuperscript{31} This had a tremendous effect in creating an Islamic consciousness amongst Muslim South Africans. International organizations also helped provide the organizational structure for South African Muslim mobilization. Muslims in South Africa began communicating with Muslim communities in America. The American Muslim Student Association (MSA) gave South Africans the “nuts and bolts” on establishing institutions and developing the community.\textsuperscript{32} The MSA helped the MYM create various different social as well as economic organizations that allowed the MYM to function as an effective movement. Although discouraged by Apartheid’s isolation, transnational ties with a broader Islamic community were produced. The radical ideas circulating through this transnational Muslim community were applied to the unique situation of Apartheid.

This international body could provide relevant solutions because Muslims throughout the world were undergoing a period of decolonization. Segments of this international Muslim Community were affected by colonialism in different ways, and also worked to decolonize their states in different ways. However, engaging with a transnational Muslim community did provide Muslims in South Africa with means and methods to engage with their own community. Mohammed Amra describes,

\begin{quote}
The 60s and 70s were a low period in Islamic history. Post-colonization Islam was very down as a cultural movement; there was no vibrancy, no dynamism. It was merely a ritual cultural expression of Islam... So our kind of revival was to become better Muslims, and recognize Islam as a way of life...It was we, the Muslim Youth Movement who came and changed...We were a serious game changer in making Islam relevant in the 20th century. So that was our input, and we brought in literature, and guest speakers. We came on campuses. The MSA became more dynamic and more vibrant, the MYM grew, allowing us to have branches throughout the country. We started projects that were unheard of: your winter warms, your Qurbani distribution, your relief organizations.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{28} Essack, \textit{Qur'an, Liberation \\& Pluralism}, 33.
\textsuperscript{29} Zeinoul Abedien Cajee, Former MYM Member, Founder of Awqaf, Interview, January 5, 2016.
\textsuperscript{30} Abdulkader Tayob, \textit{Islamic Resurgence in South Africa} (South Africa: UCT Press,1995), 141.
\textsuperscript{31} Ebrahim Jadwat, MYM Founder, interview, January 12, 2016.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
We were a very socially involved organization. Deeply involved with communities, and of course against Apartheid.33

“To make Islam relevant in the 20th century” in the South African context, necessarily coincided with a reaction against Apartheid, and racialism.34 Thus, these organizations gave the Muslims involved an Islamically-centered anti-Colonial consciousness, which could be used to criticize compliant community and state. Creating a socially just society and righting the wrongs of Colonial oppression was an integral part of the decolonization. Throughout much of the Muslim world, internal racialism and racial segregation, although an issue, has not factored as prominent to the decolonization struggle. Those engaged with the struggle were not necessarily those who were racially marginalized or noticed religious marginalization within their country. The Muslim Youth Movement then, was unique in how it employed the literature of Islamic decolonization to react against racism.

The MYM proliferated alongside the Black Consciousness Movement, and drew inspiration from it.35 Although rejecting its emphasis on race, it applied the terminology of black racial solidarity to religious solidarity. This arose in dialogue with Muslims abroad, which also encouraged Muslims to throw off racial or ethnic identifiers in favor of religious ones.36 By emphasizing that community formed around religion, this opened a space through which non-Gujarati, non-Indian, non-South Asian Muslims were also part of the community. Even mixing with non-Indian Muslim activists from abroad was instrumental in painting that Islam was not only an Indian religion. By engaging with a decolonization trend and a transnational movement, the MYM challenged racialism in both community and state.

The Arabic Study Circle was instrumental in bringing the Islamic revivalist tradition to South Africa. It influenced the MYM, which drew heavily from literature and work from authors in the Islamic revivalist tradition, but interpreted these connections as specific to the experience of decolonization in South Africa. The Gujarati Muslim community was active in these movements, and used their activist ideology to challenge the hegemony of their conservative ulama and promote new ways of understanding faith.

**Education**

Education is essential as means of social pedagogy. Members of the Gujarati Muslim community place heavy value upon education. It is through education that the religious beliefs of many from this community are shaped. Some institutions, like the largely segregated Islamic schools, represent the hegemony and spread a very conservative religious belief. However, I look at Universities as providing a space historically and contemporarily where these conservative viewpoints can be debated. Thus, it is through the University that many in the

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33 Mohammed Amra, Former MYM President, Interview, January 13, 2016.
34 Ibid.
36 Ebrahim Jadwat, MYM Founder, interview, January 12, 2016.
older generation join the struggle, and that many in the younger generation encounter the ideology of the struggle.

Private Islamic or Indian Schools

The Passenger community, when settling in South Africa, set up madrasas – or religious schools that catered primarily to those within the ethno-religious community.\textsuperscript{37} They also primarily recruited teachers from the subcontinent, who were unaware of the South African situation. By 1951, secular secondary education was largely for the male children of elite merchants, and was still of lower quality than those available to whites.\textsuperscript{38} During Apartheid, South African Indians were required to go to Indian-only schools. These schools were often multi-religious, consisting of Hindu, Muslim, and some Christian Indian students, and sometimes multi-ethnic, depending on location.\textsuperscript{39} Indian schools performed very well – though at a disadvantage - and after Apartheid, many students from the surrounding townships moved into Indian schools because of their high performances, which often left them overstrained. As a result, many Indian Muslims set up and sent their children to private Islamic schools. Enrollment in private schools almost doubled between 1995 to 2001 in KwaZulu-Natal. These schools were viewed as educationally better than public schools, but gave the family of the student Islamic prestige.\textsuperscript{40} Often, these Islamic schools form along the lines of Indian racial boundaries. Since they would be funded by wealthier, more conservative communities, these schools tended to support a particular Deobandi or Tablighi perspective.\textsuperscript{41} Although South Africa had overcome Apartheid, the forces of privatization served to strengthen racial boundaries through transition.

University

Going to college or university is now valued within the Indian community. However, many of those I interviewed who were 50-60 years old did not get to the University level, and instead, had service learning from their relatives. University experience though, existed, and was not uncommon even for the 50-60 year olds. College and University has been the place through which individuals have been able to step outside of the comfort of racial or residential segregation. Even during Apartheid, Universities, although segregated, allowed new spaces for racial mixing. In the process of going to University, the social and religious conformity that had become comfortable to many had space to be challenged. This was especially beneficial for women, who, during this time, often lacked the mobility that allowed men to encounter and interact with the struggle.

\begin{itemize}
\item Goolam Vahed, \textit{Ahmed Deedat: The Man and His Mission} (Islamic Book Trust, 2015), 59.
\item Rabiya Kolia, Group interview, January 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 2016.
\item Ibid., 249.
\end{itemize}
Rabiya, in her 60s, a devout Muslim woman from Lenasia, active in the Muslim Youth Movement, describes the experience of going to college in Braamfontein:

I remember when I finished matric, in a predominantly Indian school, where there was only Gujarati speaking Hindus and Muslims. We didn’t have Coloreds and Africans there. So when I finished, when I had to go to college in Braamfontein, where we came from, and when I saw the Tamils and the Blacks, I couldn’t assimilate with them. At first it was like ‘(gasp) I can’t, because they’re drinkers’ and they used to drink in front of us. They used to take dagga in front of us. They used to play music, and we’re not used to it. They used to play the guitar, the hymns, the Christian song… and how old was I, 17 years old, 18 years old… it was completely new to me. And of course, the parents wouldn’t want us to go there. But we said, ‘no, it’s our education, we have to, we have to…’ And it took us a while to break into the whole scenario. It was difficult.\(^4\)

However, despite her fear of unfamiliarity, she later describes engaging in activism, with those who were ‘culturally unfamiliar.’ Rabiya described earlier that when she attended Roodepoort School, she was a student of Ahmed Timol, a prominent Communist anti-Apartheid activist. Although she was afraid to integrate at first, she was later able to join with other members of her college and protest for Ahmed Timol – a man who was familiar and similar, who was from the same community even – and Chris Hani – a black communist activist – one whose life was totally different from hers. Her commitment to activism even got her expelled until an apology was given. College had changed her perceptions, and had given her the strength, political awareness and opportunity to challenge the rhetoric and practices of Apartheid.

Currently, the same type of culture shock is felt amongst many upon entering university. The role of affirmative action policies has been effective in diversifying the University and creating a climate in which Gujarati Muslims can feel accepted and welcomed. Tasneem, a South African author in her late 20s from Durban described her experiences in University:

We stayed in our Indian areas. We met our Indian families. I went to my Indian school. I went to my Islamic school. I didn’t mix that much. Probably in University I started mixing more, made more friends of other races, other religions even, and obviously your mind opens up because you start studying, start reading all these theorists, and it’s also where I probably had my own understanding of what religion is as opposed to what I was brought up to think what religion is. There was a change,

\(^4\) Rabiya Kolia, Group interview, January 3, 2016
a shift in my understanding, my perspective of what I thought Islam is.\textsuperscript{43}

Although Tasneem does express that her generation is beginning to challenge ideologies of racialism and religious conservatism in University, there has been fears and concerns that the Indian community has not been engaging in activism as past generations have. Similarly, even Tasneem expressed the sentiment that many in the Indian community stick to themselves while at University.

Aneesa, who grew up in an environment of progressivism in her University in the 80s, further expresses this sentiment. Her Muslim Students Association (MSA) promoted anti-racialism and progressive politics. However, she feels that the MSAs now are providing a very different experience for her children,

I look back at us in the 80s on campuses, the MSAs were progressive institutions. They were aligned to the anti-apartheid movement they were fighting; they were thinking, they were agitating. And we were pushing back against notions of Islam that I grew up with. So a lot of that generation has turned into activists. So it’s kind of borne fruit. Whereas now, the campus MSAs are conservative – completely conservative – like segregation of the sexes; and they don’t have an activist agenda. They do some nice things like have an Orphan day, or have an Islam day on campus, but it’s not as an activist. So…. I don’t know. I just don’t know if they don’t know other forms of Islam exist, other thinking exists, or if they just don’t question. I don’t know, but it’s a concern.\textsuperscript{44}

Aaisha Dadi Patel describes the lack of participation or understanding that many in the Indian Muslim community had for the Fees Must Fall movement.\textsuperscript{45} She argues that the Indian class privilege and perhaps sense of racial superiority has prevented meaningful engagement within the universities. Many of the older generation who I spoke to also expressed that they were concerned with the younger generation’s lack of involvement because they were removed from the context of struggle.

The Gujarati community depends upon and believes strongly in education. However, there are differences in opinions on the effect of private Islamic schools. Similarly, there seems to be great differences between the experience of the private Islamic or Indian school and the college and university experience. Most Gujarati Muslims encourage their children to attend post-secondary school. Because many middle class Indians tend to go to Indian-only Islamic schools or private schools, this ‘Indian education’ has come under fire as encouraging racial segregation. However, because there is the norm of post-secondary

\textsuperscript{43} Shubnum Khan, Interview, January 10, 2016.

\textsuperscript{44} Aneesa Moosa, Interview, January 10, 2016.

educational attendance, private school ideologies have space to be challenged and subverted. That being said, they do not have to be challenged and subverted, as it is very possible to stick with only Gujarati Muslims at University. However, many people do enter those spaces of contention. To understand the ‘Indian education,’ in full, then, we must also acknowledge these spaces.

**Religious Observance**

The mosque is essential in forming and sustaining a Muslim religious community. Many of these mosques, however, are founded and run by conservative boards that are both racist and patriarchal – representing ideologies of conservative hegemony. Many, especially those created and run by the Gujarati community, don’t provide women’s spaces. However, women who have engaged with the struggle against Apartheid are now engaged in a struggle for space at the mosque. I look at how the mosque becomes a place of debate where conservative and hegemonic ideologies of religio-cultural patriarchy can encounter the anti-patriarchal ideologies of the struggle. Further, I look at how the debate for women’s place in the mosque has shaped the community’s religious perspectives.

**Representations of Muslim Women and Islam**

South African Gujarati Muslim women constantly struggle to make themselves present in religious spaces. These issues are specific to the Indian community. In Cape Town, for example, where the Malay community – who follow the Shafi’i school, which keeps them fairly ideological distinct from the Indo-Pakistan scholarship – predominates, most mosques provide women’s spaces in the same room as male spaces. In Durban and Johannesburg – as is representative of most of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, in which mosques are dominated by the Hanafi Indo-Pakistan tradition – most mosques did not even have a women's section. Of the few mosques that do provide women’s spaces, the women’s sections were in rooms separate from the main area.

Muslim women have been constructed in both the colonial past and post-colonial present as symbols of Islamic otherness. Their veiled presence represents the oppression and the violence of which the other is capable of.\(^46\) Presently, individuals like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, for example, have tried to construct every action of the Muslim woman as a struggle between the binary opposites of Islam – representing irrational patriarchy – and secular freedom.\(^47\) This opposition, frankly, has little relevance in the lives of ‘pious’ Muslim women, who do not see freedom from socio-religious constraints as necessary in maintaining a fulfilling life.\(^48\) Because of this, Muslim women issues often become very sensitive within the community. There is a sentiment that when sexism within the community is

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brought up, it affirms negative images of the community. Similarly, the ulama, mosque boards, and scholarship are male-dominated. Because of this, women’s issues are often viewed as irrelevant or less important when compared to other issues. Challenging forms of patriarchy within the community, and debating women’s space in the mosque is essential in overcoming colonial patriarchy’s perceptions of Muslim women.

Many South African Gujarati Muslim women constantly struggle to make themselves present in religious spaces. Within South Africa, these issues are specific to the Indian community, as followers of the Hanafi madhab or Hanafi school of thought. Although women were allowed in the mosque during the time of the Prophet, later theological developments and historical revisionism has prevented their religious attendance. However, even amongst Hanafis there are disagreements. In the subcontinent, it has become religious de-facto that “the best place for women to pray is at home”. These sentiments and interpretations are not represented across the Islamic legal community.

The mosques that provided comfortable and dignified space for women were primarily the Soofie Mosques in Durban, and the Saaberie Mosques in Lenasia. These mosques do not necessarily originate from, or cater explicitly to the Gujarati community. The Soofie Mosques have a diverse constituency, but were largely established with Memon and some Gujarati support to cater to a largely working class – the previously indentured population. The Saaberie Chishtie mosques are made up largely of people of Urdu-speaking origin. Of course, because of their possession of women’s facilities, they do get significant traffic from women of all communities. Unfortunately, they can be very far from where women live or work, making it very difficult for women without transportation who work or who have young children to attend the mosque. By being unable to enter the mosque, women are both marginalized and denied access to Islamic knowledge, and thus, removed further from having access to Islamic leadership. Even, within these mosques that do provide women’s spaces, the women’s sections were in rooms entirely separate from the main area – something that does not predominate to such a degree elsewhere with more ethnically diverse Muslim diasporas.

Change and Activists

However, despite these barriers, women have been active in promoting female space in the mosque. Women’s presence within the community was not always discounted. Previously, women had religious spaces in which they could be educators of the community such as at women’s Muharram gatherings. However, with Deobandi and Tabligh-i Jamaat ulama control over the space of

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49 For more discussion on how this perspective has developed and been revised, look at, Marion Holmes Katz, *Women in the Mosque: A History of Legal Thought and Social Practice* (New York City: Columbia University Press, 2014), 74.


the madrasa and the mosque, women have been denied access to these knowledge forms. For women involved in asserting their place in the mosque, involvement with anti-apartheid Islamic resistance had been instrumental in changing community-wide perceptions of women in the mosque.

The Islamic resistance in South Africa against apartheid gave meaning and strength to the ideology of ‘struggle.’ Thus, when being a good Muslim became struggling to overcome violent institutional hegemonies, women’s rights had a new window through which it could be addressed. When the struggle against racialism gained resonance within the community, an intersectional struggle against colonial, social, or patriarchal hegemony too became necessary. Thus, the Muslim Youth Movement, although male dominated, was significant in challenging the existing status of women. The president in the 1980s, Na’eem Jeena was also instrumental in promoting a feminist agenda in the Muslim Youth Movement. Women activists, like Aneesa were empowered in the community by their engagement in the MYM in the 1980s. Further, women’s absence in the mosque contradicts with the strong presence they held in politics, in protests, MSAs, and MYM camps. Any women in these organizations and contexts began to normalize prayer in the mosque or the musallah, or prayer room, by praying in the same room as men. Even the integration, association and acceptance of Malays within the Muslim community, in the process of challenging racialism, introduced to members of the South African Gujarati community that women’s absence in the mosque was not a norm and not necessarily Islamically correct.

Engagement with international scholars has been influential, as well. Amina Wadud, a controversial American Muslim woman scholar, visited Cape Town in 1994. She addressed the Claremont Main Road Mosque – a progressive mosque representing mostly members of the Malay community in Cape Town which is removed to a degree from many members of the Gujarati Indian community of Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. However, Amina Wadud’s presence has resonated throughout South Africa. There was international controversy, as her visit was protested by conservative elements of society. This was the first time a woman stood in front of a mosque and delivered a lecture in South Africa. Afterwards however, pre-Friday sermons led by women at the Claremont Main Road Mosque in Cape Town and the Masjidul Islam – a Muslim Youth Movement led mosque in Johannesburg – became a regular occurrence. By asserting her space in the front of the mosque, which is progressive in all community contexts, Amina Wadud challenged the ideology that denied women space in the mosque. This struggle then continued and was enlivened following the fall of Apartheid.

Other women like Aneesa have been instrumental in challenging her community. She has asserted the female Muslim presence with the use of public forums. She was instrumental in organizing with the group, Bringing Islam to the People, the family Eidgoh – the open air space where Muslims pray during Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr. Traditionally, women in the Gujarati community were not

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33 Essack, Qur’ān, Liberation & Pluralism, 248.
34 Jeenah, “The National Liberation Struggle and Islamic Feminisms in South Africa.”
35 Ibid., 34.
permitted to participate. They often stayed home, prepared, and cooked for the Eid festivities. However, the family Eidgoh was the first completely public, open-air space where women could assert themselves as individuals who are engaged in the rituals of worship. Because it was public too, it had the effect of making patriarchal Muslim institutions accountable to a broader audience.

Further, Aneesa, beyond her Eidgoh activism, has also pushed to challenge hegemony both by attending mosques where she felt she was respected and having her children attend mosques. This has made mosque attendance normative for her children. Generational fears and insecurities have been prominent throughout my interviews. Almost all of the older activists that I interviewed expressed that the generation after them was not involved in student activism to the same degree as they were. Student organizations like MSAs had lost their socially progressive activist agenda, and as Aaisha Dadi Patel, a South African Muslim journalist, expressed earlier – without racial exclusion, middle class privilege has prevented many Indian Muslims from social engagement. Although she does not discuss the Gujarati community specifically, the critique is likely best applied towards them. However, activists of the older generation, like Aneesa, have been involved in passing their ideology to the younger generation. Although her family may not be as heavily involved as their mother is, they reflect and support her ideology. While there may be less social engagement amongst the youth, the ideology of the former generation has not been lost on them. When I went to jummah and dhikr at the Soofie Masjid in Westville – a suburb of Durban – there were many women present, and almost all of them were in the 20-30 age group. Although the changes may seem slow and quiet because they are dispensed generationally, they are lasting, visible, and concrete.

This debate and engagement has been producing certain changes, even amongst non-activist members of the older generation. Tasneem, in her late 20s, who grew up going to a conservative ‘Islamic school’ but was exposed to new ideologies in University, challenges her family members with some degree of success.

I’ve been having a lot of discussions, which we would never have been able to have before with my father, about women being at the mosque. Before, it would just be a shut case. Now, over the years, we’ve discussed it more and more...I’m like, ‘and what if you’re traveling?’ - and he knows this, because we go traveling and he needs and I need a place to pray. I’m not going to pray on the side of the road when he has a mosque to pray... I also have to pray so why not give me space to pray? And I think that started working on his mind a lot, like yeah, if you’re traveling. Now, to him, it’s not that you need to go, it’s if you’re traveling you should have a place, actually.

56 Aneesa Moosa, Interview, January 10, 2016
57 Patel, “#FeesMustFall And How It Showcased Indian Privilege.”
Men, on their own, are unable to understand the intense discomfort of having no space in a mosque or having a space of which is undignified. Marrying women from similar families as their own or women with similar ideologies does not necessarily help them challenge these ideologies, for these women often share the view that attending the mosque is unacceptable. However, this story illustrates that those of the younger generation can be instrumental in challenging the ideologies of the older generation. Some conservative men do put their daughters in the types of schools that promote conservative ideology, or discourage or prevent them from going to University, or mixing in groups in which alternative ideologies may proliferate. However, despite their visibility, these are not the norm.

Tasneem’s education is important to her father, as is true for many men in the community. Thus, when Tasneem pursues her education, she is able to enter spaces where the ideology of her upbringing can be challenged. And thus, by allowing and encouraging that education, her father provides a space where his ideology too can be challenged. When Tasneem feels indignity at having to pray on the side of the road, while he prays in the mosque, he empathizes. It cannot be assumed that men will certainly grapple tightly to their slipping hegemony. There are spaces where empathetic personal relationships, engagement with a broad struggle, and dialogue with the younger generations can allow slips in the patriarchic hegemony. In the mosque, many men who have been involved in the anti-Apartheid struggle have also been involved in supporting the push for a women’s place.

Thus, mosque attendance is a political act for Gujarati Muslim women in Gauteng and Durban, and a means through which they can challenge community hegemony. They are able to call out and publicly criticize the men in power who finance and encourage the erasing of women from the community. By being physically present, visible, and active within the community, mosque attendance challenges the Colonial construction of Islam as a patriarchal, male dominated religion. Similarly, by expressing agency and freedom through religious engagement, mosque attendance challenges the Colonial and neoliberal dichotomy between emancipation and Islam.

Conclusion

My main interjection is perhaps obvious but necessary – that Islam is not homogenous, and Muslim diasporic communities do not necessarily practice religion exactly as it is practiced in ‘the home.’ Historical processes that occur across generations have shaped the religious beliefs of Gujarati Muslims. Although many Gujarati Muslims in South Africa do have access to religious hegemony, by looking at how ‘decolonized’ religious beliefs circulate within the Gujarati community, I illustrate that this community is not homogenous, and hegemony can be challenged from within. I illustrate that religious beliefs and diasporic identities are very much informed by this experience. Gujarati Muslims as diasporic Muslims are shaped by the struggles of their ‘hostland,’ and transnational religious literature. Thus, belongings are interpreted through this

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38 Shamim Bhodanya, interview, January 12, 2016.
lens of the hostland’s decolonization struggle. Being in a state with colonial heritage, decolonization could not completely erase those colonial processes from the Gujarati Muslim consciousness. Decolonization writes new histories and new relations, which are of course, still informed by coloniality. However, these new forms of belonging are uncertain and unsure, and thus, in the postcolonial space there exists space for the circulation of multiple different beliefs.

In my paper, I highlighted how community involvement with the struggle manifests itself in certain spaces. In the women’s space of the mosque, ideas of the struggle associated with social justice fight against patriarchic hegemony. Within the education system, Gujarati Muslims, by going to University, are able to come across new religious ideas associated with the struggle that may conflict with the hegemonic ideals in Islamic or Indian private education. Ultimately, because of the impact of the struggle, there are many spaces where multiple religious beliefs can proliferate.

This is not to say that everyone’s beliefs incorporate the ideology of struggle. Many in the Gujarati community have a socially conservative hegemony over religious institutions. Many still cling to conservative ways of thinking. Similarly, many find other transnational influences such as the orthodox Tabligh-i Jamaat or Saudi-style Salafism. These beliefs too, although conservative, and considered ‘traditional’ are relatively new. The decolonization struggle in South Africa has created a sense of religious revivalism – giving space for these new forms of revival. However, because religious revivalism in South Africa is based around anti-Apartheid struggle and the protection of the marginalized and disempowered, South African revivalism is inherently anti-hegemonic. Because of this, there exists a space in South Africa for multiple different religious beliefs to circulate and exist, even if some of these beliefs are socially regressive.

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Theme 4:

China – A Global Actor
China’s Economic Engagement with West Africa: Problems, Prospects, and Present Realities

Donald Gerard Gayou

Chinese economic engagement with the rest of the world has risen dramatically in the past two decades. While the majority of this activity is concentrated in large investments and massive two-way trade with the United States and Europe, many analysts are wary of the disproportionate influence that China’s opaque policies might have on the development of smaller, more vulnerable economies, particularly the economies of sub-Saharan Africa. In this paper, the researcher cuts through an abundance of conjecture on China in Africa to address two of the most basic and pressing questions regarding Sino-African economic relations: What is the level of Chinese economic engagement with African countries? And how does this engagement affect these economies? To answer these questions, the researcher applies a self-designed Economic Engagement Metric (EEM) to the three case studies of Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, and Cameroon to assess both China’s level of engagement in these countries and the resulting positive or negative effects of that engagement. The paper concludes that Chinese activity in West Africa, when compared to US engagement, is both broad and deep. Furthermore, while Chinese economic engagement patterns can be alarming to Western observers, China has nonetheless benefitted these three countries’ economies on the whole.

Introduction

China’s rise to the second largest economy in the world has been marked by rapid economic growth and increasing engagement with the world economy. Evolving from more ideological fixations in foreign policy during the Maoist era, present-day China is more pragmatic and less ideologically focused in its activities abroad. The size of its domestic economy has pushed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to look beyond its borders for natural resources, business partners, and investment opportunities. In the 21st century, large investments in the United States and Europe and massive two-way trade with numerous partners account for the majority of Chinese economic engagement abroad. China’s activities in the developing world, however, have been the subject of intense scrutiny in the past decade.

While trade and investment with regions like Africa and Latin America are smaller in scope than China’s activity with more established partners, many analysts are wary of the disproportionate influence that China’s opaque policies might have on the development of these smaller, more vulnerable economies. While questions abound, many cannot simply be answered by a difference of

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opinion. In this paper, the researcher addresses two of the most basic and pressing questions in the Sino-African debate using three case studies of West African countries: What is the level of Chinese economic engagement with these countries? And how does this engagement affect these economies?

After a succinct literature review of the PRC’s economic engagement activity in sub-Saharan Africa, the paper turns to measuring current engagement. The painstaking determination of measuring Chinese activity in these countries via an Economic Engagement Metric, developed by the researcher, is a vital step in providing an understanding of Chinese activity in individual African countries, namely Ghana, Cameroon, and Cote d’Ivoire. The level and breadth of China’s economic engagement, measured by this metric from 2006-2013, is representative of the level of influence China has over these countries’ economies. Trends in the decade-long metric are also indicative of how China might continue to influence these economies in the future. Influence over a partner economy affects everything from a country’s global economic standing to its per capita income, so this engagement determination is a significant factor in a developing country’s economic development.

The second half of the paper covers the assessment of Chinese influence over these countries, which is vital because robust Chinese engagement does not necessarily translate to benefit for African economies. There are several significant concerns, including debt potential and spillover from a slowdown of the Chinese economy that will be assessed at the end of the paper.

Therefore, the purpose of this paper is twofold: To establish a clear level of engagement between China and three African countries, and to determine the positive and negative effects of that engagement on those countries. To be sure, three case studies out of forty-nine sub-Saharan nations can hardly be applied to the whole continent, but they do give a glimpse into influential Chinese activity that, when combined with expert opinions in the field, reveal patterns in the PRC’s West African engagement. The final conclusion points to robust Chinese engagement being a mixed bag, as these three African countries stand to benefit overall from continuing to engage with the Chinese.

Historical Background: The PRC has Always Been in Africa

Despite headlines that label China the bombastic newcomer in African development policy, Sino-African relations have an extensive history that dates back to the PRC’s inception in 1949. While facing a daunting domestic poverty rate that eclipsed ninety percent after independence, Beijing was nonetheless willing to assist postcolonial Africa in the face of these struggles at home. Of course, China’s willingness was firmly rooted in the ideological and political context of the 1950s and 1960s. The chief ideological motivations for the PRC’s development programs were persuading influential developing nations to recognize the People’s Republic of China over the Republic of China, or Taiwan, in

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addition to garnering political clout that might otherwise have gone to their northern rival, the Soviet Union. To be sure, the PRC’s earliest involvement entailed Communist proselytizing, but this ideological focus faded with time. Incredibly, the Chinese had completed 470 projects in developing countries by the late 1970s, showcasing a significant commitment to the developing world. However, in this so-called “first phase” of Chinese aid, there was almost no trade or investment to compliment the projects that were completed for mainly political purposes. After the death of Chairman Mao, however, one of two Chinese aid evolutions would take place to catapult China into the development spotlight.

In the late 1970s the Chinese began to explore compensatory trade and other forms of economic engagement as opposed to rigid and traditional aid grants. A firm switch from one-way to more mutual economic engagement occurred during Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang’s 1982 trip to Africa. Covering his voyage and subsequent declaration, the Beijing Review writes that “Economic cooperation between poor countries cannot be sustained if it is limited to one-way aid.” At the forming of this conviction, aid was henceforth combined with other economic packages to support mutually beneficial cooperation between Africa and China. Zhao’s trip provided the foundation for the modern Sino-African relationship in that it established a partnership of mutual benefit between the two, unlike the more asymmetric relationships that Western development aid, tied with policy recommendations and good governance requirements, implied. While Maoist political rhetoric on Chinese engagement was still present, Chinese aid grew more pragmatic in its focus on profit and market opportunities for Chinese companies, leading up to a third evolution in the PRC’s strategy by the 1990s.

In the late 1980s, when most Western businesses were leaving Africa due to a growing belief in a “failed continent,” the Chinese saw significant business and investment potential there. This perception of a market opportunity, coupled with China’s “Going Out” policy that was announced in 1999, led to a modest increase in business activity and investment in sub-Saharan Africa, while aid for the purposes of “checkbook diplomacy” against Taiwan was still being doled out. At the turn of the century, Chinese activity was being noted for its increasing focus on profit-seeking, market access, and natural resources, and this focus has continued in the past fifteen years. Indeed, a 2015 Brookings Institute re-

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3 Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 45.
4 Ibid., 145-6.
5 Ibid., 50.
6 Ibid., 146.
8 Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 69.
In a comprehensive review of small and medium-sized Chinese enterprises, noted that companies’ focus was profit-based.\textsuperscript{11}

The PRC’s engagement approach of aid, trade, and investment continues today, where the strategy is increasingly broad and deep. More specifically, Chinese FDI flows in Africa have gone from close to zero as late as 2003 to $3.1 billion in 2013, with total FDI stock reaching $24 billion in that same year. Running parallel with soaring investment numbers, Sino-African two-way trade increased by more than a thousand percent from 2001 to 2011. This increase is especially remarkable given that Africa’s share of global trade had dropped beneath one percent in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{12} Therefore, while the Chinese have ramped up activity in the past decade, they have long been a partner to many African countries; a history that provides the foundation for its present-day engagement.

This flurry of activity has become the object of vociferous attention from the West, which was formerly the only significant player in the African development sphere. The glaring absence of official aid numbers contributes to the confusion at the root of both conjecture that the Chinese are making Africa their next colony, and baseless optimism in which the PRC is Africa’s savior.

While many of the headlines regarding China in Africa serve only to dramatize the situation, many levelheaded analyses bring up both rational criticism and praise for the Sino-African partnership. Criticism aimed at Chinese development programs abounds among Western analysts. Adama Gaye, author of \textit{China-Africa: The Dragon and the Ostrich}, asks a leading question:

\begin{quote}
(China) has now grabbed huge natural resources while dumping into the continent cheap industrial manufactured products… The early colonizers came to Africa with alcohol and useless gifts to lure the locals. Is not China doing the same with the help of greedy leaders?\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

This criticism that China is adopting a neo-colonial approach towards Africa and reinforcing a center-periphery dynamic that Africans have struggled to break free from is prevalent enough to have reached the highest levels of U.S. government. On her trip to Senegal in 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton subtly implied similar sentiments, asserting that the United States is looking for a "model of sustainable partnership that adds value, rather than extracts it… America will stand up for democracy and universal human rights even


when it might be easier to look the other way and keep the resources flowing.”

This conception of Sino-African relations as parasitic is made by many more that were not included in this paper for the sake of brevity.

While the majority of observers are pessimistic about Chinese activity in Africa, that attitude is by no means the only one. Notably, Deborah Brautigam, Director of the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University, writes that the notion of China as a resource grabber in Africa is a wholly incomplete and perhaps misleading analysis, and the PRC is much better understood as a business partner that is largely apathetic to internal political issues. Gill and Reilly, while questioning the sustainability of China’s strategy in Africa, concede that China’s track record is relatively clean compared to the much more complicated history of the West in Africa, and that the PRC is viewed in Africa as a more friendly partner.

Literature Review: Attempts at Quantification

Despite knowledge of large increases in continent-wide Chinese to African investment and trade, these debates of China’s role in Africa are still lacking accurate quantitative analysis. Quite simply, there have been few successful endeavors into the type and amount of Chinese activity in specific African countries. Without this determination, Chinese activity in Africa cannot be fully understood, much less criticized or praised. Foreign aid, considered a state secret, is often difficult to differentiate from substantial amounts of Chinese investment that are state-sponsored or subsidized, resulting in abundant misreporting of actual Chinese aid and investment numbers. Furthermore, the Chinese government does not consistently release investment numbers on a bilateral basis, and more often releases numbers on regional or continent-wide investment sums, only contributing to the confusion surrounding many attempts to analyze the breadth, depth, and quality of that engagement.

Several strong studies have been put forth in an attempt to determine China’s exact economic engagement with Africa in the 21st century. A 2008 NYU study attempted to account for China’s foreign aid in the regions of Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, finding that while Official Development Assistance (ODA)-defined aid was low, one of China’s key areas of engagement were non-concessional loans that were often used to finance Chinese companies abroad. The study reports that across the three regions, Chinese aid activity grew from $1.5 billion in 2003 to $25 billion in 2007, the largest increases being in sub-Saharan Africa. The Congressional Research Service (CRS), building off of the Wagner School Study, reaffirms that relatively little of China’s aid actually meets the standards of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.

15 Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 17.
which stipulates that any aid package must have, among other components, a 25% grant or concessional element. Therefore, the CRS includes non-concessional and investment-supporting loans in their analysis of “aid,” a decision that allows for a rough picture of Chinese economic engagement but prohibits a meaningful cross-country comparison between the United States and China.  

An enlightening report by RAND in 2013 moved away from broad, all-encompassing definitions of aid found in the Wagner School and CRS reports, deciding instead to label the wide array of Chinese development finance activity “Foreign Aid and Government-sponsored Investment Activities,” or FAGIA. Because of this more comprehensive approach, the report notes that the scope of Chinese engagement is far wider than Western aid programs.

FAGIA is useful for conceptualizing the broad scale and variety of Chinese “aid,” but it still prevents an accurate comparison with Western donors because a similar approach would not accurately represent Western development activity. While China’s programs contribute more aggregate money than Western Official Development Assistance, it is very difficult to extract meaning from two inherently different measures (the two measures being FAGIA and ODA-style aid). Indeed, Brautigam notes that most of the time, when numeric comparisons are drawn between Chinese and Western development strategies, it is like comparing “apples to lychees.” Therefore, a better and clearer method to compare development activity of Chinese and Western donors is needed, particularly before any value judgment can be placed on what China is or is not doing on the continent.

**Methodology**

The researcher uses the self-designed Economic Engagement Metric (EEM) comprised of aid, trade, and investment to represent China and the United States’ respective levels of engagement with the West African countries of Ghana, Cameroon, and Cote d’Ivoire. The level of economic engagement must be established because it lends perspective into how much influence China might have over each country’s respective economic circumstance. A clear metric that compares apples to apples, so to speak, cuts through the confusion often caused when discussing Chinese “aid” to Africa, as well as supplements generalizations about China’s large-scale activity in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the metric measures bilateral engagement because Chinese activity, while taking place in almost all of the forty-nine sub-Saharan African countries, is often far too generalized in referring to the continent as one entity. Limiting the scope of the study to three specific countries, all within a similar region of Africa, allows the

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researcher a much narrower lens to develop a more nuanced snapshot of China in a specific part of Africa.

The researcher chose Ghana, Cameroon, and Cote d’Ivoire for several reasons pertaining to their geographic proximity and global economic standing. All three countries are situated on the West African coast, making them slightly more representative of regional trends as opposed to three randomly selected countries. Furthermore, these three countries represent three rough tiers of sub-Saharan African economies, drawn namely from the World Bank’s Doing Business Ranking. Ghana ranks in the top ten of all sub-Saharan African countries, with Cote d’Ivoire in the middle of the pack, and Cameroon in the bottom ten. These different stages of investment and business appeal provide a more comprehensive picture of Chinese engagement with a variety of different actors. Furthermore, the US is an established donor and economic partner in all three of these countries, a factor necessary for the US-China comparison section.

Table 1 Economic Engagement Metric Designed by Researcher

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Point Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>$100 million of Foreign Direct Investment</td>
<td>1 point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid (ODA)</td>
<td>$20 million of Foreign Aid</td>
<td>1 point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports (Home country to China)</td>
<td>$20 million in Exports</td>
<td>1 point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports (China to Home Country)</td>
<td>$200 million in imports</td>
<td>1 point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data sources drawn on to compute metric: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Atlas of Economic Complexity; the US government’s Foreign Assistance database; The American Enterprise Institute’s Chinese Global Investment Tracker; Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Atlas of Economic Complexity; and William and Mary’s AidData database.

For the period from 2006-2013, data was collected for the following measures (Ghana, Cameroon, and Cote d’Ivoire represent host countries): China’s foreign direct investment to host country; China’s imports from host country; China’s exports to host country; China’s aid to host country. For the US engagement with each of these three host countries, the same measures were used.

Significant consideration was taken to accurately represent foreign aid that only qualified as Official Development Aid (ODA) as defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). To qualify as ODA, a grant must meet the following definition:

Official development assistance (ODA) consists of technical aid, official grants, or loans promoting economic development and welfare, and having concessional terms, with a grant element of at least 25 percent.

More important than the definition of OECD aid, however, is the reality that very little of what the Chinese government classifies as aid meets these criteria. The vast majority of Chinese loans offered for development purposes are either lent at near-market rates (nullifying their qualification as concessional loans or maintaining a grant element) or are part of mixed packages that include export credits and other non-grant components, mixtures that RAND concludes
makes a comparison of Western and Chinese aid inherently difficult.\textsuperscript{21} Therefore, the researcher only includes in the metric the limited amount of Chinese aid that does qualify as OECD ODA.

Despite the best efforts of William and Mary’s Aiddata database of Chinese aid activity in Africa, abundant criticism has been aimed at its attempt to use Chinese media reports to account for Chinese bilateral aid to respective countries. Therefore, the researcher has only used Aiddata as a first step for identifying concessional, completed projects that potentially qualify as OECD ODA before exploring for details on their concessional elements and completion via different sources, especially through reports of the host country.

Aside from the complex task of identifying legitimate aid, a second issue that arises from a lack of Chinese aid transparency is differentiating between aid commitments and completion of projects. Quite often, the Chinese have committed a concessional loan to Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, or Cameroon that simply remains in the “pipeline commitment” stages or a hazy implementation stage. Therefore, only projects that were reported completed by both Aiddata researchers and another source were included in the researcher’s metric.

It is also prudent to note the considerable limitations of the EEM. Chinese investment and aid data, as noted earlier, were not readily available save from third-party sources that, while widely reputable, are also prone to making mistakes. In addition to potential inaccuracy of some data in the EEM, Chinese non-concessional loans, which the country deals in quite often throughout development activities, were not included simply because there is no comparison found among Western donors. To reiterate, the advantage of this metric is comparing apples to apples, so the researcher decided that a side-by-side comparison, with the provided stipulation that a portion of Chinese activity was not represented, would still be more valuable than a conglomeration of mismatched statistics that could cause considerable confusion.

Besides data challenges, the metric’s chief limitation is its subjective assessment of points values to different elements of economic integration. Value assignments were based on researched determinations of what is most significant in a partner country’s economic engagement with a developing country. However, several subjective judgments on the part of the researcher were unavoidable. For example, exports were deemed more indicative of significant economic engagement because exports, unlike imports, involve monetary flows going from China to Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, or Ghana, similar to aid and investment. That being said, imports were still included in the metric because of their non-trivial influence on a recipient economy.

**Findings**

**Metric Results**

The metric results partly confirm that Chinese engagement in these three West African countries is both broad and deep when compared to United States

engagement. Cote d’Ivoire is the notable exception. Indeed, US engagement to Cote d’Ivoire is nearly five times larger than that of the Chinese. However, from an aggregate view, it is clear that Chinese economic influence is more or less on par with the United States in these three countries. In addition to supplementing previous analyses of Chinese economic engagement summarized above, this finding affirms recent literature that Chinese economic resources are comparable and in some countries more significant than the United States in Africa. Furthermore, given that non-concessional loans, in which China deals quite often, are not included in the metric, Chinese economic engagement in these three countries is indeed quite robust. The graphical data representation is formatted on a case-by-case basis below.

The Chinese economic engagement in Ghana has grown significantly in the past eight years and surpassed the United States in 2012. Aid numbers from both the US and China were relatively consistent to the country, although China’s project-centered aid program made for more sporadic increases. The keys to the PRC’s increased engagement were the investment numbers. Going from around $250 million in FDI in 2006 (an amount barely recognizable on the EEM), Chinese investment to Ghana soared, totaling $4.34 billion across five sectors in 2013. While US engagement declined steadily after 2011, it also increased investment in Ghana by a significant margin. Interestingly, the lower US numbers were due to fairly wide fluctuations in imports from Ghana, despite China and the United States importing the same types of goods (foodstuffs, mineral products, and wood products) from the country, with petroleum imports going only to China.

As opposed to robust engagement by both parties in Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire’s EEM was thoroughly dominated by the United States. Neither country contributed large amounts of foreign direct investment to Cote d’Ivoire, most likely due to its continuing recovery from civil war that ended in 2007. Much more significant were trade totals, as the United States consistently imported over ten times the amount of goods from Cote d’Ivoire as China did, mostly in foodstuffs such as cocoa, Cote d’Ivoire’s chief export. Therefore, the US has much more influence on Cote d’Ivoire’s economy than China does, particularly given that 43% of the coastal nation’s GDP is dependent on exports. The PRC did export over $1 billion worth of goods to Cote d’Ivoire in 2012 and 2013, resulting in a minor uptick in the EEM, but these exports to the African nation are not valued as highly given the emphasis on African exports in the metric.
China's Economic Engagement with West Africa

**Figure 1** US and Chinese Economic Engagement in Ghana

**Figure 2** US and Chinese Economic Engagement in Cote d'Ivoire
In Cameroon, China’s break from US-level engagement in 2009 is marked by an increase in investment. Chinese investment soared from less than $100 million to $5.93 billion in the span of only five years, demonstrating an established economic commitment to the country. US investment sputtered throughout the time frame, most likely due to Cameroon’s notoriously unwelcoming business environment. The fact that the Chinese seem relatively undeterred by stringent business regulations indicates a comparatively low risk aversion that will be expanded upon in the next section. Goods imported from Cameroon also weigh heavily towards the Chinese. Aid numbers, fitting a pattern with Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, remained fairly consistent for the US but fluctuated wildly for China.

While effective in demonstrating levels of engagement, these quantitative comparisons fail to effectively demonstrate how these countries are engaging on a wider basis, which is arguably the more important point. The researcher has established the Chinese are at least as economically influential as the United States, a more established development partner, in two of the three cases. But analyzing patterns in respective engagements bridges the discussion between sheer amount of engagement and its efficacy, which is the concluding section of the paper. Therefore, the following section is divided into key sections that discuss patterns revealed in the data.

Aid Differences

In terms of aid given to Ghana, Cameroon, and Cote d’Ivoire, the United States has not only given more OECD ODA than the Chinese, but has given it more consistently. Of course, this difference in aid consistency could in part be due to differences in data accuracy. However, it is significant to note that US development aid never dipped below $50 million to any of these three countries.
in any of the measuring years. On the other hand, there were multiple years in which China did not give any aid at all. One likely reason for this is that China rarely gives out cash payments to countries, opting instead to provide aid through projects that are often led by a Chinese company. This line of reasoning is consistent with Brautigam’s analysis that Chinese aid is rarely in the form of a cash grant. Therefore, inconsistencies in aid allocation and infrastructure project-oriented tendencies indicate that Chinese aid, while similar in amount to US aid to Ghana, nonetheless has a relatively narrow scope. American-style aid, coming from many different federal agencies, is much more holistic in its approach to engage these three countries. Further, these data reaffirm conclusions made by other authors that find concessional loans and grants are not the principal method of Chinese development strategy in African countries.

While many authors have affirmed that ODA coming from China is relatively low, others still inject confusion into the conversation by mentioning that Chinese “official development finance” is roughly on par with the United States. Bradley Parks, one of the founders of Aiddata, which the researcher used for a catalogue of Chinese aid projects, asserts that US and Chinese development finance are almost equivalent. However, the United States does not often deal in loans. Therefore, the comparison shouldn’t be made. As the Economic Engagement Metric shows, Chinese aid is a relatively small portion of their overall engagement and is significantly lower than US aid. Aiddata has also asserted that Ghana is among the largest recipients of Chinese aid, but based on Official Development Aid numbers, Chinese aid to Ghana has been lower than the US equivalent. This misunderstanding is precisely why comparing apples to apples in a metric like the EEM are so important; if non-concessional loans are counted as aid, then Chinese business activities are suddenly credited as Chinese development activities, leading to false assumptions and the brushing aside of important effects loans have on an economy as opposed to aid.

**Investment Divergence**

US investment numbers are higher in more economically prosperous and stable countries, while Chinese numbers seem less affected by particular investment risks. Both US and China invested heavily in Ghana, ranked 114th in the World Bank’s Doing Business ranking, which is a key indicator of a country’s investment climate. As expected, US foreign direct investment was significantly diminished in Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon, which are ranked 142nd and 172nd, respectively, in the Doing Business ranking. Chinese investment behavior, however, appeared apathetic to investment climates, with a FDI position of nearly $6 billion in Cameroon by 2013. Given Cameroon’s significant petroleum exports, some analysts might assume that this level of investment is simply due to China’s need to shore up and secure natural resource flows, but investment allocations demonstrate impressive diversity. Only 30% of Chinese foreign direct investment to Cameroon is in the energy sector, which, while significant, is not enough to explain the surge in investment in sectors such as utilities, technology, and

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transport after 2010. While determining precise reasons for this increase in investment is outside the scope of this paper, the researcher can affirm that Chinese investment from a macro perspective is less risk-averse than corresponding US investment.

The impressive investment diversification in Cameroon and Ghana on the part of the Chinese is important to note in itself. While Chinese foreign direct investment to Ghana is more concentrated in energy (at roughly 40%), growing investment in the real estate, transport, and utilities sectors further indicate that the Chinese portfolio is diversifying over time. The researcher’s findings in Ghana and Cameroon support a 2015 World Bank report which concluded that Chinese investment, despite being concentrated in oil, was undergoing increasing diversification in a variety of sectors, including construction, manufacturing, and financial services.²⁴

Trade: Similar Content, Different Quantity

Despite widespread assumptions that the Chinese are subjecting Africans to neo-colonial trade relationships, the goods imported by the US and China from Ghana, Cameroon, and Cote d’Ivoire are remarkably similar. Foodstuffs and metals account for most exports from Ghana. Petroleum, cotton, wood, and mineral products dominate exports from Cameroon. Jean Pierre Cabestan, writing on China’s influence in Cameroon, notes that many elites are worried that goods traded with the PRC are locking Cameroon in primary industries and preventing diversification of their economy, a concern present not only in the three case studies but across most resource-rich sub-Saharan African nations.²⁵ However, it is important to note that in these three case studies, the Chinese are hardly more resource-focused than the United States in terms of trade. US similarities to Chinese trading profiles only indicate that, at least in this regard, Chinese engagement is not unique among the Western nations that have, perhaps hypocritically, criticized the PRC. This finding points to causal factors in the domestic economies of African countries as opposed to the trade policies imposed by their partners that are preventing diversification of the economy.

Discussion

The researcher has established that, on the whole, Chinese engagement with Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, and Cameroon is comparable to the US engagement with these same countries, indicating robust engagement and significant influence over these developing economies. In an assessment of US and Chinese engagement patterns with Cameroon, Ghana, and Cote d’Ivoire, clear differences have been revealed in consistency and type of aid allocated and favored investment climates, particularly regarding the less risk-averse Chinese approach to investment. Interestingly, the analysis found that Chinese and US trade profiles


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with these countries were fairly similar in terms of goods imported, and the Chinese demand for natural resources, at least in these three cases, was not disproportionate. In the concluding section of the paper, the discussion turns to the effects that this influence has on the economic development of these countries, taking into account corresponding literature and in-person interviews conducted by the researcher. Importantly, common concerns of Chinese engagement with Africa, namely growing debt burdens and burdening of domestic African industries are addressed. While many analysts are concerned about China’s apathy towards quality of governments they engage with, the researcher will not delve into quality of governance issues given their less clear cut relationship with economic development. Too many factors are involved in assessing the effect of governance on an economy for this project to cover. However, more research is needed and encouraged on the effects of Chinese economic support for governments that may not be economically benefitting their countries.

China is a Consistent Business Partner

The most direct indication of Chinese benefit to African economies is the increase in trade between the respective partners. While skeptical of China’s benefits in Africa in other ways, Matthias Busse et al. found that the growing volume of African exports to China were definitely beneficial to the growth of sub-Saharan Africa, despite these being mostly in natural resources. Indeed, despite a lack of diversity in the exports of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, their exports account for 35 and 43 percent of GDP respectively, demonstrating the importance of both Chinese and US demand.

More so than the United States, Chinese engagement comes with likelihood for investment. This tendency, coupled with the PRC’s affinity for using concessional loans and mixed development packages as opposed to a large amount of Official Development Assistance, are largely beneficial to African nations desirous of investment and infrastructure. Investment, in particular, is a characteristic of China in Africa that is not matched by Western donors. Importantly, investment is not just a preference of many African nations but has measurable positive effects when directed at a wide range of sectors. The World Bank’s 2015 Chinese investment report discusses the “increasingly significant contribution of Chinese FDI to job creation in countries across the continent,” thanks to diversification similar to what was seen in Ghana and Cameroon in the analysis section above. In a personal interview with Professor David Shinn, the researcher inquired about the apparent diversification of Chinese investments in Ghana. Shinn replied:

Since the publication of my book, China has increasingly moved away from the extractive sectors. Continent-wide, China is moving into services and finance...in part because

they’re getting a lot of criticism from Africans about the extractive sector.\textsuperscript{28}

From this assessment, it is clear that Chinese diversification is not only the result of domestic changes in the Chinese economy, but also of feedback from African nations that China is often criticized for ignoring. Importantly, both this investment and Sino-African trade has been consistently connected with increased output for sub-Saharan countries. Drummond and Liu’s 2013 report estimated that for every percentage point increase in China’s real domestic fixed asset investment, African countries see an average 0.6 percent increase in their export growth.\textsuperscript{29} In Busse’s earlier referenced paper, however, his team concludes that in contrast to Drummond and Liu’s conclusion, most Chinese engagement may actually hurt Africa more than it will help it. Indeed, despite some clear benefits to increased trade and increased investment, many worry that the negative externalities of Chinese involvement will outweigh any positives.

\textbf{Debt Issues}

Many observers are increasingly worried that the PRC’s engagement might bring debt to the fragile fiscal systems of African countries. An impending contribution to another African debt crisis in which Western institutions would have to salvage the situation from China and other potentially imprudent donors is probably the most significant pitfall facing Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, and other African countries. Underlining the importance of preventing debt with the Chinese, Jean Claude Cabestan writes that in Cameroon, as in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, a domestic government’s most important goal is finding the balance between desperate infrastructure needs and a fragile fiscal system.\textsuperscript{30} In particular, official development finance such as non-concessional loans and other less transparent non-ODA development assistance from China are labeled as potential debt bombs that won’t produce the type of economic growth needed to justify their cost.

Several quantitative studies have demonstrated that up until 2012, these debt concerns were overblown. Reisen and Ndoye’s 2008 OECD study finds that across Africa, even among countries with the highest amounts of Chinese engagement, debt levels were not significantly altered by PRC development activity. Jean Claude Berthelemy of the African Development Bank finds in 2012 that Chinese financial activity, despite a heavy emphasis on non-concessional loans, does not appear to be exacerbating the debt problem.\textsuperscript{31} In recent years, however, concerns about Chinese induced debt in Africa have been growing. In her book, \textit{The Dragon’s Gift}, Deborah Brautigam labels debt concerns as over-

\textsuperscript{28} Personal Interview with David Shinn, conducted on February 8, 2016.


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
blown, but she noted in the researcher’s personal interview that she was revising this hypothesis:

I’m starting to revise my hypothesis as new data is available and the debt levels rise. Back at the time, around 2007, there was very little debt to speak of...but it’s growing...we’ve found about four or five countries that we think are at risk of debt problems now.32

Brautigam’s growing concern reflects that of other analysts who don’t see a debt problem with current Chinese activity, but also don’t rule one out in the future if that activity continues to increase. Both Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon are currently at sustainable levels of public debt, but Ghana is notably more debt-ridden, and therefore vulnerable to debt exacerbation in its relationship with the Chinese. This past year, Ghana passed the seventy-five percent threshold of the debt-to-GDP ratio. As pointed out in the detailing of this paper’s Economic Engagement Metric, it is difficult to account for development activity such as non-concessional loans that would probably be most indicative of debt exacerbation, but Ghana is without a doubt most vulnerable of the three countries to the debt pitfall.

**An Impending Chinese Slowdown**

Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, and Cameroon may not currently be in serious danger of another debt crisis solely (or even mainly) due to interaction with the Chinese, but the researcher would be remiss not to mention the vulnerabilities that these and other African exporters have to the slowing down of the Chinese economy. For example, a decrease in Cameroonian timber demand from a slowing PRC economy would be a tough blow to valuable revenue streams Cameroon depends upon to make consistent debt repayments. Other countries across sub-Saharan Africa are even more vulnerable to a Chinese slowdown, including the Zambian economy and its dependence on copper exports for roughly 86 percent of its export revenue. Therefore, the issue of debt cannot be ignored in a holistic view of Chinese engagement in any African country. While Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Cameroon are not overburdened by debt from Chinese loans, their future relationship with the PRC will require an abundance of caution and awareness in how many infrastructure projects they are able to take on.

**Conclusion**

This paper has established the robustness of Chinese economic engagement in Ghana, Cameroon, and Cote d’Ivoire when compared to the US via the Economic Engagement Metric. Patterns of engagement have been discerned between the US, Chinese, and their West African partners, along with the benefits and drawbacks of robust Chinese engagement with these countries through analysis of relevant literature and personal interviews. The Chinese are a signifi-

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32 Personal Interview with Deborah Brautigam, conducted on February 11, 2016.
cant partner for these West African countries and appear just as committed (and in some cases more so) as the US in economic engagement. While Chinese engagement patterns can be alarming to Western observers, they have benefitted these three countries in terms of their export industries, diverse sector investment, and infrastructure projects financed by both concessional and non-concessional loans. To be sure, debt situations of each nation need to be guarded closely, and a dramatic Chinese slowdown may ebb away the key benefits in export sectors. Therefore, African leaders should continue engagement with the Chinese, but approach repayment of debt with an abundance of caution in the future, especially given the potential for decreasing Chinese demand.

Acknowledgments

This paper was possible because of the many faculty of The George Washington University that taught me to question common knowledge and research with sincerity. I am particularly indebted to Professor Robert Sutter, as he kept my research focus narrow and challenged my assumptions at every turn, challenges that resulted in a more succinct and precise paper than would have been possible on my own. I am also grateful to Courtney Heath, Lindsey Kallman, and Amy Stearns for their unparalleled dedication to the thesis program. Furthermore, I thank the Elliott School Undergraduate Scholars class for the privilege it was to learn alongside them. Finally, I want to thank my dad. With the mind of an engineer, he inspired me to take my research in a more quantitative direction, a vital step in my grappling with this very complex issue.
This study analyzes publications from the research institutions directly connected to civilian and military actors in China’s decision-making system regarding Non-traditional Security (NTS). NTS encompasses non-military threats, which are often transnational in nature, where the state and human populations are referent objects of such threats. This study found that NTS is a foreign-borrowed concept and the development of Chinese discourse parallels international discourse on NTS. Furthermore, there is not a significant debate among Chinese foreign policy scholars regarding NTS. Lastly, the discourse revealed that China continues to maintain a traditionalist/realist paradigm when confronting NTS. Despite their rhetoric on how cooperation on NTS issues could bridge gaps made by traditional security problems, China’s maintaining of a traditional security paradigm even when confronting NTS will likely pose a major challenge to international and Sino-American cooperation on shared NTS threats.

Introduction

In the past decades, nations have found themselves confronted by a diverse range of new security challenges that transcend the realm of traditional security. No longer are governments solely concerned about the balance of power and armed conflict over borders. Rather, they have begun to confront threats such as terrorism, epidemics, and environmental degradation. Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, major-power peace, rapid globalization, and the increasingly porous nature of sovereign borders have made the impact of such threats more serious in the 21st century.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the focus on these new threats resulted in the development of the concept of non-traditional security (NTS). While this concept is associated with the Copenhagen School of international relations theory, there is no broad consensus on the definition of NTS. For the purposes of this study I define NTS as encompassing non-military threats, which are often transnational in nature, where the state and human populations within a given state are referent objects of such threats. 

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Marguerite Wedeman double majored in International Affairs and Chinese Language and Literature, spending every summer in China developing her Mandarin. Marguerite was chosen as a member of the inaugural class of Schwarzman Scholars and will pursue a fully funded Masters of Arts in global affairs at Tsinghua University in Beijing during the 2016-2017 academic school year.

As NTS theory has developed, countries have sought to grow their knowledge of NTS issues, their origins, and how to build security strategies to address these threats. However, due to the transnational nature of NTS threats, the solution to most NTS issues require international cooperation. Because of this, it is necessary to observe what major powers think about NTS in order to project how non-traditional threats will be handled in the future, and to illuminate areas of cooperation and challenge regarding these threats. One country that is of particular interest regarding this discourse is China.

In the past three decades, China has become increasingly interdependent with the outside world. While reforms, which were initiated in 1978, have helped China evolve into a rising power, the process of globalization has made the country vulnerable to new threats. While China’s global power still does not match that of the US, its influence on global affairs continues to grow and thus, China plays a central role in the world’s ability to create security and insecurity in almost all realms of NTS. Moreover, due to the shared nature of NTS treats, these threats create opportunities for international cooperation. Such cooperation could help China establish itself as a responsible global stakeholder and build bilateral trust in the Sino-US relationship.

To gain insight into foreign policy debates about NTS within China, one can examine publications from government and military research institutions (so-called ‘think tanks’). More specifically, this study examines publications associated with the research institutions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of State Security on the civilian side, and think tanks and publications produced and authorized by the Central Military Commission/People’s Liberation Army on the military side. These publications will be analyzed regarding the linear development of NTS, the types of NTS issues emphasized, and determining whether or not there is ongoing debate on NTS, and if so, what are the various groups within these debates in China.

Non-Traditional Security: Theoretical Foundations

The concept of non-traditional security is a reaction against traditional security. Traditional security encompasses many schools of international relations theory and posits that the state is the central actor within the international system, and the threats a state faces emanate from other states. However, at the end of the Cold War, many scholars were frustrated by this limited scope of security and developed what is now called the Copenhagen School of international relations theory. The Copenhagen School argues that what is considered a threat shifts depending on the level of the referent object and the sector of society in question. Copenhagen scholars also argue that ‘security’ is socially constructed

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and issues can be ‘securitized’ depending on how they are presented to the public.\(^5\)

The acceptance that the field of security studies transcends ‘state vs. state’ use of force resulted in the development of the concept of ‘Non-Traditional Security’. This concept has utility in that it elevates non-military threats against human populations that merit attention and resources from the state. Although there has been pushback by ‘traditionalist’ scholars, the post-Cold War era saw an increasing number of non-military threats (terrorism, genocide, global warming, etc.) emerge against the backdrop of increasing peace amongst major powers, which resulted in NTS becoming more central to discussions in security studies. While there was largely agreement about the changing nature of these threats, there are many divergent views about what should be included as an NTS issue and how to settle these issues.

**Chinese Foreign Policy Decision-making**

In order to identify a path into China’s thinking on issues of NTS, China’s foreign policy decision-making process must be understood and key actors must be identified. According to Kenneth Lieberthal and Michale Oksenburg, China’s foreign policy decision-making system is characterized by the fragmentation of authority, within which the leadership sought to build consensus among various stakeholders.\(^6\) While the politburo and politburo standing committee make final foreign policy decisions, some of the central players within this process are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department (GSD), and the Ministry of State Security.\(^7\)

Within the civilian bureaucracy, the MFA has the most important role in China’s international relations policy, interpreting foreign policy decisions of the central leadership and translating them into policy as well as providing processed information to central foreign policy decision makers.\(^8\) The official research arm of the MFA, the China Institute for International Studies, conducts longer-term projects.\(^9\) On military side, there are a number of ways the military apparatus influences foreign policy, and it often does so behind closed doors. One concrete way the military helps inform foreign policy decisions is through the PLA General Staff Department, which controls the intelligence analysis think tank, China Institute for International and Strategic Studies.\(^10\)

Intelligence gathering institutions also contribute to foreign policy formation. Though there are a number of such institutions, the Ministry of State

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8 Ibid., 50.


Security (MSS), and particularly its subordinate China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), also plays an important role in intelligence gathering. The MSS and CICIR collect and assesses civilian intelligence on national security issues in order to formulate counter-espionage against foreign actors and can be equated to a combination of the US Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation.11

Given the aforementioned model, a clear pathway into China’s discourse on NTS is to evaluate the works produced by the research divisions of these different institutional interest groups and their associated ‘think tanks’. Specifically, the MFA’s China Institute for International Studies (CIIS), the PLA GSD’s China Institute for International and Strategic Studies (CIISS), and the MSS’s China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). It is important to note that in China there is no such thing as an ‘independent’ research institution or think tank.12 To this day, international relations research institutions in China are situated within bureaucratic hierarchies of the Party, government, or military. They are tasked with projects to research for their institution and there is little horizontal collaboration among institutions. That being said, think tanks increasingly provide analysis to Chinese leadership both on subjects that scholars propose and research on their own volition.13

This study will examine the following publications attached to the MFA (China Institute of International Studies’s (CIIS) publication: China International Studies (中国国际问题研究)), MSS (China Institute of Contemporary International Relations’s (CICIR) publication: Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系)), and PLA China Institute for International Strategic Studies’s (CIISS) publication: International Strategic Studies (国际战略研究) to uncover the range of discourse occurring within China on NTS. Additionally, the study will examine the China National Defense White Papers, produced by State Council Information Office and approved by the Ministry of National Defense, Central Military Commission, and the State Council. This publication is an authoritative depiction of China’s military missions, the campaigns it is prepared to execute, and the military’s various roles.14 The study thus examines four publications, two from civilian foreign policy institutions and two linked to the military establishment.

China’s Discourse on Non-traditional Security: A Linear Analysis

To evaluate how the discourse within China on NTS has developed over time, an initial Large-N study can be conducted by searching the term non-traditional security (非传统安全) in CKNI, China Academic Journals Full-Text Database. According to the large-N study, the concept of NTS was not in use before the late 1990s. NTS took off as a concept after 2001 and continued to popularize quickly until 2004-05. After 2004-05, the literature continues to grow, but it is less rapid and actually declines in 2012-13.

By examining this timeline it appears that the rise of the concept of NTS was borne out the development of China’s ‘New Security Concept’ (新安全观) (NSC). There is further evidence to support this idea when looking at the above Large-N study of NTS against a Large-N study of NSC, as seen in Figure 1. This graph shows that while the NSC was developed first (as early as 1996) its popularity began to diminish as early as 2006, and was picked up by NTS.

The NSC was first unveiled by China in a meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1997, but was internationally articulated in March of 1999 by President Jiang Zemin at the UN Conference on Disarmament.15 Though the origins of the NSC is not the focus of this study, the concept appears to have

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arisen after the Cold War, as China found itself in a new type of security environment. In terms of traditional security, China was highly secure.\textsuperscript{16} Despite this traditional sense of security, influential Chinese elites understood that after the Cold War, China’s security environment was increasingly complex and irregular. China found itself in an increasingly globalized world, with longstanding security problems on its periphery, and new challenges that had developed from the country’s growing interdependence with the world.\textsuperscript{17}

Moreover, in the years after the Cold War, China had come to a greater awareness regarding the connection between internal and external security, and elites increasingly recognized the existence of non-military, transnational threats. Such threats include energy insecurity, drug trafficking, transnational crime, and terrorism, to name a few. This basket of non-military transnational security issues is what came to be known as NTS after the turn of the century, but were first discussed under the terminology of the NSC.\textsuperscript{18}

As stated before, the focus on security as an increasingly diversified subject began around 1997 after China began to understand the broad impact of the Asian financial crisis. The idea that China found NTS through a broader understanding of economic security is consistent throughout a number of the articles read and across several of the think tank publications. In 2000, Luo Renshi of CIISS argued that economic security is “the first to pound at the old security concept.”\textsuperscript{19} He suggested that an economic crisis could lead to political turmoil and undermine national cohesion, leaving the state vulnerable to domestic regime change or external aggression.

Liu Yuejin, a professor at the University of International Relations in Beijing, a training academy for the MSS, makes a similar argument. Liu tracks the evolution of China’s concept of national security through examining reports to the National Congress of the CPC. He observes that while national security is first mentioned in the 1992 report to the 14\textsuperscript{th} National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the concept is limited to a purely military scope. The concept evolves in the 1997 report where the national ‘securities’ mentioned are diversified. The mention of these diversified types of securities are not called NTS, but Liu points out that there is heightened worry about the risks of economic globalization.\textsuperscript{20}

The analysis of Luo Renshi and Liu Yuejin matches the large-n study, which shows the discourse on NTS taking off in the early 2000s (2000-2004). However, in reviewing the literature, there are three additional events in the early 2000s that stimulated further discourse on NTS within China. These events were as follows: the 9/11 terrorist attacks, outbreak of SARS in 2002 and 2003, and Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. These three events represented the broad

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{20} Yuejin Liu, "CPC Statements and Decisions on National Security,” \textit{Contemporary International Relations,} July/August (2010), 71-86.
range of phenomena that NTS encompasses, and the close coupling of these events appears to have helped sustain the growth in literature on NTS moving into the late 2000s and 2010s.

In terms of the military’s response to the rise of NTS, combating NTS issues became a more central priority of China’s military after 2004 when President Hu Jintao announced “new historic missions” for the PLA. This important doctrinal speech by China’s leader began the process of “securitizing” a broad range of phenomena and placing them on the PLA’s agenda. According to RAND Corporation experts, these missions included internal and external operations during peacetime, including contributing to humanitarian aid and disaster relief, counter-terrorism efforts (with an emphasis on anti-separatist movements), maritime safe-passage, and participation in UN Peace Keeping Operations. These collectively are addressed as military operations other than war (MOOTW). While the National Defense White Papers began to discuss these types of issues even in the 2000 paper, the specific term MOOTW did not appear in the National Defense White Paper until 2008.

Between the observed years, the importance of NTS vis-à-vis traditional security issues seems to fluctuate based on specific events that occurred during the year. This observation has led to the conclusion that independent variable driving NTS discourse in the specified journal publications and the National Defense White Paper is the occurrence of actual events that can be categorized as NTS. More specifically, beyond the linear progression of NTS as a general concept, the occurrence/rise of a specific type of NTS threat stimulates increased discussion about that specific kind of threat (discussed in the following section).

In some of the Chinese discourse writers explicitly state that NTS threats outweigh those of traditional security. At other points, NTS does not even make the list of central challenges to China’s strategic posture and security environment or it is explicitly said that China is primarily focused on challenges from the traditional realm. It should be noted that while NTS is indeed a rising topic, Chinese foreign policy is still captivated by many specific perceived traditional threats – the US pivot to Asia, Taiwan, and territorial disputes over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. Thus, while discourse on NTS rises, growth in the discourse seems driven by specific events and Chinese scholars stress the need to balance focus on NTS and traditional security. In many instances they warn that overemphasizing one area will cause unforeseen flare-ups in the other.

When reviewing the literature, it appears that the growth in discourse on NTS within China parallels the international growth on the subject, and if not, they trail the international dialogue by only a couple of years. While the end of

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22 Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation, 25-42.
24 Wentao Li, Zonglei Wei, Yanyu Zhang, and Caixia Li, “Chia and the Changing World: Summary of the International Seminar in Commemoration of the 30th Anniversary of the CICIR (Part 1),” Contemporary International Relations 20 no. 5 (September/October 2010): 152-143.
the Cold War was the intellectual catalyst for increased discourse on the subject, 9/11 more fully solidified the trend as nations around the world realized (or were re-introduced to the idea) that the state was not the only potential source of an existential threat. However, it is important to acknowledge that the rise of the concept of NTS within China is borrowed from the outside world and Chinese analysts working on NTS seem to unanimously agree that NTS grew out of the Copenhagen School.25

Content Analysis

One of the major characteristics of NTS is that there is no definition or broad consensus and no limit to the list of threats that can be included in the grab bag of ‘NTS Threats’. This lack of consensus on the definition of NTS poses a challenge when evaluating the field as a whole, and across time and space. However, one way of circumnavigating this issue is to identify the type of threats that Chinese scholars emphasize and analyze the threat-specific discourse overtime. Of all works read in the four publications studied, terrorism (combined with extremism, and secessionism), environmental security (including climate change, natural disasters, and pollution), economic and financial security, and energy and resource security, take up a little under half of the total discourse (45%). It is useful to break down these four subtopics and understand how they develop individually.

Terrorism

As with most of the world, China begins to focus on terrorism as a NTS issue after 9/11. Terrorism in many ways is an easy gateway issue into NTS because while it still deals with violence, terrorist organizations are primarily non-state actors and transnational. In years after 9/11, scholars in the journals surveyed appear to be toying with the question of the significance of 9/11 and the rise of terrorism. In a discussion published in CIR, scholars question whether 9/11 is “epoch-making” and will bring about a new era of multilateralism, or if terrorism will cause the US to be more unilateralist and return to the two camp mentality of the Cold War.26

Clearly, through the guise of terrorism, Chinese scholars in the early 2000s realized the potential for a major shift in the global security environment. However, in these early years, there is no consensus on the likelihood of this transition. This debate can be seen in a series of papers published by scholars at CICIR in 2005 and 2006 – with some scholars stating that terrorism has become the major world threat and others arguing that people are inflating the significance of terrorism in international relations.27

Additionally, there is debate over whether terrorism should be dealt with militarily. When reviewing the three journals, it is apparent that China watched how the US and specifically the US military grew its capabilities to deal with terrorism.\(^{28}\) Largely, China’s early perceptions of terrorism still clung to the traditional security paradigm – using military force to secure national interests. However, later there was a realization that combating terrorism would take international cooperation, and less conventional means. While China was and is uninterested in involving itself with the ‘Global War on Terror’, its first steps toward international cooperation to solve NTS issues developed through regional efforts to mitigate threats of terrorism.

It should be noted that Chinese scholars do not see China as a primary target of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, predominantly associated with the US’s ‘Global War on Terror’.\(^{29}\) That being said, some scholars and the 2002 National Defense White Paper acknowledge that China is indeed threatened by “home-grown” terrorism, primarily terrorism perpetuated by the East Turkistan Independence Movement and other “extremist” forces in Xinjiang and Tibet.\(^{30}\) Subsequently, the discourse on threats of terrorism in China focuses on security cooperation between China and Central Asian countries to counter the ‘Three Evils’ – terrorism, extremism, and secessionism. Stemming from China’s interest in confronting terrorism on its periphery, China and Central Asian countries formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001.\(^{31}\) The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is another regional organization through which China addresses terrorism. That being said, because of close proximity of Central Asian nations and the overlapping ‘Three Evils,’ China discusses counter-terrorism primarily through the SCO.

When examining China’s collaboration with the SCO and ASEAN on terrorism, its clear China takes a hard line on non-intervention and abiding by international norms of sovereignty. In 2005, American scholar David Finklestein pointed out that competing views of national sovereignty would be a challenge to global cooperation on NTS issues.\(^{32}\) Additionally, many Chinese scholars suggest that the US and other Western nations have double standards on terrorism, which hinder cooperation.\(^{33}\) According to China, the international debate over

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\(^{29}\) It became clearer that China was not immune to international terrorism after the US found a number of Chinese Uighurs in Afghanistan with connections to Al Qaeda. Regardless, in the early 2000s, Chinese scholars began to more deeply understand terrorism through the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.


what does and does not constitute terrorism will negatively impact multilateral counter-terrorism operations.\textsuperscript{34}

The peak of the discussion on terrorism occurred around 2006 and decreased afterwards. This decrease in the terrorism discussion may result from fatigue over the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and envelopment of terrorism to international and domestic security framework. Alternatively, the decline in discussion may result from the increased focus on other NTS issues. Regardless of the decline, many scholars still view terrorism as a primary threat to global and national security.

Environmental Security

Environmental security (encompassing natural disasters, pollution, and climate change) is the second most discussed NTS issue within the literature surveyed, and was introduced around 2004. Despite some early recognition of the importance of environmentalists on the global governance level, the main mentions of environmental security come in the form of ‘environmental degradation’ and ‘natural disasters/calamities,’ with the close linear coupling of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the 2005 Earthquake in South Asia. Specifically, there was a clear call for the military to diversify its capabilities to deal with such disasters.

Chinese scholars appear to securitize environmental phenomena in the following ways: (1) they consider the impact of environmental hazards on the individual Chinese and human existence, (2) the impact environmental degradation will have on the development of China at large, and (3) the potential for environmental degradation to produce traditional conflict between nation-states.

Discussion about the environment and its relation to global security and global governance is more clearly articulated in Chinese scholars’ discussion of climate change. In many regards, Chinese scholars see the environment as an issue in which the ‘North and South’ can find common interest and that there can be no ‘zero-sum’ approach. Moreover, Chinese scholars appear to view issues of the environment essentially as issues of development. Chinese scholars consistently imply that the West, and more specifically the US, do not observe the ‘principle of equality’ when managing climate change, and they further suggest that developed countries should bear prime responsibility for such threats.

Last, there seems to be varying views on the status of environmental security in reference to the NTS hierarchy. Despite the number of mentions of the issue between 2002-2014, it is often suggested that the international community values environmental security more than China. Twice, Chinese scholars suggest the threat of environmental security is overemphasized and that China must address other domestic issues first.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, while Chinese scholars do see environmental security as important and one of the threats that dominates the discussion on NTS, this might be reflective of a trend in the larger international community and not indigenous to Chinese discourse on NTS.

\textsuperscript{34} China’s National Defense in 2002.

\textsuperscript{35} Yiming Zhang, comp., “G20 and Global Governance - Summaries of Two Conferences at CICIR,” Contemporary International Relations 19 no. 6 (November/December 2009): 99-111.
Economic Security

As stated earlier, scholars argue that Chinese scholars and policy makers expanded their notions of security when they realized how economic fluctuations could impact national stability. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis brought about this awareness. That being said, economic security drops off after 2000 and does not reappear with any significance until 2004 and 2005. This can likely be explained by the world’s captivation with 9/11 and the overall diversification of the NTS field. Discussion then peaked in 2004 and 2005, after global oil prices exceeded the pre-9/11 high.\(^{36}\) The next large spike in literature occurred in 2008, during the global financial crisis, and then subsequently decreased and flatted out.

In reviewing the literature, a number of aspects of economic and financial security are stressed. The first is the implications that economic security has on development. The Chinese literature on NTS suggests that the potential of economic crises has increased as the Chinese economy has become increasingly globalized. That said, in the 1997 Asia Financial Crisis and 2008 Global Financial Crisis, China did not suffer major economic downturns.\(^{37}\) Despite this, in a 2009 response to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, General Xiong Guangkai stated that the spread of the international financial crisis was a new problem within NTS and that China was carrying out the plan of “securing economic growth, expanding domestic demand, and adjusting economic structure.”\(^{38}\)

From this it can suggested that there is not sufficient evidence to merit severe anxiety about global economic fluctuations. However, this could change in the near future. Additionally, as Xiong Guangkai alluded to, the main variable of economic instability appears to be the structure of China’s domestic economy and its dependency on an export-driven economy.\(^{39}\) Returning to Luo Renshi’s model, if economic growth is not sustained, the Chinese population is likely to be unsatisfied, and this aggregate dissatisfaction could in turn threaten the stability of the CCP’s regime. Even though the long-term infeasibility of China’s economic structure appears to be the central variable in its economic and financial security, this discussion is not mentioned in the NTS-related literature. Moreover, this suggests that China’s true economic security concerns are not within the jurisdiction of NTS.

Additionally, it is important to note that the need for domestic economic development is often used as a reason to not become fully involved in other NTS issues. Yin Chengde, a guest research fellow at CIIS, argues that there is a con-


\(^{37}\)In 1997, China deepened its relationship with its Asian neighbors by lending money when other international organizations would not. In 2008, China quickly adopted an economic stimulus program that stressed domestic consumption. Moreover, the severity of the downturn was also lessened because the big slump hit during Chinese New Years and migrant workers had returned home for the holidays. Thus, when they heard of factory closings, they simply stayed home and waited for the economic recovery.


tradition between national security and development, and in most cases wants and interests are hard to be simultaneously met. While this may be true in the short term, if NTS and global governance issues are treated as secondary to economic development for the long term, then it will be more difficult for China and other global powers to be economically prosperous in the future due to the increased severity of some NTS issues overtime.

Beyond issues of development, the price of oil and economic integration with ASEAN and China’s Asian neighbors are mentioned with most frequency. The global price of oil impacts China’s economic security, as China’s energy posture is heavily reliant on the importation of fossil fuels. If the cost of oil increases, the cost of Chinese production and Chinese goods also increases, constraining profits and overall GDP. This discussion can duly be categorized within economic security, and thus is explored in more depth in the following section.

Last, the need for economic integration with China’s Asian neighbors is emphasized within the literature on NTS and economic security. Zheng Xianwu, a professor at the Institute for International Relations at Nanjing University writing for CIR, suggests that the long term effects of the Global Financial crisis have resulted in decreases in exports and foreign capital inflows to Asian countries and thus, there has been increased incentive to open up trade within the region. Beyond the economic benefits of increased economic integration, Zheng explains that these ties have the potential to stabilize political relationships. Thus, economic integration with China’s Asian neighbors is viewed as aiding its economic security and its broader political stability.

The Chinese literature on economic security suggests that scholars recognize China’s vulnerability to external shocks and the potential that such shocks could trigger domestic instability and weaken China. Despite this, the literature suggests that the motivation behind the need to restructure the economy comes from a need to maximize growth and appease the domestic population. By working toward an economy driven by services and innovation, China can boost long-term growth and protect itself from potential global shocks. Thus, China still tries to increase its economic security, even though economic security is treated as an issue outside of normal NTS agenda.

Energy and Resource Security

The third most prevalent issue discussed within NTS is energy and resource security (security of oil, natural gas, and water.) Energy is vital to security because it enables countries to fight wars, and within the NTS paradigm, energy fuels economic growth, which increases a nation’s stability. Although it was once energy self-sufficient, China was forced to start importing energy resources in 1993, and has come to import over half of the oil it consumes in present day.

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Because of this expanded need for energy resources, Chinese scholars have spent more time discussing the security of these energy resources.

The discussion of energy security revolved around two themes: volatile global oil prices and the security of the flow of energy resources via pipelines and critical waterways. China’s concern over the global price of oil can largely be linked to the increasing price of oil after 9/11 and the wars in the Middle East. More specifically, in 2004, the price of oil exceeded the pre-9/11 high. This spike in oil prices matches the data from the publications reviewed when energy security began to be mentioned within the NTS framework in 2004. Moreover, Chinese scholars seem to point to the impact of violence in the Middle East on energy prices. Despite this, the Chinese have eschewed an active role in that region and have not sought to help bring greater stability to it. Furthermore, the literature suggests a concern that resource competition could lead to outright conflict and war. Competition over resources has been a major factor in the territorial disputes in East China and the South China Seas. Zheng Xiangyu, writing in CIR, suggested that the potential for substantial sub-sea oil and natural gas had lead some countries in the region to start to “play tough.”

In terms of global energy flows, there was a spike in the number of mentions of energy and resource security in 2008. This was the year that the PLA Navy (PLAN) began counter-piracy operations off the Somali Coast and in the Gulf of Aden. Due to China’s importation of significant energy resources from the Middle East and Gulf Countries, growing piracy in this region started to impact energy flows to China. China’s willingness to use the PLAN to take part in the counter-piracy efforts alongside other major powers displays the importance of this issue to the Chinese security agenda. It also shows the potential of China’s participation in global governance and the use of international organizations and big power coordination to address NTS issues.

**Cohort Analysis**

The last important element of analysis is to investigate if the different journals studied can be grouped according to their differences and similarities. If within China’s foreign policy decision-making process different groups vie for their own policy recommendation in the attempt to win over consensus and the consent of the central leadership, then identifying and understanding the differences between these groups (as established by their attached research institutions) can help establish whether significant disagreements exist within the foreign policy establishment on NTS or whether there a rough consensus exists on the issue.

The hypothesis of this study was given that the potential differences in perspectives and interests of the military and civilian related think tanks, there

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should be differences between the ways in which scholars within these think tanks discussed NTS. Correspondingly, the null hypothesis is that there was, in fact, little or no difference in the manner they discussed NTS. Ultimately, the study found that while there were minor differences in the way NTS was discussed, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that there are competing cohorts or schools of thought on the issue. To be precise, although the authors of different works on NTS suggest different nuances to their conception of NTS, these slight distinctions did not appear contradictory or incompatible. Given the overarching consensus in the examined journals, it is useful to chart some of the common notions presented by Chinese scholars in their discussions of NTS.

The Origins of NTS

Overall there seems to be a lack of theoretical engagement with NTS issues and their origins. However, some of the more extensive works do offer explanations and identify four root causes of NTS issues. To begin, the growth of NTS issues is attributed to globalization. Scholars argue that globalization has unmasked threats that previously existed; it has deteriorated the nation-state with opaque borders, thus exposing the state to new risks, and this increased exposure allows for transnational forces to act with more ease and larger impact than ever before. China’s 2002 National Defense White Paper adds that economic globalization has created acute international economic competition. Clearly, while NTS issues have existed since ancient times, they have been more noticeably felt and their severity has increased under globalization.

Secondly, Scholars suggest that uneven global economic development has stimulated the growth of NTS threats. For example, societal groups that disenfranchised from the global economic order often turn to illegal black markets for their livelihood. Additionally, global economic disparity often results in gaps in human knowledge and financial ability to solve crises. Third, the ‘unjust international order’ is also seen as a root of NTS. Such scholars identify power politics and “hegemonism” as the root of NTS. Xiong Guangkai spells out that power politics results in major powers meddling in other countries to pursue their own interests; this has subsequently given rise to NTS issues such as terrorism. This line of argumentation appears as a criticism of Western nations, specifically the US, and the post-WWII international community. By attaching NTS to the Western world order, scholars seem to be displacing blame and responsibility to act from China to Western nations.

The last origin of NTS for Chinese scholars is incompatible development between man and nature. Xiong Guangkai states that Western-led industrialization has resulted in the world adopting the mindset of “construction first, improving the environment second,” and countries that are currently developing

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48 Zhaoyu Huang and Qin Sun, “The Essence of Non Traditional Security and Their Solutions,” Contemporary International Relations 19 no. 6 (2009).
have adopted this “unharmonious” model.\textsuperscript{50} The exploitation of global resources has resulted in challenges in the field of energy security, as well as global climate change and associated natural disasters.

Cooperation

The need for international cooperation to address NTS threats is another theme throughout the literature. The need for cooperation appears to be driven by two factors: (1) the nature of NTS and the mechanisms that are needed to combat specific issues, and (2) the manner in which NTS creates shared interests between nation-states. Many scholars, like Fu Mengzi of CICIR, who states that NTS threats do not respond to “balancing” or deterrence, represent Chinese sentiments.\textsuperscript{51} Moreover, Lin Limin of CICIR argues that NTS issues have caused East Asian countries to have a feeling of “sharing the same fate as if in a fate community.”\textsuperscript{52}

While scholars acknowledge cooperation is necessary, there is a hierarchy of issues they think China should address via cooperation: prioritizing multinational cooperation on tangible threats that acutely impact China itself, to be managed through military means. Scholars seem wary of taking action on abstract threats affecting the global commons at large. Despite this, many scholars understand that as a responsible global stakeholder, China must involve itself in some of the more intangible threats. For example, the literature frequently mentions China’s contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Despite these mentions, however, there is an emphasis on sovereignty norms and the expectation of international missions involving NTS issues to adhere to the (constraining) ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.’\textsuperscript{53}

This tension between China being a responsible global stakeholder and the hierarchy of threats scholars perceive begins to expose the limitations to cooperation that scholars discuss. Ruan Zhongze of CIIS was the earliest to warn of the challenges of NTS in a 2005 article, however many scholars echo his sentiment later on.\textsuperscript{54} The primary limitations discussed are: US unilateralism and primacy, and contradictions between national security and development. To begin, US unilateralism and American insistence on global primacy is seen as an obstacle to potential cooperation. When considering cooperation on counter-terrorism in 2006, Xu Tao of CICIR reflects that after 9/11 there was room for international relations to improve, but this was complicated by the US reaction to terrorism and unilateralism in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{3} Xiong, “Stand up to New Challenges Hand-in-Hand and Build Mankind’s Happy Homeland with Joint Efforts.”
\textsuperscript{32} Limin Lin, Bojiang Yang, Shulin Dao, Junhong Liu, and Wenjing Yang, “East Asian Summit and Deepening of Regional Integration,” Contemporary International Relations no. 3 (2005).
\textsuperscript{33} “CISS and HIIR Cosponsored the International Symposium on ‘Non-Traditional Security Challenges and Responses’,” International Strategic Studies 77 no. 3 (July 2005): 80-83.
The conflict between national security needs, engagement in international cooperation on NTS issues, and development is also seen as challenges to cooperation on NTS. It should be noted that, this discourse falls in line with Allen Carlson’s observation that because the concept originates from the West, some scholars see NTS and calls for China’s involvement in global governance as a conspiracy to promote hegemony and weaken China.\textsuperscript{56} Scholars appear to address this tension by stressing cooperation on tangible threats. Additionally, they avoid this contradiction between need for cooperation on NTS threats with calls for absolute observations of sovereignty by bringing in the aforementioned Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; making it so that when cooperation suits China, China will get involved, but when its interest in cooperation wanes it can focus on sovereignty.

It is also important to examine what mechanisms of cooperation China’s scholars emphasize. Again, there does not appear to be any strong debate on whether China should engage in some cooperative processes and not others. However, purely from the number of times China’s involvement in the ARF and SCO is mentioned, it appears that Chinese scholars find regionalism the most pragmatic way to address China’s NTS concerns. This can be explained by the fact many of China’s neighboring countries share similar, tangible security concerns and their priorities and methods of combating NTS issues more closely align. Additionally, because these regional institutions are newer, China can play a larger role in the formulation of their norms and values (most importantly regarding sovereignty and non-intervention at all cost).

The Role of the Military

Another theme found in the literature is the clear call for the diversification and capability building of the military to handle NTS threats. The expansion of military capabilities became a more central priority of the PLA in President Hu Jintao’s 2004 speech announcing “new historic missions” for the PLA (MOOTW). Despite the call for the development of the PLA’s capabilities, the publications surveyed did not discuss them with more exactitude until after 2008.\textsuperscript{57} The discourse on the positive role the military should play in NTS appears to be precipitated by two major events: the May 2008 earthquake in Sichuan province and the decision to dispatch PLA Navy (PLAN) ships to the Gulf of Aden in December of 2008.

The 2008 earthquake demonstrated that the PLA was in many ways unprepared for large-scale disaster relief. The military lacked relief resources (like heavy-lifting helicopters) and many units had minimal emergency rescue training, which contributed to the climbing death toll.\textsuperscript{58} This event appears to have helped Chinese scholars and military officials realize the need for the military to

\textsuperscript{56} Carlson, ”An Unconventional Tack: Nontraditional Security Concerns and China’s ‘Rise’,” 49-64.
\textsuperscript{57} China’s National Defense in 2008.
diversify their capabilities.\textsuperscript{59} Counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden are also a focal point of Chinese literature on NTS. On December 26, 2008, China dispatched naval ships to the Gulf of Aden to combat piracy. Although China’s priority is to protect Chinese ships, it has also devoted resources to the protection of global shipping.\textsuperscript{60} Some scholars have suggested this case shows that major power cooperation with China is possible and perhaps this engagement is part of an initial NTS coordination ‘socialization’ process that will catalyze more non-military cooperation in the future.

The emphasis the publications place on the role of the military in supporting counter-NTS threats suggests China has yet to fully embrace and utilize non-traditional mechanisms of managing NTS issues. The development of entirely fresh and innovative ways to manage NTS issues seems to be lacking from the literature. In conclusion, within the publications studied, there does not appear to a major debate on NTS. Thus, it is not possible to identify distinct competing cohorts. In outlining some of the terms of consensus, it can be seen that although Chinese international relations and foreign policy specialists have defined NTS in terms not dissimilar to the way western specialists have defined it, their thoughts about NTS appear to remain highly dominated by ‘traditional’ thinking.

\textbf{Conclusion and Implications}

With the dénouement of the Cold War, the world has become predominantly peaceful in the sense of traditional security. Despite this, new types of security threats have come to the forefront of international politics. Using the publications of research organs within the civilian and military institutions involved in China’s foreign policymaking, this study found that NTS is a concept that Chinese scholars have borrowed from abroad, and it was introduced and popularized in the early 2000s. Additionally, four issues dominate over half of all NTS issues mentioned: terrorism, environmental security, economic and financial security, and energy security. The last major finding was that there is no significant debate within China about NTS; while different scholars place different levels of emphasis on certain NTS issues, these views are not contradictory. Some of the main points on consensus include the origins of NTS, ideas about cooperation, and the role of the military to combat NTS issues.

The deep content and discourse analysis of works on NTS by Chinese scholars yielded two important findings that are somewhat interconnected. China’s approach to NTS is limited by its determination to observe and promote ideas of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention. The whole point of NTS is that these issues cross sovereign boundaries and transcend sovereignty, and thus, China’s determination to abide by norms of absolute sovereignty is incongruous with NTS itself. This use of the idea of sovereignty may be a fundamental principle for Chinese policy makers, but it might also be an excuse for not getting

\textsuperscript{59} China’s National Defense in 2010.

China appears to get involved in global governance and NTS issues when it suits them, but does not get involved when their interests are not directly challenged, or there are other nations bearing the bulk of the burden of dealing with NTS.

China’s grasp on absolute sovereignty can be interpreted to be it holding onto traditional ideas of security, which are incompatible with managing NTS issues. This relates to the second central finding of the discourse analysis, which concluded that Chinese policy analysts continue to see the military as the primary mechanism for handling NTS issues and prioritize NTS issues that can (on the surface) be handled militarily. The diversification of the military and the expansion of MOOTW is an emphasis throughout the literature and it appears that China is most comfortable involving itself in NTS cooperation on non-sovereignty infringing, military operations. These findings clearly align with popular debate regarding whether or not China is or will become a ‘responsible global stakeholder’ and will increase its involvement in global governance, or if it is a revisionist power acting outside of the established global order. This analysis cannot definitively suggest that China is or is not committed to global governance or if China is or is not a revisionist power. Though Chinese scholars see how cooperation is necessary to solve NTS threats, its attachment to the traditional security paradigm and viewing NTS issues through the lens of traditional security is a significant barrier to its involvement in global governance.

Despite this barrier, the literature does not merit an overly cynical reading of China’s willingness to participate on NTS for the future. The transition to a non-traditional security paradigm will take time, and there have been major shifts in the thinking of Chinese security scholars in only the past fifteen years. China’s participation in international NTS operations (like in the Gulf of Aden) can be read as evidence of this transition and as ways in which China is becoming socialized into NTS operations. Such socialization will build strategic trust between China and other world powers and might create precedent for China to increase its involvement in NTS issues for the future. That being said, China must continue to develop its idea of NTS in the future and lift the restrictions it places on its involvement if there is to be progress on many NTS issues.

These findings are also important for the US-China relationship. As displayed in the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SAED), Chinese and American leadership see cooperation on NTS issues as a way of balancing against competition in favor of cooperation and strategic partnership. The 2015 SAED was particularly notable for the long list of areas of US-China cooperation on NTS issues. The SAED factsheet not only includes larger issues such as climate change and environmental protection, but also includes smaller issues such as wildlife trafficking. That being said, it is important to have knowledge of their respective understandings of NTS and the limitations of their conceptions if China and the US are to move past simply enumerating areas of cooperation to cooperative action.

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Although this study was not comparative in nature, China’s contradictory approach to NTS will have to be considered when analyzing whether or not there is true room for feasible cooperation. While optimism should be retained, serious evaluation of China’s ideas regarding NTS should be taken into consideration before assuming NTS is the be-all/end-all solution to managing Sino-American competition.

* * *

**Acknowledgements:**

I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor David Shambaugh, for invaluable guidance in developing the topic and structure of this research, and for mentoring me on my post-graduation plans. Additionally, I owe a deep debt to my parents, Andrew Wedeman and Kelly Eaton, who have helped stimulate my interest in China and read numerous drafts of this paper, and who always encourage me to produce my best work, even when I think I cannot make one more trip to the library or write one more sentence.
THE LOOMING SPACE DEBRIS THREAT:
A Game Theoretical Analysis of U.S.-China Strategic Dynamics

Tianyao Xiao

Space Debris poses constant collision threats to operational spacecraft and threatens not only a country’s national security but also worsens space environment. As two of the largest space-faring countries, the United States’s and China’s bilateral cooperation is essential to reducing space debris hazards. Thus, this research aims to identify the optimal cooperative level – coordination, cooperation or collaboration – using a game theoretical analysis, and to formulate a set of strategies for both governments to achieve that optimal cooperative level. The researcher uses interviews with American and Chinese space scholars and think tanks to form a theoretical framework to provide strategic guidance for both countries. This theoretical analysis finds that both the United States and China would benefit the most from a cooperation relationship in jointly working to reduce space debris hazards. By pursuing common interests in a manner that corresponds with a mutual understanding of fair contributions and payoffs, both countries would achieve higher resource allocation efficiency than they would from a pure coordination relationship, and could also avoid potential costs of high strategic dependency generated from a collaborative relationship if the other side reneged. To reach the optimal cooperation level in real terms, China and the United States should coordinate by engaging in regular government-level consultation and inter-departmental communication, refining space orders and laws in multilateral settings, and sharing data for early warning and satellite collision avoidance. After enough trust is built through coordination, the United States and China could further their relationship to a cooperation level by engaging in bilateral cooperation agreements on research and data sharing, enforcing adherence on binding mitigation guidelines, and incentivizing research and private sector joint exchanges and activities. However, unless the strategic positions of the two countries alter or technological breakthroughs enable a less integrated relationship, collaborative activities will impose more threats than benefits to each country, and will not be the optimal choice for either country.

Introduction

Space Debris – all man-made, dysfunctional space objects orbiting the Earth – pose constant collision threats to operational spacecrafts. Collision between an operational satellite and orbital debris not only threatens a country’s national security, but also worsens the space environment by generating more debris. To maintain future sustainability of space, countries need to engage in cooperative efforts to reduce space debris hazards. As two of the largest space-faring countries, the United States and China need to take the lead in fostering closer bilateral cooperation in mitigating space debris threats.

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This research categorizes the interactions between the United States and China in limiting space debris hazards into three cooperative levels: coordination, cooperation, and collaboration, each level being more comprehensive than the former. Current literature mainly addresses the benefits, costs, and the implications of interactions between the United States and China in reducing space debris hazards, without identifying the optimal cooperative level that would be vital to long-term strategies. Thus, this research aims to identify the optimal cooperative level using a game theoretical analysis, and to formulate a set of strategies for both governments to achieve that optimal cooperative level. The researcher uses interviews with U.S. and Chinese space scholars and think tanks to form a theoretical framework to provide strategic guidance for both countries. This theoretical analysis finds that both the United States and China would benefit the most from a cooperative relationship in jointly working to reduce space debris hazards. By pursuing common interests in a manner that corresponds with a mutual understanding of fair contributions and payoffs, both countries would achieve higher resource allocation efficiency than they would from a pure coordination relationship, and could avoid potential costs of high strategic dependency generated from a collaborative relationship if the other side reneged.

**Background**

**Space Debris**

After over 80 years of active space exploration, the United States and Russia have become the two fully deserving superpowers among space faring nations, sending thousands of satellites and spacecrafts into space. As Japan, the European Union, China, India, and other countries have gradually caught up, space has become an area crucial to a country’s national security, military strength, technological achievements, and national pride. However, as countries focused on space advancement, they often ignored the operational debris left in space. It was not until the 1980s that NASA began to identify its potential hazards. NASA scientist Donald J. Kessler proposed his Kessler syndrome hypothesis in 1978, stating that as space debris density in low Earth orbit (LEO) reaches a certain level, collisions between debris can trigger self-generating cascade effects.

In recent years, increasing numbers of accidental collisions have generated worries that further under-regulated space activities will push the debris density to a tipping point where space debris is self-generating and debris mitigation efforts are no longer effective. In 2007, China destroyed its dysfunctional meteorological satellite, Fengyun-1C, with its kinetic ASAT test, generating 2,841 trackable debris. Over the past few years, the Fengyun debris has become a major source of collision threat looming over the International Space Station (ISS) and

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countries’ space assets. In 2014, the ISS was forced to perform five expensive debris avoidance maneuvers. In 2009, an accidental collision between Cosmos 2251, a Russian dysfunctional satellite, and Iridium 33, an active U.S. satellite, created 1,788 pieces of space debris. This accidental collision is the first to corroborate the Kessler Syndrome, and directly contradicts with the “Big Sky Theory,” which states that space is so vast that the possibility of any collision between two objects is significantly small.

International Efforts

As early as 1993, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), alongside with its Russian and Japanese counterparts, founded the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), dedicated to fostering worldwide coordination in activities related to space debris. In 1995, China National Space Agency (CNSA) joined the IADC, and actively participated in all four of its working groups: Measurement, Surveillance and Database, Protection, and Space Debris Mitigation. Over the past 22 years, the IADC has made huge progress in fostering cooperative activities, facilitating research in space debris mitigation and remediation, and formulating international guidelines which were widely adopted by space faring countries as basic references for their national regulations. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) also played an important role by publishing its Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines in 2007 and establishing a working group for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.

U.S. and China in Space: Counter-balance, Isolation, and The Wolf Amendment

The United States and China have generated most of the space debris due to their frequent space activities, which significantly undermines space safety and sustainability. However, there have been few bilateral actions to reduce space debris hazards. In fact, although the two countries engage in extensive trade and cooperation in economic sectors, joint actions and projects in space have been significantly limited. Space has been the ultimate high ground to each country’s national security and benefits, thus both countries exercise extreme caution when dealing with joint space activities. Concerns over unwanted technology transfer, information leaks, lack of funding, and technological readiness all hinder cooperation.

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7 IADC, “Key Definitions of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC),” http://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub.
Because of its strategic position and its ideological differences from the West, China has been isolated by the United States from the international community since the beginning of its space development. The United States has kept China away from many of its international space programs, and one of the most controversial is the International Space Station. Despite multiple invitations from other countries and China’s own request to join the ISS, the United States has continuously rejected China’s participation. This exclusion prompted the Chinese to develop its own space station, Tiangong-1, drastically contradicting the U.S.-led ISS.\(^8\)

The Wolf Amendment implemented under the 2011 Appropriation Bills poses a great legislative obstacle for all bilateral state-level activities between the U.S. and China. The Wolf Amendment, named after its drafter, former Republican Congressman Frank Wolf, constrains NASA and Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from using federal funds to participate in any bilateral programs with China or any Chinese-owned company. In 2014, the Wolf Amendment was altered to further restrict, unless specified otherwise by new law, the hosting of Chinese official visitors at any NASA-owned or used facilities, and the usage of any government-granted money in bilateral or multilateral programs involving China.\(^9\) Although many Chinese and American scholars and scientists publicly criticize the policy, many American strategists are still holding onto the belief that it is better to be safe than sorry.

**U.S. and China in Space Debris Mitigation**

Despite all the restrictions from their governments, the United States and China have managed to engage in conversations over the past decade, signaling a more promising future bilateral relationship. In recent years, the United States has been unilaterally sharing conjunction warnings of space debris with China through the State Department. Subsequently, in 2014, China officially reached out to the U.S. Air Force Space Command asking for more information sharing on possible satellite and debris collisions. In the past, this data was shared through the State Department, but given the latest Chinese request, U.S. Air Force Space Command would interface directly with CNSA. This unprecedented step that China took signaled an increasing interaction between the two countries in space debris mitigation. This was soon attested to by the bilateral agreement the United States and China made during the 7th Strategic and Economic Dialogue in June 2015. Both leaders of the two countries agreed on strengthening communication in areas of space debris mitigation and satellite collision avoidance. The same year, the first U.S.-China Space Dialogue was held between the U.S. State Department and CNSA in October, focusing on bilateral cooperation on space debris mitigation, satellite collision avoidance, and long term sustainability of outer space activities.

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Although unfavorable laws and regulations take time and effort to alter, with more long term strategic planning over bilateral engagement, China and the United States can still achieve promising agreements in selective areas in space debris mitigation.

**Methodology**

This research aims to formulate a game theory model to identify the optimal cooperation level that would generate the most desirable outcome for both countries. Game theory is “the study of the ways in which strategic interactions among rational players produce outcomes with respect to the utilities of those players.”\(^ {10}\) It has been used extensively in international relations to analyze and predict the strategic balances between international powers in their employment of threats and promises.\(^ {11}\) In this research, both countries are rational actors that do not have guarantees on each other’s behavior. Both would have significant national security costs if the other one walks away from the cooperation with valuable strategic information, but both would gain more from cooperating in mitigating space debris hazards than by working separately.

A metric is developed to evaluate the net numerical gain for each country on the three cooperative levels based on perceived benefits and costs. For each cooperative level, strategies will be categorized into track 1 diplomacy, track 1.5 diplomacy, and track 2 diplomacy according to their government involvement level.\(^ {12}\) Three game theory analyses will be applied to the numerical data between status quo and coordination level, coordination and cooperation level, and cooperation level and collaboration level to determine the optimal relationship. An aggregation of added values, known as the net benefits or costs each country will get by moving from one level to the next, will be used to calculate additional incentives to provide further support.

This research conducts game theory analyses in the simplest form, and could incorporate more variables into the metrics in the future, such as the effect of Russia on U.S.-China bilateral relationship and the impact of historical events on the current relationship. Although there are limitations, these metrics offer a comprehensive baseline framework that could be applied to analyze future China and U.S. interactions in space debris mitigation. The metrics and the scorecards are highly applicable to many scenarios, and the value points on each scorecard can be adjusted with changing relations and dynamics. Last but not least, these metrics provide references for future studies in space debris mitigation, and could be developed further if more information and data become available.

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Case #1: Coordination Level

The coordination level is defined as the harmonious interactions between the two countries to achieve resource allocation efficiency in mitigating space debris hazards without much interference and tradeoff on each country’s policy autonomy, political structure, and national security. On the coordination level, both countries recognize the common interest as well as the various domestic differences that are tied to national interest and security. While neither want to compromise their space independency, both are willing to coordinate through selected academic and technological information sharing, communication and consultation, and jointly drafted guidelines to reduce space asset collision or new debris generation.

In the context of limiting space debris hazards, U.S.-China coordination will most likely happen in the following areas listed below. Coordination strategies under each track of diplomacy will be given a score leveraging the total benefits and costs it will generate for each country. A game theory analysis will then be formulated, comparing outcomes countries would get from either remaining in status quo or engaging in coordination activities.

Track 1 and 1.5 Diplomacy

The overall political attitude the two countries hold towards each other will guide the direction of bilateral relationships in all industries, including space. Both countries need to engage in senior-level consultation to recognize each other as a counterpart of the same interest, and provide the right political environment to foster regular consultation and communication at all levels. Since consultation focuses on identifying common interests and no binding agreements are made, few national security threats are involved.

Inter-departmental communication involves establishing direct contacts between U.S. and Chinese space departments or liaison offices for the more efficient coordination of early warning sharing and operation consultation. Security concerns arise over potential information leakage or unwanted technology transfer, but could be reduced if communication is monitored by the state’s foreign minister or government agency.

Track 1.5 and 2 Diplomacy

The current national and international space laws, although already comprehensive, lack important definitions regarding space debris related issues and fail to outline the legal responsibilities countries have on space debris. Without clearly defined laws, it would be difficult for countries to standardize their space operations and responsibilities in space debris related joint activities. Since the United States and China combined have generated the most amount of space debris, it is in both countries’ common interest and responsibility to refine space laws in a multilateral setting. Although it takes time, making laws will not gener-
ate many security concerns to either country, as laws are created through consensus on basic operational procedures and definitions.

Track 2 Diplomacy

Space surveillance and database systems track and catalog artificial objects orbiting Earth, and are used extensively for satellite collision avoidance and space debris monitoring. The U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN) is the most comprehensive space object tracking system in the world, while the Chinese surveillance system is merely supporting its domestic space operations.14 The United States has been sending early warning data to China in the past, but the sharing is neither systematic nor efficient.15 For a more standardized sharing process and more efficient use of the data, the United States and China should set up a non-binding agreement for systematic and specific transfer of information and early warning alerts. For most space debris modeling and measurement, very little national security risk is involved. Increasing communication between scientists to compare modeling results and share modeling techniques will benefit both the United States and China as debris tracking and scenario analyses are more accurate and efficient.

Metrics

Points are assigned for the net added benefits or costs for the result generated from coordination level activities compared to the status quo. For simplicity, the net benefits China and the United States get from reduced debris generation are 5 points each. Since coordination involves little risk of disclosing information crucial to national security, 0 points are assigned for the cost. Finally, if one country reneges and walks away with the strategic data of the other side, it gains 0.5 points, a relatively low gain because of the low level of integration. The other side loses 0.5 points due to the compromise on its national security.

Score Card

| Benefit of reduced debris generation for one country | 5 |
| Benefit of reduced debris generation for both countries | 10 |
| Potential National Security cost for one country on coordination level | 0 |
| National Security cost on one country if the other reneges | -0.5 |

Points

For the status quo scenario, we assume there is no interaction between the two countries, and each earns a total score of 0. For all strategies under coordination, both countries will get 10 if they commit to the relationship. For both

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track 1 & 1.5 diplomacy and 1.5 & 2 diplomacy, if either one reneges, meaning
one side reveals its information and interests to the other, the one who revealed
its information will lose 0.5 points, while the other will gain 0.5 points. For track
2 diplomacy, payoff arrangements are different due to the unequal levels of the
two countries’ surveillance abilities, and do not follow above metrics. If the United
States shares its surveillance data to China without getting anything back, both countries can still earn 10 points, for China will use the data for more accurate
satellite collision avoidance, and the United States can certainly benefit from less debris generation. If China shares its surveillance data to the United
States without getting any data from the U.S., the U.S. will not gain much valuable
data other than those it already has in its surveillance database, because China would not provide any data crucial to its national security in coordination level. China will not gain much either since most of the non-strategic data it provides are already available to the U.S. Thus, both will gain 0 points. The sum of
each scenario is presented below in the chart, and are recalculated and presented
on a scale of 0 to 1 in the game theory matrix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Track 1 &amp; 1.5 US</th>
<th>Coordination (China reneges)</th>
<th>Coordination (US reneges)</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status quo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 1 &amp; 1.5 China</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 1.5 &amp; 2 US</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 1.5 &amp; 2 China</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 2 US</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 2 China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Points US</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Points China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1** Coordination Level Score Allocation

In this game theory matrix, both countries have the incentives to move
from the status quo to the coordination level, with the greatest payoff possible for
each country. However, if either country has the perception that the other would
renge, it might move back to status quo, but it still has some incentives to stay
in this unfair relationship. Although the overall points for one country to move
to coordination are still slightly greater than remaining in status quo, realistically,
countries might ignore the minor benefits due to national pride, domestic interest disputes, or other strategic concerns. To increase the possibility of the other country sticking with coordination, both countries need to build trust through consistent efforts, honest communication, and friendly senior-level relationships.
Case #2: Cooperation Level

The cooperation level is defined as joint efforts of pursuing common interests in a manner corresponding to a mutual understanding about contributions and payoffs. It is one step forward from the coordination level, and requires both countries to invest either financially or strategically (time, resources, market access, and skills) to generate rewards from the alliance that may be difficult to attain via transactional relationships. Cooperation itself has different levels, ranging from loose cooperation, like short-term arrangements, to highly integrated cooperation, like long-term partnerships. When countries invest relatively little into the relationship, neither will get much return, but the sunk cost of one country when its counterpart breaks promise would be low. On the contrary, if both countries invest heavily into the relationship, the sunk cost of a country is high when the other reneges. Thus, countries with closer cooperation have higher interdependence between each other, but unlike the collaboration level, tradeoffs in the cooperation level are still under the control of each government, and any broken promise on the other side will not substantially affect the country negatively. In the context of limiting space debris hazards, the U.S. and China will most likely cooperate by engaging in bilateral cooperation agreements on research and data sharing, enforcing adherence on binding mitigation guidelines, and incentivize research and private sector joint exchanges and activities. Cooperation under each track of diplomacy will be given a score leveraging the total benefits and costs it will generate for each country. A game theory analysis will then be formulated, comparing outcomes countries would get by moving from the coordination level to the cooperation level.

Track 1 Diplomacy

Frequent and regular intergovernmental dialogues are one level up from consultation and communication. Both governments show more effort and seriousness in the alliance and trust building. Annual space debris dialogues on the governmental level to discuss joint action plans can be a good example of the two countries entering into the cooperative level.

Similar to those bilateral agreements the United States established with other national agencies, bilateral cooperation agreements with China could foster a closer relationship, efficiently utilize resources, and tie the hands of both
Agreements can cover scientific and technical research on space debris, adherence to mitigation guidelines, and data sharing. However, concerns over intentional and unintentional technological transfer, information leakage, and binding effect on countries’ space operations might prevent countries from entering into agreement.

Track 1 and 1.5 Diplomacy

Sharing operational data of GEO satellites is part of Space Traffic Management (STM). STM measures provide standard datasets, warnings, and recommendations of avoidance maneuvers to satellite operators, improve utility of GEO, and lower the energy usage for satellite maneuvers with more accurate trajectory information. For example, public data for conjunction assessment predictions have errors of 20 to 50 kilometers, while data gathered from satellite owners and operators have errors of only seven kilometers. However, the disclosure of trajectory data of dual-use satellites will undermine a country’s national security significantly. Thus, voluntarily sharing operational data of selected civil satellites can be the first step of achieving a more comprehensive STM.

There are currently several internationally accepted debris mitigation guidelines, but no guideline was designed to be forcefully binding, weakening its ability to regulate countries’ behaviors. Thus, binding debris mitigation guidelines are needed to limit the new debris generation. Reaching an agreement on a jointly accepted binding mitigation guideline might not be difficult, since both China and the United States have already implemented certain regulations in some of their space agencies and departments respectively. NASA and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) have both incorporated the mitigation guidelines into their daily operations. On the commercial side, the Federal Communications Committee (FCC) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), who are responsible for issuing satellite launch licenses to private companies, also regulate applicants by requiring all to present the end-of-mission passivation plan of their space vehicles before granting them their launch licenses. In 2005, China released the Aerospace Industry Standards QJ3221 Part I in Space Debris Mitigation Requirement, elevating the space debris mitigation issue to the level of national space policy. Despite efforts made by both countries, reaching a forceful binding guideline is still challenging, especially in more sensitive areas related to one’s security. Thus, it requires mutual trust built from the coordination level, many rounds of consultation, and reciprocal concessions to achieve a guideline that will regulate both countries’ behaviors effectively.

Track 1.5 and 2 diplomacy

By the time the cooperation level is reached, joint research facilities and personnel exchange based purely on scientific research between non-sensitive institutions and universities will become more frequent and less risky. Exchange of scientific and technological information will enable jointly developed projects,

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which could hardly be achieved with only one country’s technological skills and expertise, such as in the field of modeling, measurement, protection, and even active debris removal. However, personnel exchanges also put countries at risk of intentional or unintentional information leakage.

With the advancement of space development, the private sector plays an increasingly important role in supporting government activities and fostering bilateral relationships through economic cooperation. The private sector in the United States has already gained success in areas of spacecraft shielding, surveillance systems, and remediation techniques. For example, Lockheed Martin is deploying its own surveillance system, the Space Fence Program, which will provide a radar system with 24/7 capabilities to find, fix, and track small objects in LEO by 2018.17 Thus, if the U.S and Chinese private sectors can cooperate in areas not related to national security, it could foster amenity and trust as well.

Metrics

Points are assigned to the net added benefits or costs for the result generated from cooperation level activities compared to those from coordination level activities. For standardization, the net benefits China and the United States receive from reduced debris generation are the same as those in the first analysis. However, the national security cost of one country if the other reneges is increased to 3 points since both countries commit their strategic and financial resources in the cooperation, such as hosting joint scientific or legal conferences, accepting binding operational agreements, and sharing more detailed data. For potential national security cost for one country if both commit to the relationship, 0.5 points is assigned according to its strategic balance of information known.

Score Card

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit of reduced debris generation for both countries</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefit of reduced debris generation for one country</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security cost on one country if the other reneges</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential national Security cost for one country on cooperation level (if one country lost 0.5 points due to compromise on its national security, the other country gained 0.5 for strategic data)</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this analysis, the coordination level is treated as the new status quo, and each country earns a total score of 0. For all strategies under cooperation, both countries will get 9.5 if they commit to the relationship: both get 10 points for reduced debris generation, but the integrated cooperation exposes countries to some risks, and thus -0.5 off. For track 1 diplomacy under cooperation, if China reneges by either not adhering to the agreement or unilaterally accepting information transfers from the United States, the United States will get 2 points. With the United States adhering to the agreement and sharing information that will help reduce debris generation in China, it can guarantee a reduction of half of the total debris generated by the two countries, thus gaining 5 points. However, 3 points must be deducted for national security concerns. For China, it also gains 5 points for the partial debris reduction, and 3 more for gaining strategic information about the United States. Point distribution is reversed if the United States reneges. For track 1 & 1.5 diplomacy and track 1.5 & 2 diplomacy, point distribution is the same as those of track 1 diplomacy because of the similar benefits and security concerns. The sum of each scenario is presented in the chart, and are recalculated and presented on a scale of 0 to 1 in the game theory matrix.

Matrix

In this game theory matrix, both countries have the incentives to move from the status quo to the coordination level, with the greatest payoff possible for each country. However, if the United States reneges and particularly chooses to not share its early warning data, neither country would have much difference than if they remain in coordination. However, if the United States unilaterally shares its data to China, both countries would get much more benefit than they would in coordination scenario as illustrated above. Thus, the United States benefits from engaging in cooperation activities with China. If the United States can clearly express its willingness to cooperate China, it would be rational for the Chinese to engage in cooperation as well. In this scenario, the role of the United
States is similar to that of an international leader, guiding and directing China to a more standardized and regulated space operation.

![Nash Equilibrium Diagram](image)

**Figure 2** Cooperation Level Game Theory Matrix

### Case #3: Collaboration Level

The collaboration level is defined as a durable and mutually dependent relationship with full commitment in creating jointly planned and operated missions. On the collaboration level, new structure and leadership for joint actions are created to balance ownership. Mutual trust, resource pooling, responsibilities, and compromises made by each country are necessary for sustainability. Comprehensive planning and many levels of inter-agency interactions are also crucial to success. Since each country contributes its own resources and reputation, cost of a failed collaboration is the greatest among all three levels. The high mutual dependency also makes one vulnerable if the other side reneges. On top of joint actions in cooperation level, U.S.-China collaboration will most likely happen in the following areas. Collaboration in each of these areas will be given a score based on the total benefits and costs it will generate for each country.

**Track 1 Diplomacy**

After extensive cooperation, both countries have enough trust and information to be confident in entering into collaboration. Binding laws and agreements on usage of Anti-Satellite Missile Tests, space debris mitigation, and space operation will all make China and the U.S. responsible for its own space actions, and the consequence of violating the laws are much more severe than that of breaking voluntary promises. However, binding laws and agreements significantly limit both countries’ autonomy in space strategic operations, and reveal confidential information on operational procedures and space military capability, thus potentially threatening each country’s national security if its counterpart violates the laws.

Establishing an accountability system on debris generation with either punishment mechanisms or economic incentives will enable the United States and China to regulate each other’s space behaviors. Space resources are viewed as a global public good, and each country has environmental responsibility. However, these responsibilities are not enforced routinely, and are often neglected for rapid space development. Thus, establishing an accountability system with pun-
The Looming Space Debris Threat

Remediation mechanisms will impose significant costs on each country for potentially risky behaviors. On the other hand, implementing policies on space debris generation with a form similar to that of cap and trade could reduce the debris generated globally to a manageable amount through market reallocation.

**Track 1 and 1.5 Diplomacy**

After voluntarily sharing operational data of selected satellites, the two countries need to invest more if both want to improve resource arrangement efficiency in crowded orbits. If the United States and China establish enough trust and consider each other as a strategic ally in all aspects of the relationship, setting agreements on STM by enforcing operational data could be achieved, leading to a very accurate database and the highest level of space debris early warning system. However, ideological and strategic differences may prevent this type of sensitive data sharing.

**Track 1.5 and 2 Diplomacy**

Although the U.S. currently has the most advanced space surveillance network, it has realized that its SSN is insufficient to track all hazardous debris. Very early on, the U.S. established strategic cooperation with major European countries and Japan in sharing space awareness data and measurements. As China develops its space surveillance system, it would be an ultimate goal to incorporate all the resources and data from each country to create a global database. However, this collaboration would put China and the U.S. at risk of revealing its own surveillance ability, which is highly crucial to military strategic planning and counterbalance.

Space debris remediation, also called active space debris removal, comprises of efforts to remove the existing space debris population with a priority on densely populated orbit regions. According to NASA, the space environment will only be stabilized if ten large mass objects in densely-populated regions are removed per year. Thus, although space debris mitigation is crucial at the current stage, space debris remediation has become inevitable. However, countries encounter many obstacles when engaging in space debris remediation. On the legal aspect, national security and sovereignty problems retard the creation of a sound law for space debris remediation. Much of the equipments for active debris removal has dual use purposes, and can be turned directly into a military weapon targeting space assets of another country. Moreover, space debris, which contains military and technical data of its launching country, is considered as a sovereign asset of that country, and no other country is considered responsible for, or trustworthy of removing the debris of another country. Thus, although the United States and China might be able to start considering collaboration if enough mutual trust and history of good cooperation is guaranteed through the cooperation level, it requires both countries to compromise on crucial national

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19 IADC, “Key Definitions of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC),” [http://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=docs](http://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=docs).
interests, such as financial contribution, technological spillover, and giving up partial autonomy or even sovereignty of its own space debris.

Metrics

Points are assigned to the net added benefits or costs for the result generated from collaboration level activities compared to those from cooperation level activities. The national security cost on one country if both collaborate is 4 points, nearly canceling out the benefit of reduced debris generation from one country. For example, the accountability system will significantly constrain countries’ operational behaviors and may add additional costs to countries’ space development. Moreover, agreements and joint activities on sharing database and space debris removal will require countries to disclose private data and operational abilities. The national security cost on one country if the other reneges is 7 points, cancelling all 5 points gained through reducing debris. This is because the information the other country walks away with will reveal many strategic data that will make the country an easy target for its counterpart during conflicts. Since the financial cost of active removal is huge and the country takes on all burdens itself to create benefit for all other countries, the financial cost for one country to remove space debris alone is worth 7 points. However, if both countries work together in space debris removal, the financial cost for each country is reduced to 3.5, for which each country can still benefit 6.5 (10-3.5) for cleaning up the debris. Furthermore, if one country (for example, country A) lacks sufficient capability of removing its own debris and requires assistance from another country (for example, country B), country A would be exposed to national security threat as country B might obtain valuable information when removing country A’s debris. Thus, under the above scenario, the national security cost for country A would be -1 point if country A has sufficient data protection against country B during B’s removal process, while the national security gain for country B would be 1 point. Finally, the additional financial cost for one country to maneuver based on public data, which is less accurate, compared to that if to maneuver based on private operational data is 1 point. Although it only represents 1 point here, considering the actual amount countries can save in the long term, gathering private operational data is still attractive to each country.
Score Card

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefit of reduced debris generation for both countries</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit of reduced debris generation for one country</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security cost on one country if the other reneges (if one country lost 7 points due to compromise on its national security, the other country gained 7 for strategic data)</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential national Security cost on one country if both collaborate</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial cost for active debris removal for one country (if two collaborate)</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial cost for active debris removal for one country</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security cost on country A if country B removed A's debris itself</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial cost for one country to maneuver based on public data (less accurate) compared to operational data (more accurate)</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Points

**Table 3 Collaboration Level Score Allocation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Collaboration (China reneges)</th>
<th>Collaboration (US reneges)</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Track 1 US</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 1 China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 1&amp;1.5 US</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 1&amp;1.5 China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 1.5&amp;2 US</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 1.5&amp;2 China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Points US</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Points China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this analysis, the cooperation level is treated as the new status quo, and each country earns a total score of 0. For Track 1 diplomacy, if the United States chooses to be bound by agreements and implement accountability for itself, while China does not follow, the United States will lose 2 points in total. Although the United States reduced its own debris generation (+5 points), it burdens itself with much higher cost: more costly debris mitigation procedures and less ASAT tests (-7 points). For China, it enjoys the reduction of U.S. debris generation (+5 points), while still having the freedom to use ASAT for strategic purposes and not be financially or legally accountable for the debris it might generate (+7 points), gaining a total of 12 points. The point distribution reverses if only the United States reneges. If both countries collaborate in Space Traffic Management, both will gain 6 points given that 4 points of national security costs need to be subtracted from the 10 points of reduced debris generation. For Track 1 & 1.5 diplomacy, if the United States shares the operational data of its satellites while China does not, the cost benefit structure for the two countries is
similar to that of track 1 diplomacy, with the United States getting -2 points and China 12 points. Moreover, with more accurate data from the United States, China can reduce its maneuver expenditure with smaller and more targeted movements. Thus, China gets 1 more point, while the United States loses 1 point because of the opportunity cost of the extra expenditure spent on less targeted maneuvers. The point distribution reverses if only the United States reneges. Similar to that of Track 1 diplomacy, both countries collaborate in Space Traffic Management, gaining 6 points.

For Track 1.5 & 2 diplomacy, if the United States chooses to share its surveillance data and unilaterally take out space debris using its own funding, it will get 3 points. There are two scenarios: the first scenario is when the United States takes out its own space debris. Since the removal of debris from space reduces the possibility of future collision, thus benefiting both countries, 10 points are assigned for the removal of debris for each country. However, 7 points need to be subtracted because of the huge financial expenditure the removal process generates. Thus, a total points of 3 is gained by the United States, while China gains 10 points for the cleaner space. The second scenario is when the United States cleans up China’s debris. The benefit for each country is still 10 points, but the United States gains 2 more points and China loses 2 more points compared to the first scenario due to the disclosure of sensitive information the debris contains. Thus, the United States gets 5 points, while China gets 5 points. Assume these two scenarios have similar possibility of happening, a weighted total for the United States and China is 4 points and 7.5 points respectively. The point distribution reverses if only the United States reneges. If both countries collaborate in active debris removal and joint surveillance activities, both will get 6.5 points – 10 points for reduced debris hazards and -3.5 points for financial cost.

Matrix

In this game theory matrix, neither country has the incentive to collaborate, because the cost of being betrayed by the other country is too high. This is the classic prisoner’s dilemma, in which both countries will choose to stay with cooperation rather than advancing to collaboration. Although collaboration might generate better results for each country compared with cooperation, neither country has enough trust for the other not to renege. Nevertheless, if the United States and China do enjoy strong mutual trust, collaboration can be a good option for both countries in the long term. Strong mutual trust might derive from positive senior-level relationship, similar strategic positions, increasingly dependent space activities, or even unexpected disasters.
Recommendations

Senior-level Relationships

Senior-level relationships offer the best direction for bilateral activities in all industries, including space. Cooperation in space debris mitigation is first and foremost a symbol of a better U.S. and Chinese relationship, and should be initiated with a top-down approach (government to space agencies). Thus, a senior-level relationship favoring tighter integration and friendly policies is the prerequisite for coordination and cooperation in space debris mitigation, and can be achieved by engaging in consistent foreign policy strategies, ensuring direct and frequent communication at all levels, and committing to greater mutual understanding.

Consistent Foreign Policy

When two countries engage in repetitive interactions, each country will decide its policies for the next round by analyzing the strategies and behaviors employed by its counterpart in the previous rounds. By displaying consistent favorable policies that could be identified by the other, both countries eliminate the worries of the other of being betrayed and can easily lock in a stable cooperation with strong mutual trust. Thus, in order for China and the United States to engage in stable coordination or cooperation in space debris mitigation, foreign policies towards each other must remain consistent throughout the years. However, historically the U.S.-Chinese relationship has fluctuated with the transitions of national leadership, which often hindered the advancement of U.S.-China relationship. For example, in 1971, President Nixon initiated the unexpected ping-pong diplomacy to normalize U.S.-Chinese relations by isolating the Soviet Union from China. This initiative succeeded because then Chinese Vice-Premier, Deng Xiaoping, also saw the value of improving U.S. relations.21 During Reagan’s presidency, China and the U.S. experienced initial tension due to

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Reagan’s pro-Taiwan rhetoric, but later witnessed a better relationship when Reagan softened his stance on Taiwan.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, given this precedence, U.S. and China should focus on developing consistent foreign policies to enhance mutual trust, which help strengthen the relationship.

**Direct and Frequent Communication of All Levels**

The United States and China also need to hold direct and frequent senior-level dialogues to ensure progress is made on the issue of space debris mitigation. In recent years, there has been a decline in direct senior level dialogues, while more dialogues have been held between scholars or foreign ministers who do not directly make policies. Engaging in more direct senior-level communication might be more efficient for the two countries to foster mutual understanding and move forward with policy-making.

Although senior-level decisions offer directions for the U.S. and China in space activities, all levels of communication from government agencies to non-governmental organizations and academic institutions are crucial for setting the stage for a more integrated relationship. Even though the Wolf Amendment and other state regulations set barriers for bilateral cooperation, both U.S. and Chinese entities should seek opportunities to work together in areas that do not involve sensitive information. The recent NanoRacks deal with the Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) was a good example of track 2 cooperation that could lead to positive reactions on both sides. After consulting with the U.S. government and NASA, NanoRacks reached out to BIT for a joint research experiment in which NanoRacks offered to fly BIT’s immune system experiment on its commercial payload to the ISS, and then report the result of the experiment back to BIT. Although this cooperation is by no means a joint activity between NASA and the Chinese government, it symbolizes the initiative both countries took to strive for scientific findings that will benefit the international community as a whole. This cooperation was approved by the U.S. government because it honored the Wolf Amendment: it did not require transferring technology or hardware from the United States to China. The result of the experiment would also be published in leading Western research publications for full disclosure, generating intrinsic scientific value unrelated to either country’s defense system.\textsuperscript{23} Although this single cooperative agreement was viewed by both U.S. and Chinese experts as an exception that would not generate any influence on senior-level policy making, increasing cooperation in scientific research and academic dialogues could gradually create a positive atmosphere between the two countries. This could help foster a favorable relationship that might lead to cooperation in other areas such as space operations and surveillance.


\textsuperscript{23} Keith Cowing, "Commercial Payload From China to Fly on ISS," NASA Watch, August 3, 2015.
Greater Mutual Understanding

Fostering mutual understanding is also crucial to long-term cooperation. China needs to increase transparency in its space operations, while the United States needs to deepen its understanding of the logic behind the language China employs in its foreign relations. Another way to foster mutual understanding is through concession. While China arguably has a right for rapid space development, just as the United States and Russia did decades ago, doing so by generating debris will have severe implications for the space environment. If the United States could help China develop environmentally-friendly technologies to limit debris generation, China could sacrifice its development speed for some environmental protection. Finally, the United States and China should continue working together multilaterally and unite more countries to jointly develop technologies to mitigate space debris. By jointly refining mitigation guidelines and engaging in constant mutual supervision on each other’s space operational behaviors, China and the United States can improve mutual understanding through repetitive coordination.

Conclusion

This research contributes to the ongoing debate over U.S.-China cooperation in space debris mitigation by identifying the optimal cooperative level for the two countries using a theoretical framework designed by the researcher. The study shows that coordination-level activities -- bilateral consultation, selected data sharing, and non-interference -- entail little risk and benefit both countries by limiting the possibility of debris generation on both sides. Cooperation-level activities, which require more resource pulling and information sharing, still provide added value to each country if both are committed to the relationship. However, when moving to the collaboration level, which requires sensitive information sharing and bulk resource investments, both countries are incentivized to renege on the deal because the strategic and military advantages can outweigh the moderate gains from a cleaner space environment. In light of these results, the United States and China should aim for reaching the cooperation level in the field of space debris mitigation by focusing on establishing friendlier senior-level relationships, enhancing all levels of communication and informational sharing, and engaging in more multilateral activities. Concerns and mistrust arising from historical sentiments and current conflicts between China and the United States are still holding each country back from even engaging in coordination level activities. Moreover, space debris, like other environmental issues, generally poses chronic and insidious threats rather than acute ones to a country’s national security, so the issue tends to be ignored until some serious accidents happen. Thus, realizing the urgency of the looming space debris threat and the increasing possibility of space assets collisions will prompt both China and the United States to react early to prevent accidents, which could have huge costs or even paralyze either country’s defense or communication system. Fortunately, China and the United States have already identified their common interest in jointly mitigating space debris, and are moving towards coordination. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that, with increasing governmental and institutional communication, the
two countries will enhance their level of cooperation, but whether or when they will reach cooperation or even collaboration is still unclear.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my faculty advisor, Professor Henry R. Hertzfeld, my graduate mentor, Ekaterina Khvostova, and my undergraduate scholars’ program coordinators Lindsay Kallman and Amy Stearns for their insight, direction, and support. I would also like to thank all the American and Chinese space experts and scholars that I interviewed for their knowledge and wisdom. Last but not least, I would like to thank all the undergraduate scholars and my family for their unconditional support. Without their help, this project would not have been completed.
The seventh edition of the Elliott School *Undergraduate Scholars Journal* continues a valuable tradition of scholarship for a select group of undergraduate sophomores, juniors and seniors. Throughout the 2015-2016 Undergraduate Scholars thesis program, each student set out to question, explore, and discover various parts of the world. Our ultimate goal was to create original research that contributed to greater conversations surrounding international issues in a meaningful, albeit small way. The powerful realization of that goal, presented in these pages, is a testament to the hours poured into framing questions, designing methodologies, traveling for field research, exploring (and often getting lost in) cavernous academic databases, and, finally, presenting research. Perhaps most difficult, the Scholars needed to cut the result of these hundreds of hours into fifteen short journal pages. Looking back, however, the end result was worth every second. As the editors of this journal, we hope you’ll agree.

The Scholars class owes many thanks to those who made this year possible. Despite innate inquisitiveness, no Scholar would have been able to pursue our questions without the help of someone who’d asked many of their own: a faculty advisor. Most of the Scholars would agree that our advisors might better be classified as academic parents; the fear of disappointing them was always enough to keep us on deadlines. But every criticism pushed us closer to a better paper and, more importantly, a lasting connection.

The considerable support and assistance lent by our graduate mentors was also instrumental. These Masters and PhD students willingly gave up time from their own research to show us the ropes. Always approachable as a peer mentor, the graduate students provided support and advice best exchanged between fellow students in the trenches.

Of course, no advising relationships would have been possible without the Elliott School Undergraduate Scholars Program itself and, most importantly, the wonderful people who run it. The Scholars are indebted to Courtney Heath and Lindsay Kallman, who ran the program for the first and second semester, respectively. Courtney helped expand our skill sets, demystify (somewhat) the IRB
process, and fine-tune our direction, always expanding our vision for what the class could be. Lindsay, assisted by Amy Stearns in the second semester, helped us to see this vision through in April’s Research Symposium. Making 80 pages into a ten-minute presentation would have been next to impossible without the help of these two.

Our class owes perhaps the biggest thanks to the Elliott School of International Affairs, which gave us both the financial and faculty resources to do something as ambitious, scary, and rewarding as this during our undergraduate career. This program encapsulates what is terrific about Elliott: opportunities for students to turn the world into their classroom, learning alongside professors who are still in that classroom. It is our great joy that new Elliott School Dean Reuben Brigety intimately understands this and Elliott’s mission to produce capable young leaders as the world evolves. Despite our excitement for a postgraduate adventure, the senior Scholars wouldn’t mind a few more years under Dean Brigety’s leadership.

Finally, to the Scholars class: It has been a privilege to question, to explore, and to discover alongside you. Each Thursday morning brought with it a better understanding of our abundant mistakes and how to embrace these for the sake of improving. The fruit of these rigorous peer review sessions, we hope, is not only confined to this journal, but to what each of us will achieve in the coming years.

We hope you gain as much from this journal as we, the editors, received from putting it together. Expect these diverse works to inform, surprise, and challenge you. And remember that the answers we provide are not the end of the conversation, nor the beginning. They are merely a link between the answered and that which has yet to be questioned, explored, and discovered. Thank you.

Ethan Nava
Donald Gerard Gayou
Anabelle Suitor